


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2 vols.



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Drawn by M^{rs} J. G. Ward.

San Juan de Dios

La S^a Vera Cruz. Iztaccihuatl

Cathedral

MEXICO

Popocatepetl

Artillery Barracks

J. M. D. B. del. sculp.

From the Azotea of the House of H.M.'s Mission, San Cosme.

Published by Henry Wilson, New Burlington Street.

W B Walter

MEXICO.

BY

H. G. WARD, ESQ.

HIS MAJESTY'S CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN THAT COUNTRY
DURING THE YEARS 1825, 1826, AND PART OF 1827.

SECOND EDITION ENLARGED,

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE MINING COMPANIES, AND OF
THE POLITICAL EVENTS IN THAT REPUBLIC,
TO THE PRESENT DAY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
HENRY COLBURN, NEW BURLINGTON STREET.

1829.

MEXICO

H. G. WARD, ESQ.

Just published,

SIX VIEWS

of the great Towns of ZACATECAS, SOMBRERETE, CATORCE,
TLALPUJAHUA, GUADALAJARA, and VALLADOLID, not
included in the present Work. Drawn upon the spot by
MRS. H. G. WARD, and engraved by MR. PYE.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY S. AND R. BENTLEY,
Dorset Street, Fleet Street.

P R E F A C E.

IT is difficult for a person who is desirous to lay before the Public an impartial view of the present state and capabilities of Mexico, to determine exactly at what point to commence his undertaking.

Three years ago, nothing was questioned that could tend to enhance the opinion entertained of its resources. Now, the most cautious assertions are received with a smile, and facts, however well demonstrated, are hardly admitted to be such, if they militate against a preconceived opinion.

This state of things is, perhaps, the natural consequence of the advantage that was taken of the first removal of those barriers, which so long separated the Old World from the New, by men, some of whom were themselves enthusiasts, while many had no better object than to turn the enthusiasm of others to account.

Both, unfortunately, concurred in exciting the imagination of the ignorant by pictures of a state of things, that could have no foundation in nature, or truth.

Viewed through the medium of delusive hope, Spanish America presented nothing but prospects of unalloyed advantage. Great, and instantaneous, success was to attend every enterprise there, without the employment of those means, upon which the experience of the world has, hitherto, proved success to depend. Time, industry, perseverance, a knowledge of the scene upon which operations were to commence—of the men by whom they were to be conducted,—of the language and peculiarities of the country, in which they were to be carried on; all these were stated to be considerations of minor importance; capital alone was represented as wanting; and facts, important in themselves, were so warped and distorted, in order to favour this theory, that when its fallacy was demonstrated, the facts fell to the ground with the superstructure which had been raised upon them.

Unexampled credulity amongst the disappointed, was succeeded by obstinate unbelief. Transatlantic States, and adventures, were involved in one indiscriminate condemnation; and, even at the present day, enterprises of the greatest public utility are stigmatised as bubbles, because, during a period of unbridled spe-

culation, bubbles may have been recommended by a similarity of form to the notice of the Public.

It is possible that, on a closer examination of the subject, we may find that the expectations of 1824, and the despondency of 1828, originate in the same cause,—namely, a want of proper data for the regulation of our opinions; and it is the hope of being able to supply these data, with regard to one very interesting portion of the former dominions of Spain, that has induced me to undertake my present task.

If I have exceeded, in the execution of it, those bounds, within which works of an ephemeral nature, (and such all accounts of a new, and rising, country must be,) are usually confined, I must allege, as my excuse, the impossibility of assuming, amongst the generality of my readers, an acquaintance with any part of my subject, without rendering unintelligible what I have to communicate with regard to the rest.

So little attention has been, hitherto, paid to American affairs, that I generally find the vast territories now distributed amongst the New States, classed as provinces, or counties, belonging to one kingdom, and not as empires occupying half a world. I have been asked repeatedly, since my return to England, whether Captain Head's description of the Pampas is correct, although Mexico is nineteen degrees North, and

Buenos Ayres thirty-four degrees South, of the Line ; while men well read, and well informed upon every other subject, have expressed surprise, that, after a residence of three years in the Capital of New Spain, I should not be intimately acquainted with the state of parties in Lima and Santiago, Bolivia and Bögötā.

Under these circumstance, I have conceived that it ought to be my object to combine as much information as possible in my present work, and thus to render it independent of those which have preceded it, by entering into details, a knowledge of which could not have been derived from other sources, without a perpetual, and harassing, reference to authorities, many of which are not within the reach of the public in general.

For instance, in addition to the *Essai Politique* of Baron Humboldt, to which I have expressed my obligations in another place, I have drawn largely from the *Español* ; whose eloquent author, Mr. Blanco White, has embodied not only the most curious collection of State-papers now extant, with regard to the period, at which the tendency towards Independence first began to appear in the Spanish Colonies, but a mass of reflections upon American affairs, so moderate, so judicious, and so admirably adapted to the circumstances of the times, that, had his counsels been

listened to by the contending parties, no small portion of the calamities which have since befallen them might have been averted.

I have likewise made free use, in my sketch of the Revolution, of the Cuadro Historico of Don Carlos Bustamante, as well as of Robinson, Brackenbridge, and a number of other works published in the United States, and but little read in England, from each of which I have taken whatever my own observations pointed out as correct.

The whole will, I think, be found to indicate with sufficient clearness the causes of the American Revolution; and these, again, are the best guarantee for its stability.

The subject is one of deep, and universal, interest, for it is upon the duration of the new order of things that the prospects of the rising States depend. The Revolution has affected not only their political, but their commercial, relations with the rest of the world; its influence has extended to their agriculture, and mines, to both of which, after threatening them with total annihilation, it has given a fresh impulse, and opened a new, and more extensive, field. But liberty can alone repair the evils, which the struggle for liberty has caused; and to ascertain the probability of its

permanency is, consequently, a first step towards the consideration of its effects.

I have endeavoured to trace their operation in Mexico upon each branch of the great interests of the State, but more particularly upon the Mines ; the importance of which, both to New Spain and to Europe, it has been one of my principal objects to develope.

As my views upon this subject differ materially from those generally entertained, I think it right to state, most distinctly, and unreservedly, that the situation, which I had the honour of filling in Mexico, rendered it impossible for me to take any other interest in the issue of the enterprises, by which I was surrounded, than that which I could not but feel in operations, in which British capital to so large an amount is invested.

I never have possessed a single Mining share ; yet, from circumstances stated in the body of my work, I have, perhaps, seen more of the mines of New Spain, and am in possession of more data, with regard to their former produce, than the majority of those, whose fortunes depend upon the result of the present attempt to work them by foreign capital.

With regard to my opinion of their present prospects, the public is now in possession of the data upon which it is formed, and may rectify any errors into

which I may inadvertently have been betrayed.* Convinced that publicity ought to be desired by all the Mining Companies, as the only security against those suspicions, by which their credit has been so frequently shaken, I have laid before the world, without reserve, the whole of the information now in my possession respecting them, together with my own observations upon the mode, in which their affairs have been directed. The result will, I trust, be to produce an impression that these great undertakings have been, in many instances ably, in all honestly, conducted ; that if errors have been committed, they are errors which it was extremely difficult to avoid ; and that although the investments are large, the magnitude of the object, (demonstrated by records of a very recent date,) bears a fair proportion to the magnitude of the stake.

* Amongst these errors I should mention that, in the First Section of the Fourth Book, I may be thought to have challenged a principle of political economy, by alleging an increase in the rate of interest in Mexico as a proof of the diminution of the circulating medium ; whereas it might be an indication only of the possibility of employing capital to greater advantage. The fact, however, is correct ; for the chasm in the circulation, created by the remittance of the property of the Old Spaniards to Europe, was not filled up by the investments of foreigners, or by the produce of the mines ; the two together not having furnished any thing like an equivalent for the amount of the specie withdrawn.

It now only remains for me to add, that the Map annexed to the First Volume, though compiled from very incorrect data, (there being few even of the principal places in New Spain, the latitude and longitude of which have, as yet, been exactly fixed,) will be found to be of use in many essential points.

It gives the new territorial division of the country into States, with the names of the "Partidos," or districts into which those States are divided; and it likewise rectifies many local errors, both in the Central, and Northern, Provinces; Colonel Bourn, a gentleman recently returned from Sonora and Cinaloa, having been so obliging as to furnish me with a great deal of valuable statistical information respecting those States.

In the Map of Routes, attached to the Second Volume, I have to express my obligations to Mr. Beaufoy, for the assistance, which he has afforded me, by furnishing me with a copy of his routes, in the vicinity of the Capital, and from thence to Tampico, and Veracruz. With the exception of the expedition to the South of Valladolid, we both passed over the same ground; but it will be seen, that in my journey North, where I had nothing but my own remarks to guide me, I have been unable to enter into as many details

as in my visits to the Central districts of Tlalpujahua, Temascaltepec, and Real del Monte, where I had the benefit of Mr. Beaufoy's observations in addition to my own.

The distances are estimated, in general, by the reputed number of leagues, and time, combined.

The rivers are merely laid down where they intersect the road, the course of most being little known.

The mountains are traced in a similar manner, nor is it attempted to connect the two great branches of the Sierra Madre, by filling up the intervening space, although their direction may be easily perceived.

The heights are taken from Humboldt, wherever he has given them, with the toises reduced to English feet; to which are added those of Real del Monte, the Doctor, Catorce, Zacatecas, and Bolaños, as measured by General Wavel, Captain Wild, Mr. Glennie, and Dr. Coulter.

The drawings were all taken upon the spot; many of them under circumstances, which would have discouraged most persons from making the attempt, as fatigue, and a burning sun, often combined to render it unpleasant. I mention this in justice to Mrs. Ward, whose name, in conformity to custom, appears upon

the plates, for all of which I am indebted to her pencil.

With regard to the general tone of my work, which will be found to differ materially from that adopted in some recent publications, I shall make no apology for this want of coincidence between my views and those of my predecessors. I have met with much kindness in Mexico, and should be sorry to think that this kindness emanated entirely from my public situation, which was an advantage only in as far as it brought me into more general, and immediate, contact with the natives. Upon this my opinions of their character are founded. To write either a satire upon human nature in general, or a criticism upon those peculiarities of manner, in which foreigners differ from ourselves, was not my object. The first I might have accomplished without leaving home ; and had my happiness depended upon the second, I should have been a very miserable man during fourteen years of my life, nearly the whole of which I have passed abroad. I confess, therefore, that it has been my pleasure to dwell rather upon the good, than the bad, and to separate the valuable parts of the national character from the scum, and dross, which a long period of misrule, followed by the total dissolution of all social ties,

could hardly fail to bring to the surface. If I have succeeded in this attempt, my reward will consist in the gratification of thinking that the labours of the last six months may have some tendency to confirm that good understanding between Great Britain and Mexico, which, during the two preceding years, it was my anxious wish to promote.



P R E F A C E

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN submitting to the Public a Second Edition of Mexico, I have to express my gratitude for the favourable reception given to a work, which had little to recommend it beyond the information, which it might be thought to convey.

The facts to be recorded were too numerous to leave room for those lighter details, the want of which has been frequently complained of; and, although subsequent events have tended to deprive those facts of much of the importance, which I was inclined to attach to them,—although the country has been torn by intestine divisions, and its career of improvement checked by the implacability of party spirit,—yet I cannot regret having traced the history of its ephemeral prosperity, for I am still convinced that the past is the best criterion for the future, and that, under a moderately good government, what has been, may, must, and will, again be.

I shall, however, I doubt not, be accused of having misled my readers by not preparing them for events, which the tenor of my work gave them no immediate reason to expect.

It would be a poor justification to say, that I foresaw much, which it was not possible for me to predict : I rather choose to admit that I did *not* foresee the excesses, which political animosity has since engendered ; and, that although I was aware that there existed in Mexico a number of ambitious men, willing to hazard every thing in order to obtain political power, I did not foresee that, by a chain of untoward events, the better portion of the community would be so disunited, intimidated, and overawed, as to become passive spectators of the execution of their projects.

To investigate the causes of the late changes, would be a task as unpleasing, as it would be fruitless ;—and, although sufficiently provided with materials, (from the communications which I have naturally kept up with many natives of a country, in which I passed not the least interesting period of my life,) I prefer confining myself to a plain narration of what has taken place, which will be found in the Additional Chapter annexed to the present edition.

With the exception of this Chapter, (which likewise contains whatever information I have been enabled to collect respecting the mines,) and a few unimportant verbal alterations, the work remains exactly as it was ; for I have thought it better to lay the whole of my new matter before my readers in a compact shape,

than to disperse it throughout the different books by introducing notes, to which it might have been difficult to refer, or altering the text, where the opinions expressed a year ago seemed likely not to be realized.

At page 193, Vol. ii. I have inserted a note, which, I hope, will fully satisfy a gentleman,* whose feelings I inadvertently wounded by the manner in which his name was alluded to in my first edition. I attributed to him a failure, for which he was not justly responsible, and I am happy to have it in my power in some measure to repair my error by acknowledging the mistake.

I have learnt with much regret, that I have been thought by some friends of Mr. Mackenzie, not to have done justice to the assistance which I derived from his Report on the Veracruz Trade, in my Section on the Commerce of New Spain.

I am the more sorry for this, because there are few persons to whom I have been so much indebted as to Mr. Mackenzie, whose acute and laborious researches embraced not only the period of his residence at Veracruz, but the general state of the trade of that port for twenty-five years before his arrival.

I never meant, therefore, to confine my acknowledgments to the years 1823, and 1824, although such appears to have been the interpretation given to my note.

It now only remains for me to add, that as I have

* Mr. Lucas, director of the Smelting Establishment at Guanaxuato.

no longer access to those sources, from which I formerly derived my information, the additions made in the present edition must be regarded as proceeding entirely from such public documents, as are within the reach of all, who feel a sufficient interest in Mexico to devote a little time to their perusal, or from the private communications of friends, some of whom are too deeply interested in the state of affairs to be very impartial judges of measures, or of men.

The difference between an opinion thus formed, and one resting upon official communications, collected with care, and rectified by personal observation, I need not point out; and if I was accused before of knowing too much to write with freedom, I fear that it may now be said that I know too little to write with success.

I have endeavoured, however, to supply the want of former advantages by a diligent use of the materials within my reach; while, in relating what has past, I certainly feel less scruple in speaking as I think, from knowing that my opinion is merely the opinion of a distant observer, and not that of a man, to whose views the situation which he had the honour of holding might give a distinct, and almost undue, weight.

I shall annex a translation of a few of the principal documents referred to, in order to enable my readers to make their own comments upon the views of the parties, whose collision has proved so fatal to New Spain; and to judge, at the same time, of the degree of stability, which the new government may be expected to attain. Until this point be decided, there is no hope

of farther progress, for even the improvements already effected must be held by a very precarious tenure. Under such circumstances to talk of the future prospects of the country would be useless ; and I shall, consequently, not apologize for the absence of all calculations upon a subject involved, at present, in obscurity, and doubt.

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MEXICO.

BOOK THE FIRST.



MEXICO.

BOOK I.

SECTION I.

BOUNDARIES.—GEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE.—CLIMATE.

THE Republic of Mexico, which comprises the whole of the vast territory formerly subject to the Vice-royalty of New Spain, is bounded to the East and South-east by the Gulph of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea ; to the West by the Pacific ; to the South by Guățēmălă, which occupies a part of the Isthmus of Darien ; and to the North by the United States.

The exact line which separates the provinces of Las Chī-āpă and Tăbăscō from the territory of Guățēmălă has not yet been fixed, but is at present the subject of amicable discussion between the two governments. To the North, the frontier is defined, with sufficient exactness, by the treaty of Washington,* the validity of which, since the declaration of Independence, has been tacitly acknowledged both by Mexico and the United States.

* This treaty was signed on the 22d February, 1819, by Mr. Adams and the Chevalier Onis, then Spanish Minister at Washington.

According to the third article of this treaty, the boundary line between Mexico and Louisiana (then ceded by Spain to the United States) commences with the River Săbîna, which runs into the Gulph of Mexico, about Lat. 29, West Long. 94, and follows its course as far as its junction with the Red River of Natchitoches, which then serves to mark the frontier up to the 100th degree of West longitude, where the line runs directly North to the River Arkansas, which it follows to its source, in the 42d degree of North latitude, from whence another direct line is drawn, (immediately upon the forty-second parallel,) to the coast of the Pacific; thus dividing between the two rival republics the whole Northern continent of America, with the exception of the British Colonies.

A reference to the accompanying map will explain this seemingly complicated arrangement, which, at present, is of but little importance except with regard to the Eastern coast; as between the frontier established, and the last settlements of the Americans and Mexicans to the North and West, a vast space intervenes, tenanted only by Indian tribes, who have never yet been subdued, and over whom neither of the two governments possesses the slightest authority. With the exception of a narrow belt of Missions in New California, on the Western coast, which terminates with the port of San Francisco, in Lat. 36, and the isolated province of New Mexico, the capital of which (Santa Fé) is situated in the same parallel as San Francisco, the whole country contained between 28° and 42° of North latitude, is unappropriated by any white population, and almost unknown; and centuries must elapse before the civilization of America can increase sufficiently to give it any value. It will, probably, be one of the last strong holds of man in a semibarbarous state; for it is in this direction that the Indians, who have been driven from the valley of the Mississippi by the rapid emigrations,

which have taken place, during the last twenty years, from the old Atlantic Anglo-American states, are now retiring.*

On the North-eastern frontier the case is different, for there the rich and beautiful province of Texas might prove a source of contention, did not the two governments wisely determine to remove all motives of difference, by abiding by that arrangement, to which (directly or indirectly) each has already given its consent.

It will be perceived, by this sketch of the Mexican territory, that, at the two most distant points of S.S.E. and N.N.W. (the southern extremity of Yūcātān, and the boundary line, where it runs into the Pacific,) it extends over twenty-seven degrees of latitude, or $1876\frac{1}{2}$ English statute miles. Its greatest breadth is in the parallel of 30 N. lat. where, from the Red River (Rio Colorado) of Texas, to the coast of Sönōrā, Humboldt gives the distance at 364 leagues, of twenty-five to the degree.

Nothing can be more imperfect as yet, than our acquaintance with this vast country. Few even of the principal towns and rivers are correctly laid down, and consequently not even the elements of a good map exist. Humboldt has done much towards correcting the errors which prevailed before his time, but his personal observations were confined to a comparatively small circle, and upon those of others he could not rely. A little time, however, will now add considerably to our stock of information; for amongst the foreigners who are at present exploring the Mexican territory, there are some scientific men, who employ their leisure hours

* Should any of my readers wish for information respecting the mode in which these Western settlements have been conducted, and the extraordinary manner in which they have thriven, I can refer them to Flint's "*Journal of a Ten Years' Residence in the Valley of the Mississippi*;" which, although written in a most uncouth style, is both an interesting and instructive work.

in taking observations, and tracing their route through the various parts of the country, which their avocations oblige them to visit.*

The result of their inquiries, when combined with the statistical information which the governments of the different States are labouring to collect, and the military surveys of the *Estado Mayor*, will be extremely valuable; and many years will, probably, not elapse, before the interior of Mexico will be as well known as that of most countries in the Old World.

The territory of Mexico presents, according to Humboldt, a surface of 118,478 square leagues, of twenty-five to the degree; but this estimate does not include the space between the Northern extremity of New Mexico and Sönörä, and the boundary line, as fixed more recently by the treaty of Washington, the extent of which is not yet well ascertained. Thirty-six thousand five hundred square leagues, comprising the states of Zácātēcās, Guădălajără, Guănăjūātō, Văllădölīd, Mēxicō, La Pūēblă, Věrăcrūz, Ōăxăcă, and Mērīdă, are within the Tropics, or, what is usually denominated, the torrid zone; while New Mexico, Dŭrăngō, New and Old California, Sönöră, and a great part of the old Intendancy of San Luis Pōtōsī, containing, in all, 82,000 square leagues, are without the Tropics, or under the temperate zone. The whole extent of the Republic is equal to one-fourth of Europe, or to France, Austria, Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain, put together; and the difference of latitude alone, on so enormous a surface, would naturally have the effect of

* I allude particularly to Captain Vetch, Director of the Real del Monte Company, and Mr. Glennie, one of the Commissioners of the United Mexican Association, both of whom have been indefatigable in their researches. Captain Vetch has nearly completed a very valuable map of the interior of the country; and Mr. Glennie possesses a series of observations, taken by himself, which extend from Ōăxăcă, (100 leagues to the S.W. of Mexico,) to Chihŭāhuā and Guăymăs, a port situated in the centre of the Gulph of California.

causing considerable changes in the temperature of the more distant points.

It is not, however, to this circumstance, so much as to the peculiarity of its geological structure, that Mexico owes that singular variety of climate, by which it is distinguished from most other countries of the world.

To this I must call the particular attention of my readers, as, without a right understanding of its causes, a great part of the present sketch would prove unintelligible.

The Cordillera of the Andes, after traversing the whole of South America and the Isthmus of Pănămă, separates into two branches on entering the Northern continent, which, diverging to the East and West, but still preserving their direction towards the North, leave in the centre an immense platform, or Table-land, intersected by the higher points and ridges of the great mountain chain by which it is supported, but raised, in the more central parts, to the enormous height of seven thousand feet above the level of the sea.

This elevation it loses, in part, on its approach to the North, by the gradual disappearance of the Eastern branch of the Andes, which sinks nearly to a level with the ocean, about the 26th parallel of North latitude, as if to make way for those mighty rivers by which Tēxăă, Louisiana, and the Flōrīdăă are watered: but to the West, the Cordillera continues in an almost uninterrupted line, through Dŭrăngŭ and Sŏnŏră, towards the frontiers of the United States, where it splits into various ramifications, until its course is lost in the unknown regions of the North.

Upon the whole of this Table-land, the effect of geographical position is neutralized by the extreme rarification of the air; while upon the Eastern and Western declivities it resumes its natural influence as it approaches the level of the sea, until the strip or belt of flat country, which extends from the base of the Cordillera to the ocean, is subject to the same degree of heat as that which prevails in the East or

West Indies, or any other country similarly exposed to the rays of a tropical sun.

Thus Mēxīcō, Guāñajuātō, Zācātēcās, and the other great towns upon the central plateau, enjoy a temperature entirely different from that of Vērăcrŭz, Tămpīcō, Ācăpŭlcō, and Săn Blăs, which are situated nearly in the same parallels on the Eastern and Western coasts; while the intervening space is filled up with almost every possible modification of heat.

On the ascent from Vērăcrŭz, climates (to use Humboldt's expression) succeed each other in *layers*, (*se suivent par couches*;) and the traveller passes in review, in the course of two days, the whole scale of vegetation.

The parasitic plants of the Tropics are exchanged at a very early period for the evergreen oak, and the deadly atmosphere of Vērăcrŭz, for the sweet, mild air of Jălăpă: a little farther, the oak gives place to the fir; the air becomes more piercing; the sun, though it scorches, has no longer the same deleterious effect upon the human frame; and nature assumes a new and peculiar aspect. With a cloudless sky, and a brilliantly pure atmosphere, there is a great want of moisture, and little luxuriance of vegetation: vast plains follow each other in endless succession, each separated from the rest by a little ridge of hills, which intersect the country at regular intervals, and appear to have formed, at some distant period, the basins of an immense chain of lakes. Such, with some slight variations, is the character of the Table-land from Mexico to Chīhŭāhuă. Wherever there is water, there is fertility; but the rivers are few, and insignificant, in comparison with the majestic streams of the United States; and, in the intervals, the sun parches, in lieu of enriching the soil. High and barren plains occupy but too large a portion of the centre of the country, between Zăcătēcăs, Dŭrăngō, and Săltillō; nor does nature recover her wonted vigour, until the streams, which gradually filter from the Cordillera, are sufficiently

formed to dispense moisture on their passage to the ocean. As the Eastern branch of the Cordillera disappears, or rather recedes towards the West, the space fertilized by these streams becomes more extensive; until in Texas, a country low, but well wooded, and rich in beautiful rivers, takes the place of the dreary *steppes* of the interior.

The Rio Grande de Săntiăgă, which traverses the Băxîă, and empties itself into the Pacific near San Blas, and the Rio Bravo del Norte, which enters the Gulph of Mexico in 26 North lat., are the two principal rivers of the Table-land: the last, indeed, hardly merits that title, as it pursues its course over a part of the country where the Eastern Cordillera is lost;* but the first rises in the very centre of Mexico, and the district through which it passes is amongst the richest of the known world.

Humboldt gives 25 degrees of the centigrade thermometer, (or 76 of Fahrenheit,) as the mean heat of the coast, and 17° centigrade (64 Fahrenheit) as that of the Table-land. But, in a country so extensive as Mexico, any general theory upon this subject must be liable to great exceptions. A situation, so sheltered as to give additional force to the reflected rays of the sun, or too much exposed to the winds of the Northwest, which sweep the country, at times, with incredible violence; a nearer approach to the Pacific side, (where the air is perceptibly milder;) the want, or abundance, of water; all these are circumstances which affect the temperature in the most opposite manner, even at the same height, and in the same parallel; and thus render it impossible, by the standard of elevation alone, to form any exact idea of the climate of the Table-land. Humboldt mentions the valley of Rio Verde, where sugar is raised with success at near four thousand feet above the degree of elevation which previous experiments had induced him to fix, as productive of the *minimum* of heat

* It rises at the foot of the mountains of Sierra Verde, and traverses a space of 512 leagues before it reaches the Gulph.

requisite for its cultivation ; and I have myself seen a little spot, in the vicinity of Guădălăjără, which presents a similar phenomenon.* In addition to these local peculiarities, which occur without there being any sensible difference in point of elevation to occasion them, every little break or descent in the surface of the Table-land, leads as naturally to an increase of heat, as the ascent from the coast does to a diminution of it. The transition is sometimes extremely sudden, for a deep ravine, or Căñădă, is sufficient to occasion it. Thus, in the Căñădă of Qŭerētărö, and in the famous Barranca of Rēglă, at Real del Monte, both of which are situated in the centre of the Table-land, and nearly upon the same level as the Capital, a few hundred yards change the face of nature entirely. The luxuriancy of Tropical vegetation replaces the stunted growth peculiar to the central plateau ; the birds assume a more variegated plumage ; the inhabitants a more relaxed and indolent expression ; and the whole scene the characteristics of another world.

The same effects are produced wherever the same causes occur ; and as, on a mountain chain, the inequalities of the surface are naturally very great, it is hardly possible to proceed to any distance, either to the East, or to the West of the Capital, without experiencing these transitions, which sometimes are met with repeatedly in the course of a single day. The natives, without inquiring into their origin, express the fact, by designating these hot, low ravines, as *Tierra caliente* ; a term which always signifies a portion of the country, in which (from whatever causes) there is a sufficiency of heat to produce the fruits, and with the fruits, the diseases of the Tropics. *Tierra fria* (the cold country) is applied to the mountainous districts which rise above the level of the Capital, up to the limits of eternal snow ; while *Tierra templada* (the temperate region) embraces, in its most

* The village of Zăpötlănějö ; for an account of which, *vide* Personal Narrative, Book VI.

general acceptation, all that is not included under one of the other two divisions. By many, however, it is thought to apply more particularly to a climate such as that of Jălăpă and Chîlpănzîngö, (on the Eastern and Western ascent from the coast,) both of which are very much below the level of the Table-land: and I have myself found, that whenever applied by the inhabitant of any one place to the temperature of any other, it denoted an increase, and not a diminution, of heat. Thus, Jălăpă would certainly be called *Tierra templada*, by a native of Mexico, although Mexico might not, perhaps, be so termed by a native of Jalapa; while both would be designated in the same way by an inhabitant of *Tierra fria*, to whose district nature has assigned a degree of warmth much inferior to that of either of the other two.

Notwithstanding the arbitrary manner in which these terms are used, I shall frequently employ them in the course of this work; for, until a barometrical survey of the whole country has been executed, and the relative height of the principal points fixed, it would require a tedious explanation to give the ideas which the words *Tierra caliente*, and *Tierra templada*, are sure to convey. In order to illustrate still farther the peculiar character of the country, of which I fear that no words can furnish an adequate idea, I subjoin a sketch of Mexico, which, supposing it a bird's-eye-view, without any pretensions to geographical accuracy, may serve to show the relative position of the *Tierra caliente* and the Table-land, and to explain the variety of climate in the intermediate space.

The former division of New Spain into what was denominated the "Kingdom of Mexico," and the Eastern and Western Internal provinces, was never very distinct, and is now of little importance; as the Republic is distributed, under the present system, into States, of which the Federal government is composed. These States are nineteen in number, and commence to the South, with the Peninsula of Yû

cătân (or Mēridă) to the East; and Tăbăscō, Las Chiăpăs, and Ōăxăcă, to the South and West. These are followed in regular succession towards the North by Věracrūz, Tămăulipăs, San Luis Pōtōsī, New Lēōn, Cōhăhūilă and Tēxăs, which comprise the whole territory to the frontiers of the United States on the Gulph side: La Pūēblă, Mēxicō, Vălădōlid, Gūadălăjără, Sōnōră, and Cīnăloă, the Western extremities of which border on the Pacific; and Qŭerētărō, Gŭanăjŭatō, Zăcătēcăs, Dŭrāngō, Chīhŭāhuă, and New Mexico, which occupy the centre of the country, and extend, between the two oceans, towards the Northern frontier. Beyond these again, are Old and New California, (which in some maps is called New Albion,) and the Indian territory, the extent and inhabitants of which are almost equally unknown. The two Californias and New Mexico are not yet admitted to the rank of independent States, their population not entitling them to be represented in the Congress. Each of the others returns a quota of deputies, in proportion to the number of its inhabitants.

As it is the general character of the country, and not that of particular States, that forms the subject under consideration in the present chapter, I shall reserve for another part of my work the statistical details which I collected during my visit to the Interior, and proceed to point out here a few of the circumstances, by which the fate of Mexico, as a country, is most likely to be influenced.

Nature has bestowed upon her a soil teeming with fertility, and a climate, under which almost every production of the Old and the New World finds the exact degree of heat necessary in order to bring it to perfection. But the peculiarity of structure, in which this variety of climate originates, neutralizes, in some measure, the advantages which the country might otherwise derive from it, by rendering the communication between the Table-land and the Coast extremely difficult, and confining, within very narrow limits,

the intercourse of the States in the Interior with each other. On the Table-land there are no canals, (with the exception of that from Chalco to Mexico, about seven leagues in extent,) and no navigable rivers; nor does the nature of the roads allow of a general use of wheel-carriages; every thing is therefore conveyed on mules from one point to another, and this mode of carriage, when applied to the more bulky agricultural produce of the country, increases, enormously, the price of the articles of most general consumption, before they can reach the principal markets. Thus, in the Capital, which draws its supplies from a circle of perhaps sixty leagues, comprising the valley of Mexico, and the fertile plains of Tōlucă, as well as the great corn lands of the Băxīō and La Pūēblă, wheat, barley, straw, maize, and wood, are not only dear, but the supply is uncertain;* while in the districts immediately beyond this circle, but which, from their distance, are excluded from the market, the same articles are a mere drug, and may be purchased at a fraction of the price.

The same effect is produced in the vicinity of each of the great towns of the Interior, and more particularly of the mining districts, where, from the number of animals employed, the demand is very great. But for the mass of the produce of the country there is no home-market, and therefore no encouragement for industry, beyond the production of the mere necessities of life.

On the Table-land, there is no doubt that this disadvantage may, to a certain extent, be removed, and distant points be brought more into contact, by the establishment of lines of road, traversing the country from North to South, or even of canals, as soon as the civilization and population of the Republic are sufficiently advanced for the attempt. The nature

* Wheat sells for fourteen and sixteen dollars the Carga (300 lbs.); barley for four or five dollars, according to the season; charcoal for one dollar, and, in the rainy season, for one and a-half dollar per arroba (of 25 lbs.)

of the ground would rather favour than oppose the project ; but to the East, and West, the obstacles to be overcome are very serious. On the Eastern side, particularly, the descent from the Table-land is so precipitous, that it appears to me very questionable whether it be possible to construct a road sufficiently good to open a communication with the Coast to the landowners of the Table-land ; I mean, *such* a communication as would enable them to bring their produce into the West Indian, or even the European market, at the same price as the flour from the United States. It is true, that from the extraordinary ratio of increase, and the lowness of wages in Mexico, a greater expense in conveyance might be borne ; but as the Americans are already in possession of the market, that expense must be so far reduced, as to lower the price of Mexican wheat, in the first instance, to something *below* that, at which it can be offered by the farmers of Kentucky, and the Anglo-American Western States.

To ascertain, and accomplish this, (if practicable,) should be the great object of the Mexican government, as nothing could have so immediate an effect upon the general interests of the country. The vessels by which Mexico is now supplied with European manufactures, return in ballast, or obtain, with difficulty, a cargo of Campeche wood, or coffee ; in default of which, remittances are made in specie alone. Roads, if constructed with success, as Baron Humboldt, and many other scientific men, are of opinion that they may be, would give quite a different character to trade, by furnishing a mass of raw produce for exportation, which would, at once, increase the consumption of the country, (by giving a value to property, which has now, comparatively, none,) and the advantages of the foreign merchant, by enabling him to invest his profits immediately in a second venture. Towards this, as yet, nothing has been done. The proposals made by foreign houses of respectability, in 1825, for the establishment of a line of roads between Vera Cruz and

the Capital, were not taken advantage of, because the government conceived that the mania for foreign investments in England would last for ever; and when, in 1826, it perceived its error, no foreign capitalist would advance a shilling towards the attempt. With the exception, therefore, of some temporary improvements, made by the Real del Monte Company for the conveyance of its steam-engines, the principal communication with the coast is now in the same state as in 1815, when the great stone-causeway, built by the merchants of Vera Cruz in 1803, was destroyed by the Insurgents, in order to cut off the intercourse between the Peninsula, and the Spanish Authorities, and merchants, in the Capital. When this is thoroughly repaired, and continued across the Table-land into the vicinity of the corn lands of La Puebla, it may be expected to produce a great change in the agricultural prosperity of the country, if the opinions of those, who think it possible to bring Mexican flour into the Havanna market, at a lower price than that of the United States, prove to be correct. I am myself inclined to question the probability of Mexico ever finding a source of wealth in the exportation of her *Cerealia*, or, as it would be termed in the United States, her *bread stuffs*; and this, not from any deficiency in the power of producing, to almost any extent, but from the want of a market for the produce when raised. The consumption of the West Indian Islands is extremely limited, and most European nations have been endeavouring, for some years, to render themselves independent of external supplies, by growing a sufficiency of corn for home consumption. The effects which have been produced already by this system upon the United States, prove how little reliance Mexico can place upon the foreign market. The exports of *bread stuffs* from the United States, amounted, in 1817, to 20,388,000 dollars; in 1821, to 5,296,000, (*vide* Mellish's United States;) and the consequence of this sudden falling off would have been inevitable

ruin to the grain-growing states, had they not, instantly, turned to manufactures the capital, and the population, which agriculture had before employed. But the necessity for doing this, in a country where internal navigation afforded to the landowner every facility for disposing of his produce, holds out but little encouragement to the proprietors of a country, where no such facilities exist, to attempt to bring into the market produce of a similar description, however well adapted the nature of the soil may be for its growth.

I do not, therefore, conceive that the exportations of Mexico in corn will ever be very considerable; but in those articles, which we term Colonial produce, for which there is a constant demand in Europe, and which a large portion of her territory is so admirably qualified to produce, she has a source of wealth as inexhaustible as her mines themselves. The whole Eastern coast of Mexico, extending, in length, from the River Guăşăcũălcõ to the Northern frontier, and, in breadth, from the ocean, to that point upon the slope of the Cordillera, at which Tropical fruits cease to thrive, is susceptible of the very highest cultivation; nor can any part of the now exhausted islands sustain a competition with the fertility of its virgin soil.

The state of Vera Cruz alone is capable of supplying all Europe with sugar. Humboldt estimates the produce of its richest mould at 2800 *kilogrammes* per *hectare*, while that of Cuba does not exceed 1400 *kilogrammes*; so that the balance is as two to one in favour of Vera Cruz.

Coffee is produced in a ratio almost equally extraordinary. Indigo and tobacco succeed as well; while, a little to the North, the state of Texas, which enjoys nearly the same climate as Louisiana, or South Carolina, is equally well adapted to the growth of cotton, the great staple of the United States. Mexico can never want a market for these more precious articles, to which the attention of the landowners is now much

turned. Immense coffee plantations have been made, during the last four years, in the vicinity of Córdova and Orizávia; cotton has been planted, to a considerable extent, by the American colonists in Texas; and the re-establishment of crushing-mills for the cane, which now grows almost spontaneously throughout Vera Cruz, will be one of the first effects of the recovery of the country from that state of absolute stagnation, into which every thing has been thrown, during the last fifteen years, by the civil war.

The prospect of so abundant a supply of many of those articles, which have, hitherto, been regarded as the *luxuries* of life, is interesting to Europe, and to Great Britain in particular. There can be no doubt, that the opening of the American continent will have the effect of rendering almost universal the use of many things, which have long been confined to the privileged few; while the more general consumption of these very articles in the Old World, will lead to a more general use of European manufactures in the New, among people, who have, hitherto, been excluded from the benefits of civilization.

No better proof of this can be given, than the change which I have myself witnessed, in the course of three years, in the habits and appearance of the lower classes in Mexico. Before the Revolution, the streets of the capital were infested with a race of naked *lazzaroni*, whose numbers were supposed to amount to nearly twenty thousand, and who were, at once, the disgrace, and the bane, of all public places. This class has now almost totally disappeared; clothing has become so common, that none appear without it. In the mining districts, a similar change has occurred; and as the resources of the country develop themselves, there is little doubt that it will gradually spread into the most remote provinces.

Mexico cannot, during the present century, be a manufacturing country, and, probably, will not attempt it. Her mines, and her agriculture, will enable her, with only common

industry, to enjoy all the advantages of Transatlantic arts, and to bring to her own door the luxuries of the highest civilization. With the necessities of life she is abundantly provided within herself, as will be seen by the following sections, which will contain a general account of her population and productions.

A great maritime power she likewise cannot be, for her ports, on the Atlantic side, are barely sufficient for the purposes of commerce, and were, certainly, never intended by nature for naval depôts. Most of them are insecure, and some, mere roadsteads. The entrance to her principal rivers is obstructed by sand bars; and though art may, in some measure, correct these deficiencies, yet it cannot give what nature has denied, a harbour of sufficient magnitude to become a fit station for any considerable maritime force. Fortunately, this is not in any way essential to the prosperity of the country, as the vicinity of the United States, and the multitude of European vessels which seek the ports of Mexico with the manufactures of their respective countries, will afford sufficient facilities for the exportation of her raw produce, to whatever extent it may be carried.

On the Western coast, the case is different. From Ācāpūlcō to Gūāymās, (in the Gulph of California,) there is a series of magnificent ports, many of which no vessel has ever yet entered. Acāpūlcō itself (the finest harbour, perhaps, in the world,) is but little frequented; its importance ceased with the trade of the galleons, nor is it likely ever to recover its former fame. The China and India trade has taken a different line, most of the ships engaged in it discharging their cargoes at the ports of Sān Blās, Măzătlan, and Gūāymās; the demand for China goods being found to be greater on the Northern, and Western part of the Table-land, which is not yet sufficiently supplied with European manufactures, than in the Capital, where the market is absolutely glutted. Many years, however, must elapse before the commerce of

the Western coast of Mexico can acquire any thing like the importance of that carried on upon the Eastern side; for, as there is but little difference between the agricultural produce of the countries with which she can hold intercourse, through the medium of the Pacific, (Güayāquīl, Pērū and Chile, China and Calcutta,) and her own, all remittances must be made in specie, with the exception of the hides, tallow, and wheat of California, in which an extensive trade is already carried on.

I have now traced most of the leading features which characterize Mexico as a country, with the exception of her mineral wealth. Silver may be called one of the staple commodities of New Spain; but I shall have occasion to enter into this subject, so fully, in the fourth book of this sketch, which is devoted to an account of the mines, that it would be superfluous to state any thing here but the fact, that the average annual amount of the silver raised before the Revolution was twenty-four millions of dollars; a sum sufficient, alone, (without making any allowance for agricultural produce,) to render the country capable of producing it, a valuable market for European manufactures.

When added to those sources of wealth, which I have already pointed out, and to which I shall allude more fully in the third section, it places Mexico almost in the first rank of *consuming* nations, and ought to render her progress towards that station, which she is destined to occupy amongst the great communities of the world, an object of the deepest interest to all. Should my present undertaking have the effect of directing to the subject the attention of some one better qualified to do justice to it than myself, all that I venture to hope from this sketch, will be fully accomplished.

SECTION II.

POPULATION.

THE first census ever taken of the population of Mexico, was that made in the year 1793, by the orders of the Viceroy, Count Revillagigedo, by which it appeared, that the number of inhabitants registered amounted to 4,483,529. This was the *minimum* of the population; as, independently of the difficulty with which statistical researches are always attended, it is well known, that, in America, a census was regarded as the prelude to some new system of taxation, which the natives endeavoured to elude, by diminishing the number of those, upon whom it was to operate. Humboldt adds one-sixth, in order to cover the deficiency, and estimates the total (in 1794) at 5,200,000 souls. He conceives, that, in nineteen years, this population ought to double, according to the average proportion of births to deaths, given by the parish registers in every part of the country, (170 to 100,) unless its progress be checked by pestilence, or famine; and he regards it as more than probable, that, at the period of his visit, (1803,) it already amounted to six millions and a half.

Since that time, only one very imperfect census has been taken, (in 1806,) which, however, proved Humboldt's estimate to be correct, by giving six millions and a half as the *minimum* (that is, the registered amount) of the population. The civil wars by which the country has since been desolated, must have rendered any considerable increase impossible, not only by the mortality which they occasioned on the field of

battle, but by depriving the agricultural population of the means of subsistence. During this contest, the most fertile districts were those that suffered most; and the traveller, who now crosses the plains of the Baxio, would hardly believe, but for the ruins which he sees around him, that they were once thickly peopled, and smiling with cultivation.

Still, the inhabitants, though driven from their ancient seats, were not exterminated; nor is there any reason to suppose that more than three hundred thousand persons altogether perished during the war. The remainder must, according to the ordinary course of things, have gone on increasing. If, therefore, in lieu of supposing the population to have doubled, from 1806 to 1826, (which it certainly has not,) I add one million and a half to the *minimum* of 1806, as the increase during the last twenty years, and estimate the whole population of Mexico, (in 1827,) at eight millions, I shall, I think, be making a very moderate computation, and one, in which the census, now forming in the different States, will bear me out.

Before the Revolution, this population was divided into seven distinct Castes. 1. The old Spaniards, designated as Gächüpīnēs, in the history of the civil wars. 2. The Creoles, or Whites of pure European race, born in America, and regarded by the old Spaniards as natives. 3. The Indians, or Indigenous copper-coloured race. 4. The Mestizos, or mixed breed of Whites and Indians, gradually merging into Creoles, as the cross with the Indian race became more remote. 5. The Mulattoes, or descendants of Whites and Negroes. 6. The Zambos, or Chinos, descendants of Negroes and Indians. And, 7. The African Negroes, either manumitted, or slaves.

Of these Castes, the three first, and the last, were pure, and gave rise, in their various combinations, to the others; which again were sub-divided, *ad infinitum*, by names expressing the relation borne by each generation of its descen-

dants to the White, (Quarteroons, Quinteroons, &c.) to which, as the ruling colour, any approximation was desirable.

The principal seat of the White population of Mexico is the Table-land, towards the centre of which the Indian race is likewise concentrated, (in the Intendancies of La Pūēblā, Mēxicō, Guānājuātō, Ōāxācā, and Vāllādōlid;) while the Northern frontier is inhabited almost entirely by Whites, and descendants of Whites, before whom it is supposed that the Indian population must have retired, at the time of the conquest. In Dūrāngō, New Mexico, and the Provincias Internas, the pure Indian breed is almost unknown; in Sōnōrā it is again found, because the conquerors there overtook the last tribes of the original inhabitants, who had not yet placed the River Gīlā (lat. 33 N.) between themselves and the Spanish arms. Towards the South, the coasts are inhabited, both to the East and West, by Mulattoes and Zambos, or, at least, by a race in which a mixture of African blood prevails. It was in these unhealthy regions that the slaves formerly imported into Mexico were principally employed, the natives of the Table-land being unable to resist the extreme heat of the climate.

They have multiplied there in an extraordinary manner, by intermarriages with the Indian race, and now form a mixed breed, admirably adapted to the *Tierra caliente*, but not possessing, in appearance, the characteristics either of the New World, or of the Old.

The Mestizos (descendants of Natives and Indians) are found in every part of the country; indeed, from the very small number of Spanish women who at first visited the New World, the great mass of the population has some mixture of Indian blood. Few of the middling classes (the lawyers, the Curas or parochial clergy, the artizans, the smaller landed proprietors, and the soldiers,) could prove themselves exempt from it; and now that a connexion with the Aborigines has ceased to be disadvantageous, few attempt to deny it. In my

sketch of the Revolution, I always include this class under the denomination of *Creoles*; as sharing with the Whites of pure Spanish descent the disadvantages of that privation of political rights, to which all *Natives* were condemned, and feeling, in common with them, that enmity to the Gachupines, (or old Spaniards,) which the preference constantly accorded to them could not fail to excite.

Next to the pure Indians, whose number, in 1803, was supposed to exceed two millions and a half, the Mestizos are the most numerous caste: it is, however, impossible to ascertain the exact proportion which they bear to the whole population, many of them being, as I have already stated, included amongst the pure Whites, who were estimated, before the Revolution, at 1,200,000, including from 70 to 80,000 Europeans, established in different parts of the country.

Of the Mulattoes, Zambos, and other mixed breeds, nothing certain is known.

It will be seen, by this sketch, that the population of New Spain is composed of very heterogeneous elements: indeed, the numberless shades of difference which exist amongst its inhabitants, are not yet, by any means, correctly ascertained.

The Indians, for instance, who appear, at first sight, to form one great mass, comprising nearly two-fifths of the whole population, are divided, and sub-divided, amongst themselves, in the most extraordinary manner.

They consist of various tribes, resembling each other in colour, and in some general characteristics, which seem to announce a common origin, but differing entirely in language, customs, and dress. No less than twenty different languages are known to be spoken in the Mexican territory, and many of these are not dialects, which may be traced to the same root, but differ as entirely as languages of Slavonic and Teutonic origin in Europe. Some possess letters, which do

not exist in others, and, in most, there is a difference of sound, which strikes even the most unpractised ear. The low guttural pronunciation of the Mexican, or Aztec, contrasts singularly with the sonorous Otomi,* which prevails in the neighbouring state of Valladolid; and this again is said to be totally unlike the dialect of some of the northern tribes. There is not, perhaps, a question better worthy of the consideration of philosophers, than the elucidation of this extraordinary anomaly, in the history of the Indian race: nothing is known of the mode in which America was peopled, except the fact, that the tide of population has set, constantly, from north to south. Analogies are said to have been discovered between the language of some of the Indians in the southern parts of Chile, and that used by the Aztec race in Mexico; but the intermediate space is filled up by dialects of an entirely distinct character; nor is there the slightest connexion between the Peruvian and the Mexican tongue, notwithstanding the preeminence, in point of civilization, which each of these nations had attained. It would be interesting, indeed, to discover some mode of explaining these singular facts, and pointing out the region, from which these successive swarms of emigrants must have issued, and the Babel, where their confusion of tongues originated. I do not believe that even a probable conjecture upon this subject has yet been made.

It was the policy of Spain to promote a constant rivalry between the different classes of inhabitants in her colonies, by

* Wherever the Aztec tongue is in use, the letter *r* is unknown, while in the Otomi dialect, it occurs almost in every word. Thus we have Pöpöcätépētl, Istäccihuātl, Tēnōchtitlān, and that unpronounceable word given by Humboldt, and signifying "venerable priest, whom I cherish as a father," Notlazomahuizteopixcatatzin,—all Aztec, and all without an *r*; while in Valladolid, the prevailing names are Ocāmbārō, Pürüündirō, Zifācūārō, and Cīnāpēcūārō, in all of which *r* bears a prominent part.

creating little imaginary shades of superiority amongst them, which prevented any two from having a common interest. Of the causes of the enmity, which prevailed between the Creoles and the Gachupines, I shall have occasion to speak, more at large, in treating of the Colonial policy of the Mother country :* amongst the rest, rank, as originating in a closer, or more remote, connexion with the master colour, was the subject of contention. Whiteness of the skin was the general criterion of nobility ; hence the expression so frequent in a quarrel, “es posible que se crea V. mas blanco que yo ?” (Is it possible that you think yourself *whiter* than I am ?) But the King reserved to himself the power of conferring the honours of whiteness upon any individual, of any class, which was done by a decree of the Audiencia, comprised in the words, “let him be considered as white ;” (que se tenga por blanco)—and the greatest pains were taken to impress the people with the importance of these distinctions, which, in fact, amounted to a patent of nobility. For a long time they, certainly, had the effect of keeping the different mixed breeds at variance with each other : each was afraid of losing caste by an alliance with his inferior, while the white Creole, proud of the purity of his own blood, was supposed to look down upon the rest of his countrymen, with a contempt, very similar to that which was entertained by the old Spaniard for himself.

So prevalent was this feeling in 1803, that Humboldt, a most intelligent and philosophical observer, expresses his apprehensions that a Creole government, (if one should ever exist,) would attempt to establish a still stronger line of demarcation between themselves, and the Castes, than that drawn by a government, which had no interest in favouring either party, and only aimed at keeping down all. The events of the last seventeen years have proved these fears to

* Vide 4th Section of this Book.

be unfounded. From the first breaking out of the Revolution, the Creoles were obliged to court the alliance of the mixed classes, and in all their proclamations we find them representing their own cause, and that of the Aborigines, as the same. The distinctions of Castes were all swallowed up in the great, vital distinction of *Americans*, and *Europeans*; against whom, supported, as they were, by the whole force of Spain, and holding, as they did, almost all the public employments in the country, nothing could have been done except by a general coalition of the natives. Hence the apparent absurdity of hearing the descendants of the first conquerors, (for such the Creoles, strictly speaking, were,) gravely accusing Spain of the atrocities, which their own ancestors had committed; invoking the names of Moctezuma and Atahualpa;* expatiating upon the miseries which the Indians had undergone, and endeavouring to discover some affinity between the sufferings of that devoted race and their own.

It is consoling to reflect, however, that this necessity of identifying themselves with the Aborigines, although absurd as argument, has led to good practical results. Castes can no longer be said to exist in Mexico, nor, I believe, in any other part of Spanish America: many of the most distinguished characters of the revolutionary war belonged to the mixed breeds; and, under the system now established, all are equally entitled to the rights of citizenship, and equally capable of holding the highest dignities of the state. Several *Curas*, of pure Indian extraction, have already been deputies; and I am acquainted with one young Indian, of distinguished abilities, who is a member of the supreme tribunal of justice in Durango. General Guerrero, too, who, in 1824,

* Vide the Cuadro Historico of Carlos Bustamante, passim; and the first Manifesto of the Congress of Buenos Ayres, in which the massacre of Caxamalca is introduced, as one of the pleas of independence.

was one of the members of the Executive Power, and who is now a candidate for the Presidency, has a strong mixture of African blood in his veins, which is not considered as any disparagement. This is no slight indication of the amelioration, which a little time may be expected to produce. Rescued from political degradation, and awakened to a sense of a political existence, I shall not, I trust, be regarded as a theorist, for supposing that a sensible improvement will take place, and that many of the most valuable members of the community will, hereafter, be found amongst those very classes, who were formerly excluded from any share in the direction of the affairs of their country.

I cannot conclude this sketch of the population of Mexico, without remarking upon one great advantage which New Spain enjoys over her neighbours, both to the North and South, in the almost total absence of a pure African population. The importation of slaves into Mexico was always inconsiderable, and their numbers, in 1793, did not exceed six thousand. Of these many have died, many have been manumitted, and the rest quitted their masters in 1810, and sought freedom in the ranks of the Independent army; so that I am, I believe, justified in stating, that there is now hardly a single slave in the central portion of the republic.

In Texas, (on the Northern frontier,) a few have been introduced by the North American settlers; but all farther importations are prohibited by law; and provision has been made for securing the freedom of the offspring of the slaves now in existence. The number of these must be exceedingly small, (perhaps not exceeding fifty altogether;) for, in the annual solemnity which takes place, in the capital, on the 16th September, in commemoration of the proclamation of the Independence by Hidalgo, at Dolores, a part of which was to consist in giving freedom to a certain number of slaves, which is done by the President himself, the greatest

difficulty was found, in 1826, to discover persons on whom to bestow the boon of liberty, and I much doubt whether any can have been forthcoming in the present year.

The advantages of such a position can only be appreciated by those, who know the inconveniences, and dangers, with which a contrary order of things is attended. In the United States, where the Slaves, Mulattoes, and Free Blacks, constitute more than one-sixth of the whole population,* they are a constant source of disquiet and alarm. In a country, where civil liberty is incessantly invoked, and where every thing is done in its name, and for its perpetuation, they are a proscribed, and degraded caste; nor can they hope for any amelioration of their lot. Slavery rests upon the supposed natural inferiority of the slave to his master: to admit the manumitted slave to a participation of political rights, in common with his former lord, would destroy this basis altogether; and the Free Black is, therefore, not only exiled from the society of the Whites, but excluded most carefully from power; not by law, indeed, but by virtue of common usage; for the law, in general, does not recognize any difference of colour, or establish any distinction, except that of slave-owner and slave.† The consequence is, that the hostility existing between the free blacks, and the whites, in the United States, is even more inveterate than that of slaves towards their masters; and that, in some of the States, (Virginia especially,) it has been thought necessary to enact laws, by which all manumitted slaves are compelled to quit the

* By the census of 1810, the total population amounted to 7,239,903 inhabitants, of whom, 1,377,810 were blacks, either free or slaves; by that of 1820, the total population was 9,638,226, of whom 1,538,118 were slaves, and 233,557 free people of colour.

† In some states this is not the case: in South Carolina, for instance, the free people of colour are ineligible *by law* to any public situation. A Senator, or Representative, must be a free *white* man, uncontaminated by any mixture of African blood.--Vide Mellish's *United States*, p. 275.

commonwealth ; while in others it is forbidden, under heavy fines, and even corporal punishments, to teach a slave to read or write.*

Mexico is exempt from all these evils. In her territory, the African race is already amalgamated with the Indigenous ; and when education shall have prepared its descendants for exercising the higher rights of citizenship, there is neither law, nor custom, to prevent them from attaining the first offices in the state. In the mean time, they furnish the *Tierras calientes* with the most useful race of labourers, who, from not being liable to the Vomito, (or Vera Cruz fever,) perform most of the drudgery in the towns upon the coast, and cultivate, in the interior, those productions, which are peculiar to the *Tierra caliente*.

However the question of free labour may be agitated elsewhere, in Mexico it is already decided. The sugar, coffee, and indigo, which abound in many parts of the country, and which, though not at present exported, are raised in sufficient quantities for a very large home consumption, are all cultivated by free men. There is not a single slave in the valley of Cuernavaca, or in the environs of Orizaba and Cordoba, which are the great marts for sugar, and coffee. The whole labour is performed there by the Indians, and mixed breeds, and a want of hands is seldom, or ever, known. I shall give, upon this subject, some additional details in the following section, which treats of the productions of the Mexican soil. Here, it only remains for me to add, that in the New World, as in the Old, Great Britain has done all that in her lay towards ameliorating the condition of the African race. The abolition of the slave-trade was made a *sine qua non* condition of her intercourse with the New American States. It is pleasing to reflect on the readiness, with which this wish was

* Vide Mr. Politica's Sketch of the Internal Condition of the United States, from which many of the above observations are borrowed.

complied with in Mexico: I have no doubt, however, that it will bring with it its own reward, as policy is hardly less interested than humanity in the removal of those laws, which, by perpetuating the distinction of master and slave, endanger the safety of the whole body politic, by setting the interests of one portion of society in direct opposition to those of the rest.

SECTION III.

PRODUCTIONS.—THOSE NECESSARY FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE INHABITANTS, AND THOSE CALCULATED FOR EXPORTATION.

FROM the account which I have given in the preceding pages of the peculiar structure and climate of Mexico, the infinite variety of its productions may be inferred. The fruits of the most opposite regions are not only assembled there, but are often to be met with in singular approximation. I remember having followed once, during a whole day's journey, (between Tēmāscāltēpēc and Angāngēō,) the course of a ravine, which we crossed and recrossed several times, always finding the fruits of the Tropics in profusion on the banks of a little stream, which wound down the centre of the Barranca, while the hills on either side were covered with the beech, the oak, and the fir. These changes are, as I have observed in the first section, of almost daily occurrence, and render it impossible to assign to any particular production a particular parallel, or district, or to attempt any other classification than that of the fruits of *Tierra caliente*, and those of the Table-land.

Indeed, I do not consider it essential to make even this distinction, as the simplest mode of conveying an idea of the agricultural wealth of Mexico, will be to give a précis of the most important productions, mentioning the characteristics of each, and the parts of the country in which its cultivation has been most attended to.

I shall begin with those which are essential to the sub-

sistence of the inhabitants, amongst the most important of which is Indian corn.

MAIZE.

(*Mexican—Tlaolli—Haytian—Mahiz—Blé Turc—
Indian corn.*)

THERE are few parts, either of the *Tierra caliente*, or the Table-land, in which Maize is not cultivated with success. In the low hot grounds upon the coast, and on the slope of the Cordillera, its growth is more colossal than on the Table-land; but even there, at seven and eight thousand feet above the level of the sea, its fecundity is such as will hardly be credited in Europe. In some particularly favoured spots, it has been known to produce eight hundred fanegas for one sown; and wherever irrigation is practicable, from three to four hundred for one is the ordinary ratio of increase. Where the crop depends upon the season, it is more variable; so that, upon the high lands of Zăcātēcās, and San Luis Pōtōsī, where there are few reservoirs to supply the want of the periodical rains, the farmer does not reckon upon more than one very good year in ten: but although the ratio of increase in the intervening years does not exceed forty or fifty bushels for one sown, it is usually sufficient to supply the demand, and prevent any dearth of provisions from being felt amongst the lower classes, to whom wheaten bread is a luxury nearly unknown.

The great majority of the inhabitants of New Spain subsists almost entirely upon maize flour, made up into a sort of unfermented, doughy, but nutritious bread, called *ărēpă*, or more generally *tōrtillās*, which they eat rather warmed through, than baked, with a pungent sauce, composed of chile, (a sort of capsicum,) and tomatoes.

The price of maize varies with the year, and the distance from the principal markets. In the capital, I have seldom

known it lower than two dollars the fanega, (of 150lbs.); but it sometimes rises to three and a half, as was the case a short time before my departure from Mexico, (April 1827,) in consequence of the total failure of the crops, after the unusually dry season of 1826. In the Interior, from three to four reals, (of eight to the dollar,) is the ordinary price; but in 1826, it rose to two dollars, and two and a half, to the great distress of the Indian population.

Maize may be cultivated to almost any extent in Mexico: but a great deal of the land which was devoted to this purpose before the Revolution, has been neglected since 1810, in consequence of the suspension of mining operations, which regulate the demand everywhere, except in the immediate vicinity of the great bishopricks, and the capital.

Some idea of the consumption in the mining districts may be formed by the fact, that, in Guānājuātō alone, fourteen thousand mules were in daily use, all of which were fed on maize, straw, and *zácātē*, (the maize-stalk dried,) of which most animals are fond. There was a similar demand, in a more or less extended circle, around each of the other mining towns, so that the agricultural prosperity of the country depended, in a great measure, upon the prosperity of the mines; while the labours of the miner, on the other hand, were never carried on with such facility, or to such an extent, as when a succession of favourable years, by placing an abundant supply of agricultural produce, at moderate prices, within his reach, enabled him to augment his establishment in such a manner as to reduce even the poorer ores with profit. A great rise in the price of maize, affected the mining interests almost as much as a rise in the price of quicksilver; and, were a table drawn up of the years most productive in mineral riches, they would be found to tally exactly with those which are recorded as most abundant in the agricultural annals of the country. But upon this subject I shall have occasion to enlarge in a subsequent part of

this work. It therefore only remains for me to add here, that the districts now most abundant in maize, are the Băxîö, (which comprises the central part of the Table-land;)—the plains of Tölucă,—the Southern and Eastern parts of the valley of Mexico itself,—the state of La Pūēblă, and the vicinity of Āgūas Căliēntēs. It may, however, be grown wherever there is water to be obtained, and will be so, undoubtedly, as the demand increases. In some parts of the country, a variety of fermented liquors, known by the general denomination of Chicha de maiz, are prepared from maize by the Indians; they are all more or less intoxicating, as is the Pulque de maiz, or Tlaolli, which is composed of the sugary juice or syrup, extracted by pressure from the stalk. Before the conquest, this syrup was condensed by the natives, and used as sugar.

CEREALIA.

UNDER this head I include Wheat and Barley, Oats being but little known: for cattle, barley is in general use, either mixed with maize, or alone.

Wheat succeeds well throughout the Table-land of Mexico. The minimum of height, at which the proper temperature may be found for bringing it to perfection, has not been ascertained; but both in the *Tierra caliente*, and on the Eastern and Western slope of the Cordillera, experience has shown that, from, perhaps, too great a luxuriance of vegetation, the ear will not form.

About Jălăpă, (678 toises above the level of the sea,) it is merely sown to be used as green forage for cattle. At Pěrôtě (530 toises higher) it seems to find its proper level, and continues from thence without interruption towards the North, where a less degree of elevation is required, in every succeeding parallel, to produce it, until, in California, it may be found in the lowest valleys. On the Table-land, want of water is the great difficulty with which the farmer has to

contend: wherever the ground affords any facility for irrigation, his crops are sure to succeed; but where this is not the case, the natural fertility of the soil becomes almost a secondary consideration, as the success or failure of the crop depends, entirely, upon the timely commencement of the rainy season. In Mexico, our division of the year into four separate periods, is unknown. They have no distinction but the Rainy season (*Estacion de las aguas*), which commences about the end of May, and lasts four months; and the Dry season (*el Ėstio*), which comprises all the rest of the year.

The rain begins on the Veracruz coast, and spreads gradually from East to West, in the direction of the trades; but its commencement is very uncertain, and whenever the dry season is prolonged beyond the middle of June, the Cerealia, and the maize, suffer severely, unless artificial means are employed to counteract the effects of the drought. Irrigation is, therefore, the great object of the Mexican farmer, and to attain it immense sums are expended on the principal estates, in the construction of *ăcēqũiās* (canals of irrigation), *prēsās* (dams, or reservoirs), and *nōriās* (waterwheels, *roues à godet*), by the aid of which a sort of balance is established between the dry and the rainy season, and the soil refreshed, when burnt up by the rays of a vertical sun. There have been instances of the dry season continuing for three whole months beyond the usual period, as in 1802, when the crops throughout the country failed. In 1826, the rains did not commence till quite the end of July, and the maize was lost in consequence; but these irregularities are, fortunately, rare. Wherever a system of irrigation is established, the corn lands, (*Haciendas de trigo*), are watered twice; once in January, when the young shoot appears above ground, and again in the beginning or March, when the ear is about to form; and so well is the importance of this process known, that a situation is seldom chosen for a *Hacienda de trigo*, where a supply of water cannot be obtained.

The great corn lands of Mexico are those of La Pūēblā, (near Atliscō, Sān Mārtin, and Chōlūlā,) the Băxīō, which comprises a portion of the States of Gūanājūatō, Quērētārō, Văllădōlīd, Zăcătēcăs, and Guădălăjāră, in the vicinity of the great river of Săntiăgō;—the valley of Tĕnōchtitlān, or Mexico; that of Pōănăs, in Durango; and the Missions in California. These are but spots of cultivation on so large a surface as that presented by the territory of New Spain; but it is supposed that the ground cleared, in the vicinity of each, is capable of producing a supply of wheat, sufficient for a population, five times as numerous as that of Mexico, at the present day.

This is partly owing to the fertility of the soil, which gives an extraordinary ratio of increase, and partly to the large consumption of maize and Bananas, in lieu of wheaten flour, in the *Tierra caliente*, and upon the whole line of Coast. The difficulty of communication with the Table-land renders wheat an article of luxury to the inhabitants of these regions; for, strange as the assertion may appear, in the present state of the roads, it would be easier, and cheaper, for towns upon the Eastern and Western coasts to draw their supplies from the United States, or California, by sea, than from the nearest corn lands on the Table-land. American flour, for instance, sells for fourteen dollars per barrel, at the Havanna, after paying a duty of six dollars. Each *Carga*, (or 300lbs. weight) of flour, from Atlisco, if sent as a mule load to Veracruz, would cost this, or more, as freight, at the present day, without allowing any thing for prime cost. Veracruz could, therefore, be supplied from Kentucky, or Ohio, at almost one half the price which flour now bears there; nor do I think that the amelioration in the internal communications of New Spain can easily be carried to such an extent, as to prevent the Mexican land owners from being undersold in their own market by their northern neighbours, unless they are protected (as it is called) by prohibitory laws. They have, in-

deed, in the extraordinary fertility of their soil, and the cheapness of labour, some compensation for the difficulties of communication, with which they have to contend; but the amount of produce on good land, however much it may exceed that of Europe, is not much superior to that of the most productive districts in the United States.

Humboldt gives twenty-five bushels for one, as the average annual produce of the whole of the corn lands of Mexico. In France, the maximum of the ratio of increase would be as ten to one; in England, perhaps twelve.

In the poorer parts of Germany, from five to six bushels for one is reckoned a very good crop. In Kentucky, twenty-two is, I believe, the maximum; but in Mexico, where irrigation is properly conducted, and the year good, from sixty to eighty bushels for one, have frequently been produced. At Chōlulā, the common ratio of increase is from thirty to forty for one. At Zēlāyā, Sālāmāncā, Lēōn, and Sāntiāgō, from thirty-five to forty, *communibus annis*. In the valley of Mexico it varies from eighteen to twenty; and even as far North as New California, from fifteen to seventeen is not at all uncommon. Humboldt affirms too, that the proportion between the seed and the produce, would appear still greater, were it not for the quantity of grain unnecessarily employed as seed, a great part of which is choked, and lost: yet, notwithstanding this prodigious productiveness, wheat in Mexico is half as dear again as at Paris, and considerably exceeds the price it now bears in the English market.

It is difficult to institute any exact comparison between two countries, where the measures in use are entirely dissimilar; but the following statement may give some idea of the relative value of corn in England, and New Spain.

The Carga, or mule load, which is the usual mode of selling the more bulky agricultural produce, weighs twelve Arrobas, or three hundred pounds, which, taking the English bushel at sixty pounds, are equivalent to five bushels Eng-

lish measure. The price of the Carga, I have found to vary but little ; for, as the consumption of wheaten flour is confined almost entirely to the towns, where the demand can be pretty correctly ascertained, a sufficient supply is raised, in the vicinity of each, to meet that demand, and no more. Thus, there is neither much competition, nor any great fluctuation in the value of the article when brought into the market.

The Carga fetches, almost uniformly, from Mexico to Dūrāngō, from thirteen, to sixteen dollars, according to the year ; which, taking the dollar at four shillings, and the Carga (as stated) at five bushels, gives 10s. $4\frac{3}{4}d.$ or 12s. $9\frac{1}{2}d.$ as the price of the bushel, which is now selling here at seven shillings.

This is the more remarkable, as it is not the case in any other part of South America. The best Chilian corn, for instance, sells upon the spot for $3\frac{1}{3}$ reales de plata, the fanega, or seven reals per carga. The carriage to the coast, (near which it is usually grown,) and freight to Lima, (the great corn-market on the Pacific side,) are estimated at three reals more ; and, at Lima itself, it sells for twenty-four reals, (three dollars,) or about twelve shillings English money ; while in Mexico the average price is nearly five times as much. But in New Spain, the want of roads, and the consequent difficulty of intercourse between the corn-growing States, excludes from competition, in each market, all those who are situated beyond a very circumscribed circle in its immediate vicinity ; and thus maintains a sort of factitious price for an article, the intrinsic value of which ought not to bear any sort of proportion to that which it now possesses, from the abundance in which it is already produced, and the facility with which its cultivation might be carried to almost any extent.

Whether the obstacles can be overcome, which have given it this factitious value, and to what extent they will be so, are questions which time, and the good sense of the Mexican

people, must decide ; but the contents of this chapter will prove that a very great change must take place in the interior of the country, before any idea of exportation can reasonably be entertained, if, indeed, it be found practicable at last, of which, as I have stated in the first chapter, I entertain great doubts.

THE BANANA.

Platano-Musa.

The Banana is to the inhabitants of the *Tierra caliente*, what maize is to those of the Table-land ; it furnishes them with the principal article of their daily food, and has the merit likewise of producing more nutritious substance in a less space, and with less trouble, than any other plant. Humboldt calculates that one acre of ground planted with the Platano Arton is sufficient to support fifty men ; while an acre of wheat, *communibus annis*, would barely supply the wants of three. Its cultivation requires but little attention : the suckers once planted, nature does the rest. In ten or eleven months the fruit comes to maturity ; the old stalks must then be cut away, with the exception of the leading sprout, (pimpollo,) which bears fruit about three months after the mother plant ; and if the earth about the stems be loosened once or twice in the year, a Plătănăr may be kept in full produce without any farther exertion. The fruit is used either fresh, or sliced, and partially dried in the sun, when it is called Platano Pasado. It requires a mean temperature of 24° of the Centigrade, (19 of Reaumur, or 75 of Fahrenheit,) to bring it to perfection.

CASSAVA BREAD.

Pain de Manioc.

This bread, which is prepared from the root of the Yuca amarga, (*jatropha manihot*,) is more in use on the Western, than the Eastern coasts of Mexico ; on both sides it is pecu-

liar to the *Tierra caliente*. The root which yields the flour, (which is afterwards made up into thin, brittle cakes,) is a deadly poison in its raw state; but it loses its deleterious qualities when rasped, and pressed in a bag called Cībūcān, during which process the juice exudes, until nothing but a farinaceous pulp remains.

The consumption of Cassava bread in Mexico is not considerable, nor at all likely to increase.

RICE

Is but little cultivated, and not very generally known.

OLIVES.

The first Olive plantation known in Mexico, was that belonging to the Archbishop, at Tācūbāyā, near the Capital; but, during the Revolution, a great number of Olive trees were planted, both in the Provinces, and immediately about Mexico, all of which are now flourishing. The oil yielded by them is as pure as the finest French or Italian oils, and as the climate is particularly favourable to the growth of the tree, there is reason to suppose that the quantity of oil produced will soon render importation unnecessary. Before 1810, the cultivation of the olive was prohibited, as it was apprehended that it might interfere with the interests of the Mother country.

THE VINE.

The vine was likewise a forbidden fruit before the Revolution, although the soil of Mexico is so well adapted to it that it flourishes naturally in Texas, (which is overrun with wild vines,) and has succeeded as far North as Parras, the only spot where, under the old system, wine was allowed to be made, in consequence (I suppose) of the difficulty of supplying it from the Capital. In the centre of the country, vineyards were destroyed wherever an attempt was made to carry the cultivation to any extent.

As late as 1802, a general order to this effect was issued, which was acted upon at Dōlōrēs, (the curacy of the first Insurgent chief, Hidalgo,) in 1805.

There is little doubt, however, that the vine will flourish, and that wine may be made, in almost every part of Mexico. Whatever be its quality, it cannot well be worse than the coarse Catalonian vintages, with which the country has been hitherto supplied; while on the balance of trade it would have a considerable effect, the sum averaged by wines imported, before the Revolution, being not less than 700,000 dollars per annum. The attention of the landed proprietors is already turned to the subject, but much time must elapse before any change can be effected; and as the French have, in the mean time, possession of the market, it is probable that they will find it to be their interest to keep it so well, and so cheaply supplied, that the project of growing wines for home consumption will be abandoned, before the attempt has been seriously made.

CHILE, OR CAPSICUM.

Whole estates are devoted, on the Table-land, to the cultivation of this most powerful stimulant, and few are more productive, as it constitutes one of the necessities of life with the Indian, and Mestizo, population, and is used in very large quantities at the tables of the Creoles of all ranks. Its pungency is so great, that, amongst the uninitiated, it produces absolute excoriation; but the palate becomes accustomed to it by degrees, and habit renders it indispensable. It is used by the lower classes as a seasoning to the insipid tortilla, and the two together furnish a meal, which they would not exchange for an allowance of meat, and wheaten bread.

In addition to the vegetable productions already enumerated, Mexico possesses the potatoe, which is found in great

abundance on every part of the Table-land; the yam, which is confined to *Tierra caliente*; Tomates, (Tomatl,) with every variety of garden plants and vegetables; apples, peaches and pears, and most European fruits; together with pines, guavas, chirimoyas, oranges and lemons, pistachio-nuts, melons, and all the usual productions of the Tropics. It likewise has the

MAGUEY—(*Metl*—*Agave Americana*.)

A species of Ananas, or Aloe, from which is drawn the favourite beverage of the lower classes in the central part of the Table-land, a spirituous liquor called Octli, or Pulque.

It is in the States of La Pūēblā, Mēxicō, Guāñājūātō, and a small portion of Vālladōlid, that the principal plantations of Māgūēy are found: the most celebrated are those in the vicinity of Chōlulā, and in the Llanos de Āpām, between the towns of Hūāmāntlā, Tlāscālā, Āpām, and the Capital: the valley of Tōlucā is likewise famous for its Pūlquē; which is drawn from the extensive Maguey grounds in the vicinity of Lērmā: but in general, although the plant is found wild in every part of Mexico, no attempt to extract Pulque from it, is made, except in the districts which are within reach of the two great towns of La Pūēblā, and Mexico; where, amongst the lower classes of the inhabitants, the consumption is enormous. Before the Revolution, the revenue derived from a very small municipal duty exacted on the Pulque, at the gates of these towns, averaged 600,000 dollars, and amounted, in 1793, to 817,739 dollars, about 170,000*l.* sterling.

Pūlquē is so little known in Europe, that some account of the process, by which it is made, may be acceptable.

The Maguey, or Aloe, from which it is extracted, differs but little, (if at all) in appearance, from those which abound in the South of Spain, and which are known, though of



From the original drawing by J. G. Smith

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J. G. Smith, del.

AGAVE AMERICANA



a much smaller size, in England. Its growth is slow, but when arrived at maturity, its leaves are usually from five to eight feet in length, although some considerably exceed these dimensions.

In the plantations, the plants are arranged in lines, with an interval of three yards between each. If the soil be good, they require no attention on the part of the proprietor until the period of flowering arrives, at which time the plant first commences to be productive. This period is very uncertain; ten years, however, may be taken as a fair average, for, in a plantation of one thousand Aloes, it is calculated that one hundred are in flower every year. The Indians, acquainted with the plant, know, by certain signs, almost the very hour at which the stem, or central shoot, which is destined to produce the flower, is about to appear, and they anticipate it, by making a deep incision, and extracting the whole heart, or central portion of the stem, (*el cōrăzōn*,) as a surgeon would take an arm out of the socket, leaving nothing but the thick outside rind, which forms a natural basin, or well, about two feet in depth, and one-and-a-half in diameter. Into this the sap, intended by nature for the support of the gigantic central shoot, is continually oozing, in such quantities, that it is found necessary to remove it twice, and even three times in the day. In order to facilitate this operation, the leaves on one side are cut away, so as to admit of a free approach: an Indian then inserts a long gourd, (called *ăcō-jōtē*,) the thinner end of which is terminated by a horn, while, at the opposite extremity, a small square hole is left, to which he applies his lips, and extracts the sap by suction. This sap, before it ferments, is called *Aguamiel*, (honey-water,) and merits the appellation, as it has a very sweet taste, and none of that disagreeable smell, which is afterwards so offensive. From the plant, a small portion of it is transferred to a building prepared for the purpose, where it is allowed to ferment for ten or fifteen days, when it becomes

what is termed *Mādrě Pūlquě*, (the mother of Pulque,) which is distributed, in very small quantities, amongst the different skins, or troughs, intended for the daily reception of the *Āguāmīēl*. Upon this it acts as a sort of leaven; fermentation is excited instantly, and in twenty-four hours it becomes Pulque in the very best state for drinking: the quantity drawn off each day is replaced by a fresh supply of *Aguamiel*, so that the process may continue during the whole year without interruption, and is limited only by the extent of the plantation. A good *Maguey* yields from eight to fifteen *quartillos*, (pints,) of *Āguāmīēl* in a day, the value of which may be taken at about a real, (sixpence); and this supply of sap continues during two, and often three months. The plant, therefore, when about to flower, is worth ten dollars to the farmer; although, in the transfer of an estate, the *Magueyes de corte*, (ready for cutting,) are seldom valued, one with another, at more than five. But, in this estimate, an allowance is made for the failure of some, which is unavoidable, as the operation of extracting the *cōrāzōn*, if performed either too soon, or too late, is equally unsuccessful, and destroys the plant altogether. The cultivation of the *Maguey*, where a market is at hand, has many advantages, as it is a plant, which, though it succeeds best in a good soil, is not easily affected either by heat or cold, and requires little or no water. It is propagated, too, with great facility; for, although the mother-plant withers away as soon as the sap is exhausted, it is replaced by a multitude of suckers, which spring from the old root, and grow well when transplanted. There is only one drawback, the time that must elapse before a new plantation can be rendered productive, and the uncertainty with regard to the time of flowering, which varies from eight to eighteen years. But the *Maguey* grounds, when once established, are of great value, many producing a revenue of ten and twelve thousand dollars per annum.

The natives ascribe to Pulque as many good qualities as

whiskey is said to possess in Scotland. They call it stomachic, a great promoter of digestion and sleep, and an excellent remedy in many diseases. It requires a knowledge of these good qualities to reconcile the stranger to that smell of sour milk, or slightly tainted meat, by which the young Pulque drinker is usually disgusted; but if this can be surmounted, Pulque will be found both a refreshing, and a wholesome beverage; for its intoxicating qualities are very slight, and as it is drunk always in a state of fermentation, it possesses, even in the hottest weather, an agreeable coolness. It is found, too, where water is not to be obtained; and even the most fastidious, when travelling under a vertical sun, are then forced to admit its merits.

It is only to be met with in perfection near the places where it is grown, as it is conveyed to the great towns in skins, on asses: a tedious process, in the course of which the smell increases, while the freshness of the liquor is lost.

A strong sort of brandy, called *Mēxīcāl*, or *aguardiente de Maguey*, is likewise extracted from the aloe, of which there is a great consumption in the country. Nor is the utility of the plant confined to this; the Aztecs prepared from its leaves the paper on which their hieroglyphics were written, pieces of which, of various thickness, may be found at the present day; and the more fibrous parts supply the country with *pita*, a strong thread, or twine, which is made up into ropes, and used not only in the mines, but on the Western coast, as cordage for vessels. It is not so pliable as hemp, and is more liable to be affected by the weather; but it is extremely tough, and durable, and consequently of very general utility. The annexed plate contains an Aloe in full produce, with the leaves cut, the central cup displayed, and the skin, gourd, and scraper, used in extracting the sap.

COLONIAL PRODUCE.

I come now to those productions, which are termed in Europe "Colonial produce," as being, usually, the growth of Colonies founded by the nations of the Old World in the warmer regions of the New, and supplying the parent States with those articles of luxury, or necessity, which the climate of Europe is not calculated to produce.

In Mexico they comprehend sugar, coffee, tobacco, indigo, chocolate, and cotton, besides vanilla and cochineal, of which nature seems to have given to New Spain the almost exclusive possession. I shall begin with sugar, as being the only article of general consumption in Europe, the exportation of which, before the Revolution, was carried to any extent.

SUGAR.

Humboldt has endeavoured to fix the maximum of height at which the cane may be cultivated in Mexico; and to his scientific disquisitions I must refer such of my readers as are inclined to view this part of the subject with interest. It is my own belief, that no general theory can be established; for, as I have stated in the first section, a thousand local causes, totally independent of elevation, may, and do, produce the degree of heat required to bring the cane to perfection. It is admitted, however, that the juice is more, or less, abundant, and rich in saccharine matter, in proportion to the height at which it is grown; and that the produce of a plantation in a valley on the Table-land, would not be equal, either in quality, or quantity, to that of a plantation of similar extent upon the coast.

Elevation has, therefore, some peculiar effects upon vegetation, even where external appearances are the same; but to what extent, and in what way its influence is exercised, it remains for future naturalists to determine. In general, it

is thought that the sugar-cane requires a mean temperature of 19 or 20 degrees of the Centigrade thermometer, (68 or 69 of Fahrenheit). Mexico possesses upon her Eastern and Western line of coast, a vast extent of country in which this temperature may be found ; but as exportation was only permitted, before 1810, through the port of Veracruz, while the great body of consumers was concentrated on the Tableland, but little attention was paid to those situations, which were not within reach of one of these markets.

It is to the constancy of the demand in the Interior, that we must attribute the choice of the valleys of Cuernāvaca and Cūāutla Āmīlpās, (within twenty leagues of the Capital,) as the seat of the principal sugar plantations of the country ; and the fact, that these plantations have maintained themselves during the whole of the revolutionary war, while those of Orizava and Cōrdōvā, on the slope of the Cordillera, which depended more upon the foreign market, fell into decay, as soon as the progress of the Insurgents put an end to their freedom of communication with the coast.

In the course of time, the increasing intercourse with foreign countries will, probably, create a change in this respect, and render the value of a sugar estate upon the coast at least equal to that of one in the Interior. The number of vessels that now return in ballast from Veracruz insures a ready market, and although the rate of wages upon the coast is higher, the superior fertility of the soil will more than compensate this disadvantage.

Humboldt gives 2800 kilogrammes, or 224 Arrobas (of 25lbs.) of raw sugar, as the produce of a hectare of the best land in the province of Veracruz, in situations favourable to irrigation.

That of Cuba does not exceed 1400 kilogrammes ; so that the balance is as two to one in favour of Veracruz.

The immense amount of the capitals withdrawn from the country since 1822, and the distrust still inspired by a re-

collection of the Revolution, render any very speedy extension of the cultivation of the sugar-cane improbable.

Enough is hardly grown, at present, for the home consumption of the country, which is enormous. In 1802 it was estimated at 1,400,000 Arrobas, (35,000,000 of pounds;) the value of which, at the market price of two dollars and a half per Arroba, was 3,500,000 dollars, or nearly 700,000*l.* sterling. In addition to this, in the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, sugar to the amount of one million and a half of dollars was exported, and although the exportations afterwards diminished, the quantity raised up to 1810 was not supposed to have materially decreased.*

At the present day, the amount of the total produce is not exactly known, but it must be considerably less than that of the best years before the Revolution, as the sugar estates are confined almost entirely to the valleys of Cūāutlá and Cuernāvaca. Those of Ōxaca, the Baxiō, Valladōlid, and Guadālajara, were destroyed during the civil war, and the machinery has never been re-established, so that the most distant provinces are obliged to draw their supplies of sugar from Cūāutlá; a circumstance, which, of course, limits the consumption exceedingly, by raising the price so as to exclude the poorer classes from the market. The present price of the Arroba of sugar in the Capital, is from three, to three and a half dollars, (twenty-four to twenty-eight reals,) which, taking the dollar, as I have done throughout

* Extract from "Balanza General del Comercio de Veracruz:

	Value of Sugar Exported.
1802	1,454,240
1803	1,495,056
1804	1,097,505
1809	482,492
1810	269,383
1813	19,412
From 1814	
to 1820	

this sketch, at four shillings, and the Arroba at 25lbs. will give something more than sixpence a pound (English money) as the value of sugar in Mexico, within twenty leagues of the place where it is grown. When sent into the Interior, the price rises with every twenty leagues, until, in Dūrāngō, the Arroba sells for six and seven dollars, and in Chihūahūa, for nine and ten. This can only be remedied by a more equal cultivation of the cane in those situations, which are more especially favourable to its growth; and there is, perhaps, no Transatlantic speculation that would prove so advantageous as this, if properly conducted.

I was induced, by the proximity of the great sugar estates of Cuernāvaca, and Cūāutla to the Capital, to visit the valley in which they are situated. It lies at the foot of the first step, or terrace, on the descent from the Tableland towards the Pacific, about 319 toises* below the level of the Capital; and extends nearly fifty miles, in a direction from S.W. to N.E. The plains of Cūāutla are considerably lower than those about Sān Gābriēl, in the vicinity of Cuernāvaca; but, with the exception of a ridge of hills dividing the two valleys, the whole space from İzucār to Cuernāvaca is occupied by a succession of *Haciendas*, (estates,) all of which are in a state of the most beautiful cultivation. The valley abounds in water, both for irrigation and machinery, which last, in the opinion of a gentleman who accompanied me, and who is well acquainted with our West India Islands, is fully equal to that employed in the British Colonies, where steam-engines have not been introduced.

The crops are usually very abundant, the cane being

* This is the level of the town of Cuernavaca itself, but the plains of San Gabriel are, I should think, at least eighty toises lower than the town, and those of Cūāutla approach nearer to the level of Istla, which is 664 toises lower than Mexico.

planted much closer than is customary in Jamaica, but the ground is not exhausted by this system, as the Mexican planter is enabled, from the extent of his estate, to divide his sugar lands into *four* equal parts, one only of which is taken annually into cultivation. The remaining three lie fallow, until their turn comes round again.

The sugar produced, though abounding in saccharine matter, is generally coarse in appearance, and of a bad colour, being merely clayed, in order to free it from the molasses: the art of refining, though well understood, is seldom, or never, carried beyond the first stage of the process, there being no demand in the market for double-refined sugar.

The principal estates in the neighbourhood of Cuernavaca, are those of Tēmīscō and Sãn Găbrīēl, both of which belong to the family of Don Gabriel Yērmō, (a Spaniard, famous for the arrest of the Viceroy Iturrigaray, in 1808, with which the Mexican Revolution may be said to have commenced :) Trēintă-pēsōs, El Pūēntē, Měăcătlan, Sãn Găspār, and Sãn Vīcēntē Chicōnquāc. Those in the valley of Cūātūlă are San Carlos, Păntītlān, Cōcōyōc, Căldērōn, Căsă-sănō, Săntă Inēs, Cōhăhūistlă, Măpăstlān, and Tēnēcstēpāngō. None of these estates produce less than 30,000 Arrobas of sugar in the year, while the annual produce of some of the largest may be estimated at from 40 to 50,000. The profits in a good year are very great, for, as each Arroba of sugar yields an equal quantity of molasses, which sells at the door of the Hacienda for five reals and a half per Arroba, the sale of this alone is sometimes sufficient to cover the *raya*, or weekly expenditure of the estate, leaving only the wear and tear of the machinery to be deducted from the produce of the whole crop of sugar. From the molasses, 30,000 barrels of chīngăritō, or coarse rum, are made every year, in the neighbourhood of Cuernavaca alone. At Săntă Inēs, where a private distillery is established upon the estate, in which 4,000 barrels are manufactured upon the owner's account, the spe-

cultivation is found to be a very lucrative one, as the barrel sells in Mexico for thirty-two dollars, and is worth twenty-four net, after paying both duties and carriage.

The possibility of cultivating the sugar-cane beneath the Tropics, by a system of free labour, has often been canvassed, but I know no country except Mexico where the experiment has been fairly tried upon a large scale. The plantations of Cuernavaca were all worked, in the first instance, by slaves, who were purchased at Veracruz, at from three to four hundred dollars each. The difficulty of ensuring a sufficient supply during a war with a maritime power, and the number of slaves who perished from the sudden change of climate on the road from the coast, induced several of the great proprietors to endeavour to propagate a race of free labourers, by giving liberty to a certain number of slaves annually, and encouraging them to intermarry with the native Indians, which they soon did to a very great extent.

The plan was found to be so economical, that, on many of the largest estates, there was not a single slave in the year 1808; but the policy of the measure became still more apparent in 1810, for, as soon as the Revolution broke out, those planters who had not adopted the system of gradual emancipation, were abandoned, at once, by their slaves, and forced, in some instances, to give up working their estates; while those who had provided themselves, in time, with a mixed caste of free labourers, retained, even during the worst of times, a sufficient number of hands to enable them to cultivate their lands, although upon a reduced scale.

The great Haciendas now expend in wages, and other current charges, from 8 to 1200 dollars a week.

The labourers are mostly paid by the piece, and can earn, if industrious, from six to seven reals per diem (three shillings, or three and sixpence, English money.)

The number of workmen employed upon an estate capable of producing 40,000 Arrobas of sugar, is one hundred and

fifty, with occasional additions, when the season is late, or the work has been retarded by accidental causes.

They are divided into gangs, as in the West Indies, and appeared to me to perform their several tasks with great precision, and rapidity. Fifty men are employed in watering the canes; * twenty in cutting; ten in bringing the cut canes from the field, (each with six mules;) twenty-five, (mostly boys,) in separating the green tops, which are used as fodder, and binding up the remainder for the muleteers. Twenty men, in gangs of four each, feed the engine, day and night; fourteen attend the boilers; twelve keep up the fires; four turn the cane in the sun, when the juice is expressed, and dry it for fuel; and ten are constantly at work in the warehouse, clarifying the sugar, and removing it afterwards to the store-rooms, from whence it is sent to the market.

All these labours proceed without difficulty or compulsion, and the sound of the whip is never heard; but whether freedom will have the effect (as many hold here) of raising the workmen in the scale of civilization, is a question which I cannot pretend to decide. It is much to be desired, certainly, for a more debauched, ignorant, and barbarous race, than the present inhabitants of the sugar districts, it is impossible to conceive. They seem to have engrafted the wild passions of the negro upon the cunning, and suspicious character of the Indian; and are noted for their ferocity, vindictiveness, and attachment to spirituous liquors. When not at work, they are constantly drunk; and as they have little or no sense of religious or moral duties, there is but a slender chance of amendment. They are, however, an active, and at intervals, a laborious race, capable of enduring great fatigue, and, apparently, well suited in constitution to the dangerous climate which they inhabit.

* The Spanish names, in regular succession, are, Rêgădôrês, Măchê-têrôs, Arriêrôs, Zăcătêrôs, or Atăjădôrês, Trăpichêrôs, Căldêrêrôs, Hôr-nêrôs, Vôltêădôrês, Alzadores, Pürgădôrês.

The valley of Cuernăvaca suffered much in the first years of the revolution, and particularly during the siege of Cūāutla Amīlpās, in 1814, when most of the neighbouring estates were destroyed by the contending armies. They have, however, recovered their losses during the last ten years, and I could not discover that there was any reason to believe that the total produce of the valley ever much exceeded that of the present day.

The establishment of a *Trapiche* (a term implying all the works requisite for a sugar estate) is attended with too much expense for me to venture to predict any very rapid extension of the cultivation of sugar; although, in thirty years, (from 1763 to 1793,) the number of *Ingenios*, (sugar plantations,) in the island of Cuba, increased from seventy, to three hundred and five; and, in ten years more, (1796 to 1806,) rose from three hundred and five, to four hundred and eighty: but this was occasioned by an influx of planters from Hayti, who brought with them both capital and science; whereas, in Mexico, the men who possessed the largest share of both these essential requisites, (the old Spanish proprietors,) have quitted the country, and abandoned in many instances, whatever property they could not realize. This is a drawback, for which the present freedom of intercourse with the Old World cannot afford any immediate compensation. That it will do so, ultimately, I cannot doubt; for the advantages of this mode of investing capital must long be great, in a country where the home consumption alone has kept the price of sugar, during the last ten years, at nearly double the average market-price in the Havanna,* and where the system of free labour renders the expense of working the estate infinitely less. That it does produce this effect, seems to be proved by

* The prices at the Havanna averaged, from 1810 to 1815, sixteen to twenty reals per Arroba; in 1822, from ten to fourteen reals; in 1826, from nine to thirteen, or twenty-four dollars the case.—*Vide* Humboldt Essai Politique sur l'Ile de Cuba.

the fact, that one hundred and fifty slaves are employed, in the Island of Cuba, upon a plantation capable of producing one thousand cases, or 16,000 Arrobas of sugar, (*vide* Humboldt *Essai Politique sur l'Ile de Cuba*;) while, in the valley of Cūāūtlā, one hundred and fifty free labourers are found sufficient for a Hacienda, which yields from thirty-two to forty thousand Arrobas. Thus, (supposing the expense in other respects to be the same,) in the one case, the produce of each individual would be 2666lbs., and in the other, 5332lbs., or even 6666lbs., taking the maximum of 40,000 Arrobas. The correctness of this calculation depends, of course, upon the comparative fertility of the soil in the island of Cuba, and in the valley of Cūāūtlā Āmīlpās, respecting which I am not competent to give an opinion. There is no reason, however, to suppose that there is any superiority in the soil of Cūāūtlā, sufficiently great to account for so marked a difference in the amount of the sugar, raised by an equal number of labourers; for the elevation of the valley above the level of the ocean, renders it impossible to apply Humboldt's estimate of the extraordinary fertility of Veracruz, to the plantations of Cūāūtlā, or Cuernavaca.

I regard all these points as well worthy the attention of capitalists, and it is with this view, and not with that of raising upon them any theory of my own, that I have made them here the subject of particular consideration.

COFFEE.

Coffee is another of the Tropical productions, for which the soil of Mexico is admirably adapted, and which is likely to be cultivated, immediately, to a considerable extent, because the capital required to establish a plantation is comparatively small.

Coffee has, however, never formed an article of exportation in New Spain, nor has the use of it been very general in

the interior of the country, until within the last few years, when the large returns derived by the merchants of the Havanna from their *Cafetales*, or coffee grounds, induced some of the Mexican proprietors to turn their attention to this branch of colonial agriculture.

In 1818 and 1819, extensive plantations of coffee were laid out near Córdovă and Őrizăvă, to which constant additions have been made during the last three years.

The tree has likewise been introduced into the valley of Cūăutlă, by Don Antonio Velasco, and into that of Cuărnăvăcă by the Agent of the Duke of Monteleone; who possesses, as representative of the family of Cortes, the large estate of Atlăjômûlcă, in the immediate vicinity of the town. The two estates of Velasco, at Căcăyăc and Păntîtlăn, contain about five hundred thousand coffee plants, fifty thousand of which were in full produce when I saw them in 1826. The crop of the preceding year amounted to five thousand Arrobas, or 125,000lbs., which gives two and a half pounds of coffee as the average produce of each plant. I am induced to believe that this will be the ordinary produce of good land throughout Mexico: it considerably exceeds that of the Havanna, where Humboldt gives 860 *kilogrammes* as the average of a *hectare* of land, containing 3500 plants; but it is a much lower estimate than any Mexican planter would make, as, in many parts of the country, from three to four pounds are said to be a fair average crop. I could not ascertain, however, that this calculation was founded upon correct data; and I do not, therefore, give it as one that may be strictly relied upon: but I know one instance, of a single coffee tree, having produced twenty-eight pounds of coffee in the garden of Don Pablo de la Llave, at Cordova, and it is the certainty that this fact is unquestionably true, that induces me to give, as the possible average of good grounds in Mexico, a produce more than double that which, in the Island of Cuba, is the maximum of the best year in three.

The cultivation of coffee in New Spain possesses, at present, many advantages over that of sugar. The Arroba sells in the capital at from five to seven dollars, (nearly double the price of the Arroba of sugar,) and may be raised at a much less expense; as a plantation, containing 200,000 plants, does not require the permanent attendance of more than twenty men to weed and water.*

The young plants, however, are delicate, and must be protected from the sun for two whole years, for which purpose a large piece of ground, called the *Sēmillerö*, is covered in, and thickly planted with young shoots; the third year these will bear transplantation to the open field, and the fourth they may be reckoned in full vigour; they last from twenty-five to thirty years. From the attention which is now paid to coffee plantations throughout Mexico, it is probable that coffee will soon be added to the list of her exportations, in which case the European market will, undoubtedly, draw from New Spain a very considerable addition to the supply now derived from the West Indian Archipelago; for, although the islands have the advantage of being already in possession of the market, Mexico has that of attracting annually to her shores a vast number of European vessels, to all of which a return cargo is an object of no little importance. The slope of the Eastern Cordillera is well calculated to supply this, by its vicinity to the coast, as are the Peninsula of *Yücātān*, (in which a few small coffee plantations already exist,) and the State of *Tăbăscö*, where coffee, which was originally cultivated merely as an appendage to the cacao plantations, is now considered as a separate branch of agriculture, and has already been grown, and exported to some extent.

* Ten *regadores* (waterers) and ten *escardadores* (weederers) are the allowance for a plantation; but in addition to these, from fifty to sixty men must be employed in collecting the crop, and as many more in cleaning and pruning the trees afterwards, (*la poda*;) but these operations do not last above three months.

The plantations of Cūāūtlā will be excluded from the foreign market by the distance, and the difficulties of communication; but they will supply the whole consumption of the Interior, which is daily increasing.

Of the rapidity with which the cultivation of coffee may be extended, the Havanna has furnished a memorable example.

In the year 1800, the island only contained sixty plantations, in 1817 it possessed seven hundred and seventy-nine, and at the present day the number is estimated at nearly nine hundred.

The total produce was,	Arrobas
in 1804	50,000
in 1809	918,263
from 1818 }	
to 1824 }	(Average) 1,218,000

This extraordinary impulse was communicated by events not calculated to exercise so direct an influence upon the prosperity of the country, as those which have taken place in Mexico, where the bonds by which the internal resources of the country were so long cramped, have been burst at once. It was the ruin of St. Domingo, and the relaxation of the Colonial System in Spain, that led to the prosperity of the Havanna; nor is it assuming much, to suppose that a free trade may produce a similar effect in a country, even more favoured by nature than the Island of Cuba. The want of a market need not be apprehended, for the consumption of Europe appears to increase every year, and will, probably, continue to do so, as the supply augments, until the price falls to that point, at which the planter would cease to derive any advantage from his labours. What this point is, has not yet been ascertained. According to Humboldt, coffee has varied, at the Havanna, during the present century, from thirty, to four, dollars the quintal, (of four Arrobas.) From 1815 to 1819 it was constantly between thirteen and

seventeen dollars ; now it is only twelve, and may be expected to fall still lower.

In the interior of Mexico, it was worth, in 1826, from five to seven dollars the Arroba, (twenty and twenty-eight dollars the quintal,) but this value it will, of course, lose as the cultivation extends. On the coast, I have little doubt that the coffee of Cordova might be sold, already, at the same price as that of the Havanna. The quality is, in general, excellent, and equal, in the opinion of the best judges, to that of any other country in the world.

TOBACCO.

Mexican tobacco is chiefly important as an article of revenue. The plant is a government monopoly, and the growth of it confined to a small district in the vicinity of Ōřizāvā and Cōrdōva. It is, therefore, not likely to become an article of exportation, and is only interesting to European commerce, from the quantity of paper used in the segar manufactories : of these, as well as of the mode in which the Tobacco monopoly is conducted, I shall have occasion to speak elsewhere. The quality of the plant in New Spain is thought to be inferior to that of the Havanna.

INDIGO.

Anil.

The use of this plant was general among the Aztecs before the conquest : they called it Xiuhquilitzahuac, (the pronunciation of which would be an admirable *coup d'essai* for any one who may desire to cultivate the Aztec tongue.) During the last century it has been almost entirely neglected, from the preference given in Europe to the indigo of Guatemala, or Central America, and the failure of the native cotton manufactures, in which it was principally used. A little indigo is now grown on the Western coasts, and

an attempt is making to introduce it into the valley of Cūāūtlā; but, upon so small a scale, that many years must elapse before it can possibly rise into importance. In Yūcātān, there are some plantations of indigo, and in Tă-bāscō, according to the statistical report transmitted by the State to Congress, it is a natural production of the soil, which is marshy and hot. Indeed, from the vicinity of Tabasco to the great indigo plantations of Săn Sălvădōr, (in Guatemala,) which produce annually 12,000 tercios, or 1,800,000 lbs. of indigo, valued at 2,000,000 of dollars, there is reason to suppose that the plant might be cultivated there with success; but for this, as for every thing else in Mexico, time is requisite. The resources of the country cannot be developed in a day; and whatever the future capabilities of Tabasco may be, it is now one of the poorest states of the Federation.

CACAO.

Cacava quahuil.

It is from Mexico that both the use, and the name of chocolate, (Aztec chocolatl,) were borrowed, and introduced into Europe; but the cacao of Söcönūscō, (in Central América,) from its superiority to all others, has entirely supplanted, in Mexico, the use of the cacao of Mexican growth, and but little attention is, consequently, paid to its cultivation. The plant appears to succeed better nearer the Equator, in the low hot grounds of Căracăs, Guățēmălă, and Guăyāqūil, where it is now grown to a great extent. From all of these Mexico draws an annual supply: but there are still some plantations of cacao near Cōlīmă, (on the Western coast,) in the Isthmus of Těhuāntěpēc, and in the State of Tabasco, where it appears, by the statistical report of 1826, to form an article of considerable importance. Like indigo, it is supposed to have been originally an indigenous plant, but the principal plantations are now found on the banks

of rivers, or in districts liable to be annually overflowed, (tierras anegadizas,) in which the cacao tree thrives best. The number of trees now under cultivation is not known, but the average annual produce is stated not to be less than 15,000 cargas, of 60lbs. each.

COTTON.

Cotton was found amongst the indigenous productions of Mexico, at the time of the conquest, and furnished almost the only clothing used by the natives. The cultivation has been since much neglected, and the art of imparting to it the brilliant colours so common amongst the Aztecs, entirely lost. Up to the close of the last century, however, the annual value of the cotton manufactures of the country was estimated at five millions of dollars. They are now gradually disappearing, as the supply of European manufactures becomes more abundant, and will probably cease to exist in the course of a few years; but the raw material, by which they were supplied, may become of the greatest importance, if the cotton plantations be kept up, as an article, not of home consumption, but of exportation for the foreign market. The Mexicans are not yet aware of the advantages which they might derive from this change, or of the facility with which it might be effected.

Throughout the United States, cotton is a plant of annual growth; the frost destroys it, and every year the labour of clearing the ground, and forming a fresh plantation, must be undertaken anew.

In the *Tierra caliente* of Mexico, nothing of the kind is required; the tree propagates itself, and the only attention requisite, on the part of the proprietor, is to prevent the ground from being overrun by the multiplicity of other plants, which the profuse vegetation of the Tropics is continually calling into existence.

There are still considerable cotton plantations upon the Western coast, and in the vicinity of the River Nāzās, in

Dūrāngō, from whence the cotton-spinners of Zăcățecăs, Săltillō, and San Luis, are supplied with raw material for their Tăpălōs (shawls), and other domestic manufactures.

The price of cotton on the Table-land has been, hitherto, very high, from the expense of carriage; for, until very lately, a cotton gin (simple as the invention is) was unknown in any part of the country, and the cotton was sent from the place where it was grown, to the nearest manufacturing district, without being even separated from the seeds, much less cleaned, or pressed, or submitted to any of those processes by which the bulk is usually reduced. But this state of things cannot last; and where the remedy is so easy, and the advantages so great, it is impossible that public attention should not, speedily, be turned to an object of so much interest, not only to Mexico, but to all the manufacturing countries of the Old World. Twenty-five thousand Arrobas of cotton is the utmost that has yet been exported from Veracruz in the year; but the supply must increase with the demand, since no great exertion or capital are required to produce it. In Texas, Austin's colony already makes large remittances of cotton to New Orleans; and I doubt not that this branch of agriculture will soon be every where duly appreciated.

In the United States, the production of cotton increased, (according to Humboldt,) in six years, (from 1797 to 1803,) in the ratio of three hundred and seventy-seven to one.

Were it possible to communicate a very small portion of similar activity to Mexico, the effect upon her external trade would be considerable; for, in 1824, the value of the cotton exported from the United States, amounted to 21,947,404 dollars, (*vide* Mellish's United States.) One-tenth, or even one-twentieth part of this would form no unimportant item in the exports of a country, which, at present, is forced to cover the amount of its importations, almost entirely with cochineal and bullion.

VANILLA.—(*Epidendrum Vanilla.*)

This is one of the endless variety of parasitic plants, with which the forests of Věřacrŭz abound. It was long thought to be confined, almost entirely, to the district of Mīsāntlā, at the foot of the mountain of Qŭilātě, (in Věřacrŭz,) and to the vicinity of the village of Teŭtīlā, in the state of Ōăxăcā; but it has recently been discovered in great abundance in Tabasco, upon the mountains near the coast, where, during the last two years, some hundreds of millares have been collected, with every probability of a farther increase. In Ōăxăcā and Věřacrŭz, the cultivation is entirely in the hands of the Indians. It is a very simple process, for a shoot of the Vanilla, when planted at the foot of the tree destined to support it, requires no other care than to be freed, occasionally, from the hardier creepers, by which its progress is impeded. It gives fruit the third season, and continues to produce for thirty, or forty, years without interruption. The pods are sold by the Millar, or thousand, subdivided into mazos, or packets of fifty pods each. To prepare these for the market, the Vanilla is dried for some hours in the sun, and then wrapped in woollen cloths, to sweat it; after which it is again exposed to the sun, dried, and packed up.

There are several different qualities of Vanilla, designated as Grande fina, Chica fina, Zacate, Rezacate, and Basura. The best of these sold, before the Revolution, at Veracruz, for about forty-four dollars a Millar, from nine to eighteen hundred of which were exported annually.

JALAP.

Convolvulus Jalapa.

This drug takes its name from the town of Jalapa, in the vicinity of which it is found.

It is a root of a parasitic plant, with leaves like the ivy, and a red flower, which has the property of shunning the light,

and opening only at night, whence the French name for it, *Belle de nuit*. The quantity exported from Veracruz seldom exceeds three thousand quintals.

COCHINEAL.

Cochineal is another of the precious productions which Nature seems to have bestowed, almost exclusively, upon Mexico; for the insect bearing the same name in the Brazils is of a very inferior kind. It is that known by the naturalists as *Grana Silvestre*, and the dye extracted from it is neither so brilliant, nor so durable, as that of the *Grana Fina*, with which Mexico supplies the European market. The *Grana Fina*, at its utmost growth, resembles a bug in size and colour, with the exception of a mealy, or whitish powder, through which the rings, or cross stripes on the back of the insect, are distinctly visible: The female alone produces the dye; the males are smaller, and one is found sufficient for three hundred females.

According to Humboldt, the insect is bred on a species of Cactus, (*Opuntia*, or Indian fig,) the fruit of which is white.

The Cochineal feeds only upon the leaf. The process of rearing it is complicated, and attended with much difficulty: the leaves of the Nopal, on which the eggs are deposited, must be kept free from all extraneous substances, and in the Cochineal districts the Indian women are seen bending over them for hours together, and brushing them lightly with a squirrel's tail.

In a good year, one pound of Semilla, deposited upon the plant in October, will yield, in December, twelve pounds of Cochineal, leaving a sufficient quantity of seed behind to give a second crop in May.

The plantations of the Cochineal Cactus are confined to the district of La Místecă, in the state of Oăxăcă. Some of these Haciendas de Năpălės contain from fifty, to sixty, thou-

sand plants, arranged in lines, like the Aloes in the Maguey plantations already described, and cut down to a certain height, in order to enable the Nopaleros to clean them more easily.

In the year 1758, a government registry office was established at Ōăxăcă, in consequence of the complaints of some English merchants, who had received cargoes of adulterated Cochineal, in which all the Cochineal produced in the province was ordered to be examined and registered. By the official returns in my possession, it appears that the value of the Cochineal entered upon the books of this office up to 1815, was 91,308,907 dollars, which, upon fifty-seven years, gives an average of 1,601,910 dollars per annum, without making any allowance for contraband, which has always been carried on to the amount of nearly half a million more. The number of pounds collected during the same time was 37,835,104lbs.; so that the price current upon the spot, averaged two dollars, three and a half reals, a pound; it has varied, however, from six, to thirty-four reals, and has even risen from six, to twenty-four, in the same year.

The annual registered exportation of Cochineal from Veracruz, has amounted, according to the Consulado reports, during a term of twenty-five years, (from 1796 to 1820 inclusive,) to 34,316,961 dollars, being the value of 352,843 Arrobas of Cochineal; which gives an average of 1,372,678 dollars, and 14,113 Arrobas upon each year. The total registered produce of Ōăxăcă being, as we have seen, 37,835,104lbs. (1,513,404 Arrobas,) on the term of fifty-seven years, which gives 26,550 Arrobas as the average of each year, it becomes evident, that an illicit trade, to an enormous extent, must have been carried on; as the difference between the produce and the exportation, would leave 12,437 Arrobas as the annual home consumption of Mexico, where, certainly, not half that number of pounds are employed. If, therefore, it be supposed that one-Fourth more

is produced in Oaxaca than is registered, an allowance of at least one-third must be made for contraband upon the coast. This would give 1,830,237 dollars as the value of the exportations, (taking 1,372,678 dollars as the average of the registers;) while the produce, adding one-Fourth, as before stated, to the average registered value on fifty-seven years, (1,601,910 dollars,) would be 2,002,387 dollars, which bears a fair proportion to the exportation, and at which I am consequently inclined to think that the cochineal annually raised in Mexico may fairly be estimated.

Many are disposed to rate it much higher, (two millions and a half of dollars,) but as I am not in possession of any data that warrant this supposition, I shall confine myself to the calculation given above, in which I am borne out by positive facts. The crop is divided into three classes,—Grana, Granilla, and Polvos de Grana: to these may be added, Zacatilla, the name given to the December crop in the Mistecca, the quality of which is thought to be superior to that of the others.

WAX.

The great consumption of wax in the church ceremonies renders this an article of much importance. Some attention is paid to it in the Peninsula of Yūcātān, where there are Colmenares, containing six and seven hundred hives.

But Mexico imports annually a large quantity, (from two to three thousand Arrobas,) which, now that the direct trade with the Havanna is closed, is introduced principally through New Orleans.

Mexico possesses, in addition to the productions enumerated above, Tabascan pepper, (*Pimienta malagueta*, o'llainada,) which grows wild throughout that State, and is collected in the months of July and August; Campeche log-wood, Mahogany, equal to that of St. Domingo or Cuba,

and a thousand other varieties of timber, of the most beautiful and variegated kinds. All these have been, hitherto, neglected, nor is there yet a single saw-mill in the *Tierras calientes*, where they are principally found; but the States are endeavouring to bring this branch of national industry into activity, by fitting up with native woods the halls of Congress, and other public offices established under the New System.

Pearls are found in abundance on the Western coast, and particularly in the Gulph of California, where, although the diving-bell has failed, the native divers are by no means unsuccessful.

Few countries are richer than Mexico in domestic animals: the horned cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, and horses, introduced by the Spaniards, have flourished in every part of her territory, and multiplied to such a degree that their numbers are now incalculable.

In Texas, California, and the Indian country, vast herds run wild in the forests, and even in the Interior the number both of horses and cattle kept on many of the large Haciendas is hardly known. Buffon's theory of the degeneration of European animals in America is totally unfounded. As Humboldt beautifully expresses it, "since the facts alleged have been carefully examined, naturalists have discovered proofs of harmony, where the eloquent writer announced only contrasts."

The wool of the Mexican sheep is supposed to be of an inferior quality, but I am inclined to attribute its defects more to neglect, and to the too great abundance of the Cactus, and other thorny shrubs, in the plains where the great flocks of the Interior are fed, than to any peculiarity in the climate.

Wherever due attention is paid to the subject, and care taken to preserve the fleece from injury, the quality seems

to improve, and the price rises from ten, or fourteen reals, to twenty-four, and twenty-eight reals, per Arroba. This is the case at Quērētārō, with what is termed the *Lana de chinchorro*, of which I shall have occasion to speak in the account of my journey into the Interior.

The total agricultural produce of Mexico, calculated by Humboldt upon the Tithes, (on a term of ten years,) with an allowance of three millions of dollars for the Cochineal, the Vanilla, Jalap, Sarsaparilla, and Tabascan pepper, which paid no tithes, and two millions more for the Sugar and Indigo, upon which the clergy only received a duty of four per cent., was found to amount to twenty-nine millions of dollars, and thus to exceed, by four millions, the annual average produce of the mines, from which the wealth of the country was supposed to be principally derived.

Of the present amount it is impossible to form any correct estimate, from the state of disorganization into which both church, and state, have been thrown by the civil war.

But the produce, under less favourable circumstances, cannot be objected to as a criterion of what may again be; and, should the country continue in a state of tranquillity, I am inclined to think, that before the year 1835, the agricultural wealth of New Spain will be fully equal to that of 1803.

Without wishing to found any unreasonable hypothesis upon the contents of the preceding pages, it appears to me that they warrant the following conclusions.

That Mexico possesses the means of maintaining, in abundance, a population infinitely superior to the present number of its inhabitants.

That although, from the peculiar structure of the country, the agricultural wealth of the Table-land is not likely to be brought into the European market, it ensures the general prosperity of the Interior; while the cotton, coffee, sugar,

and indigo, cacao, and other productions of the Coasts, will form, in the course of a few years, a very considerable mass of exportable commodities.

That these, in conjunction with the cochineal, and the precious metals, must render the external trade of New Spain highly interesting to Europe; while the amount of the population, and the absence of manufactures, give to the internal consumption of the country an importance, which none of the other New States of America possess.

Mexico contains nearly one half of the seventeen millions of inhabitants that are said to compose the population of the former colonies of Spain, and this half possesses, perhaps, the largest share of the mineral and vegetable riches of the New World.

It is not, therefore, a mere theory to suppose that the progress of such a country must exercise a considerable influence upon the manufacturing industry of the Old World.

Of its future consumption, (as I stated in the first section,) no estimate can be formed by that of former times, when its resources were prevented from developing themselves by the jealous policy of the Mother country, which will form the subject of the following section.

Its probable importance may be more easily deduced from the facts which I shall endeavour to embody in the present work, in order to enable my readers to form their own conclusions upon data, the authenticity of which I need not add that I have taken all possible pains to ascertain.

SECTION IV.

SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM.

UNDER this head, it is my intention to give some account of the mode in which the Internal government of the former Spanish Colonies was carried on, before the year 1810, and to add a sketch of those prohibitory laws with regard to foreign trade, which formed so marked a feature in the policy of the Mother country. It is true, that these laws have ceased to exist, but an acquaintance with them, as well as a knowledge of the political institutions by which they were supported, are essential to a right understanding of the events that have since taken place; for it is in the complication of abuses, to which the old system gave rise, that we must seek the causes of that Revolution, which has changed the face of the New World.

With the exception of Brazil, Dutch and French Guiana, and our present colonies of Demerara and Esequibo, the Spanish possessions occupied the whole of South America, the Isthmus of Pānāmā, and a portion of the Northern continent, extending to the confines of the United States.

This vast territory was divided into four Vice-royalties,* Mexico, Peru, Rio de la Plata, (Buenos Ayres,) and New Granada; and five Captain-general-ships, which comprised

* Originally, there were only two Vice-royalties, (those of Mexico and Peru,) on which all the other colonial establishments depended. The abuses to which this system gave rise, led to the establishment of a separate government in New Granada in 1718; in Venezuela in 1731; in Chile in 1734; and in Buenos Ayres in 1778.

the Peninsula of Yūcātān, Guātēmāla, Chile, Věnězuēla, and the Island of Cuba. The Captains-general, although holding situations of minor importance, were independent of the Viceroy, as were the Viceroy of each other: indeed, in most cases, natural barriers precluded the possibility of communication.

The government of each of the Colonies was vested in the hands of one of these great servants of the crown. In Mexico, the Viceroy was endowed with all the prerogatives of royalty, and considered as the *alter ego* of the King himself. The only checks upon his authority were the "*Residencia*," or legal investigation of his conduct, to which, at the King's pleasure, he might be subjected, on his return to Spain, but which was seldom, if ever, enforced; and the "*Audiencia*," or court of appeal in dernier resort, with which, as honorary president, he had many means of cultivating a good understanding. The Audiencia, however, which was composed entirely of Europeans, possessed considerable power and influence: it had a control over all other tribunals, ecclesiastical as well as civil, in cases where the value of the object in litigation did not exceed ten thousand dollars;* and it enjoyed the privilege of corresponding directly with the sovereign, and with the Council of the Indies; a board created in 1511, by Ferdinand II., and remodelled by Charles V. in 1524, for the exclusive superintendence of the affairs of the Colonies. At this board the King was supposed, constantly, to preside in person; orders and decrees, though emanating from the crown, were to be communicated through it in order to acquire the force of law; and all projects of reform were to receive its sanction, before they could be carried into execution.

The right of communicating directly with this formidable tribunal, gave, of itself, great weight to the Audiencia; and

* In this case, an appeal lay to the Council of the Indies.

this was increased by the care with which its members were usually selected, and by the pains that were taken to keep them distinct from the natives in interest and feelings. They were forbidden to intermarry with a Creole, (as were the Viceroy's and their children;) or to engage in trade, or even to hold property in the country in which they resided. As some compensation, they were entrusted with the vice-regal power, in the event of the Viceroy's decease, which was held by the Regent, or eldest Oidor, until a new Viceroy was appointed; and enjoyed a number of other privileges, which left them but little reason to regard the position of any of their countrymen as more advantageous, (even in a pecuniary sense,) than their own. In the more extensive Colonies, branches of the Audiencia were established in the provinces most remote from the seat of government,* but these exercised no independent jurisdiction, and an appeal lay from them, in all cases, to the Audiencia of the capital.

The "*Recopilacion de las Leyes de las Indias*," or General collection of the laws of the Indies, is the name given, in Spanish jurisprudence, to that heterogeneous mass of statutes, by which, during the last three centuries, the decisions of these tribunals were supposed to be determined. These statutes were, originally, nothing more than Decrees upon different subjects, emanating from the King, or from the Council of the Indies, often contradictory, and generally unconnected with each other, but bound up at last together, and published in four folio volumes. No pains having been taken to class, or reduce them to any thing like system, they were full of the most glaring inconsistencies; and, as every new case became the subject of a new Decree, which, from the moment of its publication, had the force of law, it is hardly possible to conceive a more complete chaos than that presented by the legislative code of America. As early as

* As in Mexico, where three Audiencias were established, at Valladolid, Guadalajara, and Chihuahua.

the reign of Charles III. the decrees *not* included in the Recopilacion, were more numerous than those which it did contain: many of these, again, were annulled by others of a later date; so that, at last, not even the lawyers knew what decrees were in force, which had fallen into disuse, and which had been suspended, either in their application to particular Provinces, or to the Colonies in general. The consequences of this confusion were such frequent discrepancies in the Royal orders, as to render it extremely difficult, even in the clearest cases, to prevent the defendant from sheltering himself under the sanction of some decree unfavourable to the injured party; a circumstance which encouraged, not a little, that corrupt system of administering justice, which has so long disgraced the Mother country, and which it is almost impossible to correct, where there is no check from publicity, and where, in the multiplicity, and inconsistency, of the laws themselves, the judge is sure to find a plea for the most glaring injustice.

The special privileges, or *Fueros*, enjoyed by the different professional and Corporate bodies, greatly increased this confusion. There were *Fueros* of the clergy, which embraced the dignitaries of the church, canons, inquisitors, and their dependents, and all members of colleges; *Fueros* of all persons employed in public offices; *Fueros* del Consulado, or merchants *Fueros*; special *Fueros* of the militia, the navy, the engineers, and artillery corps; and *Fueros* of the army in general. Each of these *Fueros* exempted those who chose to plead it, from the jurisdiction of the ordinary authorities, and made them amenable, both in civil and criminal causes, to the tribunal of the chief of that corporation, or body, to which they belonged.

In this clash of interests and jurisdictions, the native Americans were usually the sufferers, as it increased the difficulty of obtaining redress in any dispute with an European, who usually enjoyed a double, or triple *fuego* as a merchant, a

government officer, or, at least, as holding some rank in the militia.

The municipal establishments, throughout the New World, long retained some vestiges of that spirit of freedom, and that predilection for popular institutions, which Charles V. so effectually quelled in the Peninsula, upon his accession to the throne. We can desire no better proof of the importance originally attached to them, and of the authority with which they were supposed to be invested, than the fact, that Cortez, when desirous to emancipate himself from the jurisdiction of Velasquez, from whom his original commission for the conquest of Mexico emanated, could devise no better method of effecting his purpose, than by forming a *Cabildo*, or Municipality, for the infant settlement of Veracruz, into whose hands he resigned the commission, which he held of the Governor of Cuba, and from whom he received, in return, authority to act as Generalissimo, until the Emperor's pleasure should be known. The Regidores and Alcaldes, who composed the Municipalities, (*Ayuntamientos*,) were originally elected by the inhabitants of each town; and though the institution was soon perverted, it was always looked up to with affection, and respect, by the people, who regarded the members of the *Cabildo* as their natural protectors. And such they almost invariably proved; for they were connected with them by a thousand ties, which the higher officers of state were forbidden to form; and by a community of interests, that could not exist between the Europeans, and any class of the Natives. At the commencement of the Revolution, the *Cabildos* became, every where, the organs of the people, and the great advocates of their right to an Independent Provisional government, during the absence of the King: indeed, it was the line taken by them, in opposition to the Audiencias, which were devoted, of course, to the European interest, that first brought matters between the Creoles and the Mother country to a crisis. It is remarkable that this spirit should

have been so long preserved, amidst the changes of form to which the institutions had been subjected. In Mexico, until the establishment of the Constitution in Spain, in 1812, the privilege of election was merely nominal. The situations of *Alcalde*, and *Regidor*, were, in fact, put up to auction, and disposed of to the best bidder. In some parts of the country, they were even made use of as an inducement to engage people to enter into the militia. Thus, Brigadier Calleja, (afterwards General, Viceroy, and Conde de Calderon,) who, in 1794, was entrusted with the organization of that body, in the *Provincias Internas*, introduced a regulation, by which, in every town and village,* the Captain of the militia of the place (however ill-qualified for the situation in every other respect) became perpetual *Alcalde*; the first and second lieutenants, *Regidores*; and the first serjeant, *Procurador* (or legal adviser) to the corporation, thus singularly formed; with due provision for replacing them, when absent, by the next in rank, according to military gradation. By this absurd system, in these distant provinces, where the Municipalities were the only tribunals for the decision of all petty disputes, a corporal, or even a private, in the absence of his superiors, was entrusted with the administration of justice in villages inhabited by fifty or sixty respectable proprietors, whose only remedy against the absurdities, into which his ignorance might betray him,† was an appeal to the governor of the Province, or to the Audiencia of Chihūāhūa, which was always attended with the most vexatious uncertainty and expense.

* *Vide* the Memorial presented to the Cortes of Cadiz, in 1811, by Mr. Ramos Arizpe, deputy for the province of Cohahuila.

† One can hardly credit the possibility of so singular an instance of oppression, and that affecting not an individual, but four whole Provinces, (Cohahuila, New Leon, Santander, and Texas;) but I have had opportunities of ascertaining the correctness of the statements given by Mr. Ramos Arizpe on the subject, and know that they may be depended upon.

The independence of the Ecclesiastical establishments throughout America, forms a very singular feature in the Spanish Colonial Policy. By the Bull of Alexander VI. dated 1502, Ferdinand II. was constituted, as effectually, the head of the American church, as Henry VIII. was of that of England: and whatever subserviency the Court of Madrid may have shown towards Rome, in other respects, its most bigoted monarchs have displayed great firmness in repelling the encroachments of the Holy See wherever America was concerned. True to the principle of concentrating every branch of authority in the crown, they would allow no Spiritual jurisdiction to interfere with the Royal prerogative: Papal bulls were only admitted into the colonies on receiving a *Regium Exequatur* from the Council of the Indies; and the severest penalties were not only enacted, but enforced, against ecclesiastics, who attempted to infringe this wise regulation. The Pope could hold no intercourse whatever with any part of America, except through the medium of Spain, by which means the Cruzada, or distribution of Bulls, became one of the branches of the Royal revenue. The King bought them up at a certain price at Rome, and retailed indulgences, and dispensations, of all kinds, to his American subjects, at an enormous profit. The speculation was managed with as much regularity as the monopoly of tobacco; and, although several squabbles arose between the Courts of Madrid and Rome, in the course of a traffic, which was as lucrative, as it was discreditable, to both, the Pope, after several ineffectual attempts to obtain a larger share of so advantageous a concern, was forced to leave his Royal partner in possession of nearly the whole of the profits. It was a question, in which not merely the avarice, but the whole policy of Spain was interested. The main-spring of her Colonial System was, to teach all classes to look to the King, and the King alone, for advancement. Spaniards have always been a nation of *employés*, and the surest hold upon them was to concentrate

their hopes of preferment in one focus: the slightest interference, on the part of any other power, would have disturbed this unity of plan; and, consequently, the designs of the Court of Rome were watched with as much jealousy, and suspicion, as the attempts of the English, or French, to smuggle in their manufactures;—a crime, any participation in which, on the part of a native, was regarded as almost worse than treason itself.

Besides the great establishments which we have passed in review, there was another most important branch, the collection of the customs, and revenue, in which a host of officers were employed, under the direction of the *Intendentes*, each of whom presided over a district, in the extent, and number, of which the territorial divisions of each colony consisted.

In the present order of things, the limits of the old Intendancies have often served to regulate the number of the *States*, of which the new Republics are composed. In all questions respecting the interests of the revenue, the *Intendentes* possessed very extensive powers, and, as their appointment emanated from the Council of the Indies, without the concurrence of the Viceroy, in their own provinces they were almost independent.

The command of the troops was vested in the Viceroy in person, who regulated the military operations, and filled up all vacancies; it being understood, that promotions made by him would receive the King's sanction. He was assisted, in this part of his duties, by a Council of war, (*Junta de guerra*,) as he was, in judicial questions, by a *Fiscal*, or legal adviser, to whom the law of the case was referred: all sentences of every kind bore his signature, nor was there any appeal from his decision.

To each, and all, of these great offices, (not excepting the viceregal dignity,) *all* the subjects of the crown were alike eligible, without any distinction between Americans and Europeans. Indeed, there is hardly any point upon which

the laws of the Indies insist so frequently, or so strongly, as this equality, as may be seen by a reference to the *Recopilaciones*.

Such is the outline of that mighty fabric, by which the authority of Spain, in the New World, was so long supported. Its defects, in theory, are by no means so great as many have supposed; the evil consisted in the *practice*; and in the application of the whole political power of the crown to the maintenance of a system of revenue laws, by which the interest of the Colonies was entirely sacrificed to that of the Mother country. Upon both these points it will be necessary for me to enter into some details.

With regard to the first, (the difference between the theory and the practice of Spain, in her Colonial system,) the history of the last two centuries sufficiently proves, how entirely the conciliatory intentions of the first framers of the laws of the Indies were lost sight of, by the total exclusion of the Creoles from any participation in the government of their respective countries. Every situation in the gift of the crown, from the Viceroy to the lowest custom-house officer, was bestowed upon an *European*; nor is there an instance, for many years before the revolution, either in the church, the army, or the law, in which the door of preferment was opened to a native.* It became the darling policy of Spain to disseminate, throughout her American dominions, a class of men distinct from the natives in feelings, habits, and interests; taught to consider themselves as a privileged *caste*, and to regard their own existence as intimately connected with that of the system, of which they were the principal support. In return for their supposed devotion to the crown, all the offices of government were theirs; and, by a regular scale of promotion, they rose in dignity and rank, the

* The promotion of Don Antonio Perez, now Bishop of Puebla, to that See, took place after the King's return in 1814, when the necessity of conciliating the natives began to be admitted.

opportunity of enriching themselves increasing at every step, until they were enabled, at last, to retire in affluence to the Peninsula. Nor was it to government offices alone that this preference was confined. The superior advantages enjoyed by Europeans threw the whole trade of the country into their hands, for the good understanding which they were enabled to cultivate with their countrymen in the custom-houses on the coast, and the facility with which they obtained licences from the Viceroy for the introduction of prohibited articles, rendered competition impossible.

It is difficult to conceive any thing more universal than the corruption which prevailed throughout the revenue department of the colonies: the Viceroys themselves gave a splendid example, for both in Peru and Mexico, with a nominal salary of only 60,000 dollars, they kept up all the pageant of a court, and, after distinguishing themselves, for some years, by their magnificence, as the Representatives of Royalty, they returned to their native country with a fortune of a million, or a million and a half of dollars, the whole of which it was notorious that they must have derived from some unfair mode of turning the advantages of their situation to account.

The distribution of quicksilver, which was a Royal monopoly, was, in Mexico, one source of these illegal profits.*

The sale of titles, and distinctions, which the King usually granted at their recommendation, was another; but the most lucrative of all, was the power of granting licences for the introduction of any article of foreign produce, during a limited period, to which I have already alluded: for these, enormous sums were paid by the great commercial houses of Mexico, and Veracruz; or a share in the profits of the speculation was given to the Viceroy's agent, without any participation in the risk. The system of dilapidation, beginning with the chief, extended through every branch of the government; the in-

* The supply seldom being equal to the demand, the miners paid large sums for the privilege of being allowed to purchase in preference to others.

ferior offices swarmed with hangers on, and candidates for preferment, all Europeans, and all expecting, by means best known to themselves, to make a rapid fortune. That these expectations were not disappointed, may be inferred from the fact, that, under the administration of the Prince of Peace, government situations, *even without a salary*, were in great request, and were found to be a sure road to affluence.

The complaints of the Creoles, and the endeavours of some of the more enlightened amongst the Europeans themselves, to bring the most notorious offenders to justice, were equally fruitless. They were frustrated, partly by the rank and influence of the transgressors, and partly by that spirit of *clanship*, (I can find no other word to express what I mean,) by which the Europeans, of every description, were united amongst themselves. It is necessary to visit America in order to have any idea of the extent to which this feeling was carried. It became, at last, a passion, which induced them to prefer the ties of country to the ties of blood. The son, who had the misfortune to be born of a Creole mother, was considered as an inferior, in the house of his own father, to the European book-keeper, or clerk, for whom the daughter, if there were one, and a large share of the fortune, were reserved. "Eres Criollo, y basta:"—(you are a Creole, and that is enough!) was a common phrase amongst the Spaniards when angry with their children; and was thought to express all the contempt that it is in the power of language to convey. It was a term of ignominy, a term of reproach, until time taught those, to whom it was applied, to use it rather as an honourable distinction, and to oppose it to that of *Gächüpīn*, as designating the party of those infatuated men, who imagined, that the circumstance of having been born in the arid plains of Castille, or La Mancha, gave them a moral, and intellectual superiority, over all the inhabitants of the New World. Not the least remarkable trait in the Revolution of America, is the sort of proscription which the

name of Spaniard now entails upon those, who formerly found it the only passport to preferment: but the violence of the re-action, is perhaps the best proof of the excess of the evils by which it was occasioned.

There can be little doubt, that the Spanish Government fomented this mutual antipathy between the two most influential classes of its subjects, on the same principle that led it to encourage the distinctions of *caste*, and *colour*, which I have mentioned in the second section of this book. This was not the case, however, with the other abuses which I have had occasion to enumerate. Wherever her financial interests were at stake, the Mother country was remarkably vigilant, but then she, but too frequently, took a wrong mode of effecting what she had in view. Instead of attempting a reform by introducing into the general system something like simplicity, and uniformity of plan, every succeeding year rendered the machinery still more complicated. Whenever abuses were discovered in any office, a new office was created, as the only means of correcting them; thus, wheel within wheel was added, and check upon check established, until the action of the whole was impeded, and the confusion became so great, that nothing could remedy it. Mexico, the most important of all the Colonies, only remitted six millions of dollars annually to the Peninsula; the remainder of a revenue of twenty millions of dollars, was swallowed up, either by the government charges, which (including dilapidations) amounted to eleven millions, or, by remittances to other Colonies, (the Havanna and the Phillippine Islands,) the revenues of which did not cover the expenditure.

Under such a system it was not to be expected that much should be done for the improvement of the people, destined to be ruled by it. Spain felt that her power depended, in a great measure, upon their ignorance.—By disseminating the blessings of education amongst her subjects, she would, virtually, have undermined her own authority, and made them impatient of a yoke, which comparison would have rendered

doubly galling. They were, therefore, taught to believe that the fate of all mankind was similar to their own; or rather, that they were pre-eminently fortunate, in belonging to a monarchy so much superior in power and dignity to the rest of the world. Spain was to them the queen of nations: *hablar Christiano*, (to speak a *Christian* language,) was the privilege of those by whom her dialect was used; while English and French, Germans and North Americans, were involved in one indiscriminate condemnation, as Jews, heretics, and unbelievers, with whom no good Catholic could hold intercourse without contamination.

The Inquisition was constituted the guardian of this belief, and discharged the duty with a zeal that proved how fully its importance was felt. The works of Luther were not more rigorously proscribed, than modern histories, or political writings; and, even as late as 1811, by a strange anomaly, the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people was denounced as a damnable heresy in Mexico, at the very time that it was solemnly sanctioned by the Cortes in Spain. Particular studies, however, were encouraged amidst this general tendency to stifle inquiry; especially scholastic divinity, which was considered a very harmless amusement, and the mathematics. Some attention too was paid to the arts of drawing and sculpture, and, in the mining districts, to mineralogy, which, in Mexico particularly, was patronised with kindly munificence: but there can be no doubt that this was done, principally with a view to divert the attention of the Creoles from more dangerous pursuits: the spirit of the system was to exclude information, and to check the progress of the human mind.

Nothing can illustrate this more strongly, than a Royal decree, addressed, in 1785, to the Viceroy of Peru, by the *enlightened* Galvez, (as Humboldt deservedly calls him, on account of the many practical reforms introduced by him into the administration of the Colonies,) who was, at that

time, President of the Council of the Indies. This decree states, that in consequence of the many representations made to the King, respecting the bad effects produced by the college for the education of noble Indians, at Lima, the subject had been taken into serious consideration; and that His Majesty, "convinced that, since the conquest, no Revolution had been attempted amongst the Peruvians, which had not originated with some one better informed than the rest," had determined that the question should be referred to the Viceroy, with orders to give an opinion, as soon as possible, respecting the propriety of reforming, new-modelling, or entirely suppressing the said college."

Upon the same principle, liberty to found a school of any kind was (latterly) almost invariably refused. The municipality of Buenos Ayres was told, in answer to a petition in favour of an establishment, in which nothing but mathematics was to be taught, that learning did not become Colonies.* The Padre Mier (author of a very curious work on the Mexican Revolution) enumerates various instances of a similar kind. In Bögötā, the study of chemistry was prohibited, though permitted in Mexico: and in New Grēnādā, the works of the celebrated Mutis, though purely botanical, were not allowed to be published. Permission to visit foreign countries, or even the Peninsula, was very rarely granted, and then only for a limited time. A printing-press was conceded, as a special privilege, by the Council of the Indies, and that only to the three Viceroyalties, Mexico, Buenos Ayres, and Peru; to Caracas, and many other considerable towns, it was denied altogether.

To guard against the importation of books, was, as I before observed, the special province of the Inquisition; and the whole ingenuity of this odious tribunal was exerted, in order to check it. Not only were vessels subjected to a

* *Vide* Brackenbridge, Voyage to South America, by Order of the Government of the United States.

rigorous examination upon their arrival in port, but the captains were rendered, personally, responsible for the correctness of the list of the books on board, which they were compelled to give in. In the interior, domiciliary visits were resorted to, and denunciations encouraged amongst members of the same family; with what success, may be inferred from the fact, that, as late as 1807, a Mexican, called Don Jose Roxas, was denounced by his own mother, for having a volume of Rousseau in his possession, and confined for several years in the dungeons of the Holy Office. He was fortunate enough to effect his escape, but died, in 1811, at New Orleans.* These instances of extreme severity, however, were rare, and were less felt, because, in theory at least, the jurisdiction of the Inquisition was as extensive in the Mother country as in the Colonies. In practice, its prohibitions were disregarded in both by the higher classes, who were, in general, acquainted with all the most violent publications of the earlier days of the French Revolution, to the study of which the very anxiety that was shown to exclude them gave an additional zest.

The first proclamations of the Independent governments bear evidence of the extent to which this passion was carried: they are mostly mere transcripts of the Rights of Man, with as little real tendency to improve mankind as the original; for they invariably led to the adoption of some impracticable theory, and pointed out the overthrow of all existing institutions as the first step towards amendment.

It is curious to observe how little progress was made by any of the New States, after the declaration of their independence, until experience had taught them a sounder doctrine, and led them to model their institutions upon those of the United States; which, with some modifications, will, in

* *Vide* Brackenbridge, who lived in the same house with him, and was in the possession of his papers after his death.

all probability, be adopted, ultimately, by the whole of Spanish America.

It now only remains for me to terminate this sketch of the Colonial Policy of Spain, by an account of the commercial restrictions imposed by her upon her American subjects, and which I consider as the great cause of the Revolution. It is in the endless grievances, vexations, and abuses, to which these restrictions gave rise, that we must seek the seeds of that discontent, by which the minds of all classes were indisposed towards the Mother country. The political preference given to Europeans, might rankle in the breasts of those Creoles, who, from their birth or fortune, conceived themselves to be entitled to a share of that authority which the old Spaniards engrossed; but it was a matter of indifference to the great mass of the people. The commercial monopoly of Cadiz, on the contrary, came home to all; and, from the enormous price to which every article of European produce was raised by it, it bore hardest upon those least able to support it. Like the insolent air of superiority affected by the Europeans, it created a degree of irritation, which nothing but prudence, lenient measures, and timely concessions, on the part of the Mother country, could have calmed; and these (unfortunately) were words, which the vocabulary of Spain did not acknowledge.

“Des principes d'après lesquels on arrache la vigne, et l'olivier, ne sont guères propres à favoriser le commerce ou les manufactures.”—such is the manner in which Humboldt commences his account of the trade of New Spain, and nothing, certainly, can be more appropriate than such an introduction, to such a subject. If a system of absolute prohibition could ever prove a good one in the end, or ever be made to answer by the greatest strictness in enforcing it, the policy of Spain might be held out, as an object of admiration to all future ages. From the first, she reserved to herself the exclusive right of supplying the wants of her Colonies. No

foreigner was permitted to trade with them, or foreign vessel to enter their ports ;—no American could own a ship. In Spain itself, the trade was confined, from upwards of a century, to the single port of Seville, from which every vessel chartered for America was ordered to sail, and to which it was compelled to return. Death was the penalty denounced against any infringement of these stern laws ; and a formidable establishment of Guarda Costas was maintained, for the express purpose of enforcing them.

In order to increase the wants of the Colonies, they were forbidden to manufacture any article that the Mother country could supply ; and were even compelled to forego the advantages which they might have derived from the superior fertility of their own soil, and to draw from Spain necessities, with which Nature furnished them almost at their own doors. The cultivation of the vine and the olive, for both of which the climate of America is admirably adapted, was prohibited ; and even the growth of the more precious articles of what we term colonial produce, (as cacao, coffee, and indigo,) was only tolerated, under certain limitations, and in such quantities as the Mother country might wish annually to export. Nothing could exceed the distress to which such parts of the Spanish dominions as were not enriched by veins of gold or silver, were reduced by these regulations. The whole coast of Venezuela was sunk in poverty, in the midst of its natural riches ; and in Buenos Ayres, wheat was actually used to fill up the holes in the streets and marshes in the vicinity of the town.* The inhabitants, whose only wealth consisted in their agricultural produce, were condemned to vegetate in hopeless indigence, debarred from most of the advantages of civilization, and reduced to a state but little superior to that of the Indians, at the time of the conquest. I know of few more touching appeals to the feelings, and good sense of a government, than that addressed

* *Vide Representation of Landholders to Viceroy.*

to the Viceroy of the provinces of the Rio de la Plata, in 1809, by the Apoderado (Agent) of the Landed Proprietors of Buenos Ayres. It contains an admirable *exposé* of the system, by which the interests, both of the Colonies and of the Royal Treasury, were sacrificed to those of a few overbearing European merchants; as well as of the fruitlessness of any endeavours to obtain redress, even in cases where the advantage of the government (if rightly understood) was perfectly in harmony with that of the colonist. I subjoin a few extracts, which will be found in the Appendix.*

The reforms gradually introduced into the Colonial System in Mexico, the Havanna, and Peru, did not extend, in the same degree, to these ill-fated countries. The precious metals were so exclusively the object of the attention of Spain, that but little attention was paid to any of her possessions that did not produce them. She had no idea of creating a balance of trade, by encouraging the natural resources of the Colonies; nor of becoming herself the carrier between them and other nations, with whose manufactures she was, indeed, obliged to keep them supplied, but to whom she furnished in return but few of those productions with which her American possessions abounded. The fact was, that, perhaps, with a view of rendering it less difficult to keep the whole of the importations and exportations in her own hands, she never aimed at increasing the number of consumers, but rather contrived to enhance her profits, by limiting the supply. The luxuries of life were only to be obtained by the wealthy, the lower and middling classes could not aspire to a share of them; and it would be curious to be able to point out, in an authentic shape, the very limited number of those, amongst whom the importations of each Colony were distributed. To render the management of this extraordinary system less embarrassing, the channels of communication with the Mother country were reduced as much as possible. Until the year

* Appendix, Letter A.

1700, the whole of the supplies destined for America were introduced through the ports of Portobello and Veracruz; from the first of which, remittances were made through Pă-nămă, (on the opposite side of the Isthmus,) to the whole line of coast on the Pacific, comprising Gŷăqŷil, Qŷitŷ, Chilē, and Pěrŷ. During the war of Succession, the trade with Peru was opened to the French; and many Americans are of opinion, that, to this temporary enjoyment of the sweets of foreign intercourse, the present revolution may be traced. At the peace of Utrecht, (1713,) Great Britain, with the Asiento, (or contract for the supply of slaves,) obtained a direct participation in the American trade, in virtue of the permission granted her, to send a vessel of five hundred tons annually to the fair of Portobello. This privilege ceased with the partial hostilities of 1737, but Spain found herself compelled, on the restoration of peace, in 1739, to make some provision for meeting that additional demand, which this comparatively free communication with Europe had created. Licenses were granted with this view to vessels, called register-ships, which were chartered during the intervals between the usual periods for the departure of the galleons. In 1764, a farther improvement was made, by the establishment of monthly packets to the Havanna, Portorico, and Buenos Ayres, which were allowed to carry out a half cargo of goods. This was followed, in 1774, by the removal of the interdict upon the intercourse of the Colonies with each other; and this again, in 1778, by what is termed *the decree of Free Trade*, by which seven of the principal ports of the Peninsula were allowed to carry on a direct intercourse with Buenos Ayres, and the South Sea.

It cannot be denied that these ameliorations were attended with the happiest effect; but still, they were insufficient. The growing importance of the Colonies required more than the Mother country was able to supply; while the concessions already made, only rendered the restraints still imposed

more insupportable. To receive their supplies through the medium of the Peninsula would not have been a hardship, had she taken, in return, those products, in which the Colonies abounded, and upon which the whole wealth of some of them depended. But this she would only do to a very limited extent.* Payments in specie were the great object of the Spanish merchant, and to this every other commercial advantage was sacrificed.

The exclusion of foreigners from concurrence, in a market thus organized, was essential to the very existence of the system pursued. Their willingness to receive produce in lieu of silver, in exchange for their manufactures, and to be contented with a moderate rate of profit upon those manufactures, provided they could dispose of them in sufficient quantities, would have rendered competition, on the part of Spain, impossible, at the same time that it must have increased the difficulty of keeping the Colonies in subjection, by augmenting their resources too rapidly. The whole attention of Spain was therefore directed to this point. For a long time, she claimed a right to an exclusive dominion over the vast oceans surrounding her American possessions; and this right she asserted, to the utmost extent, wherever she was enabled to do so by a superiority of maritime force.

Few are, I believe, aware of the length to which these pretensions were carried. I shall therefore subjoin, in order to illustrate them, some extracts from a correspondence which took place, as late as 1790, between Don Teodoro de Croix, then Viceroy of Peru, and the Governor of the Island of Juan Fernandez, who was disgraced, and narrowly escaped a severer punishment, for having, in that year, allowed a vessel from the United States, which had lost her rudder,

* A return of the importations and exportations from the colonies, would prove how very small was the amount of colonial produce exported from each, (with the exception of the Havanna,) and how constant the drain of specie.

and been otherwise damaged by a storm, to put into the harbour for a few days to refit.

The Viceroy expresses, in very strong terms, his displeasure at the negligence of the Governor, in allowing the vessel to leave the Island, "without having even attempted to seize her; and his surprise at the governor of any of the King's Islands being so ignorant, as not to know, that any foreign vessel sailing in the South Sea, without a Spanish license, was to be treated as an *enemy's* vessel, although the country, to which she belonged, might be at peace and amity with Spain."

This doctrine met with the entire approbation of the Audiencia of Peru; and a circular was immediately addressed to all governors of islands, and the commandants of forts, or towns, situated upon the coast of the Pacific, instructing them, "in the event of any foreign vessel entering their harbours, to endeavour, to the best of their abilities,* to detain her, until a favourable opportunity should present itself for seizing her, with her crew, and to transmit to the capital the earliest possible intelligence of the result."

This correspondence was found in the archives of the Viceroyalty at Lima, and published by the Independent party, when it obtained possession of the capital, together with the decree respecting the college for noble Indians, which I have already quoted.

Like the letter of the Viceroy Calleja, and the representation of the Mexican Audiencia to the Cortes, to which I shall have occasion to allude in the next book, I see no reason to question their authenticity; and where this is the case, nothing tends to throw so strong a light upon the causes of a revolution, as such documents. They are better than a thousand theories, the result merely of private opinions more or less warmly expressed; for, without pretending to establish

* Literally, "with suitable discrimination, art, and prudence—con la sagacidad, arte, y prudencia, convenientes."

any system, they enable every one to form his own upon a basis, the stability of which there is no reason to doubt.

It is with this view, and not with any wish to place the conduct of the Spanish government in an unfavourable light, that I have introduced them into this sketch. The errors of Spain have brought with them their own punishment. Even during the days of her power, they were chiefly detrimental to her own interests; for, in attempting to exclude foreign trade entirely, she only reduced smuggling to a system, by which the revenue was defrauded, without the interest of the Creoles being materially advanced, since produce could not be exported, where no legal communication could be held.

With regard to the other parts of her Colonial Policy, it must always be recollected, that its spirit was originally mild; the evils which grew out of it, were, perhaps, the inevitable consequence of despotic institutions, transplanted to regions so distant, that there could be no check to the abuse of delegated power. There was no want of excellent laws in the folios in which the code of the Indies was contained; but the facility with which they were evaded, and the constant impunity of those by whom they were infringed, rendered them unavailing. What wonder, then, that under such circumstances, a remedy should have been sought in a total change of institutions, or that a system should have been adopted the very opposite to that which had before prevailed?

BOOK II.



B O O K II.

SECTION I.

EFFECTS PRODUCED BY THE EVENTS OF THE YEAR 1808 IN THE PENINSULA.

I HAVE endeavoured to give, in the preceding section, a fair and dispassionate view of the system by which the possessions of Spain in the New World were governed, during a period of three centuries. It was not in the nature of things that such a system should be endured any longer than the power to enforce it was retained. There was little mutual affection, and no reciprocity of advantages; so that the question of right, between the Mother country and the Colonies, became, in fact, a question of might; and resistance, on the part of the Creoles, the almost inevitable consequence of a consciousness of strength. It is uncertain, however, how long a disposition to assert their rights might have been cherished by the more enlightened, without being sufficiently generalized to admit of its being declared, had not the events of the year 1808 favoured its developement.

The history of Europe, (and more particularly of the Pe-

ninsula,) during this period, is so intimately connected with that of American Independence, that it is impossible to consider them apart, or even to understand the one, without a previous acquaintance with the other. I shall, therefore, not apologize for reminding such of my readers, as may have forgotten the course of Spanish affairs, amidst the endless changes which have since occurred, that, in 1808, the schemes long cherished by Napoleon, for the establishment of his brother on the throne of Spain, were carried into effect. Advantage was taken of the burst of national indignation, by which the ministry of the Prince of Peace was terminated, and of the abdication of Charles IV., which followed the dismissal of his favourite, to entice the whole Royal Family to Bayonne, under pretence of deciding an appeal, preferred by the Ex-king against his son, (the actual monarch,) where, by an act unparalleled in the history of the world, they both renounced the throne, in favour of the family of the Umpire, and consented to live in retirement, upon a stipend assigned to them by his munificence. This act, although supported by a party amongst the Spaniards themselves, (los Afrancesados,) and by the armies of Napoleon, only served to rouse the spirit of the nation, and a popular government was substituted, in every province, for that, by which the youthful monarch had been betrayed. A Central Junta* was entrusted with the management of affairs, which was followed by a Regency†, and this, again, by a second‡, created by the Cortes, which were assembled in the Isla de Leon, in September 1810, *as the only legitimate source of power during the captivity of the sovereign.* By these unexpected events, the

* Installed 25th September, 1808.

† First Regency, 29th January, 1810. *Vide* Decree of Central Junta of that date. Isla de Leon.

‡ Second Regency 18—29th October, 1810. *Vide* Decree of Cortes of that date.

form and spirit of the Spanish government were entirely changed: principles, which had been inculcated for ages, were at once exploded; a Constitution, democratic in the extreme in its theory, was substituted for the Royal Prerogative; the sovereignty of the people was set against the divine rights of Kings; and even religion was deprived of its influence, as a political engine, by the abolition of the Holy Tribunal. That such things could take place in the Peninsula without producing corresponding effects in its dependencies was not to be expected; and these effects it is my present object to trace.

It is generally admitted, that the insurrection of Aranjuez, (1808,) which led to the dismissal of the Prince of Peace, (Godoy,) and to the abdication of Charles IV., gave the first shock to the Royal authority in America. An absolute monarch, compelled to bow before the will of a tumultuous populace, insulted by his subjects, and deserted by his guards, in the very heart of his kingdom, was a sight that could not but tend to diminish those feelings of almost religious awe, with which any thing like opposition to the will of the Sovereign had been previously contemplated.

The subsequent invasion of the Peninsula by Napoleon, the captivity of the Monarch, and the abdication of the old dynasty at Bayonne, contributed to destroy whatever remained of the *prestige*, which had before attached to the name of Spain, and created an impression only the more strong, because, to the mass of the people in America, she was still the Spain of the sixteenth century, in whose dominions the sun never set, and whose arms were the terror of the world.

This belief had long been the tutelary angel of the Mother country: with it she lost her moral force, (the only force capable of compelling the obedience of seventeen millions of Transatlantic subjects,) and, from that moment, the loss of the Colonies themselves became inevitable.

It was in vain to struggle against nature, or to attempt to subdue the new spirit, which, within two years after the invasion of the Peninsula, began to appear amongst all classes of the Creoles. Its progress was both rapid, and irresistible ; and, without any previous concert amongst the parties themselves, without even the possibility of foreign interference, a mighty revolution broke out at once, in almost every part of the New World.

A momentary enthusiasm in favour of the Mother country, was, indeed, excited (in 1808) by the resolution of the Spanish people to vindicate their rights, and not tamely to submit to a yoke, which, force and fraud combined, seemed, at first, to render inevitable ; but the rapid progress of the French arms, during the year 1809, the weakness and reverses of the Central Junta, its retreat into Andalusia, and the gradual occupation of the whole of that province by the invading army, with the exception of Cadiz, not only checked this favourable disposition, but completed that change in the feelings and opinions of the Creoles, for which the occurrences of the preceding year had prepared the way. They regarded Spain as lost, and degraded almost to the rank of a province of France ; and they saw no plea of right, or justice, by which obedience could be exacted from them to the agents of a government which was itself decried, and disobeyed with impunity at home. The King was the only tie that connected them with Spain ; for it was the fundamental principle of Spanish Jurisprudence with regard to America, to consider what had been acquired there, as vested in the *Crown*, and not in the *State*. In the absence of the Monarch, therefore, the Creoles might, with justice, assert their right to determine what should be considered as a fit substitute for his authority, (as the Spanish people had done in their own case,) instead of admitting the claims of Provincial Delegates, representing at best but a fraction of the Royal power, and that in virtue of a most irregular popular election, to exercise

the King's Prerogative, in its fullest extent, in the vast possessions of Ultramar.*

Yet such were the pretensions of each, and all of the ephemeral *Juntas*, that started up in the Peninsula. Commissioners from Asturias, and Seville,† (the two first *Juntas* established in the Mother country,) arrived, almost at the same moment, in the Colonies, equally exclusive in their pretensions, and authoritative in their demands. In the impossibility of reconciling their rival claims, the attention of the Creoles was naturally turned to the source from which they emanated, and to the means by which the vacuum in the frame of the government, occasioned by the captivity of the Sovereign, had been filled up in the Peninsula. They saw every where delegates chosen by the people exercising authority under the denomination of *Juntas*; and these again, deputing members of their own body to form a Central Junta, which was entrusted with the supreme command. They heard this course not only justified by the sages of the nation, but admired by the world, and pronounced by one, whose name they had been taught to respect, (Don Gaspar Jövellänös,) “to be the undeniable and strictly natural right of any nation, placed in circumstances similar to those of Spain.”‡ They applied this doctrine to themselves, and either could not, or

* A reference to the history of the year 1808, will show, that the only title by which the first Spanish *Juntas* held their authority, was the nomination of a mob, which, in each of the great cities, called, by acclamation, those persons, in whom it placed confidence, to assume the management of its affairs.

† Each assumed the title of “Junta Soberana de Espana y de las Indias.”

‡ *Vide* “Defence of Central Junta, by Jovellanos,” in which he assumes, as his second undeniable axiom, “That a people, seeing its existence threatened, and knowing that the ministers of that authority, which ought to direct and defend it, are either intimidated or suborned, is necessarily driven to self-defence, and acquires an extraordinary and legitimate right of insurrection.”—7th October, 1808.

would not, understand the soundness of the reasoning, by which a measure, that was allowed to have been productive of the most beneficial results in the Peninsula, could be constructed into absolute treason on the opposite side of the Atlantic.*

Their perception of their own rights was quickened by a deep sense of the grievances under which they laboured, as well as by the injudicious manner in which the justice of their complaints was admitted by the new governments of the Mother country, although not one of those measures was taken, by which the causes of them might have been removed. The State papers of the day furnish abundant proofs of the vacillating policy which prevailed, with regard to American affairs; and, as they have long become the property of the historian, I shall avail myself of them, without scruple, in order to illustrate it.

After proclaiming "a perfect equality of rights, between the American and Spanish subjects of the crown," and declaring the provinces of Ultramar "to be component parts of the Monarchy, and not Colonies or Factories, like those of other nations,"† the Central Junta gave place to the Regency, which, desirous still farther to conciliate the Creoles, by a decree, dated the 17th of May, 1810, conceded to them, under

* It is impossible too strongly to insist upon the fact, that all the proceedings of the American Independents were but a transcript of those which had taken place in the Mother Country. They applied to the Cortes, at a later period, the very principles which the Cortes applied to Ferdinand VII.; and refused to submit to that despotism, in the hands of a popular assembly, which was admitted by that assembly to be intolerable, while in the hands of a monarch.

† *Vide* Proclamation, dated Seville, 5th June, 1809; and "Aviso" of 10th January, 1810.

"Considerando que los vastos y preciosos dominios que la Espana posee en las Indias, no son, propiamente, Colonias, o' Factorias, como los de otras naciones, sino *una parte esencial, é integrante*, de la Monarquia Espanola."

certain limitations, a *free trade*, during the suspension of the usual intercourse with the Mother country. This wise decree, the best possible antidote, (as the author of the “Español” very justly terms it,) against a revolutionary spirit in the Colonies, was protested against by the merchants of Cadiz, who found means to induce the Regency, very soon after its publication, to repeal it; and the measure was carried into execution, with a violence as impolitic, as the resolution itself was imprudent. On the 27th of June, a second decree appeared, stating, that “Notwithstanding the lively wish of the Regency to conciliate the welfare of the Americas with that of the Mother country, it had abstained from touching upon a point of such delicacy and importance, that the least innovation with regard to it must be preceded by the repeal of the prohibitory laws of the Indies, which could not but be attended with the most serious consequences to the State:” It therefore declared the decree of the 17th of May* “to be spurious, and of no value or effect,” and directed “all existing copies of it to be burnt, and its authors to be proceeded against;” but assured the Colonists, at the same time, “that the Regency had not ceased to meditate, and was still meditating upon some mode of relieving the Americas, by other means, from the evils and privations under which they were suffering.”†

This imprudent disavowal of a measure, by which one great cause of the dissatisfaction of the Creoles would have been removed—known, as it was, to have been forced upon the Government by the very men, whose interests it alone consulted—(the merchants of Cadiz,) naturally tended to convince the

* “Apocrita y de ningun valor ni efecto.”

† “Sin que por esto haya dexado de pensar, y piense, el Consejo, en aliviar, por otros medios, a’ las Americas, de los males, y privaciones que sufren.

(Signed)

“Castanos,

“Cadiz, 27th June, 1810.”

“Pedro Bishop of Orense,” &c.

Colonies that they had but little practical relief to expect from Spain; and that political freedom alone could emancipate them from those commercial restrictions, by which their natural resources had been so long paralyzed.* It led them to doubt the sincerity (or the value, at least,) of every other concession; to insist upon perfect equality of representation in the Cortes, by which they hoped to acquire, (and would, undoubtedly, have acquired, ultimately,) an equality upon all other points; and, when this was denied them, to seek, by the direct road of independence, those rights which it was almost impossible to withhold, from the moment that they became sensible of their importance.

Vain were the endeavours of the Regency to soothe or cajole them; vain the admission of errors, and the promises of amendment; although the first were carried so far as to allow, "that, for upwards of twenty years, the door to preferment, in every class of public employment, had been shut against all persons of information, patriotism, and real merit,† while it had been opened, by intrigue and court favour, to persons depraved, vicious, or, at best, totally unfit to command." The Colonists were not to be satisfied with words; they thought, and said, that any thing short of specific reforms would be unavailing; and that "the best laws were useless, as long as a Captain-general could affirm, with impunity, that

* Things were carried so far, with respect to the Decree of the 17th of May, that the Minister and several clerks of the Colonial department were put under arrest, when it was repealed, in order to induce the public to believe that it had not, in fact, received the sanction of the Regency.

† Lest these terms be thought too strong, I subjoin the passage in the original, as contained in a Circular of the Regency, dated, Isla de Leon, 15th February, 1810. "Convencido el Consejo," &c. "de que el favor, la intriga, y la inmoralidad, al mismo tiempo que han tenido cerrada la puerta, de veinte años a' esta parte, para toda clase de empleos, à los sujetos de luces, patriotismo, y verdadero merito, la han franqueado à una porcion de personas, depravadas, inmorales, o' ineptas quando menos."

in his government he recognized no authority superior to his own :”* they, therefore, regarded the abolition of offices, inseparably connected, in their minds, with the abuses, the existence of which was admitted, as a first step towards improvement, and this step they determined to take themselves, when they found the Mother country resolved to retain to the last every attribute of her former power.

Such was the state of affairs at the commencement of 1810 : I have quoted documents of a later date, in order the better to illustrate it ; and they render sufficiently intelligible the unanimity which characterized the first proceedings of the Creole Insurgents. Throughout the whole Continent of America, the same causes were every where in operation ; and, with little or no difference in point of time, they every where produced the same effects : in Căracăs, Būēnos Ayres, Bögötă, Cărthăgēnă, Chilē, Upper Peru, and Mexico, by one simultaneous movement, the people deposed the European Authorities, and transferred the reins of Government to Juntas, composed almost exclusively of Native Americans.†

These Juntas assumed the title of “ Guardians and Preservers of the Rights of Ferdinand VII.” ‡ In some, Europeans were at first admitted : in others, the Viceroy himself, (where not personally obnoxious,) was invited to preside. || In all, the most amicable sentiments towards Spain were ex-

* *Vide* Observations of Junta of Caracas, on the above Circular, dated 20th May, 1810.

† The revolution of Căracăs took place on the 19th of April, 1810 ; that of Buenos Ayres, 25th May ; of New Grenada, 3d July ; of Bögötă, 20th July ; of Cărthăgēnă, 18th August ; of Chilē, 18th September ; of Mexico, 16th September.—*Vide* “ Representation of American Deputies to the Cortes,” dated 1st August, 1811. Appendix. •

‡ Junta Conservadora, or Cuerpo Conservador, de los Derechos del Senor Don Fernando 7^{mo}.

|| As at Buenos Ayres, where the Congress was convoked, and a Provisional Government formed, at the suggestion of the Viceroy, Don Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros.—*Vide* his Proclamation of 18th May, 1810.

pressed, and assurances given of a readiness to assist her in her struggle against the forces of her invader.

It is difficult now to ascertain how far these professions of attachment to the Mother country, on the part of the new Governments, were sincere. Many of their members, undoubtedly, aspired to independence from the first; but the majority would have been satisfied with moderate reforms; and it was, perhaps, the necessity of conciliating these, as well as the great mass of the people, (who certainly were not prepared to throw off their allegiance at once,) that forced the bolder spirits to temporize, and to disguise their real designs, under the mask of devoted loyalty. Be this as it may, the good understanding which the Creoles seemed to court, was but of short duration. The jealousy excited amongst the Europeans, by the loss of an authority which they regarded as their patrimony, their irritating language, and the violence of their conduct wherever the presence of European troops gave them even a momentary ascendancy, soon showed the real nature of the contest. Contempt, and domineering habits, on the one side, begot hatred, and obstinate resistance on the other: rigour led to reprisals, reprisals to habitual cruelty; and thus the war acquired, very soon after its commencement, that sanguinary character, which nothing but private animosity, engrafted on a public quarrel, can explain, and which not even that can excuse.

It is a curious fact, that the importance of these great events was not, at first, felt in the Peninsula; or if felt, was, at least, greatly underrated. So little was the character of the Creoles known, and so high the opinion entertained of the superior resources of Spain, that neither the Regency, nor the Cortes, which met, (as I have already stated,) in September, 1810, would ever take the subject into serious consideration.

The First thought to quell the spirit of insurrection in Věněžělă, (where the flame first broke out,) by sending there

a Royal Commissary, (Don Antonio Ignacio Cörtävärriä,) armed with extravagant powers,* whom the Junta of Caracas, of course, refused to receive: and the Second† passed days and weeks in discussing the mode in which the Americans were to be represented in the National assembly, and fixed it, at last, upon a basis to which the Colonists refused their assent. The whole coast of Věněžŭělă was subsequently declared to be in a state of blockade,‡ without a single ship of war being upon the spot to enforce the decree; and by this impolitic mixture of arrogance and weakness, the Colonies were irritated, not intimidated, and the hope of a reconciliation rendered every day more distant.

Of the possibility of such a reconciliation, in the first stages of the Revolution, no reasonable doubt can be entertained; although nothing less than a recognition of the legitimacy of the American Juntas, and the admission of their deputies to the Cortes, on the same terms, and in the same ratio, as the deputies of the Peninsula,|| could have effected it. But these were conditions that suited not the temporizing policy of Spain. The equality, which she proffered to her American subjects, was an equality merely of words;—an

* His commission empowered him “to assume the Regal power in its fullest extent:—to remove, suspend, or dismiss the Authorities of every rank and class; to pardon or punish the guilty, at pleasure; to make use of the monies belonging to the Royal Treasury; and to give orders, which were to be obeyed as emanating directly from the King’s own person.”—*Vide* Commission, dated 1st August, 1810.

† *Vide* Sessions of Cortes, of 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, and 16th January, 1811.

‡ Decrees of Regency, of 21st August, 1810.

|| The Castes, or mixed breeds, and more especially those in any way contaminated by a mixture of African blood, were not allowed to vote in the elections; and consequently, the number of deputies to be returned by each Colony, depended upon its *White* population alone. This regulation ensured to the European deputies a permanent majority in the Cortes.

equality, which was, somehow or another, to subsist in concert with all those abuses of which the Creoles most complained: the prohibitory system was to be maintained in all its purity; Viceroys, Audiencias, and all the paraphernalia of the Royal Government were to be kept up,* with powers only the more formidable because, under the supposed reign of the law, no legal bounds were prescribed for them: their re-admission into the Colonies was insisted upon, as a preliminary to any accommodation;† and yet, although these onerous conditions were not accompanied by any one practical concession, the Creoles were assured “that they were Spanish citizens, inhabiting one of the component parts of the Monarchy, and equal in rights to their brethren of the Peninsula.”‡

From such a system as this, nothing good could result. Had the demands of the Creoles been fairly met, some arrangement might have been possible; but dissimulation only gave rise to distrust, and thus, amidst reciprocal assurances of the most amicable intentions, preparations were made for an appeal to arms, by which it was but too soon evident that the question must ultimately be decided.

In this war of words I do not mean to accuse either party of unnecessary hypocrisy; there was, perhaps, as much of the good faith, which both professed, on the one side, as on the other, (and this is not saying much for the aggregate;) but each was desirous to make out a case, and with this view the

* *Vide* Terms proposed in a Proclamation of Cortavarria's, dated Puerto Rico, 7th Dec. 1810, which may be taken as a criterion for the rest, and which amount to the re-establishment of things *in statu quo*, and nothing more.

† *Vide* Correspondence between the new Viceroy Elio, and the Junta of Buenos Ayres, 15th January, 1811, in which the dissolution of the Junta, and the immediate recognition of Elio, as Viceroy, are required.

‡ *Vide* Proclamations of Regency, *passim*; and particularly those already referred to.

Cortes held out hopes, which they never intended to realize,* while the Colonies replied by professions of a fidelity, which they could hardly pretend to feel. In point of fact, from the commencement of 1811, independence on the one side, and the re-establishment of the old system, with as little modification as possible, on the other, were the real objects in view.

The Spaniards urge, that this state of things was the natural consequence of the first steps taken by the Insurgents, which could lead to nothing but the emancipation of the Colonies, and were consequently opposed, from the outset, by the Mother country.

This is perhaps true; but it is not less so, that, until driven to it by actual hostilities on the part of Spain, the war-cry of Independence was not raised by any one of the Colonies;† nor was it done, even then, without reluctance.

The concession of privileges, much inferior to those enjoyed by the former Colonies of Great Britain in the United States, would have satisfied the Creoles, and placed their treasures for years at the disposal of Spain. They would have purchased, at almost any price, the right of Colonial assem-

* I do not wish to animadvert upon the conduct of the Cortes with unnecessary severity. They have fallen themselves "from their high estate," and their misfortunes are their protection. But, in considering the feelings of the Americans towards this assembly, it must not be forgotten that the Cortes were the first to sanction the barbarous principle that, "with rebels and Insurgents, no engagements were binding." They approved of the violation of the capitulation of Caracas, by Monteverde, in 1812; the first of a long series of similar breaches of the public faith; and, with such facts as this before them, it was hardly to be expected that the Americans should place much confidence in their professions of amity, equality, and brotherly love.

† The Declaration of Independence of Venezuela (which was the first) did not take place till the 5th July, 1811,—seven months after the blockade.

blies ; which were very justly regarded, by the most enlightened men amongst them, as the greatest blessing that could be conferred upon their country. They might indeed, (and probably would,) have prepared the way for ultimate independence, by initiating the New States in the art of self-government ; but their emancipation must have been gradual, and would have been effected, at last, on terms highly favourable to the Mother country : while the Crown, acting as a centre of union in America, would have prevented those desultory struggles for systems, or for power, which have involved the whole Continent in the calamities of civil war, and rendered its fairest provinces a scene of desolation.

Unfortunately, both for Spain and for the New World, any project of distinct Colonial legislation was incompatible with that exclusive system, with regard to trade, which the Mother country had always conceived it to be its interest to maintain. This was the great bar to accommodation on both sides. Pecuniary advantages might have afforded a compensation for the loss of a portion of that authority, which could hardly have been retained much longer, under any circumstances, in its former extent : but freedom of discussion and commercial monopoly could not exist together. Ignorance was its basis, and the strong arm of power its support. To allow of inquiry or interference on the part of the Colonies, (and who was to check them, if once a Legislative assembly were granted ?) was virtually to abrogate the prohibitory laws ; and against this, the pride and the prejudices of the Peninsula alike rebelled.

Neither the Constitution of 1812, nor the overthrow of that Constitution in 1814, nor its re-establishment in 1820, created any material difference in the Colonial policy of Spain : the King, on his return from captivity, though he reprobated all the other acts of the Cortes, adopted their system with regard to America, and even pursued it with additional vigour. General Murillo's expedition against Car-

thagena took place a year after the restoration, (1815,) and a second expedition, upon a still larger scale, was, as is well known, preparing in 1819, and led to the Revolution of 1820.

It is unnecessary to enter into the details of this contest, which possess but little interest for the European reader : it is sufficient, for my present purpose, to state, that in Columbia, Mexico, and Peru, the war has been prosecuted with all the energy that the exhausted state of the finances of the Peninsula would admit of ; and that, at the close of a struggle of seventeen years, the result has been every where the same. Throughout the whole continent of America, Spain does not retain one single inch of ground : her troops, after a gallant resistance, have been driven from their last strongholds, both on the Eastern and Western coasts, (St. John of Ulloa, and Callao,) and her flag is proscribed on those shores, where, for three hundred years, it waved without a rival. This mighty change has been slowly, but progressively, accomplished. It is not the work of intrigue or faction, but the natural effect of a change as mighty in the minds of men. To recede is now impossible ; not because the Republics of the New World have discovered that standard for regulating political opinions, which has been sought in vain in the Old ; but because, whatever differences may prevail as to *form*, the consciousness of a political existence, and a sense of the advantages of an unrestrained intercourse with foreign nations, when once acquired, can never again be lost. It might rather, indeed, be a matter of surprise, that, with such inducements before them, and so great a superiority of numerical strength, the Colonies should not have brought the contest to an earlier termination, did not their position with regard, both to the Mother country, and to each other, sufficiently explain the causes of the delay.

Scattered over a vast continent, separated by impenetrable wildernesses, or by chains of mountains still more impassable, and kept purposely, under the old system, in a state of igno-

rance with respect to each other, the New States commenced their contest for freedom without the advantage of any previous combination, or concert.

Even at the present day, the natives of Mexico and Chilé,—of Buenos Ayres and Bogotā,—know as little of each other, as the Neapolitan peasant and the Lapland boor; and, in most cases, England would present the only medium of communication between them.* At the commencement of the Revolution, their estrangement was still greater, and it may be questioned whether the fact of the existence of some of the New States was at all generally known to the rest. With each other's resources, and means of defence, they certainly had no acquaintance. Each therefore, individually, pursued its object, unconnected with the rest; and each was obliged to cope, singly, with whatever force Spain could bring to bear against it.

In addition to this, they had internal as well as external enemies to contend with: the old Spaniards, (known, in the annals of the Revolution, by the names of *Gächüpīnēs*, *Gödös*, *Patriotas*, and various other designations,) distributed throughout the possessions of Ultramar,—wealthy, powerful, and connected by intermarriages with the most influential families amongst the Creoles themselves,—were a check to all their operations.

Where they did not openly oppose, they sowed the seeds of discord amongst the leaders of the Independent cause: while, from their intimate acquaintance with the resources of the country, they were enabled, both by their counsels, and the

* A letter from Buenos Ayres to Mexico, would be sent by the double line of packets now established between London and Rio de la Plata, and London and Veracruz. And, although there may be, once or twice in the year, a direct intercourse between Mexico and Peru, or Chilé, by the Pacific, letters, at all other times, would be forwarded by the English mail.

liberality of their donations, to render the most essential services to the Royalist generals.

Nor was this all: the first movements of the Insurgents had indeed been eminently successful; and, (as we have already seen,) with the exception of Mexico, a single year had sufficed to wrest, from the hands of the Europeans, the authority of which they had so long been the sole depositaries. But this was the only point upon which any sort of unanimity prevailed amongst the Creoles. Left to themselves, they knew not how to dispose of the power, which they had so unexpectedly acquired, and it became the apple of discord amongst all who had any pretensions to a share of it. They were totally inexperienced in the science of government, and had no good model to follow:* it is not surprising, therefore, that they should have engrafted upon the stern despotism under which they were brought up, the wildest theories of the French school, nor that their ardour, in the cause of liberty, should have cooled, amidst the many evils which these theories brought upon them.† They soon learnt that tyranny was not, as they had fondly supposed, an heir loom in the family of the Kings of Spain, but might be exercised, just as effectually, in the name of the Sovereign people, by any man, or set of men, to whom that people was supposed to

* Spain was their only model, and to her most of their errors may be traced. The want of fixed principles, the preference of theory to practice, the dilatory habits of those in power at one time, and their ill-judged strides towards impracticable reforms at another,—all are of the modern Spanish school, as are the bombastical addresses to the people, the turgid style which disfigures most of the public documents of the Revolution, the intolerance, and jealousy of strangers, which are only now beginning to subside.

† It is melancholy to reflect how soon the Americans were initiated in all the cant of Revolutions, and taught to distrust the bewitching terms of patriotism and public felicity, under the sanction of which they found themselves a prey to private ambition, anarchy, and distress.

have delegated its authority ; and, in their despair at not being able to fix, at once, a balance of power, many would willingly have purchased tranquillity, by submitting again to that yoke, to which time had lent its sanction, and given respectability.

I shall not, I hope, be accused by the friends of American Independence, of a wish to colour this part of the picture too highly ; but if I should be suspected of any such intention, a reference to the first acts of any of the new Juntas, will be sufficient to clear me from the imputation.

It will be found, I believe, that, in almost every instance, they exercised the power with which they were entrusted, in the most wanton and oppressive manner.* Not only opposition to their will, but hesitation in the adoption of their political creeds (however exaggerated, or absurd,) was visited with the severest penalties.† Nor was it to their own territory alone, that this spirit of proselytism was confined ; the instant that a Province, or State, had determined upon the principles to be adopted for its own guidance, it endeavoured to force these same principles upon its neighbours, and stamped the least demur in conforming to them, as treason to the common cause.

Sovereigns “ by the grace of Adam and Eve,” (as Blanco White somewhere says of the Cortes,) “ they ought to have reflected upon the injustice of attempting to dictate to others, who, by the same undeniable title, were free as themselves :”

* See, as an instance, an order of the day published at Buenos Ayres on the 6th December, 1810, by which a citizen who had, *when drunk*, given a toast, at a dinner, offensive to the President, *was banished for life*.

† *Vide* a “ Declaration of the Rights of the People,” sanctioned by the Congress of Venezuela, 1st of July, 1811, followed by a law for regulating the *liberty* of the press ; by the nineteenth article of which, any one who should publish any political writing contrary to the system then established in Venezuela, was *condemned to death* : 25th July, 1811.

but, far from this, the great object of every Junta throughout America, appears to have been, to extend its own authority, and its own creed as to the abstract rights of man, on the plea of the public good. In it, as in the natural diversity of opinions, which prevailed, where no previous understanding existed, and no fixed principles were known, we find the real cause of that protracted struggle, by which the country was desolated : Buenos Ayres wished to proscribe laws for Montevideo and Pötösi,—Cărăcăs for Săntă Fé,—Chile for Përū. Each district, and family, again, sought to extend its jurisdiction, or influence : none would recognize any sort of superiority on the part of the others : the sword was the universal arbitrator in every difference : predatory bands were organized, and lived at large upon the country : the common cause was lost sight of amidst these interminable disputes, while the common enemy, whose object was, at least, clear and well defined, took advantage of them to re-establish an authority, which, under other circumstances, must have sunk at once.

Such are the general features of the contest between Spain and her former Colonies. To throw off the yoke, in the first instance, was a task comparatively easy ; but to re-organise society after the dissolution of all earlier ties, to curb passions once let loose, to give to any party, or system, a decided ascendancy, where claims (or pretensions) were equal, and superior talent rare,—this was an art that nothing but experience could teach ; that nothing, at least, but the most bitter experience has ever been known to teach, in the annals of mankind.

Fourteen years of anarchy and bloodshed, have brought the Americans to something more like unity of plan, and will, probably, give stability to the system which they have, with some modifications, universally adopted. With regard to their Independence, the question has long been decided ; differences of opinion may exist upon other points, but upon

this unanimity certainly prevails ; and I believe that any hostile demonstration on the part of Spain, would, every where, be found a sovereign remedy of domestic feuds. These feuds too, however embarrassing in their effects, ought to be rather matter of regret, than surprise, to those who reflect that no nation has ever yet attained any reasonable portion of civil liberty without them. They are a part of that fearful process, by which it appears that, while human nature remains what it is, abuses, even when past endurance, can alone be corrected. Our own history, as well as that of our neighbours, attests this melancholy truth ; and, after the lapse of more than a century, the party distinctions of the day still bespeak the fury of the party-spirit of our ancestors. The same scene, modified only by differences of climate, and rendered less interesting by the want of early education amongst the principal actors, is now representing in the New World. The struggle, like every one in which the passions of the people are engaged, has been accompanied by its usual attendants, bloodshed and desolation ; but humanity may console itself with the hope that the storm is now gone by, and that future prosperity, however dearly purchased, will afford a compensation for all past sufferings.

The extent of these sufferings throughout Spanish America, (for, in every part of it the contest has borne the same character,) a *precis* of the Mexican Revolution will enable us more fully to appreciate.

SECTION II.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION IN MEXICO, FROM
1810 TO THE DEATH OF MÖRELÖS.

MANY of the causes of disaffection which I have pointed out as existing generally throughout the Spanish Colonies, did not extend to Mexico by any means in the same degree as to the rest. Her superior population gave her importance, while her mineral treasures, and her vicinity to the Peninsula, ensured to her a constant supply of European manufactures. The very process too, by which these treasures were drawn from the bosom of the earth, gave value to the landed property of the Interior, from the intimate connexion that must always subsist between mining and agriculture; and this concurrence of favourable circumstances diffused a degree of prosperity throughout the country, which few Colonies have ever attained, none, certainly, exceeded.

This prosperity, however, was due to the natural resources of the country alone; the government could not check, but did little to encourage it: for the abuses inherent in the Spanish system,—the monopoly of the Mother country, the preference given to Europeans for all public employments, and the corruption which prevailed, both in the administration of justice, and in the collection of the revenue,—existed to as great an extent as in any other part of South America; and were perhaps only felt the more, because Mexico had already

acquired that consciousness of strength, which, sooner or later, must, under any circumstances, have proved fatal to the dominion of Spain in the New World. Humboldt describes the irritation excited amongst the higher classes of the Creoles in 1803, by the political insignificance to which they were condemned; and from what he says of "the sullen hatred with which they regarded the Mother country, and the contempt in which they held her once formidable resources," it seems evident that, even at that early period, the germ of all that has since taken place existed, and only required a favourable opportunity to call it into action. Still, in Mexico as elsewhere, these feelings were confined to a comparatively small circle; for the same intelligent observer adds, "that the great majority of the people were indifferent to political rights, and not likely to join in any effort to acquire them." I believe this picture to have been perfectly correct, although it is difficult to reconcile the apparent apathy of the Creoles, with the energy displayed by them a few short years afterwards, in the struggle for those rights, which they were supposed to be incapable of appreciating; unless, indeed, we allow that there are, in nations as in individuals, particular periods, at which a general fermentation takes place throughout the system, rendering intolerable the pressure of some evil, which has been long and patiently supported, and inspiring an irresistible longing for the attainment of some particular blessing, the importance of which has not been before so acutely felt.

Some great moral change of this description must have occurred in Mexico at the commencement of 1810, to render so general that disposition to rise against the established order of things, which was displayed in every part of the country, the moment that the standard of insurrection was unfurled. Men unconnected with the capital, or with politics; landowners resident upon their estates in the most re-

mote provinces; *Curas*, whose lives had been passed in the midst of their parishioners; and young men educated for the law, or the church, and just emerging from the university;—all flew to arms, and embarked at once in a contest, for which no one conceived them to be prepared. Nor were the feelings which led to this step light or evanescent in their nature. The war was carried on for years, under most unfavourable circumstances, by the Insurgents, with a spirit that set all attempts to reduce them at defiance; and we shall see one of the most distinguished supporters of the cause of Spain (the Viceroy Calleja) confess, in 1814, (at the very moment when his arms had given him a temporary ascendancy,) that this spirit remained unchanged, and could be restrained by nothing but an immense superiority of force. But a rapid outline of the Revolution itself will best explain its character and progress.

The government of Mexico, at the commencement of 1808, was entrusted to Don José Iturrigaray, whose authority as Viceroy, supported by a host of European officers and settlers, whom the riches of the Colony attracted, appeared to be as firmly established as at any former period.

The country was flourishing and tranquil; mines, and agriculture affording to the whole population, (which did not exceed seven millions,) occupation and wealth: nor did any thing announce the approach of that storm, by which the whole fabric of society was so soon to be overthrown.

The first symptoms of agitation appeared upon the receipt of the disastrous tidings from the Peninsula, which announced the occupation of the capital by the French army, and the captivity of the King.

The Viceroy, uncertain as to the line which he ought to pursue, and doubtful (it is said) of the fidelity of many of the old Spaniards about him, communicated this intelligence in the Government Gazette, without a single comment to guide

the feelings, which it was so well calculated to excite. A very few days, however, convinced him of his error, and he issued a second proclamation, soliciting the support of the people, and declaring his determination to preserve, to the last, his fidelity to his, and their, Sovereign.

This declaration was received with enthusiasm. It was the first time that the *people* of Mexico had been taught to consider their voice of any importance, and they availed themselves of the opportunity with an eagerness, which proved that they felt the value of the right which they were called upon to exercise.

The Ayuntamientos, in most instances, became the organs of the people, and addresses poured in from every quarter, in which provinces, towns, and even villages, expressed their devoted loyalty, and their resolution to support the authority of the representative of their captive Sovereign.

This interchange of congenial sentiments created a kindly feeling between the Viceroy and the Creoles; and advantage was taken of his wish to conciliate them, by the Ayuntamiento of the capital, composed of men of the first influence and respectability in the state, to propose the creation of a *Junta*, in imitation of the Mother country; and even the convocation of a National Mexican assembly, to be composed of deputies from the different provinces.

This suggestion was not unfavourably received by Iturrigaray, but was protested against by the Audiencia, as contrary to the privileges, both of the Crown and of the Europeans. Disputes ran high between the Municipality and this body, during the months of July and August, and the beginning of September (1808), when the Audiencia, finding that the Viceroy was inclined to side with their opponents, and to admit the Creoles to a share in the government, determined to arrest, and depose him, in order to cut short a project, which they regarded as fatal to their own authority.

This resolution, the principal promoters of which were the Oidores Aguirre and Bataller, was carried into execution on the night of the 15th of September, when Iturrigaray was surprised in bed, in his own palace, by a band of Europeans, (mostly merchants,) headed by Don Gabriel Yermo, a rich Spaniard, the proprietor of some of the finest sugar estates in the valley of Cuernavaca. No resistance was made by the guards, who would not fire upon their countrymen, and at midnight the Viceroy was conveyed to the prisons of the Inquisition, while his wife and family were confined in a neighbouring convent.

To the populace, a suspicion of *heresy* was assigned as the cause of this measure; while, to the better informed, the Audiencia attempted to justify it by one of the laws of the Code of the Indies,* by which it is provided, that in cases where the Viceroy exceeds his powers, the Audiencia has a right of interference, in order to preserve the tranquillity of the country. But all attempts at concealment were vain: the Creoles knew that the removal of Iturrigaray implied their exclusion from power, and they consequently regarded his cause as their own. These feelings were rather confirmed, than checked, by the pains which were taken by the Audiencia to repress them. Juntas of public security were formed by its orders, and armed bands of Spaniards organized, who, under the curious denomination of *Patriots*, exercised a most rigorous surveillance over all whose opinions were suspected of being favourable to the imprisoned Viceroy. Many persons of note were arrested, who had voted in favour of a Mexican Junta in the Ayuntamiento, of whom some

* Seg. 36. tit. 15. lib. 2. which says, "Que excediendo los Vireyes de las facultades que tienen, las Audiencias les hagan los requerimientos que conforme al negocio pareciere, sin publicidad; y si no bastase, y no se causase inquietud en la tierra, se cumpla lo proveido por los Vireyes, o Presidentes y avisen al Rey."

were banished to the Philippine Islands, and others sent to Spain, to be there tried, or confined in the Castle of St. John of Ulloa. The Viceregal authority was confided, for the time, to the Archbishop Lizana, and an account of all that had taken place transmitted to Spain, for the approbation of the Central Junta.

But although the Mexicans submitted at the moment to these innovations, they were far from viewing them with indifference. The moral change which a few months had produced was extraordinary; they had learnt to think, and to act; their old respect for the King's Lieutenant was destroyed by the manner in which his authority had been thrown off, and his dignity profaned by his countrymen; and they felt that the question was now, not one between their Sovereign and themselves, as subjects, but between themselves, and their *fellow-subjects*, the European Spaniards, as to which should possess the right of representing the absent King.

The insolent manner in which this right was claimed, as exclusively their own, by the Europeans, increased not a little the general irritation. The Ayuntamiento of Mexico was told by the Audiencia, in reply to some remonstrance in favour of the Viceroy, "that it possessed no authority, except over the leperos (lazzaroni,) of the capital;" and it was a favourite maxim with the Oidor Bataller, "that while a Manchego mule, or a Castilian cobbler remained in the Peninsula, he had a right to govern the Americas."

These sentiments were re-echoed by all the Europeans, both in the Capital, and in the principal towns of the Interior: they every where formed *Patriotic* associations for the defence of what they termed their *rights*, and armed themselves against the Natives, whose spirit these very precautions contributed to arouse. The Archbishop, whose moderation and conciliatory policy accorded but little with these views, was allowed to retain the reins of government but a short time. He was

replaced, in 1809, by the Audiencia, to whom the supreme authority was entrusted by the Central Junta; and by the violence and arrogance of this body matters were soon brought to a crisis. In every part of the country, a feeling of hostility towards the Europeans spread, and with it an impatient desire to shake off their yoke. In some places, (as at Valladolid,) attempts were made to concert insurrectionary movements as early as May 1809, which were checked by the arrest of those principally concerned in the project. But nothing was gained by this; discontent had become too general to be repressed entirely, and to check it at one point, only gave it a tendency to break out, with additional violence, at another. The scene alone was changed from the province of Michoacán, to that of Guanajuato, where the famous Cura Hidalgo was destined first to rouse into action the excited feelings of his countrymen.

Don Miguel Hidalgó y Cöstillá, was a man whom the Spaniards themselves allow to have possessed very superior acquirements.* His reading was extensive, and in the little town of Dölörës, of which he was Cura, he had given proofs of great activity and intelligence, by encouraging different manufactures amongst his parishioners, and introducing the cultivation of the silk-worm; in which, in the year 1810, they had made a very considerable progress. He had likewise planted vineyards to a great extent in the vicinity of the town; but this attempt to increase the resources of his curacy was rendered abortive, by a special order from the Capital,

* *Vide* Appendix, 37th paragraph of the Representation of the Audiencia to the Cortes, in which Hidalgo, although designated as a "man without honour, or religious principle," is admitted to have possessed "sufficient acuteness, and knowledge of mankind, to calculate, not only upon the assistance of the troops, whom he had seduced, but upon the powerful aid of the ambition, the vices, and the ignorance of his countrymen."

prohibiting the inhabitants from making wine, by which they were reduced to the greatest distress.

Thus, private motives for discontent were added to those which he shared in common with the rest of his countrymen ; and this may account for the stern, inexorable spirit, with which he began the contest, and which, being met by a spirit equally stubborn, and unrelenting, on the part of the Spaniards, gave at once to the revolution that sanguinary character, by which it is distinguished throughout.

To form a party willing to join him in the enterprise which he meditated, was no difficult task, since the minds of his countrymen were so well prepared for it beforehand. Indeed, so little caution does he seem to have observed, that his projects were discovered before they had come to maturity, and orders issued for the arrest of himself and his associates, Āl-lēndē, Āldāmă, and Ābāsölö, three Creole officers in garrison at Guănjūātō, who were amongst the first converts to his opinions.

This premature disclosure might have discouraged a man of less determination than Hidalgo ; but with him it produced no other effect than that of hastening the execution of his plan.

Having been joined by Āllēndē, on the 13th of September, 1810, and secured the co-operation of ten of his own parishioners, on the morning of the 16th of September, just two years after the arrest of Ītŭrrīgārāy, he gave the signal for revolt, by seizing and imprisoning seven Europeans, resident in the town of Dölörēs, whose property he immediately distributed amongst his followers. The rapidity of his progress after this first exploit seems quite incredible.* The news of it spread in every direction, and was every where received with

* "The flame which Hidalgo lighted at the little town of Dolores, spread through the country with the rapidity of atmospheric plague."—*Vide* Appendix, 42nd paragraph of Representation.





*Drawn by M^{rs} J. Ward
Engraved by P. W. S.*

Ahondiya Public Amusement

PAVANA DE MARINIA



London 1828

J. Clark del.

VIEW TO GUANAJUATO.

the same enthusiasm. Within twenty-four hours, Hídālgō's force became so considerable, that, on the 17th of September, he was enabled to take possession of Săn Fělīpě, and, on the 18th, of Săn Mīgūel ăl Grāndě, (towns each of 16,000 inhabitants,) in both of which places the confiscated property of the Europeans afforded him the means of increasing the number of his own partizans.

Guănājūātō, the capital of the Province, and the emporium of the treasures of the Spaniards in that part of the country, was his next object; but, as he was aware of the activity, and decided character of the Intendant Rianōn, (a magistrate respected still in Mexico, for his integrity, and benevolent spirit,) he would not risk an attack upon a city containing, at that time, 75,000 inhabitants, until he was sure that his numbers were equal to the attempt. The Intendant had, at first, resolved to defend the whole town; but finding that he had not men enough to undertake it, and observing strong symptoms of disaffection amongst the lower classes, who were inclined to make common cause with their countrymen, rather than to assist the Spaniards, he shut himself up, with all the Europeans, and the gold, silver, quicksilver, and other valuables contained in the Royal Treasury, in the public Granary, (called la Ālhōndīgă,) where he fortified himself, and made preparations for an obstinate defence.*

On the morning of the 28th September, Don Măriănō Ābāsōlō, in the uniform of Colonel of Hídālgō's army, appeared before the town, with a letter from the Cura, announcing, "that having been elected *Captain general of America*," by the unanimous choice of his followers, and recognized as such by the Ayuntamientos of the towns of Cělāyă, and San Mīgūel, he had proclaimed the independence of Mexico: that,

* The Ālhōndīgă is the large square building which rises above the rest in the annexed Plate of the Canada de Marfil, or Ravine which forms the entrance to Guănājūātō.

as the Europeans were the only obstacles to this, it was necessary to banish them from the kingdom and to confiscate their property; but that, if the Spaniards at Guāñājūātō would submit without opposition, their persons should be respected, and they should be conveyed to the coast uninjured."

The Intendant's answer was moderate, but firm; and as it afforded no prospect of any capitulation, Hidalgo's troops immediately marched to the attack.

The number of those who had flocked to his standard in the course of twelve days is estimated at 20,000; but they were principally Indians, armed with slings, bows and clubs, lances, and mǎchētēs; very few had muskets, and, on the whole, nothing could form a greater contrast than the appearance of this motley crew, when compared with that of the regiment of La Reina, which, together with a part of the infantry of Cēlāyā, had joined Hídālgō, on his march to Guāñājūātō.

The Ālhōndīgā was surrounded by a number of little eminences, which were immediately occupied by swarms of slingers, who kept up such a constant shower of stones that the Europeans could hardly appear upon the fortifications. The musketry, however, from the fort did great execution, as every ball took effect amongst the crowds with which the streets were filled. But the whole population of the town having joined the Insurgents, such numbers pressed on to the attack, that they at last carried every thing before them. Their progress was checked for a moment by some shells, which the Intendant had invented by filling some of the iron flasks, in which the quicksilver is contained, with gunpowder, and boring a hole for a match; but confusion soon ensued amongst the besieged, and resistance was given up as hopeless, the great gate having been forced, and the Intendant himself killed by a ball, which struck him on the temple.

The number of *Whites* who perished in, and after, the action, is not exactly known. I use the term '*Whites*,' because

several of the principal Creoles of Guāñajūātō, connected by marriage with the Spanish residents, and apprehensive, no doubt, that their property would not be respected in the general pillage, which was to be expected on Hidalgo's entry, determined to share the fate of the Europeans, and shut themselves up with them in the Ālhōndigá.

The slaughter is allowed to have been very considerable: indeed, I am acquainted with one family which lost seventeen of its members on that fatal day. Nothing could exceed the *acharnement* of the Indians, after the action was over; they put to death all the Europeans who fell into their hands, and seemed to seize with delight the opportunity, which was at length afforded them, of avenging the evils which Spanish ambition had brought upon their ancestors and themselves. This ferocity was the more extraordinary, from having lain dormant so long. During three centuries, the Indian race had appeared to be in a state of the most abject submission to their conquerors; nor was it suspected, until the Revolution broke out, that they entertained so deeply rooted a feeling of former wrongs.

As all the Europeans had transported to the Fort their most valuable effects, the amount of the money, and other precious commodities, found in it was enormous: it is usually estimated at five millions of dollars, the possession of which entirely changed the aspect of Hidalgo's affairs, and induced the public to watch, with the most anxious interest, the progress of an insurrection, which many had at first considered as an ill-judged, and desperate attempt.

The property of the old Spaniards at Guāñajūātō was given up to Hidalgo's troops; and such was the diligence of the Indians upon this occasion, that, although the action did not terminate till five in the afternoon on Friday, not a single house belonging to an European was found standing on the Saturday morning. Indeed, the greatest excesses were committed during the whole time that the army remained in the

town: Hidalgo had neither the power, nor perhaps the inclination, to restrain them. He was aware that the contest in which he had engaged was one of a deadly nature, and was not averse to seeing his followers so deeply committed as to render any hope of future reconciliation impossible. This appears to me the simplest mode of accounting for his never having attempted to introduce any thing like discipline amongst his troops, (the possibility of which Mōrēlōs afterwards proved); for it cannot be attributed to any want of intelligence, or activity;—qualities which he displayed, in all other respects, in no common degree.

During his short stay at Guāñājūātō, he established a Mint there, with every thing necessary for coining money, and a foundry of cannon, in which he made use of the bells which had been found in the houses of the Europeans.

I have been the more particular in detailing the occurrences which took place at Guāñājūātō, because it was to his successful attempt upon this town that Hīdālgō owed his celebrity. His name spread instantly through the different Provinces, and with his name the nature of his enterprise. From every part of the country recruits flew to join him; and, as all concurred in recognizing him as their chief, he distributed commissions and powers, by which his principles were disseminated, and his partizans augmented, in every quarter.

The consternation which the news of the fall of Guāñājūātō created amongst the Spaniards in the Capital was very great; but the new Viceroy, Don Francisco Xavier Vēnēgās, who had been installed but two days before the insurrection of Dolores broke out, displayed such firmness in all his measures, that the Creoles were compelled to conceal their exultation, and public tranquillity was not disturbed.

Vēnēgās, though at first misled by the representations of the Aūdīenciā, and particularly of the Oidor Bātēllēr, who assured him that the sound of a drum would alone be sufficient to terrify the Mexicans into submission, soon perceived

the real state of affairs. He ordered troops from La Pūēblā, ōrīzāvā, and Tōlūcā, to march upon the Capital, and, at the same time, by way of conciliating the Creoles, he intrusted the command of one of the finest regiments to the Conde de la Cādēnā, a Mexican born. The event proved his calculation to be correct, for the Count, who had been supposed before to be one of those most desirous of seeing Mexico independent, became, from that moment, a zealous adherent of Spain, and perished soon after in the defence of her cause.

The same policy was recommended to Don Felix Mārīā Cāllējā, who commanded a brigade of troops, at San Luis Pōtōsī, and was ordered to augment his division as much as possible and to march in pursuit of Hidalgo. Nor did the Viceroy neglect to turn to account the superstition of the people: some doubts having arisen, in the Capital, with respect to the justice of a sentence of excommunication pronounced against Hidalgo by his Diocesan, the Bishop of Valladolid, (as the Cura, though in arms against the King, had not committed any offence against the Catholic Religion,) Vēnēgās caused this sentence to be confirmed by the Archbishop Lizānā, and by the Inquisition, who pronounced, at the same time, the penalty of excommunication, *ipso facto incorrenda*, against any one who should presume to question its validity in future.

But the advantages which the Spanish cause might have derived from these measures, were more than counterbalanced by the public distribution of honours and rewards amongst the Europeans who had been concerned in the deposition of Itūrrīgārāy.* It renewed all the feelings of irritation which the event itself had excited, both in the Provinces and in the

* It must not be forgotten that the Mexicans considered the cause of Iturrigaray as identified with their own. That the Audiencia thought so likewise, may be seen by the "Representation," paragraphs 26 to 34. —*Vide Appendix.*

Capital, and was turned to great account by the friends of the Independent cause.

Hidalgo remained in quiet possession of Guāñajūatō until the 10th of October, when he set out with his whole army for Vāllādöllid, partly from a report that Cällējā was approaching, and partly to put a stop to the ravages, which a licentious life, and an almost habitual state of drunkenness, were producing amongst his followers: Valladolid was abandoned by the Bishop, and most of the Spaniards, on his approach; and no resistance being attempted, he took quiet possession of the town on the 17th of October.

His army had increased so enormously on the march, and during his stay at Guāñajūatō, that it consisted of nearly fifty thousand men. Hīdālgō made some valuable additions to this force at Vāllādöllid, where he was joined by the regiment of Provincial militia, and the dragoons of Mīchōācān,* both armed, and well equipped: but a greater acquisition still was Don José María Mōrēlōs, Cura of Nūcūpētārō, an old college friend of Hidalgo, and one, of whose talents he was so well aware, that he immediately gave him a commission to command in chief on the whole South-Western line of coast. The confidence which Morelos showed in his own resources by accepting this commission, and setting out, accompanied only by five servants armed with old muskets, with a promise to take Acapulco within the year, is the more worthy of notice, as the event proved it to be well-founded. But as we shall have occasion hereafter to trace the progress of this extraordinary man, who proved one of the most distinguished characters of the Mexican Revolution, I must confine myself at present to Hidalgo.

On the 19th of October the army left Vāllādöllid, and on the 28th, reached Tōlūcā, a town within twelve leagues of the Capital.

* Michoacan is the Indian name for the province (now State) of Valladolid.

Věnegās had found means to collect about 7000 men in, or near Mexico, whom he disposed in the most advantageous manner, for the defence of the town, with the exception of a small corps of observation stationed upon the Tōlucā road, under the command of Colonel Trūxillō, assisted by Don Agustín Ītūrbidē, then a Lieutenant in the Spanish service. This corps was defeated by Hidālgō and Āllēndē, on the 30th of October, at Lās Crūcēs, a pass in the chain of mountains which separates the valley of Mexico from that of Tōlucā, where Truxillo had taken up a position. The only remarkable circumstance that took place during the action was the fact of an insurgent officer, with a flag of truce, having been encouraged by Trūxillō to approach his lines until he came close to the ranks, when a general discharge was ordered, by which he was killed, with those who accompanied him. This act of treachery was boasted of by Truxillo in his official report of the engagement, and approved by the Viceroy, who thus gave his sanction to the principle, that none of the ordinary rules of war were to be observed with the Insurgents. Věnegās, however, was so much alarmed at their success and near approach, that he had again recourse to the superstition of the people, as the best method of preserving tranquillity. The image of the Virgin of los Rēmēdiōs was brought in great pomp, from a little village where it was usually kept, to the Cathedral of the Capital, where Věnegās went in full uniform to pay his respects to it; and, after imploring the Virgin to take the government into her own hands, terminated his pathetic appeal to her by laying at her feet his staff of command.

A flaming account was published, on the following day, of the action of Las Cruces, where Truxillo was said to have obtained a decided advantage, though circumstances had afterwards obliged him to *retreat*;—a term rendered but too intelligible by the melancholy condition in which both he and his troops entered the capital. Every preparation was

however made for defence, and the approach of the Insurgents was hourly expected: but Hidalgo, after advancing within sight of Mexico, retreated without risking an assault. His conduct has been attributed to cowardice by some, and by others, to a wish to spare the Capital the horrors of being taken by storm; but I conceive that neither of these reasons was the true one: Hidalgo had given too many proofs of a daring spirit, for any one to suspect him of want of courage; and as to the excesses which might have been committed had he succeeded in entering Mexico by assault, he would have considered them as unavoidable evils, but which could not, for an instant, be set against the advantages which the country would derive from the termination of the contest by so decisive a blow.

The fact is, that he had not calculated upon the Viceroy's being able to assemble so considerable a force. His Indians were discouraged by the losses which they had sustained in the battle of Las Crüces, where, from their total ignorance of the nature of artillery, they had rushed upon Truxillo's guns, and tried to stop the mouths of them with their straw hats, until hundreds perished by the discharge. He foresaw that they would never be brought to face the batteries, which Vēnēgās had erected: his whole army, too, had fallen into a state of greater confusion than ever, during the march; and, on examining his supplies of ammunition, he found that there was a very great scarcity both of powder and ball. In addition to these cogent reasons for not advancing, a courier was intercepted, with dispatches from Calleja, who had already reached Quērētārō on his way towards the Capital; so that there was every reason to suppose that he would push on by forced marches, and inclose the besiegers between his own force, and that of the Viceroy. To avoid this danger Hidalgo commenced his retreat, much to the dissatisfaction of Allende, his second in command; but his measures were so badly

taken, that one might almost imagine him to have sought the peril from which he was endeavouring to escape. After a march of six days, his advanced guard, most unexpectedly, fell in with Calleja's outposts, who, on their side, were equally ignorant of the approach of the Insurgents. Calleja's troops were composed principally of Creole regiments. His cavalry was commanded by the Conde de la Cadena; and his army possessed all the advantages that superior discipline and arms could give; but it remained to be seen what effect the appearance of their countrymen, fighting for a cause, in which all Mexicans were equally interested, might produce upon their minds.

This great question was decided, on the 7th of November, 1810, in the plains of Ācūlcō. Officers who were present at the action have assured me, that the troops were wavering when they went into the field; and that, if Hidalgo had prevented his men from beginning hostilities, it was more than questionable whether they would have been brought to fire. But the Insurgents, struck with terror at the appearance of a regular army going through its evolutions in perfect silence, and beginning to advance upon them in five separate columns, dispersed in the greatest confusion at their approach, and began firing at random upon all who came within their reach. This was an insult with which the Creole regulars were so irritated, that they were even more eager than the Spaniards in the pursuit; and, from this moment, their line, throughout the early part of the Revolution, was decided. For many years, they were the chief support of the cause of Spain, and the most inveterate enemies of the Insurgents; nor was it until the declaration of Ītūrbīdē, in 1821, that they espoused the cause of Mexican Independence. One cannot but admire the dexterity with which this feeling in favour of the Mother country, was created, and kept up. The very men who enabled Cállējā to gain the battles of Ācūlcō and Cāldērōn,

would, under less skilful management, have put an end to the contest at once, by siding with their countrymen.*

Ten thousand Indians are said to have perished at Ācūlcō ; but Hidalgo and most of his officers found means to escape, and, after collecting as many of the fugitives as they could, effected a hasty retreat to Văllădōlīd. Āllēndē, having separated from his companions, took the road to Guănăjūātō, with the intention of defending the town ; but finding that he had not forces sufficient again to meet Calleja, by whom he was pursued, he evacuated the place on his approach.

Much has been said of the atrocities committed by this general, on his entry into that unfortunate city. I am far from wishing to palliate them, but there was, undoubtedly, a circumstance, which furnished him with a plea for any severities that he chose to exercise. Two hundred and forty-nine Europeans, who had escaped from the massacre at Ālhōndīgă, when Hīdălgō took it, or were found afterwards concealed in the neighbourhood, were left there by him as prisoners. The populace, furious at seeing themselves deserted by Āllēndē, in a paroxysm of rage flew to the fort in which these unfortunate men were confined, and, in spite of the resistance made by several respectable Creoles, many of whom were wounded in attempting to oppose them, most inhumanly massacred all the prisoners. This horrible act was perpetrated on the very morning that Căllējă entered the town ; and it was upon receiving intelligence of it, that his troops were ordered to give no quarter. This order too, by which the innocent were confounded with the guilty, was revoked before the troops had penetrated beyond the suburbs ; and I do not find that the

* *Vide* Representation of Audiencia, paragraph 38, in which Calleja is termed " a General, whose consummate skill converted into invincible soldiers, men who, under any other direction, would have turned against their General, and their Country ;" that is, (in dispassionate language,) men, who, if left to themselves, would have joined Hidalgo instead of Calleja, and fought for the Independence of Mexico, instead of against it.

authors, who are most zealous in the cause of the Revolution, can prove the number of those who really suffered by the sentence of decimation, pronounced afterwards against a part of the population, to have been greater than that of the Europeans, who had fallen victims to their ferocity. Besides, it must not be forgotten that, at the commencement of a Revolution, however just its causes, all those who engage in open hostilities against the established government, do it at their own peril. They must expect to be treated as traitors, until success makes heroes of them. I do not blame the Spanish Authorities so much for having done, in the first instance, what most governments would have done in their place, as I do, for having persevered in their system of severity, when time had proved its inefficacy, and when they were entreated by the Insurgents themselves, to avoid such an unnecessary effusion of blood.

Hidalgo arrived at Valladolid on the 14th of November, from whence, after allowing three days for his followers to recruit after their late losses, he proceeded, without delay, to Guădălăxără, which town had been occupied by one of his lieutenants, on the very day that the battle of Ācŭlcŏ was lost by himself. During this short stay at Valladolid, he was joined by another man, who, afterwards, took a very active part in the Revolution, the advocate (el lĭcĕnciădŏ) Don Ignăciŏ Lŏpĕz Răyŏn, whom Hidalgo appointed his confidential secretary: Răyŏn is one of those who did most towards reducing the Insurrection to a regularly organized system; he established the Junta of Zĭtăcuărŏ, which was the first step taken towards creating an independent government, and gave to the Patriot cause a character of respectability, which it had not before possessed.

On the 24th of November, Hidalgo made a triumphal entry into Guădălăxără, where he was received with great pomp, and, apparently, with great enthusiasm. Although the excommunication originally pronounced against him had

not been taken off, he assisted at a grand *Te Deum*, in the Cathedral, from whence he was conducted to the palace, where all the great Corporations came to place themselves at his orders. Soon after his arrival he was joined by Allëndë, in conjunction with whom, though a great degree of irritation had existed between them since the retreat from Mexico, he proceeded, with his usual activity, to take measures for increasing his forces, and replacing the artillery which he had lost. This he effected, by bringing a number of cannon from Sãn Blãs, (the great dock-yard and arsenal of the Spaniards, on the Western coast;) some of which, though of a very large size, (24-pounders) were conveyed, by the Indians, over a mountainous district, across which no communication had ever before been thought practicable. It would have been well for Hidalgo's reputation, if these cares alone had occupied him; but, during his stay in Guădălăxără, he was guilty of an action, which leaves a foul blot upon his name. I have already remarked his inexorable spirit, and his bitter enmity towards every thing Spanish. All the Europeans in the town were thrown into confinement, upon his arrival: their number was so great, that it was necessary to distribute them amongst the different convents; and it is not improbable that they may not have been as guarded in their conversation there, as circumstances required. But, without any other crime being alleged against them than this,—on some vague rumours of a conspiracy amongst the prisoners, Hidalgo determined to make away with them all.

This cruel resolution was carried into effect with a cold-bloodedness which is really horrible. No form of trial, no previous examination even, was thought necessary; but the prisoners were brought out, by twenty and thirty at a time, and conducted, under the veil of night, by some of Hidălgô's creatures, to retired parts of the mountains in the vicinity of the city, where they were butchered in secret, the use of fire-arms being prohibited, for fear of creating any alarm.

This detestable system of midnight executions commenced at Valladolid, where Hidalgo ordered eighty Europeans to be beheaded on the Cerro de la Bătěă, during the three days which he passed in the town ; but, in Guădălăxără, the number of victims was between seven and eight hundred. There is every reason to believe too, that he intended to pursue the same line of conduct in future, and to establish it as a general rule amongst his adherents ; for a letter was produced on his trial, written by him to one of his lieutenants, in which, after recommending him to go on seizing the persons of as many Spaniards as possible, he adds, “and if you should have any reason to suspect your prisoners of entertaining restless or seditious ideas, or discover amongst them, any dangerous intentions, *bury them in oblivion at once*, by putting such persons to death, with all necessary precautions, in some secret and solitary place, where their fate may remain for ever unknown.”

Nothing can be more horrible than the idea of thus reducing assassination to a system ; and, even setting humanity and morality aside, nothing could be more ill-judged. It drove the Spaniards to despair, and furnished them, at the same time, with an excuse for any atrocities which they chose to commit. It discredited the cause of the Revolution, and prevented a number of respectable Creoles from espousing it. Allende himself, is said to have been so disgusted with the cruelty of his chief, that nothing but the approach of Calleja prevented him from abandoning him.

The cannon found by the Insurgents at San Blas, were so numerous, that Hidalgo, though there were only 1,200 muskets in the whole army, imagined that, with the assistance of his batteries, he should be able to repulse Calleja's forces. Allende foresaw that the want of discipline amongst the troops, would produce the same effect as at Ăcŭlcă, and wished not to try another action ; but being out-voted, in a council of war, he was forced to submit. The bridge of

Căldērōn, (about sixteen leagues from Guădălăjără,) was fortified, and the Mexicans awaited there the approach of the Royalist army.

Calleja, after having passed nearly six weeks in Guănăx-ŭătō, began his march towards the North; and on the 16th of January, 1811, the two armies were, once more, in sight. On the 17th, a general action took place, the event of which completely justified Allende's predictions. After some partial successes, on the part of the Mexicans, who repulsed two or three attacks, in one of which the Conde de la Cadena (Calleja's second in command) was killed; the explosion of an ammunition-waggon threw their ranks into confusion; but, as they had fought better, so they lost fewer men than at Aculco. Hidalgo and Allende effected an orderly retreat, in the direction of the Provincias Internas. Răyōn returned to Guădălăjără, to carry off the military chest, which contained 300,000 dollars. This he effected, as Calleja, satisfied with his victory, did not attempt to pursue the Insurgents, or even to enter Guadalupe, until four days after the battle. It is from the bridge of Căldērōn, where this action was fought, that he takes the title of Conde de Căldērōn; under which, in the year 1820, in Spain, he was surprised and made prisoner by Riego, in the midst of the army which he was destined to lead to Mexico, in order to terminate the work, which he had commenced ten years before.

The Insurgent Chiefs arrived in safety at Săltillō, with about 4000 men. There it was determined that Răyōn should be left in command of the troops, while Hīdălgō, Ăllēndē, Ăldămă, and Ăbăsōlō, pushed on, with an escort, for the frontiers of the United States, where they intended to purchase arms and military stores, with a part of the treasure which they had saved. They were surprised, on the road, by the treachery of a former associate, Don Ignacio Elīzōndō, who, having declared, at first, for the Revolution, was anxious to make his peace with the Government, by so valuable a

capture. They were made prisoners on the 21st of March, 1811, and conveyed to Chihūāhuā, where, such was the anxiety of the Government to draw from them some information as to the ramifications of the Insurrection, in the different provinces, that their trial was protracted until the end of July; when Hidalgo, having been previously degraded, was shot. His companions shared the same fate: they all appear to have met death with great firmness; at least, I have heard even Spaniards allow that the accounts published at the time, of their confessions, and alleged penitence, were fabrications.

It is not my intention to follow the history of the Revolution, after Hidalgo's death, through all the mazes of a Guerilla war. Throughout the whole territory of Mexico, from Veracruz to the Provincias Internas of the North, Insurgent parties were organized, and the Royalist troops employed in their pursuit. But there was no concert amongst their leaders, many of whom were barbarous and illiterate men, while each considered himself as independent in his own particular district. Rāyōn assumed the command of the remains of Hidalgo's forces at Saltillo, and retreated with them upon Zācātēcās; but his authority was acknowledged by none but his own men. The Baxio was laid under contribution by the parties of Muñiz, and the Padre Nāvārrētē: Sērrānō and Ōsōrnō commanded in the Provinces of La Puebla, and Veracruz; and even the valley of Mexico swarmed to such a degree with partizans, that all communication between the Capital and the Interior was cut off, while sentinels were *lassoed** at the very gates of the town. But still the authority of the Viceroy was acknowledged in the principal cities, and the Creoles were unable to assemble any force that could

* The lasso, respecting which the works of Captain Hall, and Captain Head, contain so many amusing particulars, is as generally used in Mexico, as in Chile, or the Pampas, and that, not merely in catching horses, or cattle, but as an offensive weapon.

meet the army of Calleja in the field. Little, therefore, was done towards bringing the contest to a close, although the country was devastated, and hardly a day passed without some partial action being fought.

Răyōn seems to have been the first to perceive that nothing but a general coalition could enable his countrymen to contend with an enemy, who had the power of directing an overwhelming force upon any particular point, and thus destroying its opponents in detail. To effect this, he conceived the idea of a National Junta, to be created by some sort of popular election, and acknowledged by all the Insurgent chiefs; and he selected the town of Zītācūarō, in the State of Valladolid, as the best residence for such an assembly; public opinion having pronounced itself more decidedly in favour of the Insurgents in that Province, than in any other.

With this view he occupied Zītācūarō, about the end of May, (1811,) and having repulsed an attack made upon it, on the 22nd of June, by Brigadier Ėmpārān, at the head of 2000 men, he proceeded in the execution of his favourite plan, in which he was so far successful, that, on the 10th of September 1811, a Junta, or Central Government, was installed, composed of five members, elected by as large an assembly of the most respectable farmers, and landed proprietors of the district, as could be collected for the occasion, in conjunction with the Ayuntamiento, and inhabitants of the town.

The principles laid down by the New Junta, in its first declarations, seem to have formed the basis of those adopted by Iturbide, ten years later, in his famous plan of Iguālā: both, at least, agree in acknowledging Ferdinand VII. as Sovereign of Mexico, provided he would quit his European dominions, and occupy the throne in person, and both profess to desire an intimate union with Spain. But there can have been but little sincerity in this, on the part of the Junta, for Mōrēlōs, with whom, at that time, Rayon had held but little communication, but whose name was, soon afterwards, added

to those of the other members of the Government, openly blamed his colleagues for consenting to recognize a Spanish Monarch on *any terms*; while Rayon only defended the measure on the score of *expediency*, "because the name of King still possessed such influence over the lower classes, that it was highly desirable to afford them the means of continuing in a state of insurrection, without shocking, in any way, their notions of what their duty to their Sovereign required."*

The intelligence of the installation of the Junta of Zītăcŭarō was received, with great enthusiasm, by the Creoles throughout New Spain; but the flattering hopes which this event excited, were, unfortunately, never realized. There was not, indeed, any want of good intentions, on the part of the Junta; but the supremacy of its members was not, at first, generally acknowledged; and when, by the accession of Morelos, they acquired additional influence, the destruction of their residence by Căllējă, and the preparations for the Congress of Chīlpănzīngō, in which the Junta itself, was, finally, merged, prevented any decisive measures from being taken. It left however, some lasting memorials of its existence. I know few papers drawn up with greater moderation, or better calculated to produce a good, practical effect, than the Manifesto, with the proposals for Peace, or War, transmitted in the name of the Junta, to the Viceroy, in the month of March, 1812.

After an eloquent picture of the state to which fifteen months of civil war had reduced the country, and an appeal to the Viceroy, respecting the manner in which the miseries inseparable from any state of warfare, had been augmented by the wanton sacrifice of the prisoners, Dr. Cos (by whom this manifesto was drawn up) proceeds to point out to Venegas his critical position; the little dependence which he could place upon the Creole troops, who, sooner or later,

* Vide Original Letters, since published by Bustamante, in his Cuadro, and Representation of Audiencia, Appendix.

must make common cause with their countrymen ;—the rapid progress of the Revolution, and the total inefficacy of all the measures of severity, by which he had endeavoured to check it. He then assumes, as undeniable principles, the natural equality of America and Spain ; the right of America to assemble her Cortes, as the Spaniards had done theirs ; and the nullity of the claims of any body of men in the Peninsula, to exercise the supreme authority in Mexico, during the captivity of the Sovereign : and finally, he proposes, on the part of the Junta, that, “ if the Europeans will consent to give up the offices which they hold, and to allow a General Congress to be assembled, their persons and properties shall be religiously respected ; their salaries paid ; and the same privileges granted to them, as to the native Mexicans ; who, on their side, will acknowledge Ferdinand as their Sovereign ; assist the Peninsula with their treasures ; and regard all Spaniards as their fellow-subjects, and citizens of the same great empire.”

Such was the plan of Peace. The plan of War was confined principally, to an endeavour to obtain some abatement of severity in the treatment of prisoners, so as to avoid unnecessary effusion of blood ; and to establish the severest penalties for all such, on either side, as should sack or burn villages, where no resistance was made ; or authorize indiscriminate massacres, on entering the smaller towns.

The introduction of the name of religion, in a quarrel where religion was in no way concerned, is likewise reprobated in very strong terms ; but, in the whole course of the manifesto, there is not one offensive or insulting expression ; an instance of moderation which is the more remarkable, as, at that time, the cause of the Revolution appeared to be every where triumphant.

These proposals Venegas ordered to be burnt by the public executioner, in the Plaza Mayor of Mexico ! He could not, however, prevent them from producing a great effect upon

the public mind, enforced, as they were, by the example and success of Mörēlōs, whose career it will now be my duty to trace, as furnishing one of the most interesting episodes in the Mexican Revolution.

We left Morelos, in October, 1810, setting out from Valladolid, with a commission from Hidalgo to act as Captain-general of the provinces on the South-Western coast, without any other retinue than a few servants, from his own curacy, armed with six muskets, and some old lances. The first addition which he received to this force, on arriving on the coast, was a numerous band of slaves from Pētātāñ, and other towns, eager to purchase their liberty on the field of battle: arms were, however, so scarce, that twenty muskets, which were discovered in Pētātāñ, were considered an invaluable acquisition. The brothers, Don José, and Don Antonio, Gălěănă, who had already declared for the cause of Independence joined him, soon afterwards, with their adherents, (November, 1810,) and increased his numbers to about a thousand men. With this force Morelos advanced upon Acapulco. He was met by the Commandant of the district, Don Francisco Paris, at the head of a numerous and well-appointed body of troops. Notwithstanding his superiority, Morelos, aware of the necessity of commencing his operations by a *coup-d'éclat*, determined to attack the camp of the Royalists by night. The attempt was crowned with complete success. On the 25th of January, 1811, the enemy was surprised, and thrown into such confusion on the first onset, that they thought of nothing but a rapid flight. Eight hundred muskets, five pieces of artillery, a quantity of ammunition, and a considerable sum of money, fell into the hands of Mörēlōs, who thus saw all his wants supplied at once. Seven hundred prisoners were taken at the same time, all of whom were treated with the greatest humanity. This successful enterprize was, as Mörēlōs himself frequently said, the corner-stone of all his later triumphs. The rapidity of his progress, from this moment, was astonish-

ing; and the skill with which he baffled the efforts of the divisions successively detached against him by Venegas, under the Brigadiers Llānō and Fūētēs, rendered him, in a very short time, the terror of the Spaniards, and the admiration of his own countrymen. His celebrity brought men of talent, from every quarter, to his standard. Those in whom he placed most confidence were, Don Ermenegildo Gălĕănă, the Cura Mătămōrōs, (whom he appointed his first lieutenant,) and the Brāvōs, whose whole family joined him, soon after the defeat of Paris. The father, Don Lĕōnărdō, and one of his brothers, perished in the course of the Revolution; but Don Nicolas Brāvō (the son) survived it, and has been placed, by the unanimous voice of his countrymen, with Vĭctōriă, at the head of the present government.

The whole of the year 1811 was occupied by a series of petty engagements, (the details of which can only be interesting to Mexicans,) and by the strenuous efforts of Morelos to introduce something like discipline amongst the Blacks, who had enlisted in considerable numbers in his army. Their ferocity was of use in the field of battle, but it was only by frequent examples that it could be prevented from showing itself on other occasions; and it required all the firmness of Morelos to keep it within due bounds.

In the mean time, the scene of action had been, gradually, brought nearer to the Capital; and, in January 1812, the Insurgents advanced so far, that Tasco, a town famous for its mines, and only twenty-five leagues from Mexico, was taken by Gălĕănă and Brāvō, after an obstinate resistance.

Various actions took place in January, and the beginning of February, 1812, in all of which Mōrĕlōs was victorious; so that, at last, his advanced-guard, under Bravo, pushed on to Chalco, with out-posts at San Agŭstĭn de las Cŭĕvăs, within three leagues of the gates of Mexico. But the alarm excited by this movement drew upon Morelos a more formidable opponent. Calleja was summoned to defend the Capital, with

the army which had triumphed over the first Insurgents at Ācūlcō, and the bridge of Căldērōn; but, though flushed with new successes, Morelos determined to wait its approach. Cūāūtlă Āmīlpăs, (about twenty-two leagues from Mexico,) was the place which he selected to make his stand. It was an entirely open town, nor did he attempt to supply the want of exterior fortifications, though he was indefatigable in his endeavours to render the interior as strong as possible, by cutting trenches in the streets, walling up the doors, and lower windows of the houses, and breaking a communication within, so as to give his men every possible advantage. In this he was seconded by the activity of his Lieutenants, Brāvō, Gălēănă, and the Cura Mătămōrōs; and such was the confidence with which they inspired their troops, that the approach of the Royal army was impatiently expected.

As Calleja, whom we left in the North of the country, did not march from thence to Cūāūtlă, without adding to the number of his successes over the Insurgents, it will be necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to trace his progress, before I give any account of the siege.

From the moment of its establishment, the Junta of Zītăcūārō was considered by the Spaniards as their most formidable enemy; and Venegas, in December 1811, sent positive orders to Calleja, then at Acāmbărō, in the province of Mīchōăcān, to march, with all his forces, against the town. Calleja obeyed; and his army, sustained such hardships, and overcame such difficulties in crossing a country where roads were unknown, and where, at times, they were forced to cut their way through forests so thick, that it required the labour of twenty-four hours to enable them to advance a single league, that even their enemies speak of the undertaking with admiration.

On the 1st of January, 1812, Căllējă arrived before Zītăcūārō; and on the 2nd, he attacked, and carried the town by assault, which must have been badly defended, as, from the strength of its situation, it was capable of making considerable

resistance. The Junta escaped to Sũltẽpẽc, where it established a new seat of Government; but the honour of having been selected for its first residence proved fatal to Zĩtacũarõ. Calleja, after having passed a fortnight there, which he employed principally in examining Rayon's papers, decimated the inhabitants, ordered the walls to be rased, and burnt the town on his departure, sparing only the churches and convents.*

From Zĩtacũarõ, he proceeded, by forced marches, to Mexico, where Venegas most anxiously expected him, in order to check the progress of Morelos. The army made a triumphal entry into the Capital, on the 6th of February, 1812; they were received with salutes, and a grand *Te Deum* in the Cathedral, and a general promotion took place. But this important point was no sooner arranged, than Venegas became as impatient for the departure of his guests, as he had been for their arrival. He had always been jealous of Calleja; but now, when brought into contact, the misunderstanding rose to such a height, that they would have kept no terms, had the stay of the army been prolonged. Fortunately, the vicinity of Morelos afforded a pretext for a speedy separation; and on the 14th of February, 1812, Calleja began his march towards Cũãũtlã Amilpas, which he threatened with the fate of Zitacuaro.

Morelos, on the approach of the Royalists, (February 18th,) went out, with a small escort, to reconnoitre them, and had the imprudence to advance so far, that he was charged by a party of cavalry, lost several of his men, and would, probably, have been made prisoner himself, had not Gãlẽañã, who was afraid of his exposing himself too much, kept a party in readiness, with which he sallied out in person to his rescue. It was upon this occasion that *Don José Maria Fernãndẽz*, now General Victoria, first distinguished himself: his father was

* I saw this unfortunate town in 1826. The situation is lovely, but the place is still in ruins.

a considerable landholder in the Provincias Internas, and Victoria, at the age of twenty-two, had just completed his studies for the bar, in the Capital, when the Revolution broke out. From the first, his resolution to espouse the cause of his country was taken, but it was not until he saw a man of acknowledged merit at the head of the Insurgents, that he determined to place himself under his orders. The instant Morelos's character was known, he left the Capital, and joined him as a volunteer.

In the present skirmish, which was a very sharp one, he received a severe wound, by which, however, he was the means of saving Galeana's life. Morelos was brought off with difficulty; but he had the pleasure of seeing that his men, far from being intimidated by the idea of having to contend with troops, who advanced with the character of invincible, had never behaved better than in this affair.

Early in the morning of the 19th, Calleja made a general attack upon the town. His army advanced in four columns, with the artillery in the centre, and, animated by the recollection of the late success at Zitacuaró, which was infinitely superior to Cūātlā in point of strength, the troops came on like men resolved to carry every thing before them. The Mexicans allowed them to approach within one hundred yards of their intrenchments, in the Plaza of San Diego; but there they opened so tremendous a fire, that the column was forced to retreat precipitately. Galeana, who commanded in the Plaza, seeing a Spanish colonel at some distance from his troops, and endeavouring to bring them up to the charge again, sallied out upon him alone, engaged him hand to hand, and killed him on the spot; an action, which contributed, not a little, to raise the spirits of his own men. Indeed, nothing could exceed the enthusiasm with which Morelos had inspired both his troops, and the inhabitants of the town. The Indians, who were stationed upon the flat roofs of the houses, did great execution with their slings, and assisted in prevent-

ing the enemy, when once thrown into disorder, from forming again. Morelos himself was equally successful with Galeana in repulsing the column which attacked the Plaza de St. Domingo, where he commanded in person. The action lasted from seven in the morning till three in the afternoon; when Calleja, after a fruitless attempt to decoy the Mexicans from their entrenchments, by pretending to abandon his artillery, drew off his men, (leaving five hundred dead upon the spot,) and retired, in good order, to a village, about a league from the town, where he established his head-quarters.

The event of the day had so completely discouraged him, that he did not think of risking another assault, but determined to lay siege to Cūāutlā in form, and wrote to Venegas for supplies of artillery, ammunition, and men. Venegas immediately sent him all that the magazines of the capital contained; and ordered Brigadier Llano, who had before been opposed to Morelos, to join the army of the Centre with his whole division. The courier charged with the Viceroy's dispatches having fallen into the hands of an Insurgent party, Morelos was apprized of the increase of force, which Calleja was about to receive; but he felt, likewise, that the eyes of all Mexico were turned upon the contest at Cūāutlā, and that a retreat would defeat the hopes, which the repulse of the Royalists, in their first attack, had excited. He determined, therefore, to defend himself to the last, in a place where, according to the rules of war, defence was impossible; and this resolution was most gallantly carried into effect.

Llano was, at this time, engaged in an attack upon İzücăr, which was successfully defended by Don Vicente Güerrērō, who had, at that time, begun his long and perilous career. In the course of the Revolution, this general had received upwards of fifty wounds, and has had almost as many miraculous escapes: one of the most extraordinary, perhaps, was at İzücăr, where, while he was asleep, exhausted with fatigue, a small shell came through the roof, and rolled under his bed,

where it exploded, and killed, or wounded, every person in the room, but himself.

On the receipt of the Viceroy's orders, Llano quitted İzūcār, and joined Căllējă on the 1st of March. On the 4th, Calleja on one side, and Llano on the other, began to cannonade and bombard the town, after having erected batteries and breastworks in the course of a single night.

The first shells alarmed the inhabitants excessively; but, within twenty-four hours, they grew so accustomed to them, that the very children were employed in collecting them, as well as the cannon and musket-balls which were strewed about the streets; for which Morelos, whose stock of ammunition was not very copious, paid them so much a dozen.

Hostilities were not, however, confined to this distant warfare: during the month of March, an attempt was made to surprise Calleja, by an insurgent division not in Cuautla, under the orders of one of the Bravos, and Larios, which failed completely. The want of water, too, constantly brought the troops, on both sides, to close quarters. Cuautla was supplied by a stream, which, at a point not very far from the town, there was a possibility of turning into another channel. This Calleja effected; and though his works were destroyed by a sally from the town, he had made some progress in re-establishing them, when Galeana, aware of the necessity of securing this important spot, undertook, on the night of the 25th of March, to dislodge the enemy, and to raise a fort close to the spring. This enterprise was conducted with such activity and judgment, that it was crowned with complete success. In the course of twenty-four hours, a fort, with three pieces of artillery, was completed, with a covered way, extending to the town. Galeana himself took charge of the new fortification, and defended it against a desperate attack, which the Royalists made upon it the following night, and in which their loss was considerable, as Galeana would not

allow his men to fire, until the enemy was within pistol-shot of the entrenchments.

An attempt to enter Cuautla, by establishing a correspondence with some of the inhabitants, likewise failed. Calleja had managed to induce a Captain Manso to promise to deliver up a battery entrusted to his charge, but his treachery was discovered by Galeana, and turned against the Royalists, who, on seeing the signals agreed upon, advanced, by night, and were introduced by Galeana himself into the trenches, where they were received with so general, and so well-directed a discharge, that they left one hundred men dead upon the spot.

Calleja's own reports do ample justice to the gallantry of the defence made by the Insurgents. He acknowledges, (March 25th) in his correspondence with the Viceroy, that, so far from having shown any symptoms of discouragement, they had supported both the firing and the bombardment, "with a firmness worthy of a better cause;" and that they continued to harass his troops by sallies, which kept them constantly upon the alert. He calls Morelos, "a second Mahomet;" and though he terms fanaticism the enthusiasm with which he had inspired his followers, he confesses that it had produced the most extraordinary effects. At a much earlier period, he had applied for a train of heavy artillery from Pérôté; but though Venegas instantly despatched the necessary orders, the troops appointed to convoy it to Mexico were so often attacked upon the road by the La Puebla, and Vera Cruz Insurgents, that their progress was extremely slow. In these Provinces the Spaniards possessed little more than the great towns; the open country was in the hands of the Insurgents; and they mustered in such formidable numbers about Nöpālūcă, that ōlāzābāl, who commanded the convoy of the artillery, was detained there, in a state of siege, by ōsōrnō, on the 23rd of March, and was only released by the

arrival of a strong detachment sent from La Pūēblā to his assistance.

The great object of Mōrēlōs was to prolong the siege until the commencement of the rainy season, when he knew that the Royalists would be forced to raise it, as Cuautla is situated in Tierra Caliente, and is a most unhealthy spot. Calleja was aware of this, and felt the ignominy with which a retreat would be attended; yet not even this could induce him to risk another general attack. All his efforts had been hitherto unavailing; and, at the end of April, he could not boast of having gained one single advantage. Unfortunately for the Mexicans, he had but too powerful an ally within the walls of the town. Cuautla had never been properly supplied with provisions, as Morelos did not expect to be besieged there in form, and famine now prevailed to a horrible extent; maize was almost the only sustenance of the troops; a cat sold for six dollars; a lizard for two; and rats or other vermin for one. An ox, which was seen, one day, feeding between the Spanish camp and the town, nearly brought on a general action; for the troops, unable to resist the temptation, rushed out in crowds to seize the prey, and were attacked, while bringing it off, by so strong a party of the enemy, that Morelos was forced to draw out nearly his whole remaining force, in order to save them from destruction. Disease, too, began to show itself in its most frightful shape, and nearly 300 sick were lodged in the hospital of San Diego alone. Such, however, was the influence of Morelos over his men, that they endured all their sufferings with undaunted resolution, as long as there was a hope of supplies being received from without; but Mātāmōrōs having been defeated in an attempt to introduce provisions, Mōrēlōs was forced to decide between making a general attack upon the camp of Calleja, and evacuating the town without delay. Had his men been in full health and vigour, it is probable

that he would have attempted the first; but considering the wretched state to which they were reduced, he thought he should not be justified in risking the fate of the nation upon the issue of so hazardous an enterprize. An attack made upon Llano's great battery a short time before, convinced him of the impossibility of preserving order amongst his men, in case of a first success, and of the fatal consequences with which their confusion might be attended. The Insurgents had advanced with great intrepidity, and carried the battery at the first assault; but finding there a considerable stock of salt meat and segars, (luxuries of which they had long been deprived,) they seized upon them with such avidity, that not all the exertions of their chiefs could induce them to turn the advantage which they had gained to account; the guns were neither carried off, nor even spiked: and so much precious time was wasted, that a large reinforcement arrived from Calleja's camp, and drove them out of the battery again with considerable loss.

With such reasons for avoiding an action, one cannot but approve of the resolution taken by Morelos to evacuate Cuautla; which was executed with equal talent and success. On the night of the 2d of May, between eleven and twelve o'clock, the troops were formed in the Plaza of San Diego; Galeana took the command of the advanced guard, Morelos of the centre, and the Bravos of the rear. Such was the silence observed by the column, that they passed between the enemy's batteries without being perceived; nor was it until they reached a deep barranca, (or ravine,) over which they were obliged to construct a bridge, with hurdles carried by the Indians for that purpose, that the alarm was given by a sentry, who fired his musket before Galeana had time to cut him down. The barranca was hardly crossed, when the column was attacked, on opposite sides, by the troops of Llano and Calleja. Morelos instantly gave the word for a general dispersion, as had been agreed upon, with

orders to rendezvous at Izucar ; and such was the promptitude with which this was effected, that the Spanish troops, finding no enemy between them as they advanced, began firing upon each other, and lost a number of men before the mistake was discovered.

Morelos reached Izūcār, which was in possession of Don Miguel Bravo, in two days, and had the pleasure to find, when his different divisions arrived, that of the soldiers of Cuautla only seventeen were missing. Amongst these, unfortunately, was Don Leonardo Bravo, who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and whose loss was universally regretted.

Calleja did not enter Cuautla until some hours after Morelos had quitted it, and even then, his troops advanced with the greatest precaution ; so apprehensive were they of some new stratagem. The cruelties which he exercised upon the unfortunate inhabitants of the town, will leave, for ever, a stain upon his reputation. I have heard officers, who were present at the siege, speak of them, after a lapse of ten years, with horror. On the 16th of May, the army returned to the Capital ; where its reception was very different from that which it had experienced three months before. In spite of the pompous account of its success, published in the Gazette, and the number of deaths with which Calleja had swelled his reports, every body knew that he had been repulsed, and outwitted at last, by Morelos ; and, as for the army, its appearance spoke for itself. A comedy was acted a few nights afterwards, in which a soldier was introduced, who, on his return from battle, presents his general with a turban, and tells him in a very pompous manner, "Here is the turban of the Moor, whom I took prisoner !" "And the Moor himself ?" "O ! he unfortunately escaped !" The passage was received with bursts of laughter, and the application instantly made by the spectators.

Such was the event of the siege of Cūāutlā Āmīlpās, which

I have given in some detail, because it may fairly be considered as the most important military occurrence in the whole Revolution. The resources displayed by Morelos, in the course of it, gave him a degree of celebrity and influence, which none of the Insurgent chiefs attained after him. His authority was recognised every where ; and continued to be respected until his death, in spite of the singular change of fortune, which marked the latter part of his career.

Mōrēlōs was detained some time at Ÿzūcār, by an injury which he received, by a fall from his horse, on the retreat from Cuautla. On his recovery, he put himself again at the head of his troops, whom Matamaros had brought into admirable order, and soon convinced Vēnēgās that "the monster of the South," as he was termed in the Gazette of Mexico, far from "seeking a hiding-place in caves and forests," was about to carry on the contest with his usual activity. After defeating three Spanish divisions, Morelos made a triumphal entry into Tēhūacān, (in La Puebla,) on the 16th of September, 1812. From thence he undertook a successful expedition against the town of Ōrizāvē, where he found nine pieces of artillery, and an immense booty in money and tobacco. Obligated to evacuate the place, by the approach of a superior force, he returned to Tēhūacān, and, after refreshing his troops there, commenced in the beginning of November, his famous expedition against Ōāxācā. After sustaining incredible hardships upon the march, the army at last arrived before the town, situated in the finest part of one of the most lovely provinces of Mexico. It was garrisoned by the Royalists, under Brigadier Regules, who attempted to defend the town ; but nothing could withstand the impetuosity of the Insurgent troops. Their artillery, under the command of Don Manuel Mier y Tērān, having silenced that of their opponents, Regules made a last stand on the edge of a deep moat which surrounds Oaxaca, and over which there was no passage but by a single drawbridge, which was drawn up,

and the approach to it defended by the Royalist infantry. The Insurgents paused on perceiving this new obstacle; but their irresolution was only momentary. Gūadālūpě Victoria, who was in the front rank, threw himself into the moat, sword in hand, and swam across; the enemies were so surprised at his temerity, that they allowed him to land, and even to cut the ropes, by which the drawbridge was suspended, without receiving a single wound: the troops of Morelos rushed across it, and soon made themselves masters of the town.

After releasing those who were in confinement for political opinions, and replacing the Spanish authorities by Mexicans, Morelos proceeded to execute his darling scheme of forming a National Congress. In order to give to this idea all possible extension, the conquest of the rest of the province was indispensable. A very short time enabled him to effect this, with the exception of Acapulco, to which he laid siege on the 15th of February, 1813. This enterprise, the most important, as well as the most hazardous, that had ever been undertaken by the Insurgent armies, detained him several months: in the course of it, Morelos, whose great fault as a general was being too fond of exposing his person, had several very narrow escapes; nor was it until the 20th of August, 1813, that his object was attained.

As soon as the Mexican flag had taken the place of the Spanish colours on the fortress of San Diego, Morelos returned to ōāxācā, where he found every thing prepared, by Matamoros, for the meeting of the Congress, which was composed of the original members of the Junta of Zītācuārō, the deputies elected by the Province of Oaxaca, and others, again, selected by them as representatives for the Provinces in the possession of the Royal troops. Such was the Assembly, which opened its sessions on the 13th of September 1813, in the town of Chīlpānzīngō. Its most remarkable act was the declaration of the absolute Independence of Mexico, pub-

lished by it upon the 13th of November, 1813. It is difficult to say what impression this declaration might have produced upon the country, had Morelos continued his career of success; but his fortune was upon the wane before it became at all generally known, and the influence of the Congress diminished, of course, in proportion to the decline in the reputation of its protector. The period of its installation was, undoubtedly, the most brilliant moment of Morelos's political existence. Up to that time, he had not only been successful wherever he commanded in person, but seemed to communicate a portion of his good fortune to all who served under his orders. The years 1812, and 1813, were distinguished by the victories gained by Don Nicolas Bravo, and Matamoros, at the Pālmār, and by the defence of the mountain of Cōscōmātēpēc. In the first of these actions, Bravo defeated Don Juan Lăbăquī, the Commandant of the regiment of the Patriots of Veracruz, at the head of a strong detachment. The engagement lasted three days, when the village, in which the Spaniards had taken refuge, was carried by storm, (20th August, 1812.) Three hundred prisoners, taken upon this occasion, were placed by Morelos, at the disposal of Bravo, who offered them to the Viceroy Venegas, in exchange for his father, Don Leonardo Bravo, who was then under sentence of death in the prisons of the Capital. The offer was rejected, and the sentence against Don Leonardo ordered to be carried into immediate execution. His son, in lieu of making reprisals by the massacre of his prisoners, instantly set them at liberty, "wishing," (as he said,) "to put it out of his own power to avenge on them the death of his parent, lest, in the first moment of grief, the temptation should prove irresistible!" So noble a trait requires no comment!

From this time, Bravo had the command of a separate division, with which he carried on hostilities in the province of Veracruz, where he fortified the Cerro of Cōscōmātēpēc, and

defended it for two months, (September and October, 1813,) against a force of three thousand men, under the orders of Colonel Aguila. Forced at last, by want of provisions, to evacuate the place, he retired in the night without the loss of a single man, and rejoined Morelos in Oaxaca, with his whole division. But the most serious check received by the Spaniards, during the whole war, was that sustained by them in the second battle of the Pálmār, on the 18th of October, 1813, where the regiment of Asturias, composed entirely of European troops, was cut off by Mătămōrös, after a severe action, which lasted eight hours. This regiment (which had been at the battle of Baylen,) came out from Spain with the proud title of "the invincible victors of the victors of Austerlitz;" and its loss was regarded by all the Spaniards as fatal to the *prestige* which had before attached to the European troops. The Insurgents, however, derived but little advantage from this victory. The time was come, when it seemed decreed that their affairs should take an unfavourable turn, nor did fortune once smile upon them afterwards. The division of Mătămōrös shortly rejoined Morelos in Oaxaca, who was then concentrating his forces at Chīlpānzīngö, in order to prepare for an expedition against the province of Valladolid, the possession of which would have brought him into more immediate contact with the Insurgents of the Interior, and enabled him, with their co-operation, to strike a decisive blow against the Capital itself.

With these hopes Morelos collected seven thousand men, and a large train of artillery, with which force he left Chīlpānzīngö, on the 8th of November, 1813. After a march of one hundred leagues across a country which no one had ever traversed before, he arrived before Valladolid on the 23d of December, where he found a formidable force under Brigadier Llano, and Iturbide, (who had then attained the rank of Colonel,) prepared to receive him. Rendered too confident by the success which had constantly attended his arms, with-

out allowing his troops time to repose, he advanced immediately against the town, and was repulsed by the Royalists with loss. On the following morning, Matamoros, (ignorant, probably, of the real strength of the garrison,) had the imprudence to order a general review of the army, within half a mile of the walls. In the midst of it, Iturbide, by a sudden sally, threw the Mexicans into confusion. They rallied, however, by degrees, and had succeeded in repulsing the Spaniards, when an Insurgent party under Nāvārrētē and el Pāchōn, (two partizans of the Independent cause in the Bāxīō,) arrived on the field of battle in order to assist Morelos, with a large body of cavalry. Not having agreed upon any general signals, they were not recognized as friends, and were fired upon by the Mexicans on their approach. They immediately made a furious charge upon the flank, and Iturbide taking advantage of an error so fortunate for him, succeeded in putting the whole army to the rout, with the loss of its best regiments, and all the artillery.

Morelos retreated to Pūrūārān, where Īturbīde attacked him again, on the 6th of January, 1814, and again obtained a complete victory. Mātāmōrōs was taken prisoner in the general dispersion. Morelos endeavoured to save his life by offering, in exchange for him, a number of Spanish prisoners, (principally of the regiment of Asturias,) taken at the Pāl-mār, and confined at Acapulco; but Cāllējā, who had, at that time, replaced Vēnēgās as Viceroy, refused to listen to any proposal of the kind. Matamoros was shot, and the Insurgents, by way of reprisals, ordered all their prisoners to be put to death.

This was the beginning of a series of reverses, which only terminated with the life of Morelos. While he himself endeavoured to recruit his forces on his old scene of action, the Southern coast, he despatched Don Manuel Mier y Tērān to take the command of the district of Tēhuācān, (in La Puebla,) and Victoria, who had distinguished himself greatly in

the unfortunate affair before Valladolid, to act as Captain-general in the Province of Veracruz. But although Morelos displayed as much resolution and activity as ever, in struggling against the tide of adversity, his efforts to retrieve his sinking fortune were ineffectual. He lost action after action; Oaxaca was retaken by a Royalist division under Brigadier Ālvārēz, (28th March, 1814,) Don Miguel Bravo was made prisoner, and died upon the scaffold, at La Puebla; Gălēcănă perished on the field of battle, (27th June, 1814;) the Congress of Chīlpănzīngö was driven from that town, and forced to take refuge in the woods of Apătzīngăn, where, however, it continued its labours, and sanctioned, on the 22nd of October, 1814, the Constitution known by that name. Here it was very nearly surprised by Iturbide, (in 1815,) who, by a rapid and masterly march across the mountains of Mīchöăcăn, came upon the Deputies almost before they were apprized of his approach. It was in consequence of this attempt, and with a view of placing the Congress in safety, that Morelos determined to undertake his expedition to Těhuăcăn, in the Province of La Puebla, where Těrăn had already assembled a considerable force. With only five hundred men he attempted a march of sixty leagues, across a part of the country occupied by several divisions of Royalists. He hoped, indeed, to be joined by Těrăn and Guěrrěrö, but his couriers were intercepted, and neither of these generals was aware of his situation.

The Spaniards conceiving the forces of Morelos to be much more considerable than they really were, did not venture to attack him until he had penetrated as far as Těsmălăcă, where the Indians, though they received him with great apparent hospitality, conveyed intelligence, both of the real number of his followers, and of their wretched state, to Don Manuel Cōnchă, the nearest Spanish Commandant, who determined to attack the convoy the next day. Morelos, fancying himself in security, as he was now beyond the enemy's

line, was surprised on the following morning, (5th of November, 1815,) by two parties of Royalists, who came upon him unperceived, in a mountainous part of the road. He immediately ordered Don Nicolas Bravo to continue his march with the main body, as an escort to the Congress, while he himself with a few men endeavoured to check the advance of the Spaniards.

“My life,” he said, “is of little consequence, provided the Congress be saved. My race was run from the moment that I saw an Independent Government established.”

His orders were obeyed, and Morelos remained with about fifty men, most of whom abandoned him when the firing became hot. He succeeded, however, in gaining time, which was his great object, nor did the Royalists venture to advance upon him, until only one man was left by his side. He was then taken prisoner, for he had sought death in vain during the action. There can be little doubt that his late reverses had inspired him with a disgust for life, and that he wished to end his days by a proof of devotion to his country worthy of the most brilliant part of his former career.

Morelos was treated with the greatest brutality by the Spanish soldiers into whose hands he first fell. They stripped him, and conducted him, loaded with chains to Tēsmālācā. But Concha, (to his honour be it said,) on his prisoner being presented to him, received him with the respect due to a fallen enemy, and treated him with unwonted humanity and attention. He was transferred, with as little delay as possible, to the capital, and the whole population of Mexico flocked out to San Agustin de las Cuevas, to see, (and some to insult) the man, whose name had so long been their terror. But Morelos, both on his way to prison, and while in confinement, is said to have shown a coolness which he preserved to the last. Indeed, the only thing that seemed to affect him at all was his degradation; a ceremony humiliating in itself, but rendered doubly so, in his case, by the publicity which was

given to it. His examination was conducted by the Oidor Bătăllër, (whose insolent assertion of the natural superiority of the Spaniards to the Creoles, is said first to have roused Morelos into action,) and was not of long duration. On the 22d of December, 1815, Concha was charged to remove him from the prisons of the Inquisition to the hospital of San Christoval, behind which the sentence pronounced against him was to be carried into execution. On arriving there, he dined in company with Concha, whom he afterwards embraced, and thanked for his kindness. He then confessed himself, and walked, with the most perfect serenity, to the place of execution. The short prayer which he pronounced there, deserves to be recorded for its affecting simplicity. "Lord, if I have done well, thou knowest it; if ill, to thy infinite mercy I commend my soul!"

After this appeal to the Supreme Judge, he fastened with his own hands a handkerchief about his eyes, gave the signal to the soldiers to fire, and met death with as much composure as he had ever shown when facing it on the field of battle.

SECTION III.

REVOLUTION FROM DEATH OF MORELOS TO 1820.

THE most brilliant period of the Revolution terminated with the life of Morelos. He alone possessed influence enough to combine the operations of the different Insurgent chiefs into something like unity of plan ;—to reconcile their jarring interests, and to prevent their jealousy of each other from breaking out into open discord. By his death this last tie seemed to be dissolved, and things relapsed into their former confusion. Each Province considered itself as isolated, and connected with no bond of union with the rest ; and by this fatal want of combination, the Insurgent cause, though supported in many parts of the country by considerable military talent, and great personal courage, sunk gradually into an almost hopeless state.

Morelos conceived that the Congress which he had assembled at Oaxaca, and for which he sacrificed his life, would prove a centre of union, to which his lieutenants might look, as they had previously done to himself ; but few of his officers entertained similar feelings with regard to this body, which, however useful in theory, was, practically, a most inconvenient appendage to a camp. Don Nicholas Bravo succeeded, indeed, in escorting the Deputies in safety to Tēhūacān, where they were received, at first, with great respect by General Tērān : but disputes soon arose between the Civil and Military authorities, and these terminated by the dissolution of

the Congress, to which measure Těřān had recourse on the 15th of December, 1815.

There is no act in the history of the Revolution that has been more severely blamed than this, and none, perhaps, that has been less fairly judged. It cannot be denied that, by dissolving the Congress, Teran injured the general cause, by depriving the Insurgents of a *point de réunion*, which might, afterwards, have been of essential use; but it has never been proved that it was possible for him to do otherwise, or that the district under his command could, in any way, have supported the additional charge, which the arrival of the Congress must have brought upon it. The fact is, that the members of that assembly, amongst the other articles of their Constitution, had assigned to themselves, as Deputies, a yearly salary of eight thousand dollars each; a resolution which Bustamante, (the historian of the Revolution, and himself a Deputy,) justifies, by saying that the salary was merely nominal, and that two thousand dollars were the utmost that any one hoped to receive. Be this as it may, it is certain that whatever could be construed into public property, either as taken from the enemy, or as the produce of fines paid by the different Haciendas, (in the nature of black mail,) became liable for the payment of these sums, whenever the Congress chose to determine that it should be so; and moreover, the assembly was so well aware of this fact, that it always endeavoured to get the management of the public purse out of the hands of the Military Commandants, in order to entrust it to Intendants of its own nomination. Unfortunately, the man selected for this office at Těhuācān, (Martinez) was particularly strict and unyielding, (Bustamante calls him *cosquilloso*, ticklish,) in every thing connected with his department; and contrived to involve himself, almost immediately, in a dispute with Těřān, by demanding possession of the money, and stores, which that general had, with infinite pains, succeeded in collecting. In this claim, Martinez was supported by the

Congress, and Teran was thus reduced to become, *de facto*, a dependant upon the body, which had just thrown itself upon his protection, or to deny its authority altogether. He asserts, however, that he would have supported with patience, his share of the dead weight of the Congress, had any disposition been shown by the other Independent chiefs to contribute towards its support. But no offers of the kind were made; and although all blamed Těran for dissolving the National Assembly, and all refused to acknowledge the Government which he attempted to establish in its place, none would receive the Deputies into their camp, or undertake the charge of protecting their sessions, which might, in that case, have been resumed, as Těran had no more right to dissolve a Congress, than he had to create one himself, in the name of the people, had he been inclined to attempt it.

It must, however, be admitted, that the breaking up of the only Central Government that had ever been generally recognized by the Insurgents, was attended with the most disastrous effects. From that moment, universal disorder prevailed: Vĭctōriă, Guěrrērō, Brăvō, Răyōn, and Těran, confined themselves each to his separate circle, where each was crushed in turn, by the superiority of the common enemy. A multitude of inferior partizans shared the same fate. The arrival of fresh troops from the Peninsula, enabled the Viceroy to establish a regular chain of communication throughout the country, and to enforce obedience, even at the most distant points; and these discouraging circumstances, together with the facilities held out to all who had embarked in the Revolution, by the new Viceroy Apōdăcă, for reconciling themselves with the Government by accepting the *indulto*, or pardon, offered by the King, reduced the number of those actually in arms, during the years 1816, 1817, and 1818, to a very inconsiderable amount.

But the reverses sustained by the Creole leaders in the field were more than counterbalanced by the effect previously pro-

duced, by the introduction of the Spanish constitution into Mexico; which, although its most important articles were suspended almost immediately, so far favoured the development of a spirit of independence, that nothing could afterwards shake its hold upon the minds of the people. This Constitution was, as may be recollected, sanctioned by the Cortes of Cadiz, in 1812, and immediately applied, not only to Spain, but to the Transatlantic dominions of the Crown. In Mexico it took effect in the Autumn of the same year, (29th September, 1812,) under the Viceroyalty of Venegas, who was soon convinced that his authority, if submitted to the test of public opinion, could not be long retained. So many violent pamphlets against Spain, and Spanish dominion, were published during the two only months that the liberty of the press was tolerated, (it lasted exactly sixty-six days from the 5th of October, 1812,) that the tranquillity of the Capital was endangered, notwithstanding the presence of a numerous garrison, and the palace itself threatened by an infuriated mob. *Vivas* in favour of Morelos, and the Insurgents, were heard under the Viceroy's own windows, as well as cries of "Down with the bad Government!" and even of "Down with the King!" In short, (to use the words of the Audiencia, paragraph 136,) "the political writings of the day produced upon the natives the same effect that spirituous liquors cause amongst savages." A national feeling was created, and became every where predominant. Fortunately for Spain, the right of electing the members of the Ayuntamiento, and the Deputies to the Cortes, afforded a vent for passions, which must otherwise have led to some terrific explosion. Out of *six hundred and fifty-two elective appointments*, of more or less importance, which the Mexicans were entitled by the Constitution to make, not *one* was bestowed upon an European; and most were filled by men notoriously addicted to the Independent cause! Nor were the legal forms prescribed by the new system, for the prosecution of criminals, turned to

less account. Suspicions were no longer admitted as sufficient ground for depriving an accused Creole of his liberty. Proofs were required by the Constitutional Alcaldes, whose jurisdiction replaced, in most cases, that of the Audiencia; and these proofs were most critically weighed, by men, who had, in general, been recommended, by their known predilection for the cause of the Revolution, to fill those offices, which entitled them to judge of the inclinations and loyalty, of others.

Thus, under the safeguard of the new institutions, disaffection became every day more prevalent; and, neither the successes of the Royal army in the field, nor the exertions of two Viceroy, who undoubtedly possessed very superior talents, could give to Spain any prospect of permanently suppressing the Revolution.

The assiduity of Don Carlos Bustamante, whom I have had occasion to mention frequently as the historian of the Revolution, has rescued from oblivion two most interesting State papers, which were found in the archives of the Viceroyalty. The one, is a representation addressed by the Audiencia of Mexico to the Cortes, on the 18th of November, 1813; and the other, a confidential letter of the Viceroy Calleja, (who succeeded Venegas, on the 4th of March, 1813,) to the King, on His release from captivity, dated a year later, but referring to the same period, and passing in review nearly the same events. Of the genuineness of these documents no doubt can be entertained; and they present so striking a picture of the effect produced by a little relaxation of those bonds, by which the Colonies had been previously kept in subjection, that I must recommend them most particularly to my readers, who will find a translation of both, annexed to the Appendix.* They are worthy of attention, not merely as disclosing the secret springs of the Revolution, but, as proving that, for many years before any intercourse with the Colonies, on the part of Foreign powers, was attempted, the

Vide Appendix, Letters C and D.

confidential servants of the Crown of Spain felt the impossibility of maintaining its authority there, unless supported by an overwhelming force, and admitted, "*that the whole population of the country was bent upon the attainment of an independent political existence.*" This fact is so strongly urged throughout Calleja's letter to the King, that it may be considered, (as he himself terms it,) *the corner stone* of his whole argument. He states, in one passage, "That notwithstanding the advantages which he had obtained in the field, but little had been done towards destroying the seeds of the Rebellion; the focus of which lies in the great towns, and more particularly in the *Capital.*" In another, he says, "That the great majority of the natives is in favour of the Insurrection,"—that "the municipalities, the Provincial Deputations, and even the Spanish Cortes themselves, (in as far as the provinces of Ultramar are concerned,) are composed of *nothing but Insurgents*, and those of the most decided and criminal character." In another: "That the Insurgents profess attachment to the Constitution, not, because they intend to adopt it, or ever to submit to the Mother country, but, because it affords them the means of attaining all that they desire without risk." In another: "That the Insurrection is so deeply impressed, and rooted, in the heart of every American, that nothing but the most energetic measures, supported by an imposing force, can ever eradicate it:"—that "the war strengthens, and propagates the love of Independence, by holding out a constant hope of the destruction of the old Spaniards, a *longing desire for which* is general amongst all classes!" and lastly, that "as six millions of inhabitants decided in the cause of Independence, have no need of previous consultation, or agreement, each one acts, according to his means and opportunities, in favour of the project, common to all: the judge, by concealing, or conniving at, crimes: the clergy, by advocating the justice of the cause in the confessional, and, even in the pulpit: the writers, by cor-

rupting public opinion: the women, by employing their attractions, in order to seduce the Royal troops: the Government officer, by revealing, and thus paralyzing the plans of his superiors: the youth, by taking arms: the old man, by giving intelligence, and forwarding correspondence, and the public Corporations, by setting an example of eternal differences with the Europeans, not one of whom they will admit as a colleague!"*

What stronger arguments could the warmest advocates of the Revolution adduce, in order to prove the impossibility of ever permanently re-establishing the authority of Spain in the New World? Yet this language was held, *thirteen years ago*, by one of her most able, and most zealous defenders. It was confirmed, too, by the opinion of the whole Audiencia of Mexico; which admits, as unreservedly as the Viceroy himself, the unanimity of the natives in favour of the Independent cause, (*Vide* paragraphs 12, 14, 18, 19, 26, 28, and 42,) and sees no hope of checking this spirit, but by having recourse to measures amounting to little less than the establishment of martial law; since it recommends that all legal restrictions should be dispensed with.†

These measures *were* resorted to, and were for a time successful. Backed by an imposing force, and relieved by the abolition of the Constitution (in 1814) from all legal trammels, the authority of the Viceroy was gradually re-established, and tranquillity, to a certain extent, restored. Seventeen thousand Insurgents are supposed to have accepted the Indulto during the Viceroyalty of Apōdācā, who assumed the reins of government in 1816; and even the expedition of Mina failed in rekindling the flame of civil war. But nothing could be more deceitful than this calm. The prin-

* *Vide* Calleja's letter to the Minister of War, Appendix, (Letter D.) from which all the preceding passages are literal translations.

† *Vide* Paragraphs, 249, 251, and 253, Appendix, Letter C.

ciples which led to the Insurrection of 1810 were daily gaining ground; they were disseminated by the Indultados themselves amongst their friends and connexions; the Creole troops were their first proselytes: disaffection spread amongst them, until whole regiments were ripe for revolt; and when, in 1820, the re-establishment of the constitutional system in the Peninsula allowed again of a freedom of intercourse amongst the Creoles, they found, with surprise, that all differences of opinion had disappeared, and that the army was ready to co-operate with its old enemies, the Insurgents, for the attainment of those political rights, against which it had fought during the earlier stages of the Revolution. Before we arrive, however, at this national movement, in which Iturbide took the lead, it will be necessary to take a rapid view of the events, by which it was preceded.

After the death of Morelos, the country (as I have already stated) was divided into districts, in each of which one of his former lieutenants took the command. Guerrero occupied the Western coast, where he maintained himself in the fastnesses of the Sierra Madre until the year 1821, when he joined Iturbide. Rayón commanded in the vicinity of Tlalpujahua, where he successively occupied two fortified camps, one on the Cerro del Gallo,* and the other on that of Cópore. Tērān held the district of Tēhuacán, in La Puebla. Bravo was a wanderer in different parts of the country. The Băxio was tyrannized over by the Padre Tōrrēs; while Guădlupē Victoria occupied the important Province of Veracruz. The intervening spaces were overrun by insurgent partizans, Albino Gărciă, el Păchon, Ėpităciō Sănehéz, Ōsōrnō, and Sēr-rănō, who sometimes acknowledged one of the principal chiefs as their superior, and sometimes acted independently of all; as was the case with the famous, (or infamous) Vicēntē Gō-

* It is from the Cerro del Gallo that the large view of Tlalpujahua is taken, which is now engraving.

mez, whose band long infested the mountains which separate Mexico from La Puebla, and often cut off all communication between them.

It is not my intention to follow in detail the events of this period. A short sketch of the career of the principal chiefs is all that my limits will allow of. Those who are desirous of a nearer acquaintance with their military exploits, will find them traced in the pages of Robinson,* and Don Carlos Bustamante,† with a minuteness which does not suit the character of my present work. Robinson, though deficient on many points, gives a spirited sketch of what he saw; and most of the facts related by him may be depended upon.

After the dissolution of the Congress by Těřān, (22nd December, 1815,) that general was engaged, for some months, in the sort of desultory warfare which was universal, at the time, throughout America. In this he was usually successful, but his efforts were cramped by the want of arms; and with a view to obtain a supply of these, he determined to undertake a march to the Coast with a part of his force, with the intention of occupying the mouth of the river Gūasă-cōalcō, where he was to be met by a vessel from the United States. This hazardous attempt was made in July 1816, and, (though unsuccessful) appears to have been conducted in a very masterly manner. Těřān set out with an escort of only 300 men. The rest of his corps he left in the fortress of Cěrrō Cōlōrādō, (a mountain in the vicinity of Těhuacān,) which he had fortified with extraordinary care, and where he had established a cannon-foundery, and a manufactory of powder. Surprised by the rainy season, he projected, and executed in ten days, with the aid of the Indian population of Tüstěpēc, a military road across the marsh leading to

* "Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, and of General Mina, by W. D. Robinson.

† "Cuadro Historico de la Revolucion de la America Mexicana." Su autor Don Carlos Maria Bustamante.

Ămîstăn, (seven leagues in extent,) which is even now acknowledged by the most scientific men of the day to be a very extraordinary work. From Ămîstăn, he proceeded, on the 7th of September, to Plăyă Vicēntē, a depôt for the Veracruz merchants in their trade with Oăxăcă: there he was overtaken by a Royalist force of eleven hundred men, under Colonel Tōpētē, which he defeated on the 10th of September, having selected so favourable a position for the engagement, that it more than compensated for the inferiority of his own numbers. But finding that his plan for occupying Gūasă-cōălcō was discovered, he returned to Tēhūacān, where a force of 4,000 men, under Colonel Brăchō, was detached against him by the Viceroy, by which he was besieged in Cerro Cōlōrădō, and ultimately compelled to surrender that fortress, on the 21st of January, 1817.

Těrăn lived in obscurity, and under the strictest surveillance, at La Puebla, (his life having been secured by the capitulation), until the second Revolution of 1821.

He has since been Minister of War, (in 1823,) and was appointed by the President, Minister Plenipotentiary in England, in 1825. This choice was disapproved of by the Senate, some of the members of which body were induced, by feelings (I fancy) of a personal nature, to establish what was generally regarded as a very dangerous precedent, by raking up old revolutionary stories, and urging against Těrăn the dissolution of the Congress, in 1815, as a disqualification for public employment, without reflecting how few men there are, at present, in Mexico, whose conduct, during that stormy period, could support a rigorous investigation.

During the last two years, Těrăn has led a very retired life, occupied principally with scientific pursuits, and the mathematics, in which he has always excelled. As an engineer, and military chief, few amongst the old Insurgents could be compared with him.

His division was always remarkable for its discipline, and

yet, he is said to have possessed the art of inspiring his followers with the warmest attachment to his person. He is still young (about 34), and his talents must, sooner or later, lead him to distinction.

The early career of Răyōn we have seen in the beginning of this sketch. During the prosperity of Morelos, he acted as one of his lieutenants, but always retained a sort of independent command in the mountainous parts of the province of Văllădölid, where he was supported by the affection of the natives, and by the natural strength of the country. His principal strong-hold was in the Cerro de Cōpōrō, where he was besieged, in January 1815, by a formidable Royalist force, under Brigadier Llano, and Itūrbidē, which retired with loss, after an unsuccessful assault upon the works, on the 4th of March. From this moment Cōpōrō became an object of particular attention to the Spanish Government. The country about it was laid waste, in order to deprive the garrison of supplies, and, during the absence of Don Ignacio Răyōn, the fortress was again invested by Colonel Āgüirre, to whom it was surrendered on the 2nd of January 1817. Răyōn himself was soon afterwards taken prisoner by General Armījō, having been deserted by all his adherents, and confined in the Capital until 1821. He has since obtained the rank of general, and holds, at present, a high situation under Government in the Interior.

The fate of Don Nicōlās Brāvō was similar to that of his former companions. After the dissolution of the Congress he wandered for some time over the country, at the head of a small division, without being able to make head against the superior forces by which he was surrounded. On Mina's landing he occupied the mountain of Cōpōrō, which he endeavoured to fortify anew, during the summer of 1817; but he was driven from it by a Royalist division, and, ultimately, taken prisoner by Armijo, (in December 1817,) by whom he was transmitted to the Capital, where he was confined until

1821. After aiding Iturbide to establish the Independence, he declared against him, when he dissolved the Congress, and took a leading part in the contest, by which the Ex-Emperor was deposed. He was afterwards one of the three Members of the Executive Power, and, ultimately, a candidate for the first Presidency with Victoria, under whom he has served as Vice-President during the last three years.*

But none of the Insurgent chiefs were pursued with such inveteracy, by the Royal troops, as Guădălupă Victoria, whose position, in the Province of Veracruz, was a constant source of uneasiness to the Viceroy. From the moment that he was deputed by Morelos to take the command on the Eastern line of coast, (1814,) he succeeded in cutting off almost all communication between the Capital, and the only port, through which the intercourse with Europe was, at that time, carried on. This he effected at the head of a force, which seldom exceeded 2000 men; but a perfect acquaintance with the country, (which is extremely mountainous and intricate,) and an unlimited influence over the minds of his followers, made up for all deficiencies in point of numbers, and rendered Victoria, very shortly, the terror of the Spanish troops.

It was his practice to keep but a small body of men about his person, and only to collect his force upon great occasions: a mode of warfare well suited to the wild habits of the natives, and, at the same time, calculated to baffle pursuit. The instant a blow was struck, a general dispersion followed: in the event of a failure, a rendezvous was fixed for some distant point; and thus losses were often repaired, before it was known in the Capital that they had been sustained at all.

Nor were Victoria's exploits confined to this desultory warfare: in 1815, he detained a convoy of 6000 mules, escorted by 2000 men, under the command of Colonel Aguila, at

* I shall annex some farther particulars respecting Bravo's late reverses in an additional Chapter, with which it is my intention to conclude the present edition.

Pūēntē dēl Rēy, (a pass, the natural strength of which the Insurgents had increased by placing artillery upon the heights, by which it is commanded,) nor did it reach Veracruz for upwards of six months. The necessity of keeping the channel of communication with Europe open, induced Calleja, in December 1815, to intrust the chief command, both civil and military, of the Province of Veracruz, to Don Fernando Mīyārēs, (an officer of high rank, and distinguished attainments, recently arrived from Spain,) for the special purpose of establishing a chain of fortified posts, on the whole ascent to the Table-land, sufficiently strong to curb Victoria's incursions. The execution of this plan was preceded, and accompanied, by a series of actions between the Insurgents and Royalists, in the course of which Miyares gradually drove Victoria from his strong-holds at Puente del Rey and Puente de San Juan; (September 1815,) and although the latter maintained the unequal struggle for upwards of two years, he never was able to obtain any decisive advantage over the reinforcements, which the Government was continually sending to the seat of war. Two thousand European troops landed with Mīyārēs, and one thousand more with Apōdācā, (in 1816;) and notwithstanding the desperate efforts of Victoria's men, their courage was of no avail against the superior discipline, and arms, of their adversaries. In the course of the year 1816, most of his old soldiers fell: those by whom he replaced them had neither the same enthusiasm, nor the same attachment to his person. The zeal with which the inhabitants had engaged in the cause of the Revolution was worn out: with each reverse their discouragement increased, and, as the disastrous accounts from the Interior left them but little hope of bringing the contest to a favourable issue, the villages refused to furnish any farther supplies; the last remnant of Victoria's followers deserted him, and he was left absolutely alone. Still his courage was unsubdued, and his resolution not to yield, on any terms, to the Spaniards, unshaken. He refused the



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rank and rewards which Apodaca proffered as the price of his submission, and determined to seek an asylum in the solitude of the forests, rather than accept the *indulto*, on the faith of which so many of the Insurgents yielded up their arms. This extraordinary project was carried into execution with a decision highly characteristic of the man. Unaccompanied by a single attendant, and provided only with a little linen, and a sword, Victoria threw himself into the mountainous district which occupies so large a portion of the Province of Veracruz, and disappeared to the eyes of his countrymen. His after-history is so extremely wild, that I should hardly venture to relate it here, did not the unanimous evidence of his countrymen confirm the story of his sufferings, as I have often heard it from his own mouth.

During the first few weeks, Victoria was supplied with provisions by the Indians, who all knew and respected his name; but Apodaca was so apprehensive that he would again emerge from his retreat, that a thousand men were ordered out, in small detachments, literally to hunt him down. Wherever it was discovered that a village had either received him, or relieved his wants, it was burnt without mercy; and this rigour struck the Indians with such terror, that they either fled at the sight of Victoria, or were the first to denounce the approach of a man, whose presence might prove so fatal to them. For upwards of six months, he was followed like a wild beast by his pursuers, who were often so near him, that he could hear their imprecations against himself, and Apodaca too, for having condemned them to so fruitless a search. On one occasion, he escaped a detachment, which he fell in with unexpectedly, by swimming a river, which they were unable to cross; and on several others, he concealed himself, when in the immediate vicinity of the Royal troops, beneath the thick shrubs and creepers with which the woods of Veracruz abound. At last a story was made up, to satisfy the Viceroy, of a body

having been found, which had been recognized as that of Victoria. A minute description was given of his person, which was inserted officially in the Gazette of Mexico, and the troops were recalled to more pressing labours in the Interior.

But Victoria's trials did not cease with the pursuit: harassed, and worn-out, by the fatigues which he had undergone, his clothes torn to pieces, and his body lacerated by the thorny underwood of the Tropics, he was indeed allowed a little tranquillity, but his sufferings were still almost incredible: during the summer, he managed to subsist upon the fruits of which nature is so lavish in those climates; but in winter he was attenuated by hunger, and I have heard him repeatedly affirm, that no repast has afforded him so much pleasure since, as he experienced, after being long deprived of food, in gnawing the bones of horses, or other animals, that he happened to find dead in the woods. By degrees he accustomed himself to such abstinence, that he could remain four, and even five days, without taking any thing but water, without experiencing any serious inconvenience; but whenever he was deprived of sustenance for a longer period, his sufferings were very acute.* For thirty months he never tasted bread, nor saw a human being, nor thought, at times, ever to see one again. His clothes were reduced to a single wrapper of cotton, which he found one day, when driven by hunger he had approached nearer than usual to some Indian huts, and this he regarded as an inestimable treasure.

The mode in which Victoria, cut off, as he was, from all communication with the world, received intelligence of the Revolution of 1821, is hardly less extraordinary than the

* When first I knew General Victoria, at Veracruz, in 1823, he was unable to eat above once in twenty-four, or even thirty-six hours; and now, though he conforms with the usual hours of his countrymen, with regard to meals, he is one of the most abstemious of men.

fact of his having been able to support existence amidst so many hardships, during the intervening period.

When, in 1818, he was abandoned by all the rest of his men, he was asked by two Indians, who lingered with him to the last, and on whose fidelity he knew that he could rely, if any change took place, where he wished them to look for him? He pointed, in reply, to a mountain at some distance, and told them that, on that mountain, perhaps, they might find his bones. His only reason for selecting it, was its being particularly rugged, and inaccessible, and surrounded by forests of a vast extent.

The Indians treasured up this hint, and as soon as the first news of Iturbide's declaration reached them, they set out in quest of Victoria. They separated on arriving at the foot of the mountain, and employed six whole weeks in examining the woods with which it was covered; during this time, they lived principally by the chase; but finding their stock of maize exhausted, and all their efforts unavailing, they were about to give up the attempt, when one of them discovered, in crossing a ravine, which Victoria occasionally frequented, the print of a foot, which he immediately recognized to be that of an European. By European, I mean of European descent, and consequently accustomed to wear shoes, which always give a difference of shape to the foot, very perceptible to the eye of a native. The Indian waited two days upon the spot; but seeing nothing of Victoria, and finding his supply of provisions quite at an end, he suspended upon a tree, near the place, four tortillas, or little maize cakes, which were all he had left, and set out for his village, in order to replenish his wallets, hoping that if Victoria should pass in the mean time, the tortillas would attract his attention, and convince him that some friend was in search of him.

His little plan succeeded completely: Victoria, on crossing the ravine, two days afterwards, perceived the maize cakes, which the birds had fortunately not devoured. He had then

been four whole days without eating, and upwards of two years without tasting bread; and he says, himself, that he devoured the tortillas before the cravings of his appetite would allow him to reflect upon the singularity of finding them on this solitary spot, where he had never before seen any trace of a human being. He was at a loss to determine whether they had been left there by friend or foe; but feeling sure that whoever had left them intended to return, he concealed himself near the place, in order to observe his motions, and to take his own measures accordingly.

Within a short time the Indian returned, and Victoria, who recognized him, abruptly started from his concealment, to welcome his faithful follower; but the man, terrified at seeing a phantom covered with hair, emaciated, and clothed only with an old cotton wrapper, advancing upon him with a sword in his hand, from amongst the bushes, took to flight; and it was only on hearing himself repeatedly called by his name, that he recovered his composure sufficiently to recognize his old general. He was affected beyond measure at the state in which he found him, and conducted him instantly to his village, where Victoria was received with the greatest enthusiasm. The report of his re-appearance spread, like lightning, through the Province, where it was not credited at first, so firmly was every one convinced of his death; but as soon as it was known that Guădălŭpě Victoria was indeed in existence, all the old Insurgents rallied around him. In an incredibly short time, he induced the whole Province, with the exception of the fortified towns, to declare for Independence, and then set out to join Iturbidě, who was, at that time, preparing for the siege of Mexico. He was received with great apparent cordiality; but his independent spirit was too little in unison with Iturbide's projects, for this good understanding to continue long. Victoria had fought for a liberal form of government, and not merely for a change of masters; and Iturbide, unable to gain him over, drove him

again into the woods during his short-lived reign, from whence he only returned to give the signal for a general rising against the too ambitious Emperor.

I have now brought the history of the Revolution up to the year 1817, which was distinguished by the expedition of Don Xavier Mina, the famous Spanish Guerilla chief, (nephew to Espoz y Mina, now in England,) who, driven from Spain by his unsuccessful attempt to create a rising in favour of the Cortes at Pampeluna, after the dissolution of that assembly by the King, resolved to advocate the same cause in Mexico, and landed for that purpose on the coast, with a small body of foreigners, (principally Americans,) on the 15th of April 1817.

Nothing could be more unfortunate than the moment chosen by Mina for this attempt. All the leaders of any note in the first Insurrection had, (as we have seen,) successively disappeared from the scene, and the cause of the Revolution had fallen into the hands of defenders, with whom it was a disgrace to be associated. Such was the infamous Padre Torres, who had established a sort of half-priestly, half-military despotism in the Băxiō, the whole of which he had parcelled out amongst his military commandants,—men, mostly, without principle or virtue, whose only recommendation was implicit obedience to the will of their chief. From his fortress, on the top of the mountain of Los Rēmēdiōs, Torres was the scourge of the country around: vindictive, sanguinary, and treacherous by nature, he spared none who had the misfortune to offend him, whether Creole or Spaniard, and did more towards devastating the most fertile portion of the Mexican territory, by his capricious mandates for the destruction of towns and villages, under pretence of cutting off the supplies of the enemy, than all those who had preceded him, whether Royalists or Insurgents, during the first five years of the war. Robinson mentions several instances of the most wanton barbarity on the part of this man, which are confirm-

ed by the general detestation in which his name is held, to this day, by his countrymen: yet, under his auspices, existed the only shadow of a government, that was still kept up by the Insurgents. It was termed the Junta of Jāūxīllā, from a little fort, in the centre of a marsh, in the Province of Valladolid, which was its usual residence; but it possessed little influence, and no authority, being composed entirely of creatures of the Padre Torres. The country was, however, still overrun by parties of Insurgent cavalry, and Torres was in possession of three fortified places; (Los Rēmēdiōs, Jāūxīllā, and Sōmbrērō,) but, with the exception of Guerrero's corps, with which, from the Eastern coast, no junction could possibly be effected, there was no force bearing a respectable character collected upon any one point. The armies of Hidalgo and Morelos were reduced to mere predatory bands; while the Royalist forces, increased by successive reinforcements from the Peninsula, were in possession of all the towns, and of most of the military stations, calculated to maintain a communication between them.

Still there was a feeling in the country so decidedly in favour of the Independent cause,—a feeling so strong, so universal, (as was proved four years later,) that had Mina succeeded in awakening it, his success would have been almost certain; but he struck the wrong chord. He was a *Spaniard*, and, very naturally, did not forget the land of his birth, nor wish to deprive it of the most precious jewel in its crown. Constitutional liberty therefore, or, in other words, such liberty as the Mexicans could hope to enjoy under the Constitution of 1812, *without* an absolute separation from the Mother country, was what he sought to establish in Mexico. He did not indeed proclaim this, but he proclaimed nothing else; and the uncertainty of the Creoles with regard to his intentions was increased by the confidence shown in them by many of his own countrymen, (particularly the merchants of Veracruz,) who wished for the re-establishment of the con-

stitutional system, but not, of course, for a separation between Mexico and Spain. The Creoles had, therefore, reason to suppose that the change to be effected by Mina, if successful, would be to them little more than a change of masters ; and this apprehension, together with the smallness of Mina's force, which was so inconsiderable as to check the hopes even of his warmest partizans, rendered them passive spectators of the contest, upon which he was about to enter, with the armies of the King.

Nothing could be, apparently, more unequal than this contest. Mina, on landing, had with him only three hundred and fifty-nine men, including officers, of whom fifty-one deserted him, under the command of Colonel Perry, before he commenced his march into the interior of the country. One hundred more were left to garrison a little fort, which was erected, as a depôt, at Sõtö lä Mărînă, (where Mina landed,) under the orders of Major Sarda ; and with the remainder, reinforced by a few straggling Insurgents, Mina attempted to effect a junction with the Independent party in the Baxïo, (the very heart of Mexico,) in the face of several detachments of the Royal army infinitely superior to him in numbers. He left Sota la Marina on the 24th of May ; and after suffering dreadfully from the want of provisions and water on his march through the Tierra Caliente from the coast, he reached the town of El Valle del Maiz, situated on the river Pănucö, in the Intendancy of San Luis Pötösî, and near the confines of the Table-land, on the 8th of June, 1817. Here he found a body of four hundred Royal cavalry, which he defeated ; and this successful action enabled him to allow his troops two days' rest after their fatigues. On the 14th of June his little corps reached the Hacienda de Pëötillös, where it was destined to meet with the first serious opposition to its progress. Brigadier Ārmiñān, at the head of nine hundred and eighty European infantry, of the regiments of Estremadura and America, and eleven hundred of the Rio Verde

(Creole) cavalry, occupied the road to the Interior, and an engagement in the field, or a siege in the Hacienda, became inevitable. Mina resolved upon the first, aware that delay would only bring reinforcements to the Royalist army, while he had none to expect. He therefore posted his whole force, consisting of *one hundred and seventy-two men*, (a small detachment was left in charge of the baggage and ammunition,) upon a little eminence, which commanded the surrounding plain, and there awaited Armiñan's approach. He was soon enveloped by the Royalist forces; but his men, rendered desperate by the apparent hopelessness of their situation, invited him to lead them down into the plain, where they made so furious a charge upon the Spanish line, that, notwithstanding their immense superiority in point of numbers, Armiñan's troops were put to the rout, and sought safety in a precipitate flight. It is said that the use of buckshot, in lieu of balls, by the soldiers of Mina, contributed not a little to the panic, with which their opponents were struck: many of his men loaded their muskets with eighteen of these shot, and reserved their fire until they were within a few paces of the Royal ranks. Be this as it may, the dispersion was general; and although there was no pursuit, Arminan and his staff did not stop in their flight for many leagues from the field of battle: the cavalry was not heard of for four days. But on his side, Mina sustained a serious loss; eleven officers, and nineteen men were killed, and twenty-six wounded, some so severely as to be unable to follow the march of the army. Nor did circumstances admit of his delaying, for a single day, his advance towards the Baxío, where alone he could hope to increase the number of his adherents. While unsupported by the Insurgents, another such victory as that of Peñitillo, would have proved fatal to him. The division, therefore, moved forward on the morning of the 16th June. On the 18th it reached Pinos, a small mining town in the Intendancy of Zacatecas, which, though defended by three hundred Roy-

alists, was carried by surprise, by a small detachment of Mina's troops during the night of the 19th. On the 22d, after three days of forced marches, during which they crossed a country desolated by the war, where neither provisions, nor houses, were to be found, Mina's advanced-guard fell in with a party of the Insurgents of the Baxío, under the command of Don Crístóval Návă, with whom he at last opened the long desired communication.

Robinson's description of Mina's new allies is very correct, and very characteristic. He represents them as fine athletic men, admirably mounted, armed with lances and sabres, (in the use of which they excelled,) with round jackets, decorated with a quantity of gold and silver-lace, velvet breeches, (also embroidered,) deer-skin wrappers round the leg, gartered at the knee, shoes of the country, open on one side above the ankle,—immense iron spurs, inlaid with silver, with rowels four inches in diameter,—open shirt-collars, and hats of the country, with a very broad brim, and silver band, ornamented in front with a picture of the Virgin of Guăđă-lŭpĉ, (the patroness of the Insurgents,) inclosed in a frame, and protected by a glass. Such was, and is, the costume of those men, by whom the first shock was given to the power of Spain in America. They compose the agricultural population of the country, and are known in the towns by the denomination of *Rănĉĉĕrŏs*;* a name, which always conveys to any one acquainted with the country the idea of great activity, strength, and excellent horsemanship, combined with the peculiarities of dress which I have just been describing.

Nava conducted Mina to a large *Rancho*, in possession of the Insurgents, which he was allowed to reach, without any opposition, by a body of Royalists, seven hundred strong,

* The Mexican *Rănĉĉĕrŏ* is equivalent to the Gaucho of the Pampas, (with whose character, and mode of life, Captain Head's delightful work has rendered every one so familiar,) but rather in a higher stage of civilization.

under the command of Colonel Orrantia, who had been deputed by the Viceroy for the express purpose of preventing this junction, but was discouraged from attempting it by the recollection of the battle of Pěõtillos. After refreshing his men there, who were almost exhausted with a four-days' fast, the division proceeded to Sömrērö, (one of the three strongholds still in the possession of the Insurgents,) which it reached on the 24th of June, having, in thirty days, traversed a tract of country two hundred and twenty leagues in extent, and been three times engaged with an enemy of infinitely superior strength.

Mina only allowed his men four days of repose at Sombrero, after which he undertook an expedition, in conjunction with his new allies, Don Pedro Moreno, (the Commandant of the fort,) and the famous Insurgent partizan, Encarnación Ortíz, against San Jūān dē lōs Llānōs, where a Royalist division of three hundred cavalry, and four hundred infantry, under the command of Don Felipe Căstăñōn, was stationed. Căstăñōn was one of the most enterprising of the Royalist officers, and, like Iturbide, had been generally successful in his expeditions : but his military achievements were tarnished by his sanguinary character, and by the cruelty with which, even under the mild government of Apodaca, he uniformly sacrificed his prisoners, whom the event of an action had thrown into his hands. His success alone caused these enormities to be tolerated, but he was too valuable a partizan for his services to be dispensed with, and, at the time of Mina's arrival, the flying division, which he commanded, was the terror of the Baxio.

The forces with which Mina prepared to meet it, consisted of his own division, (about two hundred strong, including new recruits,) with a detachment of fifty Creole infantry, and eighty lancers, under Mörēnō, and Encarnacion Ortíz. On the morning of the action, (the 29th June,) he was joined by a few more Insurgents, who increased his numbers to four hundred, but of these new arrivals, few were armed for ser-

vice in the field, being provided mostly with rusty muskets, all without bayonets, and many without flints.

The two parties met in the plains which divide the town of San Fēlīpě from that of San Jūān, and in eight minutes the action was decided. Colonel Young, at the head of Mina's infantry, advanced close to the enemy, gave them one volley, and then charged with the bayonet, while the cavalry, under Major Maylefer, (a Swiss, who was killed in the action,) after breaking that of the enemy, turned upon the infantry, already in confusion, and actually cut them to pieces. Căstăñōn himself was killed, with *three hundred and thirty-nine* of his men; two hundred and twenty more were taken prisoners, and not above one hundred and fifty effected their escape. A more destructive engagement (considering the smallness of the numbers on both sides,) is not perhaps on record. Castañon's division was annihilated, and its fate was celebrated by the exultation of the whole Baxio, which had so long groaned under the inexorable tyranny of its chief.

Mina, after striking this blow, returned to Sombrero, from whence he again set out in a few days, on an expedition against the Hacienda of Jārāl, accompanied by a small detachment. This Hacienda, of which a more particular description will be found in another part of this work,* belonged to Don Juan Mōncădă, (Marques del Jārāl, and Conde de Săn Mățēō,) a Creole nobleman of immense wealth, but thought to be devoted to the Royal cause. His estate was forfeited, and garrisoned by a Royalist detachment, which, in conjunction with the number of his own immediate dependants and retainers, had preserved him from the incursions of the insurgents during the earlier stages of the Revolution: but the dread of Mina's name induced the Marquis to abandon all idea of resistance upon his approach. He quitted his house, and fled with his escort to San Luis Pōtōsī, while Mina occupied the Hacienda without opposition, and pro-

* *Vide* Personal Narrative, Book V.

ceeded to take possession of its most valuable contents. The Marquis was known to have very large sums in specie, concealed about the house; and one of these secret hoards having been discovered, by the treachery of a servant, beneath the floor of a room adjoining the kitchen, one hundred and forty thousand dollars were dug out, and transferred to Mina's military chest. This is the estimate given by Mina's friends, but the Marquis himself made his loss amount to *three* hundred thousand dollars, and such he states it to have been at the present day. But without entering into any controversy as to the amount, the fact of the private property of a Creole nobleman having been seized by Mina, as good and lawful booty, according to his ideas of the laws of war, was universally known, and certainly did not tend to increase the number of his adherents. Most of the great landed proprietors of the country had taken the same line as the Marquis of the Jaral, and not only kept upon terms with the Government, but assisted it by contributions, not voluntarily indeed, but in proportion to the supposed means of each. If this compliance with the requisitions of the Viceroy were construed into an act of positive hostility, there was no security for the property of any one, in the event of Mina's success. It was true, indeed, that the Marquis of the Jaral had accepted the rank of Colonel in the Spanish service, and that out of the funds supplied by him, the Government had raised a regiment, which bore his name. Still he had taken no active part in the war, and consequently he was one of those, whom Mina professed to have come to defend: he was a Mexican born, and one, too, who held an enormous stake in the country; and, on all these accounts, the seizure of his property was very generally considered as an unwarrantable act.

The success of Mina in the interior of the country was counterbalanced by the loss of the fort which he had erected at Soto la Marina, upon the coast, and which was of importance to him, not only as containing his depôt of arms, and

military stores, but as the only medium of communication with the United States. He left there, as I have already stated, a garrison of one hundred and thirteen men, under Major Sarda. On the 11th of June the place was invested by a division of two thousand two hundred men, with nineteen pieces of artillery, under the orders of General Arrēdōndō, the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Internal provinces. On the 14th, a constant fire was kept up, by which the few guns that defended the mud-walls of the fort were dismounted; and on the 15th three general assaults were made, all of which were repulsed with the utmost gallantry by the garrison. Discouraged by these repeated checks, General Arredondo proposed terms, which were acceded to by Major Sarda; and, after stipulating for the honours of war, liberty on parole for the officers, and the free departure of the men for their respective homes and countries, *thirty-seven* men and officers, (the little remnant of the garrison,) grounded their arms before fifteen hundred of the enemy. The Royalists lost three hundred men in the three assaults upon the fort, a circumstance which may explain, though it cannot excuse, their disgraceful violation of the capitulation. Instead of being treated as prisoners of war, and allowed to leave Mexico for the United States, Major Sarda and his men were transferred, in irons, by the most circuitous route, and amidst a thousand intentional aggravations of their sufferings, to the dungeons of the Castle of St. John, at Veracruz, where they were confined, with thirty other of Mina's men, taken afterwards in the Interior, until they were reduced to half their original number. The survivors were removed to Spain, where, by a special decree of the 11th of June 1818, they were condemned to the Presidios of Ceuta, Melilla, and Cadiz, where they all, I believe, have terminated their wretched existence, as convicts (*Presidarios*), linked with the refuse of Spanish gaols, and reduced to the lowest state of degradation, of which human nature is susceptible.

Mina was greatly affected by this reverse, the news of which reached him at the time when his exertions to organize a respectable force, in the vicinity of Sombrero, were counteracted by the jealousy of the Padre Torres, who could not be induced to co-operate with a man, of whose superior abilities he was, at once, jealous and afraid. The time lost by his procrastination, and bad faith, was turned by the Royalists to account. Apodaca gradually concentrated his forces, and placed them under the orders of the Mariscal de campo Don Pascual Liñan, who, about the middle of July, was known to be upon his route towards the Baxio, at the head of five thousand men. Mina's troops did not exceed five hundred in number, and these were diminished by an ill-judged attempt upon the town of León, by the occupation of which he wished to anticipate Liñan's arrival. The place was garrisoned, unexpectedly, by an advanced corps of the Royal army, and when Mina attacked it, he was repulsed with the loss of one hundred men. He retired immediately to Sombrero, which was invested, soon afterwards, by Liñan, who appeared before it, on the 30th of July, with a force of three thousand five hundred and forty-one men.

The garrison, which, (including women and children,) amounted to nine hundred, was soon reduced to the greatest distress by the want of water, the fort having previously drawn its supplies from a barranca, (ravine,) at the foot of the mountain, all communication with which was cut off by one of the enemy's batteries. There was no well in the place, and, although in the midst of the rainy season, the clouds, which deluged the country around, passed over the rock upon which this ill-fated fortress stood. At length, a few partial showers afforded some relief, and Mina, seeing the spirits of his men revive, made an attempt on the entrenchments of the enemy, on the night of the 8th of August, in which he was unsuccessful. His good star seemed to have deserted him :

eleven of the little band of foreigners, to whom he was indebted for his first successes, fell upon this occasion: some died upon the spot, and others were only wounded. The fate of the last was, perhaps, the most melancholy; for, on the following morning, they were carried to a spot immediately in sight of the walls of the fort, and there strangled in the sight of their old comrades.

On the 9th of August, Mina, finding that the reinforcements and supplies promised by the Padre Torres, did not appear, quitted the fortress, accompanied only by three companions, in order to concert measures with the Insurgents without, for collecting a force sufficient to raise the siege. In this he completely failed: the cause of the Insurrection was in much too low a state to admit of the organization of a body numerous enough to contend with Liñan's force, and Mina, as a last resource, was compelled to send orders to Colonel Young, to evacuate the place by night.

Before these orders were received, that officer had perished. He died in repulsing an assault made by the enemy, on the 18th of August, which he effected, although the previous sufferings of the garrison had reduced his numbers to one hundred and fifty effective men. Upon his death, the command devolved upon Lieutenant-colonel Bradburn, who attempted to abandon the fort on the 19th of August. But, amidst such a multitude of women and children, to preserve order was impossible; their screams and cries alarmed the enemy, whose whole force was immediately put under arms: many of the fugitives were shot down, before they could cross the ravine: the rest, who, from their ignorance of the country, were wandering about the mountains in small parties of six and seven each, were cut off by the cavalry, which was detached for the purpose, on the following morning. Out of Mina's whole corps not *fifty* escaped. No quarter was given in the field, and the unfortunate wretches who had

been left in the hospital wounded, were, by Liñan's orders, carried, or dragged along the ground, from their beds to the square, where they were stripped, and shot.

The result of the siege of Sombrero was fatal to Mina's hopes. With his foreign officers, of whom only eleven ever rejoined him, he lost the means of disciplining his Creole recruits, and the men were all tried soldiers, on whom he could reckon in the hour of need. They were not to be replaced by numbers, and Mina attempted in vain, with his Mexican allies, enterprizes, in which, with his original forces, (inconsiderable as they were), he would have been almost certain of success. It was not that the Creoles were deficient in personal courage: on the contrary, they possessed both that, and all the other elements of excellent soldiers; but, in a contest with disciplined troops, nothing could compensate the want of discipline, no sort of attention to which had been paid by the Padre Torres, or any of his subordinate chiefs. They indulged their men in all the licentiousness, in which they habitually indulged themselves; and thus, though individually formidable, they were totally inefficient when called upon to act in a body. Such were the tools with which Mina was compelled to work. At an interview with the Padre Torres, it was determined that, in the event of the fort of Los Remedios being besieged by Liñan, (as it was shortly afterwards,) Mina should take the field with a body of nine hundred Insurgent cavalry, and endeavour to harass the besieging army by cutting off its supplies, while the Padre, with the remnant of Mina's officers, conducted the defence of the place. This was conceived to be an easy task, as the fort was, in fact, a natural fortification, being one of a lofty chain of mountains which rise out of the plains of the Băxîo, between Sîlăo and Pĕnjămō, separated by precipices, and immensely-deep barrancas, from the rest. On one point alone it was vulnerable; but there, a wall three feet in thickness was erected, and the approach enfiladed by three batteries,

rising in succession one above the other. So large a space was inclosed by the ravines, that the fort contained six hundred head of cattle, two thousand sheep or goats, and three hundred large hogs, with twenty thousand *fanegas* of Indian corn, ten thousand of wheat, and a large provision of flour. It was likewise well supplied with water and ammunition; so that the garrison, which consisted of fifteen hundred men, conceived that they might bid defiance to any force that could be brought by the Royalists against them.

On the approach of Liñan's army, which appeared before Los Remedios on the 27th of August, Mina quitted it, in order to take the field, and the place was immediately invested in due form. On the 30th, he was joined by Don Encarnacion Ortiz at the head of his cavalry, and with him he found nineteen of his old followers, of whom six were officers: these, with thirty more, who had previously reached Los Remedios, and whom Mina left there to assist in the defence of the place, were the only survivors of the three hundred and fifty-nine men who landed with him at Sötö lä Mărină in the preceding April: all the rest had perished; and but few of those who remained were destined to escape the fate of their comrades.

On the 31st of August, the siege of Los Remedios began, and with it, a desultory Guerrilla war, which was carried on, with but little success on Mina's side, against a division of eight hundred men, under the command of Colonel Orrantia, who was detached to watch his motions, and to protect the supplies of the army. After passing nearly the whole month of September in this manner, Mina, convinced both of the impossibility of attacking Liñan's intrenchments with the troops under his command, and of the necessity of striking a blow of sufficient importance elsewhere, to induce the Royalists to raise the siege, resolved to attempt to surprise Guănă-jūātō, where, it is said, that he had received assurances of a disposition to assist him being entertained by several of the

principal inhabitants. Not only his friends, but the members of the Junta of Jaūxīllā, whom he consulted upon this occasion, remonstrated strongly against this enterprize, but in vain : Mina's mind was bent upon it, and, on the 24th of October, he succeeded, by secret and well-combined marches, in concentrating his forces at a little mine called La Mina de la Luz, in the very midst of the mountains, and only four leagues from the town, without the Spanish Authorities being in the least aware of his approach. At nightfall, he attacked the gates, which were carried almost without opposition, and his troops penetrated into the very centre of the town ; but there, their subordination and courage failed them at once. The men refused to advance ; time was given for the garrison to be put under arms, and no sooner were a few shots exchanged, than Mina's division took to flight, and that with such precipitation, that only *five* of the number were killed. A general dispersion ensued, by Mina's own order, who appears to have been too thoroughly disgusted with his new associates, to hope ever to effect any thing with their assistance ; nor is it known what line he intended to take, had time been allowed him for deliberation. This, however, was not the case. On quitting Guānājūātō, accompanied only by a very small escort, he took the road to the Rancho del Vēnādītō, in the direction of the Hacienda of La Tlāchījērā, which belonged to Don Mariano Herrera, a friend whom he probably wished to consult with regard to his future plans. He arrived at the Rancho on the 26th, and resolved to pass the night there, conceiving it impossible that Orrantia should have received intelligence of his route, as he had purposely avoided all beaten roads. His intentions, however, were discovered by a friar, whom he met at a little Indian village through which he passed, and who instantly conveyed the news to Orrantia, who detached, on receiving it, a party of five hundred horse, which invested the village at daybreak on the 27th, and, after dispersing Mina's escort,

seized the General himself, in the act of rushing out of the house, unarmed, and almost undressed, in order to ascertain the cause of the confusion without. Don Pedro Mörēñö, the Commandant of Sömbērö, was taken at the same time, and immediately shot.

Mina was conveyed pinioned to İrăpŭătö, where he was presented to Orrantia, who had the meanness not only to revile his fallen enemy in the most opprobrious terms, but actually to strike him repeatedly with the flat of his sword. Mina's rebuke was dignified: "I regret to have become a prisoner, but to have fallen into the hands of a man, regardless alike of the character of a Spaniard and a soldier, renders my misfortune doubly keen."

From the hands of this unworthy foe, he was removed to Liñan's head-quarters, where he received the treatment due to a soldier, and a gentleman, though every precaution was taken to prevent the possibility of an escape.

On the 10th of November, the courier, whom Liñan had sent to the Capital, to take Āpödăcă's commands with regard to his prisoner's fate, returned with orders for his immediate execution; and, on the 11th, this sentence was carried into effect, in the presence of all the surgeons of the army, and the captains of each company, who were directed to certify the fact of his death.

Mina is said to have met his fate with great firmness. He appears, however, to have entertained, latterly, some doubts with regard to the cause which he had espoused, and an anxious wish to clear his memory, with his own countrymen, from the imputation of having wished to separate Mexico from Spain. With this view, I presume, he wrote a letter to General Liñan, on the 3d of November, the authenticity of which, though denied by Robinson, has been established by the discovery of the original in Mina's hand, by Don Carlos Bustamante, in which he assures him, that "if he had ever ceased to be a good Spaniard, it was erroneously, and

not intentionally, that he had done so:" and adds, "that he is convinced that the Independent party can never succeed in Mexico, and must occasion the ruin of the country." That such should have been Mina's sentiments, after the experience which he had of the men, by whom the Insurgent cause was *then* supported, is perfectly natural. He knew not how deeply the love of independence was implanted in every Creole's heart, and, as I have already observed, he was precluded by his position as a *Spaniard* from ever awakening those feelings in the mass of the people, which alone could have ensured him success.

They watched his career with interest, and would gladly have availed themselves of his assistance; but the re-establishment of a Constitution, from which no one expected to derive any good, was not calculated to awaken enthusiasm, or inspire confidence. Independence, as a *Spaniard*, he could not, and did not proclaim.

Mina died in his twenty-eighth year. He was shot on a rock in sight of Los Remedios, and his fate contributed, not a little, to strike the garrison with discouragement. The siege was, however, protracted until the end of December, (a general assault made on the 16th of November having been successfully repulsed,) when, from the total want of ammunition, the evacuation of the town was resolved upon. The 1st of January, 1818, was fixed for the attempt, which was attended with much the same results as that of Sombbrero.

Indeed, it proved more generally fatal; for the *Spaniards*, taught by experience, had raised immense piles of wood in every direction, which were fired on the first alarm, and enabled the Royalist soldiers to follow their flying enemies through all the intricacies of the ravines around. With the exception of Padre Torres, and twelve of Mina's division, few or none of the fugitives escaped. The fate of the women, of whom there were great numbers in the fort, was too horrible to be mentioned. The wounded were not excepted from the

general proscription: the hospital in which they lay was fired at all the four corners at once, and those who attempted to escape the flames, were bayoneted as soon as they reached the square without: the few prisoners to whom the soldiers had given quarter in the first instance, were compelled to demolish the works of the fort, and then shot. Amongst them was Colonel Nöböă, Mina's second in command, and two other officers, who had been in all his actions.

The fort of Jăuxillă had been invested before the fall of Los Rēmēdiös, (15th December, 1817,) by a detachment of Liñan's army, commanded by Colonel Agūirre. The defence, conducted principally by two of Mina's officers, Lawrence Christie and James Dewers, was maintained with spirit until the first week in March, 1818, when the two Americans were treacherously seized by the Creole Commandant, Lopez de Lara, and delivered over bound, as a peace offering, to Aguirre. To his honour, be it said, that he was so disgusted with the perfidy of Lără, that he exerted his whole influence with the Viceroy, in order to obtain the pardon of the Americans, and succeeded. Of all those who fell into the hands of the Spaniards, they alone were spared.

The fortress surrendered on the 6th of March, 1818, and with it the Insurgents lost their last strong-hold in the centre of the country. The members of the Government escaped, before the place was fully invested, and sought a refuge in Guerrero's camp, in the *Tierra Caliente* of Valladolid. This was soon the only place in which even a shadow of resistance was kept up. The tyranny of Torres, which seemed to increase with his misfortunes, became intolerable to his associates in the Baxio, and urged by their remonstrances, the Government deprived him of his commission, as General-in-chief, with which they invested Colonel Ārăgö, who, in conjunction with Don Andres Dēlgădö, (better known under the name of Ēl Gīrö,) endeavoured to compel Torres to submission.

The contest between them would not have been decided without an appeal to arms, had not the approach of a Royalist Division terminated the dispute ; Torres's friends gave in their submission to Arago, and the Padre himself, after leading a fugitive life for some months in the mountains of Pēnjămő, was run through the body with a lance, by one of his own captains, Don Juan Zămōră, whom he had attempted to deprive of a favourite horse. Ěl Gırő was surprised, about the same time, (July, 1819,) by some soldiers of the Royalist Colonel, Bustamante, and killed, after a gallant defence, in which he slew three of his adversaries with his own hand. Don Jose Marĭa Lĭcĕăgă, one of the oldest Insurgent chiefs, and the colleague of Rayon in the Junta of Zĭtăcŭrő, was killed at the commencement of the year by an Insurgent officer, belonging to the district of Guanajuato ; so that of all those, who had taken any lead in the Revolution, not one remained in July, 1819, when the Insurgent cause may be said to have reached its lowest ebb. Guĕrrĕrő, indeed, maintained himself on the right bank of the river Zăcătŭlă, (near Cōlĭmă, on the Pacific,) but he was cut off from all communication with the Interior, and had little hope of assistance from without ; so that, notwithstanding his military talents, his little force was not formidable to the Royalists, who were in undisturbed possession of almost all the interior of the country, with the whole of the Eastern coast.

So confident, indeed, was the Viceroy, that the Revolution was at an end, that he wrote to Madrid, to state that he would answer for the safety of Mexico without a single additional soldier being sent out ; the kingdom being again tranquil, and perfectly submissive to the Royal authority.

SECTION IV.

REVOLUTION FROM 1820 TO 1824, INCLUDING
ITURBIDE'S RISE AND FALL.

IN giving the opinion mentioned at the close of the preceding chapter, Āpōdācā showed himself to be much less intimately acquainted than his predecessor with the character of the contest, in which Spain and her Colonies were engaged. Nothing could be more fallacious than the appearances to which he trusted. The country was exhausted, but not subdued; and during the suspension of hostilities, upon which his hopes were founded, the principles of the Insurrection were daily gaining ground. The great support of Spain, during the early part of the contest, had been the Creole troops, who had embarked in her cause with a zeal for which it is difficult to account, as the military profession, under the old system, was not exempt from the disadvantages to which other professions were liable, no Creole being allowed to hold any important command. But means had been found to conciliate the army at the critical moment,* and up to 1820, it continued faithful to the cause which it at first espoused. During the war, the officers had little leisure for reflecting upon the rights of the question, and it even became a sort of *esprit de corps* with them to designate the Insurgents as banditti, to whom none of the privileges of ordinary warfare were to be extended. Their men, when once blooded, followed

* *Vidé* Căllējā's Letter, several passages of which prove how much the importance of this was felt. (Appendix.)

blindly those whom they were accustomed to obey ; and the severities which they exercised upon their Creole countrymen, and which were retaliated upon themselves whenever the fortune of the field allowed of it, left but little opportunity for any approximation of opinions. But when the heat of the contest had subsided, things assumed a very different aspect : crowds of Insurgents, who had accepted the *indulto*, were allowed to mingle with the troops, and many were even admitted as recruits into the Creole regiments : each of these men formed proselytes amongst his comrades, while the officers were attacked, not merely by argument, but by all the seductions of the female sex, who have been, throughout America, the warmest advocates of Independence. They were taught that it was to them that their country looked for freedom ; that they alone had prevented its attainment at a much earlier period ; and that it was their duty to repair an error, which a mistaken notion of honour had induced them to commit.

A feeling of this nature was gaining ground when the re-establishment of the Constitution in Spain, by the very army that was destined to rivet the chains of America, gave to the partisans of the Independent cause an additional advantage. Although the liberty of the press was not established, still freedom of communication could not be prevented. The events of 1812 seemed to be repeated ; the elections threw the minds of the people again into a ferment, which, from the restricted powers of the Viceroy, it was impossible to allay ; and, in addition to this, the Old Spaniards were divided amongst themselves. Many were sincere Constitutionals, while others were as sincerely attached to the old system. In Mexico, as in the Mother country, these parties broke out into open hostility. The Viceroy Apodaca, who probably thought *que c'étoit son métier à lui d'être royaliste*, although he took the oath to the Constitution, lost no opportunity of favouring the party opposed to it ; and took advantage of

the decrees of the Cortes respecting Church property, to form an alliance with the great Dignitaries of the church in the Capital, in conjunction with whom, it is believed to have been his intention to proclaim a return to the old system, as the only means of saving the country from ruin, and religion from contamination.

Don Agustín de Iturbide was the person chosen to carry this plan into execution; and, to all appearance, it would have been impossible to select a fitter instrument. He was a Creole born, and could therefore address the Mexicans as his countrymen; while, from the brilliancy of his military career, he was almost sure to be followed by the army. In addition to this, he was much esteemed by the high clergy, having been employed, for some time, in expiating the excesses of his former life, by a rigid course of penance and mortification, in the College of the Professa in the Capital.

It is difficult in speaking of events so very recent as Iturbide's rise and fall, to arrive at the exact truth, or to divest statements of the party-colouring by which they are disfigured: the following facts, however, seem to be universally admitted respecting the career of this extraordinary man. He was of a respectable, but by no means a wealthy family, of the Province of Valladolid; and, at the commencement of the Revolution, was serving as lieutenant in a regiment of Provincial Militia. Distinguished by a fine person, a most captivating address, and polished manners, as well as by a daring and ambitious spirit, he was amongst the first of those who dipped in the plans for shaking off the yoke of Spain, in which the years 1808 and 1809 abounded. Of the termination of his connexion with the first Insurgents, two very different stories are told. He himself asserts that he was disgusted with their projects, and refused to take any share in their execution, although they offered him the rank of lieutenant-general as the price of his co-operation; while the Insurgents affirm that these were the conditions *proposed* by

Iturbide, and *rejected* by them, because they conceived that it was setting too high a price upon the services of a man, so young, and so little distinguished, as he then was. However this may be, it is certain that all communication between them was broken off in disgust, and that Iturbide joined the troops assembled by the Viceroy Venegas for the defence of Mexico, in 1810, and distinguished himself in the action of Lās Crúcēs, under the orders of Trūxillo. From that moment his rise was rapid: his activity and knowledge of the country recommended him for every dangerous expedition; and in these he was almost uniformly successful. As a Guerilla chief he displayed great military talent; and, when entrusted with more important commands, he inflicted two of the most severe blows that the Insurgent cause sustained, in the battles of Vāllādōlid, and Pūrūārān, (where Morelos's great army was destroyed, and Mātāmōrōs taken,) and mainly contributed to the triumph of the Spanish arms. As he himself states, he never failed but in the attack upon the fort of Cōpōrō, in 1815, upon which occasion he volunteered his services, and led the party that was destined for the assault. He was afterwards appointed to an independent command in the Baxio, (an honour which few Creoles had obtained before him;) but there, as during the course of his previous career, he tarnished the lustre of his military exploits by giving loose to the violence of the most unbridled passions. Few even of the Spanish Commandants equalled him in cruelty: his prisoners were seldom, if ever spared, and a dispatch of his is still extant, addressed to the Viceroy, after an action at Sāl-vātīerrā, dated Good Friday, 1814, in which he tells him that, "*in honour of the day*, he had just ordered three hundred excommunicated wretches to be shot!"

This dispatch has been declared by Iturbide's partisans to be apocryphal; but the original exists in the archives of the Viceroyalty. All, therefore, that can be said is, that these detestable executions, in cold blood, were but too much in

consonance with the spirit of the time; and that, although it is impossible now to determine with which party they originated, they were almost universally practised by both. These were not, however, the only causes of complaint against Iturbide; his rapacity and extortions in his government led to such numerous representations against him, that he was recalled, in 1816, to Mexico, where an inquiry was instituted into his conduct, which was, however, stifled, because the malversations of which he had been guilty extended, more or less, to the whole army, which was, consequently disposed to make common cause with Iturbide, in repelling an attack so dangerous to all.

From this time Iturbide remained unemployed until the year 1820, at the close of which Apodaca had recourse to him, as I have already stated, as the fittest agent for carrying into execution his plans for the overthrow of the Constitution, and offered him the command of a small body of troops upon the Western coast, at the head of which he was to proclaim the re-establishment of the absolute authority of the King.

Iturbide accepted the commission, but with intentions very different from those with which it was conferred upon him. He had had leisure, during the four years which he had passed in retirement, to reflect upon the state of Mexico, and to convince himself of the facility with which the authority of Spain might be shaken off, if the Creole troops could be brought to co-operate with the old Insurgents in the attempt. The European troops in the country consisted only of eleven Spanish Expeditionary regiments; and these, though supported by from seventy to eighty thousand old Spaniards, disseminated through the different Provinces, could not oppose any sort of resistance to seven Veteran and seventeen Provincial regiments of Natives, aided by the great mass of the population of the country, which had given ample proofs of its devotion to the Independent cause during the earlier

stages of the Revolution. The only difficulty was to bring the two parties to act in concert ; and this Iturbide endeavoured to effect by the famous plan of Igüälä, of which I believe him to have been the sole author, although it has been attributed, by his enemies, to the Spanish party in the capital.

But the desire shown throughout it to conciliate the European Spaniards, by guaranteeing to such as chose to remain in the country a full participation in the rights and privileges of native Mexicans, and even allowing them to retain possession of such public employments as they might hold at the time of joining his (Iturbide's) party, was a feeling not unnatural in a man, who had passed his life in the service of Spain, and who regarded as friends, and comrades, those from whom his countrymen had suffered most. Nor was it impolitic, in another sense, as it weakened the motives which the Spaniards would otherwise have had for resistance, and thus smoothed the way for the adoption of those great political changes, which it was destined to introduce. Where life and property are at stake, a man must needs risk every thing in their defence ; but the case is different where the question at issue is reduced to a question of *right* between two Governments ; and there can be no doubt, that every European, who was induced by the mild spirit of the plan of Igüälä, to regard Iturbide's insurrection in this light, diminished the list of opponents, whom he would otherwise have had to encounter. I have given the whole of this plan, which consists of twenty-four Articles, in the Appendix, (Letter E.) Many of its provisions are excellent, particularly those by which all distinctions of Caste were abolished (Article 11), and an end put to the despotism of Military Commandants (Article 23), who were deprived of the power of inflicting capital punishments, which they had so long, and so shamefully, abused.*

* This power was latterly used almost entirely as a means of extorting money, to which every petty Commandant had recourse, by occasionally threatening with martial law the richest persons in his district.

But it was an illusion to suppose that any intimate union could be effected, where the passions had been reciprocally excited by so long a series of inveterate hostility. Creoles might forgive Creoles for the part which they had taken in the preceding struggle; but Spaniards, never: and from the first, the basis of "Union," which was one of the three "Guarantees" proposed by the plan of Igüälä, was wanting. The idea itself was singular. Iturbide, conceiving that Independence, the Maintenance of the Catholic Religion, and Union, were the three great objects which he ought to hold in view, denominated them, "*the three Guarantees*," and the troops who agreed to uphold them, "*the Army of the three Guarantees*." As a proof of his own principles, by the first Article of his plan, the Independence of the nation was declared; by the second, its religion fixed; and by the eighth, the crown offered to his Majesty Ferdinand VII., and, in case of his refusal, to the Infants Don Carlos and Don Francisco de Paula, provided any one of them would consent to occupy the throne in person. Such was the project, which was proclaimed on the 24th of February, 1821, at the little town of Igüälä, (on the road to Acapulco,) where Iturbide had then his head-quarters. His whole force, at the time, did not exceed eight hundred men, and of these, though all, at first, took the oath of fidelity to the plan of Iguala, many deserted when they found that it was not received by the country at large, with the enthusiasm that was expected. There was a moment when Iturbide's progress might, undoubtedly, have been checked; but it was lost by the indecision of the Viceroy, who hesitated to put himself at the head of a force, which he had concentrated for the defence of the Capital. The Europeans, alarmed at this delay, deposed him, (as they had done Iturrigaray, in 1808,) and placed Don Francisco Növällä, an officer of artillery, at the head of affairs: but the authority of the new Viceroy was not generally recognized, and Iturbide was enabled by this schism in the Capital, to

prosecute his own plans without interruption in the Interior. After seizing a Conducta of a million of dollars, sent to Aca-pulco by the Manilla Company, he effected a junction with General Guerrero, who had maintained his position on the river Zăcătŭlă, unsubdued by the forces which had been successively detached against him, but who did not hesitate to place himself under Iturbide's orders, as soon as he knew that the Independence of the country was his object. From this moment his success was certain. On his route to the Baxŭo, towards which, as a central position, he directed his march, he was joined by all the survivors of the first Insurrection, as well as by detachments of Creole troops. Men and officers flocked to his standard, in such numbers as to set all fear of opposition at defiance. The Clergy and the People were equally decided in his favour. The most distant Districts sent in their adhesion to the cause, and wherever he appeared in person, nothing could equal the enthusiasm displayed. Few have enjoyed a more intoxicating triumph than Iturbide;—few have been called, with more sincerity, the saviour of their country; and none have offered a more striking example of the instability of popular favour, and of the precarious tenure of those honours, which great revolutions sometimes give. While the tide of success lasted, nothing could arrest his progress: before the month of July, the whole country recognized his authority, with the exception of the Capital, in which Novella had shut himself up, with the European troops. Iturbide had reached Quěřětărŭ, on his road to Mexico, which he was about to invest, when he received intelligence of the arrival, at Veracruz, of the new Constitutional Viceroy and Political Chief, Don Juan O'Donoju, who, at such a crisis, was, of course, unable to advance beyond the walls of the fortress. Iturbide, with his usual talent, hastened to turn this circumstance to account: at an interview with the Viceroy, whom he allowed to advance for the purpose as far as the town of Cŭrdŭvă, he proposed to him the adoption, by

treaty, of the plan of Igüälă, as the only means of securing the lives and property of his countrymen established in Mexico, and of fixing the right to the throne on the house of Bourbon. With these terms O'Donōjū complied. In the name of the King, his Master, he recognized the Independence of Mexico, and gave up the Capital to the army of the Three Guarantees, which took possession of it, without effusion of blood, on the 27th of September, 1821. Novella, and such of his troops as chose to quit the Mexican territory, were allowed to do so, and the expenses of their voyage to the Havanna defrayed. Civilians were treated with similar indulgence, and their private property most strictly respected. O'Donoju himself, was empowered to watch over the observance of the articles of the treaty favourable to his countrymen, as one of the members of the Junta, which was to be entrusted with the direction of affairs, until the King's decision could be known: while a Congress was to be assembled, to fix the bounds, which were to be prescribed to the Royal Authority.

Such was the Treaty of Cordova, which was signed by Iturbide, "as the depository of the will of the Mexican people," and by O'Donoju, as the representative of Spain, on the 24th of August, 1821. The best excuse for the concessions made by the latter is, as stated by Iturbide,* the fact, that he had no alternative. He must have signed the treaty, or become a prisoner, or returned at once to Spain, in which case his countrymen would have been compromised, and his Government deprived of those advantages, which the Mexicans were still willing to concede. Under these circumstances, it is not easy to point out what O'Donoju could have done for Spain better than what he did; although the advantages were, at first, most apparent upon the Creole side. Iturbide obtained, in virtue of the treaty of Cordova, immediate possession of the Capital, which he entered in triumph on the 27th of September, 1821, and, on the following day, the

Provisional Junta was installed, the establishment of which was provided for by the fifth Article of the plan of Iguala. This Junta, which was composed of thirty-six persons, elected a Regency, consisting of five individuals, of which Iturbide was made President: he was at the same time created Generalissimo, and Lord High Admiral, and assigned a yearly salary of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars.

Up to this time Iturbide's plans had been completely successful. He seemed to have carried the nation along with him, and, in every thing that could tend to promote a separation from Spain, not a single dissenting voice had been heard. But, from the moment that the future organization of the Government came under discussion, this apparent unanimity was at an end. One of the first duties of the Provisional Junta was to prepare a plan for assembling a National Congress; and this, at Iturbide's suggestion, was done in such a way as to pledge the Deputies to the adoption of the plan of Iguala in all its parts, by obliging them to swear to observe it, before they could take their seats in the Congress. Many of the old Insurgents thought that this was restricting too much the powers of the people, who ought to be allowed to approve, or reject, through the medium of their representatives, what had been done in their name, but without their authority. Guădălŭpě Victoria was one of the advocates of this opinion, and was driven again into banishment by the persecution which it drew upon him. Generals Bravo and Guerrero were likewise of the same mode of thinking, as, indeed, were a host of others; and thus, although Iturbide succeeded in carrying his point, and, in compelling the deputies to take the oath proposed, the seeds of discontent were sown before the sessions of the Congress commenced.

On the 24th February, 1822, the first Mexican Cortes met, and three distinct parties were soon organized amongst the members. The Bourbonists, who wished to adhere to the

plan of Iguala altogether, and to have a Constitutional monarchy, with a Prince of the House of Bourbon at its head. The Republicans, who denied the right of the army to pledge the nation by the plan of Iguala at all, and wished for a Central or Federal Republic: and the Iturbidists, who adopted the plan of Iguala, with the exception of the article in favour of the Bourbons, in lieu of whom they wished to place Iturbide himself upon the throne.

Upon the merits of the respective creeds of these parties, I shall make no comments; each probably thought that it had good reasons for adopting that which it did adopt, and each, certainly, hoped to derive considerable advantages from the triumph of its own.

The Bourbonists soon ceased to exist as a party, the Cortes of Madrid having, by a Decree dated the 13th of February, 1822, declared the Treaty of Cordova "to be illegal, null and void, in as far as the Spanish Government and its subjects were concerned," thereby precluding the possibility of the acceptance of the crown of Mexico by a junior member of the Royal Family. The struggle was thenceforward confined to the Iturbidists and the Republicans, between whom a violent contest was long carried on,—the Congress accusing the Regency, and its President, of wasteful expenditure, and Iturbide as loudly accusing the Congress of an intention to destroy "the most meritorious part of the community"—the army, by not providing funds for its support. These bickerings were increased by the introduction of a project in the Congress, for reducing the troops of the line, from sixty, to twenty-thousand men, and supplying the deficiency by calling out an auxiliary force of thirty thousand militia. This measure was most strenuously opposed by Iturbide, but was, nevertheless, carried by a large majority, in the beginning of April. From that moment his friends saw that his influence was on the wane, and that if they wished ever to see him upon the throne, the attempt must be made before the me-

mory of his former services was lost. Their measures were concerted accordingly. No men of rank were employed in carrying them into execution; but recourse was had to the sergeants, and non-commissioned officers of the garrison, who were, in general, much attached to Iturbide's person. These men, headed by one Pio Marcha, the first sergeant of the Infantry regiment No. 1, and seconded by a crowd of the leperos, (lazzaroni,) by whom the streets of Mexico are infested, assembled before Iturbide's house on the night of the 18th of May, 1822, and proclaimed him emperor, under the title of Augustin the First, amidst shouts and *Vivas*, and firing, which lasted through the whole of the night. The old and stale manœuvre of pretending to yield, reluctantly, to the will of the people, was repeated upon this occasion, as detailed by Iturbide himself;* and was kept up during the whole of the next day, when the Congress was employed in discussing the strange title to a crown, which the Commander-in-chief stated himself to have derived from the acclamations of a mob; while Iturbide, after filling the galleries with his partizans in arms, endeavoured, like the prince of hypocrites, as he proved himself upon this occasion, to obtain a hearing for those who were adverse to his nomination. The discussion ended, of course, by the approbation of a step, which it was not in the power of Congress to oppose; and Iturbide was proclaimed Emperor, with the sanction of the National Assembly. The choice was ratified by the Provinces, without opposition; and had the new Sovereign been able to moderate his impatience of restraint, and allowed his authority to be confined within the constitutional bounds, which the Congress was inclined to prescribe for it, there is little doubt that he would have been, at this day, in peaceable possession of the throne, to which his own abilities, and a concurrence of favourable circumstances, had raised him. But the struggle for power, far from being terminated by his elevation, seemed

* *Vide Statement*, pages 38, 39, and 40.

only to have become more implacable. The Emperor demanded privileges inconsistent with any balance of power;—a Veto upon all the articles of the Constitution then under discussion, and the right of appointing and removing, at pleasure, the members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. He recommended, likewise, the establishment of a Military Tribunal in the Capital, with powers but little inferior to those exercised by the Spanish Commandants during the Revolution; and when these proposals were rejected, (as they were with great firmness, by the Congress,) he arrested, on the night of the 26th August, 1822, fourteen of the Deputies, who had advocated, during the discussion, principles but little in unison with the views of the Government.

This bold measure was followed by a series of reclamations and remonstrances on the part of the Congress, which produced no other effect than that of widening the breach between the Emperor and the National Assembly, until, at last, it became evident that the two could not exist together. Iturbide terminated the dispute, as Cromwell had done, under similar circumstances, before him, by sending an officer to the Hall of Congress, with a simple notification that the Assembly had ceased to exist, and an order to dissolve it by force, should any attempt at resistance be made. But no compulsion was required: the Deputies, many of whom were prepared beforehand for what was about to occur, dissolved their sessions at once, and the doors of the edifice in which they met, were closed by the officer whom Iturbide had commissioned to make known to them his will.

This took place on the 30th October, 1822, and, on the same day, a new Legislative Assembly was created by the Emperor, called the Instituent Junta, and consisting of forty-five members, selected by Iturbide himself, from amongst those whom he had found most inclined to comply with his wishes in the preceding Congress.

This body never possessed any sort of influence in the

country, and, with the exception of a decree for raising a forced loan of two millions and a half of dollars, and for applying to the immediate exigencies of the State, two millions in specie, which had been sent to Veracruz by different merchants, but were detained at Perote, its records are hardly distinguished by a single public act.

Iturbide's popularity did not long survive his assumption of arbitrary power. Before the end of November, an insurrection broke out in the Northern Provinces, which was headed by General Garza. It was, however, suppressed by the Imperial troops, who remained faithful to their new Sovereign. But the army was his only reliance, and, unfortunately for him, a schism soon afterwards took place between two of his most confidential officers.

The motives which first induced General Săntănă, the Governor of Veracruz, to turn his arms against the Emperor, are said to have been of a private nature; but of this it is impossible now to judge. All that is known to the public is, that, at the close of 1822, this young officer published an address to the nation, in which he reproached the Emperor with having broken his Coronation oath, by dissolving the Congress, and declared his own determination, and that of the garrison under his command, to re-assemble the Congress, and to support whatever form of Government that assembly might please to adopt.

To repress this dangerous spirit, Iturbide detached General Echāvărí, a Spaniard, in whom he placed unlimited confidence, with a corps of troops sufficiently strong to invest Veracruz, and thus to compel Săntănă to submission. But that officer had been joined, in the interim, by Guadalupe Victoria, to whom he yielded the chief command, in the expectation that his name, and the known strictness of his principles, would inspire those with confidence who were inclined to favour the establishment of a Republic. Nor was he deceived: Victoria's character proved a powerful attraction;

and Echāvāri himself, after a few actions in the vicinity of Puente del Rey, finding that public opinion was declaring itself every where against the Emperor, determined upon making common cause with the garrison of Veracruz, and induced his whole army to follow his example.

On the 1st of February, 1823, an act was signed, called the Act of Casa-Mata, consisting of eleven articles, by which the armies pledged themselves to effect the re-establishment of the National Representative Assembly, and to support it against all attacks.

This act was the signal for revolt throughout the country : it was adopted by the Provinces in rapid succession, and by most of the Military Commandants ; amongst whom were the Marquis of Vibanco, then commanding a large body of troops at La Puebla, and Generals Guerrero and Bravo, who left the Capital in order to proclaim the new system upon their old scene of action in the West. General Nēgrētē likewise joined the Republican army, and defection soon became so general, that Iturbide, either terrified by the storm which he had so unexpectedly conjured up, or really anxious to avoid the effusion of blood, determined to attempt no resistance.

On the 8th of March, 1823, he called together all the members of the old Congress then in the Capital, and tendered his abdication, which was not accepted, because there were not at the time deputies enough to form a house. On the 19th of March, he repeated the offer, and stated his intention to quit the country, lest his presence in Mexico should serve as a pretext for further dissensions. The Congress, in reply, refused to accept the abdication, which would imply (they said) a legal right to the Crown ; whereas his election had been compulsory, and consequently null : but they willingly allowed him to quit the kingdom with his family, and assigned to him a yearly income of twenty-five thousand dollars (about five thousand pounds) for his support.

Iturbide was allowed to choose his own escort to the coast, and selected General Bravo for the purpose, by whom he was accompanied to Antigua, (near Veracruz,) where a ship was freighted by the Government to convey him to Leghorn. He embarked on the 11th of May, 1823. A new Executive was immediately appointed by the Congress, composed of Generals Victoria, Bravo, and Negrete, by whom the affairs of the country were conducted, until a new Congress was assembled, (in August, 1823,) which, in October 1824, definitively sanctioned the present Federal Constitution.


Many persons have attributed Iturbide's conduct, during the latter part of his career, to pusillanimity; but this is a charge which is repelled by the whole tenor of his earlier life. I am myself inclined to ascribe it partly, to a wish not to occasion a Civil war, and partly, to a lurking hope that time would prove as fatal to the popularity of his rivals, as it had been to his own; and that the eyes of his countrymen would then be directed towards himself, as the only means of preserving them from anarchy. Such, at least, appears to have been the impression with which he returned to Mexico in 1824, when he was outlawed by the Congress, and shot, upon landing on the coast, by General Garza; a measure, the severity of which, after the services which Iturbide had rendered to the country, can only be excused by the impossibility of avoiding, in any other way, a civil war. His partizans in the Interior were still numerous, particularly on the Western coast, and had he once succeeded in penetrating into the country, with such men as Victoria and Bravo to oppose him, it is difficult to say how long the contest might have been protracted, or where the effusion of blood would have stopped.

Iturbide's family now resides in the United States, upon a provision assigned to it by the Mexican Congress. The partizans of the father were entirely personal, and his son has few, or no adherents: he is not, however, yet allowed to return to the territories of the Republic.

BOOK III.

VOL. I.

P



B O O K III.

SECTION I.

PRESENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT.—HOW COMPOSED.

THE form of government adopted by the Representatives of Mexico, when left by the resignation of Iturbide at liberty to make a free and unbiassed choice, was that of a Federal Republic, each member of which manages its own internal concerns, while the whole are cemented into one body politic, by certain general obligations, and laws, contained in the Federal Constitution of the 4th October, 1824.

This instrument, after declaring the absolute Independence of the country, (Article 1) adopting the Roman Catholic religion, (Article 3) and recognizing, as component parts of the Federation, (given alphabetically,) the nineteen States of Chiāpās, Chīhūāhuā, Cōhāhūilā and Tēxās, Dūrāngō, Guānā-jūātō, Mexico, Mīchōācān (Valladolid,) New Lēōñ, Ōājācā, Pūēblā de los Āngēlēs, Quērētārō, Sān Lūīs Pōtōsī, Sōnōrā and Sīnālōā, Tābāscō, las Tāmāulīpās, Vērācrūz, Xālīscō (Guādālājārā) Yūcātān, and Zācātēcās, as well as the *Territories* of Old and New California, Cōlīmā, New Mexico, and Tlāscālā, (Article 5,) proceeds to divide the Powers of the Supreme Government into three branches, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, (Article 6).

The Legislative Power is vested in a Congress, divided into two Chambers, the House of Representatives, and the Senate, (Article 7).

The House of Representatives is composed of members elected for a term of two years by the citizens of the States. The basis of this election is the population, one member being returned for each eighty thousand inhabitants, as well as for each fraction that exceeds forty thousand,* (Articles 8, 10, 11).

A Deputy must be twenty-five years of age, and have resided two years in the State by which he is elected, (Article 19). If not a Mexican by birth, he must have been eight years a resident in the Republic, and possess landed property to the amount of eight thousand dollars, or some trade or profession that produces one thousand annually, (Article 20). An exception is made in favour of the natives of the former Colonies of Spain, from whom a residence of three years only is required, and of military men, whom eight years of service during the War of Independence, entitle to all the privileges of a Mexican born, (Article 21).

The President, and Vice-President, of the Federation, the Members of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Secretaries of State, and those employed in their departments, the Governors of States and Territories, Military Commandants, Archbishops, Bishops, Vicars-general, Judges of Districts, and Commissaries-general of Finance, or War, are not eligible, as Deputies, for the States, or Territories, in which they exercise their functions; and to become so, must have given up their several employments six months before the election takes place, (Articles 23, 24).

The Senate is composed of two Senators for each State, elected by a plurality of votes in the State Legislature, or

* Thus a State with a population of two hundred and five thousand, would return the same number of deputies as one with two hundred and forty thousand.

Congress. The last of the two named is replaced by a new appointment at the end of two years; the first retains his seat for four. Both must be thirty years of age, and must possess all the qualifications requisite for a Deputy, (Articles 25, 26, 28, and 29).

The Congress thus constituted meets every year on the 1st of January, (Article 67,) and closes its sessions on the 15th of April; unless either in its own opinion, or in that of the President, it be necessary to prolong them for thirty days more, (Article 71).

In the interval between the ordinary sessions an Extraordinary Congress may be convoked, (composed always of the existing Chambers,) either by the President, or by the Council of Government, should two-thirds of its members agree upon its expediency, (Article 110).

The Congress cannot open its sessions without the presence of more than half the total number of its members, (Article 36).

Either of the Chambers can resolve itself into a Grand Jury, qualified to take cognizance of accusations against the President, for the crime of treason in attempting to subvert the form of Government established, or for any act manifestly tending to impede the free election of Senators and Deputies; or against the Members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the Secretaries of State, and the Governors of the different States, for infractions of the constitution, by the publication of laws contrary to the general laws of the Union, (Article 38).

Should an impeachment be decided upon by two-thirds of the members of the Chamber, before which the accusation is preferred, the person accused is, *ipso facto*, suspended from his employment, and placed at the disposal of the competent tribunal, (Article 42).

Both Deputies and Senators are inviolable, and cannot, at any time be called to account for their opinions, (Article 42).

A yearly salary of two thousand dollars is assigned to them, (Article 45).

The concurrence of both Chambers is required for the transmission of any legal enactment to the President. If he approves it, it is immediately published with his signature, when it acquires the force of law. If disapproved of by the President, it is sent back to the Chambers with his observations. Should it be again sanctioned by a majority of *two-thirds* of the members of *both*, the President must sign and publish it, without farther remonstrance. If not approved by this majority, the project cannot be again taken into consideration until the following year. The objections of the President must be stated within a term of ten days, without which the law is conceived to have received his sanction, and must be promulgated.

Laws of every kind may originate, without distinction, in either Chamber, with the exception of those on taxes or contributions, which must be proposed in the Chamber of Deputies, (Articles 51—57.)

In the formation of a law, the presence of a majority of members in both Chambers is required, (Article 66.)

The principal attributes of the Congress are :—

To maintain the Federal Union of the States, their independence of each other, and the perfect equality of their rights and obligations.

To promote general information by the establishment of copyrights, and the formation of colleges for the navy, the army, and the engineers.

To open roads and canals; to regulate posts, and grant patents to the inventors or introducers of any useful discovery.

To protect and regulate the liberty of the press in such a manner that its exercise can never be suspended, or abolished, in any part of the Federation.

To incorporate into the Union new States, or Territories, fix their respective limits, raise Territories to the rank of

States, and combine two or more States into one, at the request of their respective Legislatures, and with the consent of a majority of two-thirds in each, as well as in the general Congress.

To regulate the outlay of the country, and provide for it by taxes, imposts, and duties; to superintend the mode of collecting these, and to examine annually the Government accounts.

To borrow money on the credit of the Federation, and give security for its payment.

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and between the several States, and with the Indian tribes.

To give instructions for the formation of a Concordat with the Holy See; to approve this Concordat for ratification, and to regulate the exercise of the right of Patronage throughout the Federation.

To approve all treaties of Peace, Alliance, &c. with Foreign powers.

To open ports to foreign trade, and establish custom-houses.

To fix the weight, standard, and value of money throughout the Federation, and to adopt one uniform system of weights and measures.

To declare war; grant letters of marque; determine prize-cases; designate the armed force of the country by sea and by land, fix the Contingent of each State, and make regulations for the government of the land and naval forces.

To permit or refuse the entry of Foreign troops into the territory, or of a Foreign squadron into the harbours of the Republic.

To create or suppress public offices, and increase or diminish the salaries attached to them.

To concede recompenses to Corporations or to individuals who have rendered services to the country, and to decree public honours to their memory.

To establish a general law with regard to naturalization, and bankruptcies.

To select a fit residence for the Supreme Powers of the Federation, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in the district around it.

To give laws and decrees for the internal administration of the Territories.

To make all laws which shall be necessary for the attainment of the objects comprised under the preceding Articles. (Articles 49, 50.)

The Supreme Executive Power is deposited in the hands of a President, (Article 74), assisted by a Vice-president, who, in cases of any moral or physical disqualification on the part of the President, succeeds to all his prerogatives, and exercises his functions. (Article 75.)

None can be President, or Vice-president, but a Mexican born, thirty-five years of age, and residing in the country. (Article 76.)

The President cannot be re-elected until after the lapse of a term of four years. (Article 77.)

The election is made by the Congresses of the States, each of which, on the 1st day of September of the year immediately preceding the installation of a new President, names two individuals as candidates, one of whom, at least, is not to be a native of the State. A sealed certificate of this act is sent to the President of the Council of Government, which is opened in the presence of the Chambers on the 6th of the following January. A Commission of the Deputies, composed of one from each State, examines the validity of the certificates; and the Chamber then declares the individual upon whom the election has fallen. (Articles 79—84.)

Should two of the Candidates have an equal number of votes, or no one obtain a positive majority, the Chamber of Deputies names the President and Vice-president, confining

its choice to the candidates who have obtained most votes. (Articles 85—89.)

If, in the House of Representatives, opinions are again divided, the question is determined by lot. (Article 90.)

The President may propose to the Congress, such changes or modifications of laws, as he judges necessary. (Article 105.)

During a term of ten days, he may make observations upon the Laws, or Decrees communicated to him by the Congress, and suspend their publication. (Article 106.)

During his Presidency he is inviolable, and can only be accused before one of the Chambers, in the cases provided for by Article 38. (Article 107.)

The President has powers :—

1. To publish, circulate, and enforce the Laws and Decrees of the General Congress.

2. To issue decrees or regulations himself, for the better observance of the Constitution, and general laws.

3. To carry into execution all laws for preserving the integrity of the Federation, and maintaining its Independence and tranquillity.

4. To appoint and remove, at pleasure, the Secretaries of State.

5. To superintend the collection of the revenue, and its employment, as provided for by the Congress.

6. To appoint the chiefs of the different departments of finance ; the Commissaries general, Diplomatic agents, Consuls, Colonels, and other superior officers of the army and militia, with the approbation of the Senate, or, when the Congress is not sitting, of the Council of Government.

7. To make all other Government appointments whatsoever, under certain legal restrictions.

8. To appoint one of three candidates proposed to him, to all vacancies in the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, or as Judges and Fiscals of a district.

9. To assign military pensions, &c. in conformity to the laws.

10. To dispose of the armed force of the country, both by sea and by land, for the better security of the Federation.

11. To call out the Militia for the same purpose, the force required being previously determined by the Congress, or by the Council of State, should the Congress not be sitting.

12. To declare War in virtue of a previous decree of the Congress, and grant letters of marque.

13. To frame a concordat with the Holy See, under the restrictions prescribed by Article 50.

14. To direct all diplomatic intercourse with foreign countries, and to conclude Treaties of Peace, Amity, Alliance, &c.; the ratification of any such Treaty being preceded by the consent of the Congress.

15. To receive the Ministers and Envoys of Foreign Powers.

16. To demand of the Congress the prolongation of its Ordinary sessions, for the term of thirty days.

17. To convoke the Congress in an Extraordinary session, in case he should deem it expedient, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members of the Council of State.

18. To convoke the Congress in like manner, when two-thirds of the Council are of opinion that it is expedient.

19. To watch over the due administration of justice, and to see the sentences of the Supreme Court, and other tribunals of the Federation carried into execution.

20. To suspend for three months, and deprive of the half of their salaries, any of the Government officers guilty of disobedience, or infraction of the laws.

21. To concede, or deny, his "*Pase*," (or Exequatur) to all decrees of Councils, Pontifical bulls, Briefs, and Rescripts, with the consent of the General Congress, if they contain general regulations; and with that of the Senate, the Council

of State, or the Supreme Court of Justice, in cases of a more private, and individual character. (Article 110.)

The restrictions upon the powers of the President are the following:—

1. He cannot take the command of the forces in person, without the consent of the Congress, or of a majority of two-thirds in the Council of State. When thus employed, the Vice-President takes charge of the Government.

2. He cannot deprive any one of liberty; but in cases where the interest of the Federation requires it, he may arrest any individual, placing him, within a term of forty-eight hours, at the disposal of the competent tribunal.

3. He cannot seize or embargo the property of any individual, or corporation, unless in virtue of a decree of the Congress.

4. He cannot in any way impede or interfere with the elections.

5. Neither the President, nor the Vice-President, can quit the territories of the Republic, without the permission of the Congress, during the term of their service, and for one year after it has expired. (Article 112.)

The Council of Government or State, exists only during the intervals between the sessions of the Congress, and is composed of one half of the Senate, or one Senator from each State, with the Vice-President of the Republic at its head. (Articles 113, 114, 115.)

Its principal duties are:—

To watch over the observance of the Federal Act, and general laws of the Union.

To make such observations to the President as it may deem conducive to their better execution.

To convoke, by its own act, or at the suggestion of the President, the Congress, in an extraordinary session, for which, however, in both cases, the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members of the Council is required.

To give its consent to calling out the local militia in the cases prescribed by Article 110.

To approve the appointment of government officers, as provided by the same article.

To name two individuals, who, in conjunction with the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, may exercise the Executive Powers, in the event of the demise, absence, or incapacity, (physical or moral,) of the President, and Vice-President. (*Vide* Article 97.)

To swear in the Members of the Executive thus constituted.

To give an opinion in all cases upon which the President may consult it, either in virtue of the twenty-first Facultad, (subdivision) of the 10th Article or any other. (Article 110.)

For the dispatch of business, the Government is divided into Departments, at the head of each of which is a Secretary of State, who becomes responsible for all the acts in his department, to which his signature is affixed. (Articles 117, 118, 119.)

The Secretaries of State are bound to present to Congress a report of the state of their different departments at the commencement of the annual sessions, which report includes the budget for the ensuing year. (Article 120.)

They must be Mexican citizens by birth. (Article 121.)

The Judicial Power is lodged in a Supreme Tribunal of Justice; and in inferior Courts of Departments, and Districts, the number of which is determined by the Congress. (Article 123.)

The Supreme Court is composed of eleven Judges and one Fiscal, or Attorney General. (Article 124.)

Its Members must be Mexicans born, and thirty-five years of age. They are elected by the Legislature of the States in the same manner, and with the same formalities, as the President, and cannot be removed, unless in cases specified by law. (Articles 125—136.)

They take cognizance of all differences between two or

more States of the Federation, or between individuals of different States, respecting grants of land ; Government contracts ; controversies between the inferior tribunals of the Federation, or between these and the tribunals of the States ; all impeachments against the President or Vice President, the Secretaries of State, or Governors of States, or the Diplomatic Agents and Consuls of the Republic. They likewise decide all Admiralty cases : questions of prize-money, or contraband crimes committed upon the high seas ; treason against the nation ; and infractions of the Constitution, or general laws. (Articles 137 and 138.)

They may themselves be called to account by a tribunal constituted for the purpose, by the Chamber of Deputies. (Article 139.)

The tribunals of Departments and Districts are composed the first of a Judge and a Fiscal, the second of a Judge alone, from whom an appeal lies to the Supreme Tribunal, in all cases which exceed the value of five hundred dollars.

The Judges, in both cases, are named by the President from a list of three candidates submitted to him by the Supreme Tribunal. (Articles 140—144.)

The penalty of infamy can only attach to the person of the culprit. (Article 146.)

Confiscation of property, judgments by special commission, retroactive laws, and the torture in any shape, or under any pretence, are abolished for ever. (Articles 147, 148, 149.)

No one can be imprisoned without strong grounds of suspicion, nor detained above sixty hours, without proofs of guilt. (Articles 150, 151.)

No house can be entered, or papers examined, belonging to any inhabitant of the Republic, unless in cases expressly provided for by law, and then only in the manner prescribed by it. (Article 152.)

No inhabitant of the Republic shall be forced to give evidence on oath, calculated to criminate himself. (Article 153.)

No one shall be deprived of the right to terminate a suit

by Arbitration, in any stage of the proceedings, nor shall be allowed to commence an action without having had recourse, previously, to the Judgment of Conciliation.* (Articles 155 and 156.)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES WITH REGARD TO THE STATES
OF THE FEDERATION.

1. The Government of each State shall be divided in a manner similar to that of the Federation. (Article 157.)

The State Legislatures shall determine the time, for which all public offices within the State, shall be held by their respective constitutions; (Article 159;) as likewise the mode in which justice shall be administered in all civil and criminal cases, in which the supreme jurisdiction belongs to the State Tribunals. (Article 160.)

2. The obligations of the States are, to organize their Governments and system of internal administration, in conformity to the Federal Act.

3. To observe and enforce the general laws of the Union, and the Treaties concluded by the Supreme Government with Foreign Powers.

4. To protect their inhabitants, respectively, in the full enjoyment of the liberty of writing, printing, and publishing, their political opinions, without the necessity of any previous license, revision, or approbation.

5. To deliver up criminals reclaimed by other States.

7. To contribute towards the liquidation of the debts recognized by the National Congress.

* This Judgment of Conciliation was one of the few, the *very* few, really good and useful provisions of the Spanish Constitution. It prohibited any two parties from commencing a law-suit, until they were provided with a certificate from a Constitutional Alcalde, (not a lawyer) stating that a judgment by Arbitration or Conciliation, had been tried before him in vain.

8. To transmit, annually, to each of the two Chambers of the General Congress, a circumstantial account of the Receipts and Expenditure of their respective treasuries; with the origin of each, and a note, containing a description of the agricultural and manufacturing industry of each State; the new branches of industry that might be introduced, and the best mode of doing so, with a census of the population.

9. To transmit likewise copies of all the decrees, and laws, of their respective Congresses. (Article 161.)

No State has liberty, without the consent of the General Congress,

To establish any tonnage or harbour dues.

To lay any tax upon importations or exportations.

To maintain troops, or vessels of war.

To enter into any transaction with Foreign Powers; or declare war; though hostilities may be commenced in cases of actual invasion.

To enter into any transaction with other States of the Federation, respecting boundaries, or cession of territory. (Article 162.)

MODE OF EFFECTING CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACT.

The General Congress alone has the power of determining any question that may arise with regard to the interpretation of any article of the Constitutional Act. (Article 165.)

The Congresses of the States may make what representations they think proper against any particular Articles of the Constitution; but these cannot be taken into consideration by the General Congress before the year 1830. (Article 166.)

The Congress of that year must confine itself to qualifying, (or reporting upon) those representations which it thinks ought to be submitted to the consideration of the ensuing Congress; and this report shall be communicated to the Pre-

sident, who shall publish and circulate it without observation (Article 167.)

The ensuing Congress, in the first year of its ordinary sessions, shall discuss the report submitted to its deliberation; and make such reforms as it deems expedient; but no change can ever be made by the same Congress which declares its expediency. (Article 168.)

In addition to the rules prescribed in the preceding Articles, all the forms usually observed in the enactment of laws must be adhered to in the case of each change in, or addition to, the present act. (Article 170.)

The Articles of this Constitution, which establish the liberty and independence of Mexico as a nation, its religion, and form of government, the liberty of the press, and the division of the Supreme Powers of the Federation, can never be varied. (Article 171 and last.)

Mexico, Oct. 4, 1824.

REMARKS.

The principles of the system, some account of which has been given in the preceding pages, are too generally understood to require comment.

It is certainly well adapted, by the subdivision of the governing powers, to a country of such vast extent as to render the transmission of orders, from any central point, difficult, and uncertain: and thus, although in other respects Monarchical institutions might have been better suited to the habits, and previous education of the Mexicans, I am inclined to think that, both in the institution of local governments, and in the advantages which these Governments have derived from the immediate example of the United States, the adoption of the Federal system will be found to have been productive of many good effects. It has given to Mexico the benefit of our own experience in the science of government, as well as of that of the Americans, and substituted at once

good practical securities for the liberty of the subject, in lieu of vague theories, and still more vague discussions, upon his abstract rights.

Most of the Articles of the Federal Act are transcripts of corresponding articles in the Constitution of the United States. There is, however, an occasional mixture of the old Spanish leaven, which displays itself more particularly in the establishment of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic faith "to the exclusion of all others" (Article 3), and in the excessive precautions which it has been thought necessary to take against the possibility of encroachment on the part of the President.

The first of these is the natural consequence of a long apprenticeship, served under the most bigoted nation in the universe: the second arises from the circumstance of an Iturbide having been first placed at the head of affairs. In 1824, when the Federal Act was framed, the sceptre was but just wrested from his hands, and, for a long time, it seemed doubtful whether the Congress would resolve to entrust the Executive power to a single individual again. *Three* were appointed during the Interregnum, to exercise the functions of President; but the inconveniences of a Government thus constituted were felt in time, and the absolute necessity of a change reconciled the Chambers to the risk.

Of Religion I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the third Section of this book; it only remains therefore, for me here to call the attention of my readers to the laudable anxiety which the Mexican Constitutional act displays, for the general improvement of the country, by disseminating the blessings of education, opening roads, establishing copyrights, patents, and the liberty of the press, founding colleges, promoting naturalization, and throwing open the ports to foreign trade, abolishing the torture, arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, special commissions, retroactive laws, and

all the abuses of absolute power, and protecting the houses and persons of the inhabitants of the republic, against the undue exercise of authority in any shape.

In a more advanced stage of society, many of these enactments might have been dispensed with ; but in a country that had so recently thrown off the yoke, they were necessary, in order to inspire confidence in the system, and to teach the people to value their new rights in proportion to the extent of the grievances, from which they were exempted by them.

It cannot be denied that many of the provisions of the Federal Act, have already produced a good practical effect, and tended greatly to rouse the country into useful activity.

Proofs of the attention already paid to the education of the rising generation, will be found in Books V. and VI. of this sketch ; and this is the first great step towards a better order of things.

Statistical enquiries, too, are prosecuted with eagerness in all parts of the country, in order to furnish materials for the annual reports required, both by the General Congress, and by the Legislatures of the States. In these, a mass of curious information is already collected, and every day tends to throw more light upon the resources of the country ; while the precautions taken against too hasty a change of system, (Articles 165, 166, and 167,) embolden monied men to invest their capitals, once more, in those branches of industry which were formerly most productive.

It is to be regretted, that the non-introduction of the trial by Jury, the want of publicity in the administration of justice, and of a little more tolerance in religious matters, should cramp this rising spirit, and check the progress which must otherwise be made.

But I am inclined to consider these defects as perhaps unavoidable sacrifices to the prejudices of the day, and to look to time, and to the action of the system itself, as the best mode of removing them.

SECTION II

THE NAVY AND ARMY OF MEXICO IN 1827.

The Navy.

WHEN the Spanish troops, after being driven from the Capital and the continent, occupied the Castle of St. John of Ulloa, which is situated upon a sand bank nearly opposite the town of Veracruz, the necessity of expelling them from this last stronghold, and the impossibility of effecting it without a naval force, induced the Government to purchase six gun-boats and two sloops of war in the United States, which, with one brig, and two launches, on the Pacific side, constituted, in 1823, the whole Navy of the Republic.

During the siege of St. John, which lasted till November, 1825, this force was gradually increased; until, in January 1827, it consisted of one ship of the line, (formerly the Spanish Asia, now the Congress) two frigates, (the *Libertad* and *Tēpēyāc*,) the corvette, Morelos; brigs of war, Guerrero, Victoria, Bravo, and Constante; the schooner Hermon, four gun-boats, four large launches, and two pilot-boats, used in the conveyance of the Government correspondence with California.

The expense of the whole with that of the naval departments, stores, pay of officers and men, repairs, &c., is estimated at 1,309,045 dollars, and this it will probably never exceed, as Mexico, both from the thinness of the population upon her coasts, and from the natural difficulties of the access

to the Interior, is neither able, nor called upon, to undertake the defence of her territory at a distance from her own shores.

Her squadron, (such as it is) is under the orders of Commodore Porter; who, ignorant probably of the very superior force assembled by the Spaniards at the Havana, under Admiral Laborde, threatened to blockade that port, and, by destroying the trade of the island of Cuba, to compel the Spanish Government to come to some understanding with its former Colonies.

The fallacy of these expectations was soon demonstrated, and Porter, unable to keep the sea a moment before Laborde's fleet, which consists of six really fine frigates, and two ships of the line, besides some smaller vessels, was forced to take refuge in Key West, from whence he did not for some time extricate himself.

The attempt upon the Havana was injudicious, as with so feeble a force, it could hardly, under any circumstances, have led to a decisive result. As it is, it has only served to introduce a system of privateering, which will increase the irritation of the Mother country, and probably lead to reprisals upon the Mexican coasts, without producing any one good effect.

A little time will, however, convince the Mexicans that a few light vessels, to check smuggling, and keep up the communication between the different points of the coast, is all that they require; and the country will then be saved a very considerable, and a very useless expense.

The Army.

The Republic of Mexico is divided into eighteen *Comandancias Generales*, or districts, each under the orders of a Military Commandant, who receives his instructions, not from the government of the State in which he resides, but from the Minister of War

The army for the present year consists of 58,955 men, of whom 32,161 are actually under arms; the remainder are ready to be called out should their services be required.

The troops of the line are composed of twelve Battalions of Infantry, each of 823 men (full war complement 1,223); twelve Regiments of Cavalry, each of 559 men, (war complement 815); and three Brigades of Artillery of 1,767 men in all.

In addition to these, there are thirty-four Presidial Companies, consisting entirely of Cavalry, and employed, principally, in the protection of the Northern frontier; and eleven *Companias Sueltas*, (local corps of infantry and cavalry) distributed upon different points of the coast; the first consists of 3,317 men in all; the second of 1,120. With those previously enumerated, they make a total of 22,788 regular troops, now under arms, as specified in the accompanying table, (No. 1,) taken from the official report of this year.

The *Milicia Activa*, or Militia on actual service, consists of 9,373 men, divided into four battalions in the Interior,—four upon the Coasts, and fifteen Presidial companies. (*Vide* Table 2.) This force can be augmented, at pleasure, to 36,167 men, who are already enrolled, and disciplined to a certain extent, although allowed to retire to their homes, while not wanted: (*Vide* Table 1.) A similar regulation is adopted, though to a less extent, with the troops of the line; so that as long as the country is not menaced with actual hostility from without, the War establishment, although nominally kept up, is attended with, (comparatively) but little positive expense.

The *Estado-Mayor-General*, which unites the duties of the Quarter-master General's Office, with the more scientific branches of the department of Engineers, has been occupied, since its creation in September, 1823, in making military surveys,—preparing a general plan of defence in the event of an invasion, determining, astronomically, the posi-

tion of the most important points, laying the foundation for a Military College, and establishing a general depot of maps and charts. Some of the surveys are very interesting, particularly that of the Isthmus of Těhūāntěpēc, by Colonel Ōrběgōsō,) which proves the impossibility of opening a ship canal between the Atlantic and Pacific at that point, and those of parts of Veracruz, executed, principally, by General Těrān, and Colonel ĭbērřĭ. General Mōrān, (better known, before the abolition of titles, as the Marques de Vibāncō, is at the head of the Estado-Mayor, and employs no small portion of his private fortune in promoting useful projects, and giving an impulse to every thing connected with this department.

The total number of officers employed, together with the estimate of the expenses of the War department, for the year ending June, 1828, will be found in the Table of General Expenditure, at the end of the Fourth Section.

It amounts to 9,069,633 dollars, or, with the Navy, (both being under the same Ministry,) to 10,378,678 dollars,—about four-fifths of the whole annual expenditure of the Republic.

Nor is this merely a nominal outlay, for on the 1st of January 1827 not one dollar was due to any Regiment in the service:—It is, however, an enormous drain upon the country, and must undoubtedly, if continued, prove a serious obstacle to prosperity.

On the other hand, reduction has already been carried very far, and can now only be very gradually effected. The Estimates for the year 1825, amounted to nearly *nineteen millions of dollars*, (18,916,524 dollars); in 1826, they were reduced to 13,587,083 dollars; and in 1827, (as I have just stated,) to 10,378,678 dollars. From this again the Minister conceives that one *fourth* may be deducted, without too much weakening the national means of defence; thus reducing the total expense of the army in 1829, to 7,784,000: and he expresses

both in the report for 1826, and in that of the present year, his hopes that it may be ultimately brought down to seven millions of dollars, which he regards as the minimum, until the war with Spain be at an end.

The greatest credit is due to General Góm̃ez Pědr̃az̃a for the zeal with which he has carried the views of the Congress respecting the organization of the Militia, into execution. By no other means could so great a reduction in the troops of the line, (and consequently in the expenses of the War department) have been effected ; and, from what he has already done, I see every reason to believe that, before the expiration of the present Presidency (April, 1829,) the minimum of seven millions of dollars will be attained.

But a saving of eleven million of dollars annually, is not the only beneficial change that has been introduced into the War department, during the present Presidency. Nothing could be more deplorable than the state of the army in the Autumn of 1824. The Revolution had destroyed all discipline, and all respect for the Civil Authorities ; and the soldier, accustomed to the license of a camp, was ready to follow any leader that could promise him plunder, in lieu of his arrears of pay. This dangerous state of things ended with the establishment of the Constitution, and the command of money, which the Government obtained by means of the Foreign loans. The troops, well clothed, well fed, and punctually paid, were soon brought into subjection. A number of the most turbulent officers were dismissed on half-pay, and the greatest attention was paid to the gradual improvement of the remainder.

Arms were distributed in equal proportions to the Militia and the troops of the line, so as to make them serve, in some measure, as a check upon each other ; and as the new system has been, at the same time, gradually taking root, and acquiring stability, there has been little difficulty in preserving tranquillity, and repressing partial disorders wherever they

appeared. Since the insurrection of Lőbătő, in 1824, there has been but one instance of gross insubordination on the part of any corps, or regiment, and that was repressed without the intervention of an armed force. It occurred at Durango, where one of the lieutenants of a regiment of cavalry quartered in the town, found means to persuade his men, that he had orders from the President to carry into execution, there, a project for centralizing the Republic; and, after seizing, with their assistance, his superior officers, published a *bando*, or decree, deposing the constituted authorities, dissolving the State Congress, and, in fact, declaring himself the lord and master of the place.

This extraordinary state of things lasted until intelligence of what had passed reached the Capital, when Gonzalez and his followers were outlawed by the Congress, and troops from the neighbouring States of Jăliscő and Zăcătēcă were ordered to march against them. Three thousand men would have been assembled before Durango in three weeks, but General Parres, the Military Commandant of Jăliscő, who was appointed to take the command of the expedition, felt so confident that the troops under Gonzalez had been deceived by false representations, that he advanced upon Durango with an escort of only fifty dragoons, and was joined, as he expected, by the whole of Gonzalez's men the instant that the decree of Congress was communicated to them. Their leader, unfortunately, escaped with one of his associates, and, up to the time of my departure from Mexico, had not received the punishment, which he had so justly merited.

The vigour displayed, both by the Congress and the Executive, upon this occasion, produced the very best effect; but it must be admitted that in a country where, from the extreme ignorance of the soldiery, and the unsettled character of many of the officers, facilities exist for such attempts as these, a large standing army is not unaccompanied with some danger. The best security lies in the separation of the dif-

ferent Corps, which prevents any great mass of troops from being acted upon by the influence of any particular officer; and in the opposition which public opinion in one State, (acting, of course, in some degree upon the troops resident there), presents to violent innovations in another. This, as long as there exists no cause of complaint common to the whole army, will be sufficient to preserve tranquillity. In the mean time, due attention should be paid to the manly representations of the Minister of War respecting the mode in which the army is at present recruited, and the greatest pains taken to prevent the ranks from being filled with the scum and refuse of society, with which the States but too often supply the deficiencies in their legal Contingent. The better sort of Mexican soldier is excellent of his kind. He possesses great docility, great powers of enduring fatigue, considerable personal courage, and extraordinary readiness in acquiring the manual duties of his profession: such, at least, is the character which I have constantly heard given of them both by their own officers, and by foreigners, who have held any command amongst them: but the bad are bad indeed, and, perhaps, more difficult to manage than any other race of men in existence.

Notwithstanding the nominal war with Spain, few countries are so well able as Mexico to dispense with the existence of a large permanent force. There is hardly a single point upon her long-extended line of coast, upon which it would be practicable to disembark an invading army; and were it even landed, such are the difficulties with which it would have to contend upon the ascent to the Interior, from the want of roads, and provisions, and the deadly nature of the climate, that its destruction would be almost inevitable. A month's detention in the *Tierra Caliente* would be equivalent to the loss of a pitched battle; and, even supposing every natural defence to be successively carried in the shortest possible time, a month would hardly, under any circumstances, suffice

to reach the Table-land. There, the struggle would commence anew; and such is the horror entertained at present, of foreign domination, that I am convinced that a levy *en masse* of the whole population would be the consequence of any hostile aggression. How formidable this might prove, in a country where the distances are too great to admit of lines of communication being kept up, and where the greatest part of the inhabitants are admirable horsemen, and not unaccustomed to partizan warfare, it is needless to point out: but I do not think that the most formidable expeditionary army that Spain could furnish, would have the slightest chance of success.

It might desolate a portion of the country, and throw it back fifty years in the career of civilization, but few would live to tell the tale, and little encouragement would be given for a second attempt.

Mexico possesses only five fortresses, St. John of Ullōă, Cămpēchē, Pěrōtē, Ācāpūlcō, and Săn Blās. In most of them the works are in a bad state, but there is little prospect of their being necessary.

The Government has published a table of the quantity of arms of all kinds now in its possession; that is, either distributed to the troops, or in the public magazines, which I subjoin. (No 3.)

Most of the muskets, sabres, pistols, and lances, have been purchased during the last three years, and are in very good order. The brass artillery, too, which is all Spanish, is beautiful; but many of the iron guns are, probably, unfit for service. The sum total is formidable, and amply sufficient for the defence of the country.

TABLE, No. 1.

TROOPS OF THE LINE.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Total.
Thirteen brigades of artillery . .	1178		589	1767
Twelve battalions of infantry . .		9876		9876
Twelve regiments of cavalry . .			6708	6708
Thirty-four presidial companies .			3317	3317
Eleven <i>compañias sueltas</i> on the coasts		920	200	1120
	1178	10796	10814	22788
MILICIA ACTIVA.				
Twelve companies of artillery . .	1152			1152
Twenty battalions of infantry in the interior		24240		24240
Thirteen battalions on the coasts		6600		6600
Six squadrons and nine compa- nies of coast guards			2475	2475
Fifteen companies in the northern States			1500	1500
One squadron at Mazatlan . .			200	200
	1152	30840	4175	36167

TABLE, No. 2.

FORCE UNDER ARMS IN 1827.				
Troops of the Line, <i>vide</i> Table, No. 1.				
MILICIA ACTIVA.				
	Artillery.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Total.
Four battalions in the interior .		4848		4848
Four battalions <i>guarda costas</i> .		2000		2000
Two squadrons and three compa- nies <i>guarda costas</i>			825	825
Fifteen presidial companies .			1500	1500
One squadron at Mazatlan .			200	200
		6848	2525	9373
General resume of Force under Arms.				
Troops of the line				22788
Militia				9373
Total				32161

TABLE, No. 3.

Brass cannon of different calibers	308
Iron ditto	456
Brass culverins	35
Mortars	17
Carronades, &c.	93
Cannon-balls of from 36 to 6	210,145
Rounds of grape	19,913
Shells	38,644
Muskets	111,564
Rifles	2,000
Carbines	15,280
Pistols	8000 pairs
Sabres, &c.	26,500
Lances	5,792
Ball-cartridges	3,701,113

SECTION III.

RELIGION:—STATE OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN MEXICO; NUMBER OF BISHOPRICS—OF SECULAR AND REGULAR CLERGY—REVENUES—INFLUENCE—EFFECTS PRODUCED BY THE REVOLUTION—FOREIGNERS, HOW SITUATED.

THE great influence exercised by the Roman Catholic Clergy wherever their creed prevails, and the power which they possess, of converting that influence into a most formidable political engine, renders an enquiry into the state of the Mexican Church essential to a right understanding of the progress and prospects of the country.

The religion introduced by the Spaniards into New Spain, and propagated amongst the Natives more by the arms of the first Conquerors, than by the arguments of the Friars who accompanied them, was, of course, that of the Church of Rome; which has been preserved, during the last three centuries, in all the purity of doctrine, but with all the intolerance of spirit, for which the Mother country is so remarkable.

In some respects, however, the situation of Mexico differed essentially from that of Spain: no direct intercourse with Rome ever took place; no Papal Legate or Nuntio was admitted; and no Bull, Rescript, or Indulgence, was allowed

to circulate, until it had received the *Regium Exequatur*, or Placet, from the Council of the Indies.

The causes of this extreme circumspection, on the part of Spain, I have explained in the Section which treats of her Colonial Policy, (Book I. Section IV.) It gave a peculiar character to the whole religious system of America, and prepared the way for that spirit of independence, which has been displayed by most of the New States in their intercourse with the See of Rome, since their assumption of a political existence.

But this was not the only effect produced by the application of the ordinary principles of the Colonial System of Spain to the ecclesiastical institutions of the Colonies. In Mexico, at least, it may be regarded as one of the principal causes of the Revolution.

The Secular, or Parochial Clergy, shared in all the disadvantages under which their Creole countrymen were condemned to labour, by the jealous policy of the Mother country. They were excluded from the higher degrees of Church preferment, and left to fulfil the laborious duties of parish priests, while the Bishoprics, the Deaneries, and the Chapters of the different Cathedrals, were filled by old Spaniards, many of whom never saw the country, in which they were destined to hold so conspicuous a station, until they were sent out to enter at once upon its richest benefices.

It is true that some of these new Dignitaries displayed a spirit truly apostolical; while others have left monuments of their munificence, which prove, that they regarded their revenues, not as a patrimony, but as held in trust for the benefit of their adopted country.* Still they were strangers,—they were, a privileged *Caste*, they held what they did hold

* I allude more particularly to the establishment of hospitals, which seems to have been general in all the Bishoprics, and to the construction of the magnificent Aqueduct of Valladolid, the work of one of the Bishops of that See.

to the prejudice, and exclusion of the Natives; and these were offences which no virtues could redeem. They sufficiently account for the fact of so many of the first leaders of the Revolution having been Clergymen: Hidalgo, Morelos, Matamoros, and numberless others, who perished during the war, were *Curas*, or Parish priests; and the facility with which they induced the lower classes to follow their standards, at a time, when out of twenty of their adherents nineteen knew nothing of the rights of the cause in which they were engaged, is no mean proof of the advantages which the Crown might have derived from their support, had it been secured by a timely participation in the honours of their profession.

As it was, they were compelled, like the rest of the Creoles, to seek in the Independence of their country the enjoyment of those rights, of which they were deprived; and although the attempt failed in 1810, and the first insurrection (which may be termed the insurrection of the Clergy) was almost suppressed, still, without it, that of the Army in 1821 would never have taken place, and Mexico might have been, to this day, a Province of Spain.

The *fatal* influence of the Clergy is frequently insisted upon, both in Calleja's letter to the King, and in the representation of the Audiencia to the Cortes, to which I have so often had occasion to allude, (*Vide* Appendix;) and there is no doubt that the fact of so many *Curas* being engaged on the Independent side, could alone have destroyed the efficacy of those spiritual weapons, of which the Viceregal Government endeavoured to avail itself at the commencement of the contest. Excommunications fell harmless when directed against persons, whose sacred character acted as a shield against them; and Hidalgo was not the less respected, or the less implicitly obeyed, by his followers, because declared, both by the Inquisition and by the Bishop of Valladolid, to be no longer within the pale of the Church, although such a

denunciation, if directed against a layman, might have been attended with the most serious consequences.

The Court of Madrid saw its error when too late, and the elevation of Don Antonio Perez (a Creole,) to the Bishopric of La Puebla, in 1815, proves how willingly it would have retraced its steps. But it was no longer time for conciliation: notwithstanding their privileges, as servants of the altar, a number of priests had sealed, with their blood, their new political creed: many others were noted as wavering; some as notoriously disaffected; the passions of all were excited, and it was soon evident that a good understanding between the Crown and the Parochial Clergy was impossible.

The old system was therefore pursued, and, up to 1820, all benefices were conferred upon *Gachupines*; a circumstance that not a little facilitated the changes which the following year was destined to produce.

It is a singular fact, that, after taking so prominent a part in the struggle which preceded the Revolution, the Mexican Clergy should be almost the only class of Creoles that has derived, as yet, no advantage from the event. In the Army, the Congress, the Government-offices, and the Law, *Natives* were substituted at once for the Spaniards, whom the Vice-regal Government had employed; but the different tenure by which Ecclesiastical preferments are held, prevented this change from extending to the Church. Nor was this the only difficulty to be surmounted: the separation from Spain had broken the link, by which Mexico was connected with the See of Rome; and the establishment of a direct intercourse, at a moment, when the possession of an independent existence by New Spain was not admitted by any European Power, and was loudly denied by the Mother country, was found to be by no means an easy task.

To trench too suddenly upon the privileges of the Holy See, and to attempt to exercise, at once, the right of Patronage formerly vested in the King, without the possibility of obtain-

ing the confirmation of the Pope, was thought too dangerous an experiment in a country, where a compliance with the popular prejudices of the day rendered it necessary to insert, as the third article of a Constitution, (liberal enough in most other respects,) a declaration that the exercise of no religion but that of the Church of Rome should be tolerated within the territories of the Republic.

Under these trying circumstances, great prudence was necessary, and great moderation has been shown. The clergy, in every instance, have preferred the interests of the order in general to any prospects of individual advancement.

Far from insisting upon hasty, or premature changes, the old Spanish dignitaries have not only been allowed to retain undisturbed possession of their preferments, but even vacancies have not been filled up, in the hope that the speedy conclusion of a Concordat with the See of Rome would give the Government a *right* of Patronage, to which not even the most zealous Catholics could object.

Of the probability of such an arrangement there is not, at present, any appearance; the Pope not having yet consented to receive a Mexican Minister in his public capacity. But the six years which have elapsed since the declaration of Independence, have rendered the concurrence of His Holiness no longer of such vital importance. The country has been prepared, gradually, for a change, which cannot now be much longer deferred; and should there be any farther delay on the part of the Court of Rome, the situation of the Mexican Church is such, that the Government, in assuming the right of presentation to all vacancies, will not only be supported by the Clergy, but will set the stamp of law upon the general wish of the nation.

A short view of the present state of the Ecclesiastical establishments of New Spain will place this point in a clearer light.

The Republic is divided into one Archbishopric, (that of

Mexico,) and the nine Bishoprics of La Puēblă, Guădălăjără, Văllădölīd, Dŭrāngŏ, Mŏntērēy, ōăjăcă, Yŭcătān, Chiāpă, and Sŏnŏră.

All these, with the exception of Sŏnŏră, have Cathedral Churches and Chapters, (Cabildos Eclesiasticos,) which, with the Collegiate Chapter of Guadalupe,* contain one hundred and eighty-five Prebendaries and Canonries, formerly in the gift of the King.

Seven of the Bishoprics, and *Seventy-nine* of the benefices attached to the Cathedrals are now vacant. Some of the Chapters are reduced to two or three individuals, many of whom are old, and unable to execute the duties of their situations. Of the three remaining Bishops, (those of La Pŭēblă, Yŭcătān, and Ōăxăcă,) one (the Bishop of Yucatan), is absolutely in his dotage; and the other two, from their position in the Southern part of the Republic, are unable to ordain those who wish to enter into orders in the North, without compelling them to undertake a journey of three or four hundred leagues, in order to undergo the necessary examinations. The Primate, Don Pedro Fonte, Archbishop of Mexico, has, from political causes, forsaken the country, and is now residing in Spain, as are the proprietors of a number of other inferior benefices, the annual income of which, (amounting to 371,148 dollars,) has been sequestered by the Government. The Parochial Clergy distributed amongst the 1194 parishes, into which the country is divided, are those who suffer most severely from the present disorganization of the Church. They are not only deprived by it of the preferment to which their services entitle them, but many, who accepted, in 1821, livings in *Tierra Caliente*, or other unhealthy districts, upon an understanding that they were to be held (as before the Revolution) for a short term of years, are compelled still to retain their situations, until the exercise

* A drawing of the Church of Guadalupe, about a league from the Capital, is annexed.

Drum publico d. v. Ward



L. J. Bonnet sculp.

C O L L E G I A T E C H U R C H ,



of the right of Patronage enables the Government to relieve them.

Under these circumstances, it is not extraordinary that the inconveniences of a dependent existence should be so strongly felt, as to create a very general desire for emancipation; and should the Pope neglect the present opportunity, or insist upon onerous conditions in the Concordat, which the Government is still desirous to frame, he will find, when too late, that he has no longer any hold upon the country, and that the Colonial policy of Rome will not be more patiently endured, than the Colonial policy of the Court of Madrid.

The total inefficacy of spiritual arms in the New World has been recently proved by the reception given to the Circular Bull, or *Enciclica*, addressed by the Court of Rome to the Archbishops, Bishops, and Clergy in general of the Americas, on the 24th of September, 1824, exhorting them, "to be silent no longer; but to unite in leading back their flocks to the path of the commandments of that Lord, who places Kings upon their thrones, and connects, by indissoluble ties, the preservation of their rights and authority, with the welfare of His Holy Church."*

The Government of Mexico, convinced that, in a discussion of this nature, reason and common sense were in its favour, was not deterred from entering upon it by any fears of the intrigues of the Old Spaniards, the prejudices of the people, or the supposed infallibility of the Pope. The Bull was communicated to the nation at large, as soon as received, in the Government Gazette; and there was certainly nothing that savoured either of bigotry, or superstition, in the notes by which it was accompanied. They contained no affectation of humility, no expressions of an eager desire to be reconciled to the Holy See, but entered boldly into the question of the Pope's Spiritual and Temporal Sovereignty;

* *Vide* Enciclica, as published in the Madrid Gazette of the 10th February, 1825, and in that of Mexico, July 6, of the same year.

declared the two to be incompatible ; and even hinted, very distinctly, that any farther attempt, on the part of his Holiness, to exercise authority in the affairs of this world, would not only prove unsuccessful, but must lead to the loss of his Spiritual jurisdiction likewise. This manly stand, on the part of the Government, against the encroachments of the Holy See, was received with universal approbation. The Legislatures of the States, the Bishops, and the Cathedral Chapters, all expressed their concurrence in the doctrines laid down in the Circular of the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs : Pastors were addressed by them, upon the subject, to their respective flocks ; and, as the influence of the Government and the Church were thus thrown into the same scale, the *Enciclica* not only failed in creating the desired impression, but produced an effect diametrically opposite to that which was intended.

Not the slightest difference of opinion appeared amongst the natives ; and the President, (who was then armed with extraordinary powers,) having taken advantage of the most critical moment to banish to California two old Spaniards, (the editors of the *Filantropo* newspaper at Tampico,) who had endeavoured to circulate, surreptitiously, copies of the Bull amongst the inhabitants of New Leon and San Luis, the other Spanish residents were effectually deterred, by this vigorous measure, from making any attempt to excite the lower classes, in the name of religion, to rebellion against the constituted authorities.

The work of Baron Humboldt, and the admirable reports presented to Congress in 1826 and 1827, by the Mexican Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Don Miguel Ramos Arizpe, enable me to institute a comparison, founded upon the most authentic data, between the condition of the Mexican Church before the Revolution and at the present day.

In 1802, the number of Ecclesiastics, secular and regular, in New Spain, was estimated at ten thousand, or at thirteen

thousand, including the lay-brothers of convents, and other subordinate hangers-on of the Church. The Secular Clergy was composed of about five thousand Priests (*Clerigos*); the Regulars, wearing the habits of different Orders, of nearly an equal number; of whom two thousand five hundred (including lay-brothers) resided in the convents of the Capital alone. There were only nine bishops, including the Primate, the See of Chiapa not being then considered as annexed to Mexico. Their revenues were supposed to be:—

	Dollars.
Those of the Archbishop of Mexico	130,000
Of the Bishop of La Puebla	110,000
Valladolid	100,000
Guadalajara	90,000
Durango	35,000
Monterey	30,000
Yucatàn	20,000
Oaxaca	18,000
Sonora	6,000
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Total	439,000

This income was produced, principally, by that portion of the tithes, which was destined for the subsistence of the Clergy. The annual average amount of these, (upon a term of ten years given by Humboldt) appears to have been, in the year 1790:—

In	Dollars.	Reals.
Mexico	708,287	7
La Puebla	350,888	3
Valladolid	323,940	
Oaxaca	86,323	5
Guadalajara	257,910	6
Durango	108,031	3
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Total	1,835,382	

collected in the six principal Bishoprics. From the others, there seem to have been no regular returns. In addition to this revenue, the Clergy possessed an immense capital in specie, which had accumulated, during three centuries, under the denomination of *Capitales de Capellanias, y Obras Pias*, arising partly from bequests, and partly from surplus income; the whole of which was supposed, in 1805, to amount to *forty-four millions and a half* of dollars. This capital, which was lent upon mortgage to the landed proprietors of the country at a very moderate interest, and secured upon their estates, was distributed amongst the different Bishoprics in the following proportions:—

	Dollars.
Mexico	9,000,000
La Puebla	6,500,000
Valladolid	4,500,000
Guadalajara	3,000,000
Durango, Monterey, and Sonora	1,000,000
Oaxaca and Merida	2,000,000
Obras Pias, belonging to the Regular Clergy	2,500,000
Funds of dotations of churches, convents, and nunneries	16,000,000
Total	44,500,000

The landed property of the Church (*bienes raices*) bore no proportion to its Capital in specie. Its whole value was not supposed to exceed two and a half, or three millions of dollars; and this advantage will be duly appreciated by those who have seen the effects of territorial influence on the part of the Clergy, combined with that of religion, exemplified in the Peninsula.

In 1826, the number of the Secular Clergy was estimated

at 3473, and in 1827, at 3677. The number of those who took orders during each of these years is not supposed to have amounted to one-fourth of those who were ordained in 1808.

The Regular Clergy is divided into fourteen Provinces, possessing 150 Convents, which contain in all, 1918 Friars: so that the whole of the Secular and Regular Clergy of the present day does not much exceed *one-half* of the number known to exist in 1803.

The capitals of the Church have diminished nearly in an equal proportion. Of the forty-four millions, originally possessed by it, a part was seized by the Spanish Government in 1805, and 1806, under the administration of the Prince of the Peace, in order to form a Sinking-fund for the redemption of Royal Vales; a part was embarged by the Authorities in order to meet the exigencies of the moment during the Revolution; and another part swallowed up by those charged with the administration of the funds, (*los Directores de Obras Pias, &c.*) amidst the general disorder and confusion that ensued. In 1826, Mr. Ramos Arizpe valued the whole remaining capital at *twenty millions* of dollars; nor is there any reason to suppose that it exceeds this amount.

In the present state of the country, the Clergy derive but little additional income from this capital; for the estates upon which it is secured have not yet sufficiently recovered from the effects of the Revolution to pay the interest upon capitals formerly advanced to their proprietors. Many have required, on the contrary, additional advances in order to resume their labours; and all have refused to admit the claim of the Bishopricks to the arrears due during the Civil war.

Upon this point the Clergy have, in most parts of the country, come to a sort of compromise with the proprietors; but in others, where, (as in La Puebla,) they have insisted upon the full extent of their dues, a great deal of bad feeling has arisen. The land-owners have refused to attempt to bring land again into cultivation, from which they could

expect to derive no benefit; and the Clergy have been compelled, at last, to yield, by a threat of interference on the part of the Legislature.

Of the tithes, nothing certain is yet known: they vary, of course, every year, as the agriculture of the country revives; but they do not yet produce any thing like their former amount; nor is it probable that they will. In the Bishoprics upon the Western coast, (Durango, Guadalajara, and Valladolid,) I found a general falling off in the amount of the tithes complained of; and this not proceeding from the ruin of the great Haciendas alone, but from the dissemination of ideas unfavourable to the rights of the Church. In the extensive Diocese of Michoacán, (Valladolid,) the tithes, during the two last years, have not exceeded 200,000 dollars, in lieu of 500,000 dollars, which they averaged before 1808. This may be partly owing to the administration of the Church revenues having been long in the hands of the Cathedral Chapter, which can never possess an influence over the common people, equal to that exercised by a resident Bishop, supported by all the pomp, with which the great dignitaries of the church are surrounded; but it cannot be denied that there is a spirit abroad in Mexico, which will render it difficult for the higher Clergy to retain that affluence which they formerly enjoyed.

A more equal distribution, at least, of the wealth now engrossed by a few, will be one of the first consequences of the interference of the Congress in Ecclesiastical affairs; and it is highly to be desired that, in this respect, some reform should take place; for in many Diocesses, where the revenues of the Bishop amounted to 100,000 or 120,000 dollars, there were *Curas* (parish priests) who vegetated upon a pittance of 100, or 120 dollars in the year.

The sources from which the incomes of the parish priests are derived likewise require investigation and reform.

No provision being made for them by the State, their sub-

sistence depends upon the contributions of their parishioners ; which, in general, are regulated by custom, and not by law : they consist of marriage and baptismal fees, and certain dues payable on burials, masses, and other church ceremonies, most of which are very exorbitant, and produce a most demoralizing effect amongst the Indian population. For instance, in States, where the daily wages of the labourer do not exceed two reals, and where a cottage can be built for four dollars, its unfortunate inhabitants are forced to pay twenty-two dollars for their marriage fees ; a sum which exceeds half their yearly earnings, in a country where Feast and Fast days reduce the number of *dias utiles* (on which labour is permitted) to about one hundred and seventy-five. The consequence is, that the Indian either cohabits with his future wife until she becomes pregnant, (when the priest is compelled to marry them with, or without, fees,) or, if more religiously disposed, contracts debts, and even commits thefts, rather than not satisfy the demands of the ministers of that religion, the spirit of which appears to be so little understood.

Throughout the Bishopric of Valladolid the marriage fees vary from seventeen to twenty-two dollars : in La Puebla, Durango, and Mexico, they are from fourteen to eighteen dollars, according to the supposed means of the parties ; and these enormous sums are extorted from the meanest parishioners.

The fees on baptisms, and burials, are likewise very high. In the Mining districts, each miner pays *weekly* to the Church, half a real (a medio), in order to provide for the expenses of his funeral ; and on the day of the *Raya* (the weekly payment), an agent of the *Cura* is always present to receive it. Thus twenty-six reals, or three dollars and two reals (thirteen shillings English money), are paid annually, by each mining labourer, in full health and employment, in order to secure the privilege of a mass being read over his body upon his decease. An Indian, who lives ten years under such a system,

would pay six pounds ten shillings for the honour of a funeral, and yet would not be exempt from continuing his contributions, although the amount paid in one year, ought more than to cover any fees that could reasonably be claimed by the Church.

I do not fear being accused of an uncharitable spirit in these remarks, for I have heard many of the most enlightened of the Mexican Clergy deplore the existence of such a state of things, and admit, that the want of a moral feeling amongst the lower classes, is the natural fruit of a system, under which such abuses have been suffered to prevail.

One of the most distinguished members of a Cathedral Chapter, while lamenting, in a conversation with me, the debased state of the people of his diocese, used this remarkable phrase: "*Son mui buenos Catolicos, pero mui malos Christianos*;" (They are very good Catholics, but very bad Christians;) meaning, (as he afterwards stated,) that it had been but too much the interest of the lower orders of the clergy, to direct the attention of their flocks, rather to a scrupulous observance of the *forms* of the Catholic Church, than to its moral or spirit, from which their revenues derived but little advantage.

The Table No. I., annexed to this Section, presents a general view of the number of the Secular clergy in the different Bishoprics in the year 1827.

No. II. contains a curious comparison, between the clergy of Old and New Spain, which Mr. Ramos Arizpe, from his long residence in the Peninsula, was well qualified to draw up; and by which it will be seen, that the number of *Prebends alone* in Spain, exceeds, by nine hundred and ninety-six, the total amount of the whole Mexican Secular Clergy of *every degree*. Spain has sixty-three Cathedrals, and one hundred and seventeen Collegiate Chapters: Mexico, ten Cathedrals and *one* Collegiate Chapter: and the church of Saragossa alone, in Spain, contains *thirty-three* more Canons

and Prebends than there are at present in the whole Mexican Republic.

The Table No. III., presents a statement of the number of Convents in Mexico: the Orders and Provinces to which they belong; the number of individuals contained in each; (distinguishing those who have professed, during the last five years;)—the Parishes, and Missions, under their charge, and the amount of their property both in lands and in capitals, lent upon mortgage.

No. IV. gives a similar view of the six Colleges, de propagandâ fide, established in Mexico, Quěřetărö, Păchucă, Őřizăvă, Zăcătēcăs, and Zăpöpăn, with an account of the Indian Missions in the north, in which the members of these Colleges are employed.

From the two last of these Tables, some very important inferences may be drawn.

In the first place, it appears that in the one hundred and fifty-six Convents and Colleges of Mexico, only two hundred and ninety-four individuals have professed, or taken the vows, during the last five years, out of five hundred and twenty-seven who assumed the habit, probably with an intention of professing; and that, at the present day, only ninety-two in all are serving their noviciate.

This may be regarded as no mean proof of the diminution of that mistaken spirit of religion, by which so many, who might have become useful members of society, were induced to shut themselves up in communities, many of which subsist entirely upon the contributions of the ignorant, or the religiously disposed, amongst their countrymen. It serves, likewise, to indicate that the charity of the former supporters of these Orders is cooling fast. The total amount of the alms received, by *all* the different Convents, in the year 1826, does not exceed 204,604 dollars; a sum, which, I am assured, the receipts of the Convent of St. Francisco, in Mexico alone, frequently equalled in former times. The *métier* is therefore

becoming a bad one; and the number of noviciates will, of course, decrease in the same ratio as the inducements to enter upon a Monastic life.

It appears, farther, that the total amount of the capital possessed by the Regular Clergy of New Spain, computing the value of their lands, (*fincas urbanas y rusticas*) and of their capitals, by the annual produce as given by the table, (428,764 dollars) * at five per cent interest, and adding the value of their consolidated fund, (649,735 dollars), does not exceed 9,225,015 dollars; a very moderate sum when compared with the immense wealth of the Monastic Orders in some parts of Europe, and particularly in Old Spain.

For this advantage, Mexico, according to Mr. Ramos Arizpe, is indebted to the circumstance of never having received into her territory the Orders of the Basilians, and the Carthusians, or the Monks of St. Bernard, and St. Geronimo, who are all great proprietors in the Peninsula, and hold there, with immense estates, all the privileges of temporal jurisdiction. The only Orders established in New Spain are the Franciscans, the Dominicans, the Augustins, the Unshod Carmelites, and the Mercedarians, all of whom are prevented by the rules of their institutions from holding lordships with seigniorial rights, or acquiring property to any great extent; and consequently are much better calculated to become useful members of a Christian community. (*Vide Ecclesiastical Report of 1826.*)

Having taken a general view, in the preceding pages, of the situation of the Church of Mexico in 1827, it only remains for me to point out, a little more in detail, the effects produced by the Revolution.

* Produce of houses in towns	-	-	-	216,002 dollars.
Of property in the country	-	-	-	129,723
Interest of capitals	-	-	-	83,039
				<hr/>
Total	-	-	-	428,764

The Constitution has vested in the President the right of conceding, or refusing, the *Pase* or *Placet*, which may be considered as equivalent to the *Regium Exequatur*, without which no Bull, or even Indulgence, was allowed to circulate in the Spanish possessions of Ultramar. This right has been freely exercised; twenty-four only, of thirty-three Briefs and Rescripts transmitted from Rome, having obtained the Constitutional *Pase* in the year 1826. Of the remainder, four were referred to the Senate, and five rejected altogether.

One of these is the Bull of the 24th December, 1825, for the extension of the Jubilee, which has not been allowed to circulate, "Because it contains doctrines contrary to that of the sovereignty of the people, and in favour of the absolute power of Kings, identifying their cause with that of the Church." The other four are Bulls in favour of the parochial Church of Jalapa, which have been rejected in consequence of their being countersigned by the agent of the King of Spain at Rome. (*Vide* Report.)

In the Mandatory letters from Generals of the Monastic Orders, an entire change has also taken place. The Orders existing in Mexico were all, in their origin, branches of similar Orders established in the Peninsula, and dependent upon Generals residing there. On the declaration of the Independence, the Government, as a necessary precaution, prohibited all intercourse with the Generals, and this injunction has been hitherto complied with.

It is now the wish of the Executive, that the Mexican Provinces of Regulars should elect Generals, to reside in the territories of the Federation; but upon this point, nothing has been yet determined.

With regard to the interior discipline of the Convents, difficulties have occurred only in one instance. The Franciscans of Queretaro, were bound by the rules of their Order to observe what is termed *la Tripartita* in the choice of their Priors, who are elected every three years. By this rule, the

election fell, for the first term of three years, upon a *Spanish* Monk, who had taken orders in the Peninsula; for the second, likewise upon a *Spaniard*, but one who had professed in Mexico; and for the third only, upon a Mexican born.

The Government naturally wished to do away with a distinction so unfavourable to Natives; but the Convent declared any change to be impossible, as the regulation in question originated in a Bull of the Pope's, and was included in the fundamental rules of the Order. A reference to Rome direct was allowed them, in order to quiet their scruples; but the Pope, instead of returning a direct answer, referred the question to the Bishop of New Orleans (a Frenchman by birth), who, in a Pastoral addressed to the Monks, recommended the strict observance of the *Tripartita*.

This Pastoral was clandestinely introduced, but the Government having received information of the fact, ordered it to be delivered up, and the bearer (a Monk of the Order) to be severely reprimanded for having taken charge of it. The *Tripartita* has been since abolished, without any measures of rigour being resorted to.

I have stated in the first part of this Section, that serious inconvenience has arisen, both to the Clergy and the Country at large, from the non-existence of a right of Patronage during the last five years. The Congress has, indeed, reserved to itself, by the 50th Article of the Federal Act, the privilege "of regulating this right throughout the Federation;" but, up to the present time, it has neither authorized the Executive to appoint Bishops, nor to concur in the appointments made by other bodies.

I am inclined to attribute this apparent timidity, on the part of the Congress, to a prudent desire to allow the disadvantages of a dependence upon a Transatlantic Power to be brought home to the Clergy of all classes before any step is taken to relieve them from its effects. This object is now attained: a feeling in favour of an independent National

Church, has become very general; and, in the beginning of this year, motions were made in the Legislatures of Zacatecas and Durango, urging the Congress to assume the right of Patronage, *without waiting for a Concordat with the See of Rome*. I have little doubt that due attention will be paid to this recommendation in the sessions of 1828, if, indeed, it be not acted upon before the close of the present year.

The long interregnum which has taken place in many of the Bishoprics, has facilitated the introduction of many very useful reforms; but it has encouraged, at the same time, a spirit of innovation, on the part of some of the States, which, but for the intervention of the General Congress, would have been carried very far. In Guadalajara, for instance, the State Legislature decreed the confiscation of the whole of the Church property in that State, pledging itself to make a suitable provision for the Ministers of Religion at the public expense. This project was even sanctioned *as an Article of the Constitution of the State* (the 7th); but the Clergy, having refused to take the oath upon such terms, and resisted, by a threat of excommunication, an attempt on the part of the Civil Authorities to oblige them to submit, the question was referred to the General Congress, which, on the 22d of December 1824, issued a Decree "prohibiting the States from taking any measures calculated to diminish the revenues of the Church, without the full concurrence of the Ecclesiastical Authorities, until the time should arrive, at which the General Congress should think it expedient to enact a law for the regulation of the right of Patronage throughout the Republic."

This measure, although it has been much criticised, was undoubtedly productive of the very best effects, as it put a stop to encroachments on the part of the States, for which the country was by no means prepared, and yet left the door open for necessary reforms, wherever there was an attempt to exercise Spiritual jurisdiction, in such a manner as to affect the

rights and privileges of any other class of citizens. For, it is to be observed, that the Decree, while it prohibits any attempt to trench upon the *revenues* of the Church, does not prohibit the interference of the States with regard to the *mode* in which these revenues are collected.

Advantage has been taken of this opening, in almost every part of the Federation, in order to abolish the Tribunal de Haceduria, or Court of Tithes, before which all cases connected with the collection of tithes were brought and decided, in *dernier resort*, by the Canons, who were thus both parties and judges in their own cause. The mode of abolition has varied in the different States. In Durango, the right of decision is vested in the Supreme Tribunal of Justice: in Valladolid, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, and Jalisco, Mixed Courts have been established, the shades of difference between which it would be unnecessary to point out: but in all, the spirit is the same; and the determination to allow of no extension of Spiritual jurisdiction to civil cases has been equally asserted.

This step has not been taken without much resistance on the part of the Chapters; and, in Guadalajara, the Canons have gone so far as to declare, "that they will give up their claim to any portion of the tithes, and subsist entirely upon the alms of the faithful, rather than allow one of their number to become a member of the Mixed Court." But as the Congress, up to the period of my departure, had refused to interfere in the question, and has not, I believe, done so since, the measure will be gradually carried into execution in all the States, and will, I doubt not, be in full effect in most, before the end of the present year.

The sums left at the disposal of the Cathedrals for Obras Pias, or charitable institutions, have furnished another source of contention in many parts of the Republic. These sums constitute, as we have seen, a part of the general funds of

the clergy, and many of them have, undoubtedly, not been employed according to the intentions of the testator.

In Durango, copies of the original wills of two individuals, who bequeathed to the Church funds for the express purpose of endowing schools, having been procured, the State Congress has demanded the restitution of a capital, which has been allowed to remain thirty years unemployed, or, at least, unappropriated in the manner prescribed. The Chapter refused at first to listen to this demand; but finding no very great disposition on the part of the General Congress to interfere, it has avoided bringing matters to an extremity, by advancing the money required by the Government, for projects of public utility, as a loan.

In Guadalajara, the Canons, to avoid being called to a similar account, have commenced very extensive repairs in the Cathedral, all of which the fund of Obras Pias defrays. In other States similar precautions have been taken; and the necessity for these, on the part of the Church, has led to a great deal of jealousy, and bad feeling, between the Ecclesiastical and Civil authorities, which has been not a little increased by the circumstance of so many of the Canons being old Spaniards, against whom, individually and collectively, a decided spirit of hostility prevails.

What I have said of the growing interference of the States in the affairs of the Bishoprics, is equally applicable to the Monastic Orders. There is no national act that vests, either in the Chambers, or in the Executive, or in the State Congresses, any *legal* right of control over them, nor is any such control exercised at the present moment, except in those general regulations, which I have already pointed out: but there are evident indications of an intention, on the part of the Congress, to take measures for restricting Novitiates under a certain age, and thus gradually to reduce the number of Convents, by fixing, for each, a *minimum* of resident monks.

Abolition by any sweeping act, such as that which produced such fatal effects in Spain, is not, I think, to be apprehended;* but the present state of the Convents affords great facilities for moderate reforms, only forty-seven Convents, out of a hundred and fifty, containing more than twelve friars, and thirty-nine being already reduced to less than five.

It is much to be desired that the Congress may persevere in the prudent course, which it has hitherto pursued; for, in the States, unfortunately, the cause of reform has fallen into the hands of men, who, irritated at the abuses which have been committed under the cloak of religion, are inclined to attribute to the creed the faults of those who professed to teach it, and wish to fly, at once, from superstition to atheism. Throughout the Bishoprics on the Western coast this feeling is very prevalent, and in Jalisco especially, it is a favourite axiom of the liberal party, that, until the present Church system be radically changed, the new institutions can never take a firm root.

Nothing can be more mistaken, in my opinion, than this idea, or less suited to the habits, and feelings of the people. It is by pruning, and weeding, and not by destroying both root and branch, that salutary reforms may be effected. For these, as I have already stated, there is ample room; but, if the changes proposed, do not exceed the establishment of a necessary degree of independence in the Mexican Church,—the equalization (or more equal distribution) of its revenues, and the diminution of those excessive Church, or Surplice fees, now exacted by the Parochial clergy;—Mexican clergy-

* No one who has followed the course of events in the Peninsula during the years 1820, 1821, and 1822, will deny that the feeling of hostility towards the Constitution, which always existed, increased, in a tenfold ratio, from the day that the Cortes turned forty thousand monks and friars loose upon the country, on a badly-paid pension, to propagate their opinions amongst the lower classes, as the only means of avoiding starvation.

men may be found, (and these, men of the highest respectability,) not only capable of directing, but desirous to introduce them, even at the expense of individual sacrifices, the necessity of which they acknowledge.

The vacancy of the principal Bishoprics affords an opening, which will probably be taken advantage of; and should the overgrown revenues of some of the Dioceses be cut down, and appropriated to the support of the poorer Parochial clergy, I am inclined to think that the measure, in lieu of being opposed, would meet with very general approbation. At all events, a general coalition against it, (which might be dangerous) is not to be apprehended.

The Clergy are divided amongst themselves: besides the great leading distinction of Old Spaniards and Natives, the interests of the Parochial clergy are at variance, not only with those of the Convents, but also with those of the Cathedral Chapters; and this circumstance is particularly favourable to moderate reform. Beyond this point, I sincerely hope that no innovations will be attempted; for a National Church ought to be respectably supported; and if this be done, the Clergy will gain, in real and beneficial influence, all that they lose in an unnatural political importance, which they ought not to wish to retain.

I shall close this Section with a few observations upon the important subject of religious toleration, which, in theory, at least, cannot be said to exist at present in Mexico. No sects of religion differing from the dominant religion, are tolerated; nor is the private, or public exercise of any other allowed. To be a Mexican Citizen, an outward conformity, at least, with the practices of the Roman Catholic faith, is required; although the facility with which letters of Naturalization have been conceded to American settlers, in the North, proves, that no very strict enquiry upon the subject is instituted. But there are no rights, or privileges, either civil or military, to which any Mexican subject, *publicly* pro-

fessing any but the Catholic religion, could legally be entitled.

With regard to Foreigners, residing as such in the Mexican territory, but few concessions have yet been made ; nor has it been found possible to establish, as a *right*, the public or private exercise of the Protestant religion ; although the wishes of his Majesty's Government upon this subject were complied with by Buenos Ayres, and, under certain limitations, by Columbia likewise.

In Mexico, the third article of the Federal Act rendered a similar compliance impossible. It becomes, therefore, interesting to enquire by what means New Spain has been thrown so far behind the sister states of the South in point of rational toleration.

It is to the history of the Revolution that we must look for the causes of the difference, which now prevails ; for, in 1810, it may fairly be assumed that superstition and intolerance were pretty equally disseminated throughout the Spanish Colonies in the New World. But, in Buenos Ayres, since the first declaration of the independence (May 1810), not a single Spanish soldier has entered the territory of the Republic : the intercourse with Foreigners has been constantly open, and constantly kept up ; and it would have been hard indeed, if, in thirteen years, the minds of the people had not been prepared, by the gradual amalgamation of interests which has taken place, to entertain a more indulgent view of the religion of those Foreigners, than that which their former masters had laboured to inculcate.

In Columbia, the case has been different in some respects, although in others nearly the same. A general freedom of intercourse with Europe was not, indeed, immediately established, but a numerous corps of foreign auxiliaries joined, at a very early period, the Independent standard, and fought the battles of the Republic against the armies of Murillo. It was after more than one victory, in which this corps had

taken a brilliant share, that the Congress of Truxillo, assembled under the auspices of Bolivar, framed the present Constitution. Gratitude to the army forbade, at such a moment, the insertion of an article prohibiting the exercise of a religion, which a very important part of that army professed; and, at the same time, the certainty of its support, if required, encouraged the Columbian Legislators to avoid the insertion of a provision in the National Act, the disadvantages of which, at no distant period, it was easy to foresee.

In Mexico, none of these favourable circumstances occurred. The war of Independence, instead of enfranchising the people from the dominion of that blind system of superstition, which it had been the interest of the Spaniards, during three centuries, to keep up, had rather a contrary tendency. It was by appealing to the religious feelings of the people, and by inviting them to defend the rights of their Church against the pollution, with which they were menaced by a French invasion, that the leaders of the first insurrection, in 1810, induced the lower classes to join the standard of revolt. The Virgin of Guadalupe, was declared the Patroness of the Insurgents: her images were worn, and her name invoked by them, on entering into battle. Their first leaders, too, were all priests; and although, as the struggle became more general, a more rational idea of the great object of the contest with Spain was introduced, it was still found necessary to keep up the fanaticism of the lower orders, as the strongest hold which their leaders could possess over their minds.

Foreigners kept almost entirely aloof from the contest. The struggle was decided amongst the Mexicans themselves; and, unfortunately, by that very portion of the community, which, instead of sharing in the feelings of hostility, entertained by the rest of their countrymen towards Spain, was induced by the recollection of the privileges which it had enjoyed under the Viceregal government, to set up the laws and institutions of Old Spain, as the best model for imitation.

Purity of religion, was one of the *Three Guarantees* proclaimed by Iturbide and the army at Iguala; Union with Spain was another. The first rendered it impossible to omit, afterwards, in framing a constitution, a proviso, which might not have been thought necessary, had it been omitted at first; and the second, by pledging the nation to adopt all such old Spaniards, as chose to remain in its territory, established a corps of observation in the very heart of the country, which examined most narrowly every act of the government, and lost no opportunity of exciting the prejudices of the people against it. If to these really difficult circumstances be added the total exclusion of foreigners from the Mexican territory, until the year 1822, it must be admitted that it was not easy for the Mexican Congress, in 1824, to avoid the adoption in the Federal Act of the Religious article of the Spanish Constitution, of which the third article of that of Mexico, is, in fact, a transcript. The necessity of such a concession to the popular prejudices of the day, was, and is, bitterly lamented by the more enlightened Mexicans; and it is to time, and to the generalization of this feeling, that we must look for the removal of its cause. Much has been done towards it during the last three years. Foreigners have penetrated into every part of the Republic; and, as they have been the means of giving a new existence to the mining and agricultural interests, the prejudices formerly entertained against them, have subsided with wonderful rapidity.

In many of the States, (each of which frames a constitution in miniature, for its own special use;) the prohibitory clause in the religious article of the Federal Act, has been omitted. The right of sepulture, according to the forms of the Protestant church, which is secured to His Majesty's subjects by treaty, has not only been universally conceded, but burying grounds have been voluntarily assigned for the purpose by the local Authorities, wherever a resident foreign Consul is established. In many instances, the funerals of the more re-

spectable individuals who have died, have been attended by a number of the natives, personal friends or acquaintances of the deceased ; and, although cases have certainly occurred, in which the repose of the tomb has been violated, I am inclined to attribute them less to fanaticism, than to cupidity, and to a mistaken belief that money was contained in the coffins, the use of which was little known amongst the Mexicans themselves.

With regard to marriages, considerable difficulties have arisen since the late influx of foreigners ; nor can a Protestant yet contract marriage with a Mexican, otherwise than by professing his conversion to the Catholic faith. Between two foreigners, both of the reformed church, the marriage rite is allowed to be celebrated in the house of the Mission of the country to which they belong, and is registered as valid by the Mexican Ecclesiastical authorities, on the transmission of a proper certificate. Such, at least, is the course which has been pursued in His Majesty's mission, and which may be regarded as a precedent for the subjects of any other power, similarly situated.

It would be an injustice to the Mexican government not to add, that in this, and every other question connected with religion, the Executive has shown the greatest attention to the complaints of foreigners, and has given them every protection, and every facility that it was possible, under present circumstances, to allow of. I know not one, but many instances, in which the personal influence, both of the President and of the Ministers, has been exerted with the most beneficial effects ; and I cannot but think that this example, seconded, as it is, by the wishes of the better-informed Mexicans, both in the Capital, and in the States, will, speedily, produce such a change in the feelings of the community at large, upon this subject, as will enable the Legislature by a national act, to dispense with restrictions, which are completely at variance with the spirit of the other institutions of the country.

No. I.

General Table of the Secular Clergy in the different Bishoprics of Mexico in the year 1827.								
BISHOPRICS.						Number of Secular Clergy.	Number of Parishes.	
Mexico	-	-	-	-	-	482	245	
Guadalaxara	-	-	-	-	-	611	135	
Puebla	-	-	-	-	-	907	241	
Oaxaca	-	-	-	-	-	364	124	
Valladolid	-	-	-	-	-	500	122	
Yucatan	-	-	-	-	-	357	99	
Monterrey	-	-	-	-	-	145	57	
Durango	-	-	-	-	-	184	64	
Sonora	-	-	-	-	-	54	65	
Chiapa	-	-	-	-	-	73	42	
Total						3,677	1,194	

No. II.

Spain.	Churches.	Canons, &c.	Mexico.	Churches.	Canons, &c.
Cathedral	63	2709	Cathedral	10	168
Collegiate	117	1750	Collegiate	1	17
Total	180	4459		11	185
The whole secular Clergy of Mexico, including Canons and Prebends - - - 3463			The Church of Saragossa in Spain has Canons, &c. - - 149 } That of Toledo - 104 } 253 Mexican Canons, &c. in all - - - 185		
Excess of Canons and Prebends alone in Spain - - - 996			Excess of two Churches alone in Spain - - - 68		

MEXICO.

TABLE No. III.

General Table of the Provinces and Orders of the Regular Clergy of Mexico; the number of Convents, and of individuals in each, distinguishing those who have professed during the last five years; the Curacies and Missions served by them, with their Property in Land, Money, and annual charitable Contributions.

Provinces.	Situation of convents.	Num-ber of con-vents.	Indi-viduals taken into the habit in five years.	Have taken the habit first in five years.	Have taken the habit first in five years.	Now in novitiate.	Curas in dioc.	Mis-sions.	Pro-perty in land-taxes.	Its pro-duce.	Pro-towns.	Its annual produce.	Floating capitals.	Annual returns.	Conso-lidated fund.	Charita-ble contri-butions.
DOMINICANS.																
Santiago de Predicadores . .	Mexico	10	123	15	8	6	2	18	6	16855	321	35741	66010	3451	74825	6755
Sr. Miguel de los S ^{cs} . Angeles	Puebla	6	42	4	4	0	2	00	6	4060	112	12907	34204	1710	13079	400
Sr. Hipolito Martir	Oaxaca	5	50	13	11	2	9	00	19	9692	137	11811	96107	4655	158366	14400
Sr. Jose de las Chapas	Ciudad Real	4	44	7	7	0	9	00	11	9898	1	72	11320	566	00000	1684
FRANCISCANS.																
Santo Evangelio	Mexico	20	320	64	47	7	2	30	00	0000	1	2724	188736	3136	48315	48800
San Diego	Id.	14	212	52	17	13	0	3	00	0000	0	100	110625	5531	60115	20737
San Pedro y San Pablo . . .	Queretaro	15	162	86	33	9	3	8	00	0000	0	000	269258	13462	53384	17297
Sr. Francisco de los Zacatecas	Potosi	11	125	20	12	8	4	19	00	0000	0	000	225646	11363	59774	23972
Santiago Ialtisco	Guadalajara	7	126	28	17	1	2	23	00	0000	87	1659	34687	1711	30639	86371
San José de Campeche	Merida	1	61	00	00	0	3	00	00	0000	00	000	33763	1688	8963	9930
AUGUSTINS.																
Dulce Nombre de Jesus . . .	Mexico	11	143	49	18	12	2	00	17	8106	239	63231	179234	8644	0140	13735
Sr. Nicholas de Michoacan . .	Salamanca	11	92	34	28	4	2	00	43	34702	216	15144	162165	7768	49720	12021
CARMELITES.																
San Alvaro	Mexico	16	224	50	19	11	0	00	27	43655	237	35960	272555	13553	63420	16214
MERCEDARIANS.																
San Pedro Nolasco	Mexico	19	192	40	26	14	0	00	10	2755	427	36586	134426	5801	29095	2228
		150	1918	462	247	87	40	106	139	129723	1719	216002	1819231	83039	649735	204604

No. IV.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SIX MEXICAN COLLEGES DE PROPAGANDÁ FIDE.						
COLLEGES.	Number of religious.	Took the habit in five years.	Professed in that time.	Now serving novitiate.	Number of Missions.	Where.
San Fernando of Mexico	66	7	6	00	21	Alta California.
Santa Cruz, Queretaro	56	0	0	0	9	Sonora.
San Francisco, Páchuca	42	10	9	1	9	Cóhahuila y Tamaulipás.
San José, Orizava	35	7	7	0	0	
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, Zacatecas	83	18	11		22	Las Tarahumárás y Texas.
Nuestra Señora de Zapopan	25	23	14		0	
	307	65	47	5	61	

SECTION IV.

REVENUE OF MEXICO—ITS SOURCES AND AMOUNT BEFORE
THE REVOLUTION—PRESENT STATE AND PROSPECTS.

MY object, throughout the preceding Sections, having been to avoid all theories as much as possible, and to give what *has been*, as the best criterion of what may again be, I shall not depart from this rule in treating so important a branch of my subject as the revenue of the country; and shall accordingly commence my view of its present state and prospects, by a succinct account of what they were before the Revolution of 1810.

For this I must, as usual, recur to Baron Humboldt, who has investigated the subject with his wonted accuracy, in Book VI. of his most valuable work.

According to his statements, the revenue of Mexico, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, (1712,) did not exceed three millions of dollars:—

	Dollars.
In 1763 it was	5,705,876
1767	6,561,316
1776	12,000,000
1780	15,010,974
1784	19,605,574
1802	20,200,000

This extraordinary increase was due, in part, to the estab-

lishment of the monopoly of tobacco, which took place in 1764; but infinitely more, to that relaxation in the Colonial Policy of the Mother country, to which I have alluded in the Fourth Section of the First Book, and to the encouragement given to the mining interests by the reduction of the price of quicksilver, from eighty-four to sixty-four-dollars the quintal. The revenue rose as the price of this important article fell, and, as an impulse was given to the Colonies, by the removal of some of the earlier restrictions upon their trade. Had Spain profited by the lesson, and extended her concessions, in proportion as she found less reason to regard them as incompatible with her own interests, her position, at the present day, might have been very different from what it is.

The principal sources of the revenue of Mexico at that time were:—

	Dollars.
Duties derived from the Mines, (<i>derechos de oro y plata</i>), profits on sale of quicksilver, Coinage	5,500,000
Monopoly of Tobacco (<i>estanco de tabaco</i>)	4,500,000
Alcavalas	3,000,000
Indian Capitation tax	1,300,000
Duty on Pulque	800,000
Importation and Exportation duties	500,000
Cruzada, (sale of Bulls, &c.)	270,000
Post-office (<i>renta de correos</i>)	250,000
Gunpowder (<i>estanco de polvora</i>)	150,000
Media Anata and Mesada, (both ecclesiastical contributions)	100,000
Cards (<i>estanco de naypes</i>)	120,000
Stamps (<i>papel sellado</i>)	80,000
Licenses for Cockpits (<i>estanco de gallos</i>)	45,000
Snow (<i>estanco de nieve</i>)	30,000

Net annual produce in 1803	16,645,000
Gross amount of receipts, according to tables formed by	

Count Revillagigedo, in 1790, and by the Viceroy Iturrigaray, in 1803, *Twenty millions* of dollars: viz:

	Dollars.
Produce of Alcavalas, Indian Capitation-tax, and	
Duties on the precious metals	10,747,878
Produce of the Monopolies of Tobacco, Cards,	
Powder, Quicksilver, &c.	6,899,830
Cruzada, Tithes, Medias anatas, &c.	530,425
Revenues of Lands, &c. under the inspection of	
the Government.— <i>obras pias</i>	1,897,128
	<hr/>
Total	20,075,261
	<hr/>

These receipts were employed in the following manner:—

1. Ten millions and a half of dollars in the interior of the country, which covered all the expenses of the Colonial Administration.

2. Three millions and a half, in remittances to other Colonies, as Cuba, La Florida, Portorico, the Philippine Islands, Louisiana, Trinidad, and St. Domingo, all of which were, in some measure, supported by Mexico.

3. Six millions of dollars, in remittances to Spain, called the *Sobrante liquido remisible* lodged annually in the Royal Treasury at Madrid.

The expense of collecting the revenue, was calculated, by Humboldt, at *Eighteen* per cent.

The military establishment, and the <i>Guarda cos-</i>	Dollars.
<i>tas</i> upon the Eastern and Western coasts, with	
annual repairs of fortifications, &c., were esti-	
mated, in 1802, at	3,800,000
<i>Sueldos de Hacienda</i> , including salaries of Viceroy,	
and all inferior Government officers	2,000,000
	<hr/>
Carried forward	5,800,000

	Dollars.
Brought forward	5,800,000
Expenses of the Royal Monopolies, and transmission of specie from one Province to another	3,250,000
Administration of Justice, Audiencias, &c.	250,000
Pension list	200,000
Hospitals, and repairs of Royal buildings, &c.	400,000
	<hr/> 9,900,000 <hr/>

Humboldt gives an increase of 600,000 dollars on the expenditure of the following year; adding 200,000 dollars to the expense of the Army, 50,000 dollars to the Pension list; 50,000 to the charges for the administration of justice, and 300,000 to the general charges of collection and administration, thus making the whole amount to 10,500,000 dollars.

This estimate I believe to have been exceedingly correct, and it may be taken as the fairest possible average for the years immediately preceding the Revolution of 1810, up to which period Mexico had no public debt of any kind.

The deficit in the Revenue, occasioned by the Revolution, was supplied by *forced* loans, (called voluntary,) and by the establishment of the *Derechos de guerra, y convoy*, (Duties of War and Convoy,) the *Derecho de patriotas*, (a tax raised to support the Royalist volunteers, who assumed the strange appellation of *Patriots*), and a tax, of ten per cent. upon houses, which, as all the great towns were in possession of the Spaniards, was very productive.

The total amount of these different taxes, is supposed to have been from four to five millions of dollars, which afforded, however, but a poor compensation for the loss of the Mining duties, and the Monopoly of Tobacco; both of which were reduced to a mere fraction of their former importance, by the Civil war.

All these War taxes were abolished by Iturbide, on the declaration of the Independence, in 1821; but the distress to

which the Imperial Government was afterwards reduced, compelled him again to have recourse to the tax upon houses, which was not definitively suppressed until 1823. Forced loans were likewise resorted to during his reign, and an attempt made to bring paper money into circulation, which completely failed, as the paper only obtained a partial currency by the sacrifice of two-thirds of its nominal value.

Nothing can be more melancholy than the account given by the two first Mexican Ministers of Finance, (Don Antonio Medina, and Don Francisco Arillaga,) of the state to which the Revenue was reduced in the years 1822 and 1823. In the confusion that ensued upon the dissolution of the Viceregal Government, the Government Archives were plundered as the best mode of concealing former dilapidations; the trustees of the funds of *Obras pias*, and those charged with judicial deposits, left the country with whatever money they could secure: the Provinces seized upon their own revenues, of which they refused to give any account; and the Government officers, fattening upon the public distress, either would not, or could not, make the smallest remittances.

In October, 1822, Medina stated in his Report to Congress, that, "not only was the pay of the troops in arrear in the Capital, but on the point of being suspended altogether; and that, in the Provinces, it must be reduced from the total want of resources."

In a defence of his conduct before the Congress, (3d September, 1823,) the same Minister added: "That his orders for the collection of the necessary data for the formation of a new plan of Finance, had not been complied with; and that he regarded it as extremely difficult to enforce obedience to them, because their execution depended upon a multitude of men, some too ignorant to give the information required,—others interested in suppressing it, in order to perpetuate abuses; and all full of that languor, to which they had been accustomed by the routine of the old system."

This statement was fully confirmed by Mr. Arillaga, who succeeded Medina, in the Ministry, in 1823. He characterized, as "*frightful*," the abuses which prevailed in the administration of the Revenue, and affirmed, "that there was nothing but plunder and corruption in all its branches." As late as November, 1823, he added, in his Report of that date, that "no ordinary measures, or threats, were sufficient to awaken the inferior officers of Government from their culpable apathy: others of a more serious nature must be resorted to."

It is probable that these menaces, however strong, would have produced but little effect, had they not derived importance from the conclusion of the loan with the house of Goldschmidt, which gave the Government at once, the means of enforcing obedience to its orders, and of organizing anew, some of the most important branches of the Revenue. It is generally admitted, that Mr. Arillaga availed himself with great judgment of these advantages, and did much towards preparing the way for a better order of things. He, however, only retained the ministry for nine months after the date of his second Report, when he gave place to Mr. Esteva, who entered upon office the 9th of August, 1824.

In speaking of this gentleman, whose name is so identified with the new system of Finance in Mexico, that it is impossible for me to avoid introducing it frequently in the course of this Section, I shall neither allow myself to be influenced by that party spirit, which has but too much prevailed with regard to his measures in his own country, nor by those personal considerations, which my long acquaintance with him might not unnaturally inspire: I shall endeavour simply to judge him by his works, as laid before the Congress by himself, in his official Reports of 1825, 1826, and 1827, with which those interested in Mexican affairs in this country, are already partially acquainted.

The reorganization of the Revenue of Mexico, after the

period of distress and confusion described in the preceding pages, may be dated from the establishment of the Federal Constitution, and the publication of the Decree of the 4th of August, 1824, called the law for the Classification of Rents.*

By this Decree :—

1. All Importation and Exportation duties of every kind, whether in the ports, or on the frontiers of the Republic ;
2. The monopolies of Tobacco and Gunpowder,
3. The Post-office,
4. The Lottery,
5. The natural deposits of Salt, (*Salinas*.)
6. The revenues of the *Territories* of the Federation,
7. The produce of all National Property, (such as estates formerly belonging to the Inquisition, or to convents suppressed while Mexico was under the dominion of Spain,)
8. And all Buildings, Fortresses, Public Offices, and lands annexed to them, formerly considered as the property of the Crown, were declared to belong exclusively to the Federation, and to be consequently placed under the immediate control of the Supreme Government.

All other branches of revenue were made over to the States, which were left at liberty to regulate their own expenditure, according to their several resources.

A contribution, or *Contingent* of 3,136,875 dollars was established by the same Decree, to be levied in fixed proportions upon the States, in order to cover the deficit, which it was supposed might result, during the first years, at least, from the dilapidated state of many of the branches of the Revenue assigned to the Federation ; and regular statistical returns were ordered to be made to the General Congress, from every part of the country, in order to enable the Chambers to form a new scale of Contingent, better adapted to the

* *Vide* Decree of Congress, No. 70.—“ *Clasificacion de Rentas*.”—*Guia de Hacienda*, p. 1.

resources of the States, than that adopted in the first instance.

This Decree was followed by a second, dated the 21st of the same month, (September, 1824,) abolishing the complicated offices, which, under the denomination of Intendencias, Direcciones, Contadurias, Cajas, &c. &c., had so much impeded the action of the machine under the Vice-regal government; and creating in their place a single *Commissary-General* in each of the principal States, who, assisted by a moderate number of clerks, and under the immediate orders of the Minister of Finance, was directed to take charge in person of every thing connected with the revenues of the Federation in his district; to receive the Contingent of the States, and the Custom-house duties, to pay the troops, and to superintend the Post office, and all inferior departments.

This wise regulation may be considered as the first step towards the cleansing of that Augean Stable, in which the abuses of three centuries had accumulated. It simplified the whole system of Finance; and as, on the 16th of the following month, (October, 1824,) the States entered into possession of their rights, as such, (in virtue of the Decree of the General Congress, No. 82,) and consequently took charge of their own revenues, the attention of the Supreme Government was thenceforward directed exclusively to the improvement of those branches, which had been set apart to cover the expenses of the Federation. Such were the circumstances under which Mr. Esteva took possession of the Ministry. In some respects, he was well qualified for the situation which he was called upon to fill; for he possessed great bodily and mental activity, and was animated by a sincere desire to introduce order, and regularity, into the chaos by which he was surrounded. But here his recommendations ceased: accustomed to business upon a small scale, he had no great or comprehensive views;—no power of appreciating the effects to be produced upon the internal resources of the country by

the political change which it had undergone ; or of adapting the new system of Finance to the wants which so different an order of things was calculated to create. He saw nothing at first but a Deficit, the amount of which filled him with apprehensions ; and he discovered no means of avoiding this Deficit, but by a return to the old system of monopolies, high duties, and a strict limitation of trade.

A short analysis of the Report of January, 1825, will place Mr. Esteva's views in the clearest possible light.

The first and second parts of this Report, contained an estimate of the gross receipts of the twelvemonth which was about to commence, calculated upon those of the two preceding years.

These were rated at 10,690,608 dollars, from which, however, were to be deducted 1,317,543 dollars, being the available amount then remaining of Goldschmidt's Loan ; so that the whole produce of the Mexican Revenue, in 1825, was not supposed to exceed 9,373,065 dollars.

Against this, an expenditure of nearly *Eighteen millions of dollars*, (without including the interest upon the Foreign Loans,) was set by the third part of the Report, viz. :—

	Dollars.
Expense of collecting Revenue, Salaries, &c.	920,235 7 9
Ministry of Interior, and Foreign Affairs .	105,737
Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Af- fairs	77,220
Ministry of War	12,000,000
Ministry of the Navy	2,934,533 4
Ministry of Finance	1,083,143 1
Credits against Government, payable in 1825	865,804 7 8
Total	<hr/> 17,986,674 4 8 <hr/>

Receipts	10,690,608 2 9
Expenditure	17,986,674 4 8
Deficit	7,296,066 1 1

or 8,613,609,

if the amount to be received on the Loan account be deducted, (as it undoubtedly should be,) from the receipts.

The fourth and last part of Mr. Esteva's Report, (page 37 to 52) explains the means by which, in his opinion, this deficit might be covered. They were :—

1st. The re-establishment of the Monopoly of Tobacco on the same footing as in 1809, the Supreme Government being invested with powers similar to those exercised by the Viceroy, for the prevention of Smuggling. (Page 43.)

2dly. The closing of most of the ports recently opened to Foreign trade, which are stated, “greatly to exceed in number the wants of the country, and to serve only to facilitate Smuggling.” (Page 46,) And,

3dly. The raising of the Duties on gold and silver to the standard of 1799, which is recommended as expedient, both “because it would not be a great hardship to the miner to pay, in 1825, the duties which he could so well afford to pay in 1801, and because, at all events, the loss would fall, principally, upon *Strangers*, who had taken into account, in all their calculations, the late reduction of Mining duties.” (Pages 46 and 49.)

Mr. Esteva calculated the produce of these branches of the Revenue upon that of the years of 1795 and 1799, and assured the Congress that, “if his suggestions were adopted, an addition of 6,649,563 dollars might be reckoned upon in the year, 1825, by which means the Deficit would be covered, and time left for the Government to reflect upon those reductions, which it so anxiously desired to effect.” (Page 51.)

Fortunately for Mexico, the fallacy of this calculation, (by

which the produce of the most flourishing period of the Vice-regal government was taken as the standard of that of a period of comparative disorder and distress,) and the narrow policy by which a return to the beaten path (*la senda yà trillada*) of the old Spanish prohibitive system was recommended as the only road to salvation, did not escape the penetration of the Congress. The Committee appointed to analyze the Minister's Report, animadverted with great severity upon his confined and antisocial views, (*proyectos mezquinos y antisociales*;) they demonstrated the absurdity of supposing that the Contraband trade could be reduced by reducing the number of open ports; (as if harbours did not remain harbours, whether the Government kept up an establishment there or not;) and the illiberality of recommending an increase in the Mining duties, (which even the Government of Spain had found it necessary to reduce,) "merely *because* the disadvantages of the change would fall principally upon Foreigners, who had engaged in Mining speculations, upon the faith of a public act of the Legislature." Finally, they observed upon the omission of any mention of the Public Debt, and pointed out the mode in which, by proper reductions in the Army, and a due attention to those branches of the Revenue, which were likely to reap most immediate benefit from the new-born liberty of the country, the Receipts might be made to cover the Expenditure, without crippling for ever the resources of the State, by striking, as Mr. Esteva proposed to do, at the very roots of its prosperity.

This Analysis, the argumentative parts of which Mr. Esteva in vain attempted to refute, was adopted almost *in toto* by the Congress. The Chambers refused to make any change in the revenue of Tobacco, or to close a single port or to increase in any way the duties payable upon the precious metals, a proposal to which effect was brought forward by Mr. Esteva, and thrown out by a large majority, although supported by all his influence.

This check was of the greatest utility both to the country, and to himself: he renounced, from that moment all idea of legislating, and confined himself to the organization of his Department, and to the observance of the system traced out for him by the Chambers. The activity and perseverance displayed by him in this harassing task cannot be too highly spoken of: they gave new life to the system, and their effects were felt in the most distant parts. By a series of regulations, very severe, but very necessary where confusion had so long prevailed, subordination was established in every branch of the Finance department: the Commissaries were made strictly responsible for the conduct of the inferior *employés*; absence from their posts, even for a day, without permission, was punished by the loss of employment; monthly, weekly, and even daily returns of receipts and expenditure, were ordered to be transmitted to the Treasury of the Capital; and thus data were obtained for the Estimates of subsequent years, the minuteness of which is the more curious, from its contrast to the total want of authentic information before Mr. Esteva's time.

It is upon these data that I shall form a general view of the Financial resources of Mexico, commencing with an account of the principal sources of its Revenue, and ending with a comparative table of the Receipts and Expenditure during the two last years.

I have already enumerated the particular branches assigned by the Law of the 4th of August, 1824, for the support of the Federal Government, most of which require no explanation. With respect to their relative importance, and to the probability of increase in each, the following observations may be of use.

The Monopoly of Tobacco, from the time of its establishment in 1764 till the Revolution of 1810, was proved by experience to be one of the most productive, and least oppressive taxes possible. On a term of nearly thirty years it

yielded a net annual profit of four millions of dollars;* and although this was reduced to about *half a million* during the first part of the Civil war, the facility with which the disorder into which the establishment had fallen was remedied in 1817, and the importance which it regained in the short interval of tranquillity that afterwards occurred, (from 1818 to 1820,) not unnaturally attracted the attention of the new Government after the establishment of the Independence.

After much discussion it was resolved, that the old Royal Monopoly should be kept up under certain modifications, which the change of system seemed to require. The cultivation of Tobacco was, therefore, prohibited throughout the Federation, with the exception of the district in the immediate vicinity of Orizava and Cordova, where a certain quantity is raised annually, which the proprietors contract to deliver to the Government agents at three reals per pound.

The Tobacco thus purchased is remitted in leaf, (*en rama*,) to Mexico, where there is an enormous manufactory of segars, in different shapes (*puros y cigarros*,) on the account of the Supreme Government. The States have the option of either purchasing their supply in leaf, and working it up themselves, in which case they pay for their tobacco at *eight* reals (one dollar) per pound, (deducting all expenses of carriage, &c. which are defrayed by the Federation,) or of taking a stock of segars at once from the manufactory in the Capital, in which case the expense of labour and paper is added to the eight reals originally charged.

* Humboldt gives the annexed table for the years 1801 and 1802:—

Tobacco made up.	1801.	1802.
Value of Tobacco made up at retail price	7,825,913	7,686,834
Expenses	1,299,411	1,285,199
Pensions and Salaries	798,482	794,586
Price of Tobacco	626,319	592,229
Net Profit	3,993,834	4,092,629

The retail price in the States is fixed at eleven reals per pound of wrought tobacco.

The profits of the Supreme Government are sufficiently evident from the preceding statement, as it sells for eight and eleven reals per pound, tobacco (wrought, or unwrought) which it purchases for three. Those of the States, which establish a segar manufactory (*fabrica de tabacos*) upon their own account, (purchasing tobacco in leaf of the Supreme Government at eight reals the pound,) will appear by the following table of the difference between the retail price of the box of *Puros*, (made up in the usual shape,) and the expense of the labour and materials employed upon it.

A case of Puros de a 5

	Dollars.
Contains 4000 <i>papeles</i> (little bundles of paper segars,) which, at half a real each, make	250 0 0
It requires	
163lbs. 8 oz. 15 ads. 32 grs. of tobacco, <i>en rama</i> , which, at 8 reals per lb. is	163 4 5 7 oct.
A ream, six quires (<i>manos</i>), and 16 two-thirds sheets of paper, which, at 8 dollars the ream, is	10 5 4 0
Labour and share of general expenses	33 2 11 7
Profit	42 3 2 2 oct.

Upon the larger cases, (*cajones*), containing 4800, and 6000 *papeles*, the profits are calculated, respectively, at fifty-five dollars six reals, and seventy-seven dollars one real; so that, wherever the population is dense enough to ensure a sufficient consumption, the States derive great advantage from the establishment of a *fabrica* of their own, which, after the first few months, generally forms a very important item in their revenue.

The opposers of monopolies in general have not failed to animadvert upon the injudicious policy of retaining that of tobacco in Mexico, and seem to think that the country would derive more advantage from the free cultivation and exportation of the plant. I confess that I am not myself of

this opinion. Mexican tobacco, as an article of exportation, would have to contend, in the European market, with that of the Island of Cuba, to which it is undoubtedly inferior, and with that of the United States, with which it may be supposed to be much upon a par: it would likewise have to stand a competition with the tobacco of the whole coast of Columbia and Brazil, both of which countries are as well qualified by nature for its production as Mexico; and as the demand in Europe has never been very great, it is probable, that, by throwing in so large a supply at once, the price would be so much reduced as to leave but little profit to the original cultivator. Mellish states this to be already the case in the United States, since tobacco, which, in 1818, was worth something more than a hundred and seventeen dollars the hogshead, had fallen, in 1821, to eighty-four dollars and a-half. What then would be the effect of offering to the buyers such an enormous additional mass of produce as the New States might collectively yield, and would undoubtedly yield, were the cultivation of tobacco in all of them perfectly free from restraint? I see no means by which each could derive from its exportations an equivalent to the advantages which Mexico already derives from the monopoly as at present established; nor do I know any other branch of national industry, upon which taxation, to an equal amount, could be made to bear with fewer bad effects.

The produce of the Tobacco Monopoly will never equal the account of the yearly receipts of the Republic, the amount given by the estimates of the Vice-regal Government; because the profits are now divided amongst nineteen States, instead of being concentrated, as before, in one focus: but the effect upon the general interest of the country is the same, as these profits enable the States, in part, to cover their Contingent, and thus tend, though by a more circuitous route, to increase the Public Revenue.

Some little time is required for the proper organization of

so extensive a department in all its branches; but as the quantity of tobacco in the Government magazines has increased enormously during the last three years, and was valued, in January, 1827, at *ten millions of dollars*, regular remittances to the States may henceforward be made, and regular returns expected, until the consumption of the country equals that of 1808, when the net produce was 4,447,486 dollars.

Of the revenue to be derived from Gunpowder, Salt, the Post-office, and the Lottery, it is unnecessary to say more, than that all these branches are susceptible of great improvement. The progress made by each since 1824, will be subsequently shown; but in 1827, great reforms were still requisite. For instance, the supply of gunpowder, to my certain knowledge, bore no sort of proportion to the demand, more than half the powder consumed in the Mining districts being contraband. There were only three powder-mills in the whole territory of the Republic; two in the immediate vicinity of the Capital, (at Chapoltepec and Santa Fē,) and one at Zăcătēcă; which furnished together so precarious a supply, that the *registered* consumption of Guanajuato, at the time of my visit, did not amount to one *half* of that of the mine of Valenciana alone, during its more flourishing period. Salt, likewise, produced but little, although the demand is universal, and the consumption great.

The Post-office, under a different system, might be made to produce at least double what it now yields: as it is, there is so little security, the conveyance of letters is so slow, and the postage so high, that none have recourse to it who can forward their correspondence through any other channel, and yet the awakening activity of the country has given it importance.

The produce of the Mint of Mexico, (of which alone the Supreme Government has the direction, as belonging to a *Federal City*;) will never be comparable to that of former

times, the mining States having acquired the right of establishing Mints of their own, in which nine-tenths of the silver, formerly transmitted to the Capital, will henceforward be coined. But there are several very important mining districts in a circle around the Capital, (Real del Monte, Chîcô, Zimăpân, Tēmăscăltēpēc, Tăscô, and Tlălpŭjăhuă,) the produce of which will be sent to the Mint of Mexico in preference to any other; as will the silver from the mines of Ōăxăcă, where there is no Provincial Mint; so that, as soon as these districts become again productive, the Mint of the Capital may be expected to average from four to five times its present produce.

The duties on the exportation of silver (two per cent.) must likewise soon become of considerable importance, unless the most moderate computation of the amount of the precious metals to be raised in, or before, the year 1830, prove entirely unfounded, which I see no reason at present to suppose.

The importation duties on foreign goods, (*Aduanas maritimas*,) large as the amount of their net produce has been, (in January, 1827, they had yielded *in ten months* 6,855,633, dollars,) may undoubtedly become infinitely more productive. Smuggling is now carried on to an immense extent on the Eastern, and Western coasts. There was hardly a custom-house officer, in 1826, to the North of Tămpîcô on the one side, or of Săn Blăs on the other; and the consequence was, that the most valuable cargoes were sent to Refugio, (at the mouth of the Rio Bravo,) or to Măzătlan, and Gŭăymăs, (on the Gulph of California.) Custom-houses are now established at all these places; but the payment of duties is still easily evaded there, as there is no check upon the conduct of the officers employed. Indeed, the only radical cure appears to me to be the modification of the present Tariff, which alone can enable the established merchant to stand a competition with the illicit trader; and which, at the same time, by re-

ducing the prices of the more necessary articles of consumption, will bring them within the reach of a larger body of consumers. I shall have occasion to enter more largely into this subject in the Fifth Section of this book.—Were the improvements, which have already passed once through the Chamber of Deputies, in Mexico, adopted, I should have little hesitation in stating that the Importation duties alone in New Spain, might, as soon as the mines begin again to produce, be made to cover nearly three-fourths of the whole annual expenditure of the country, *including the interest upon the Foreign Loans.*

The Contingent, soon after its establishment by the law of the 4th of August, 1824, was reduced first to two-thirds, and then to one half, its original amount, or 1,573,756 dollars; it being found impossible that the States, on the first adoption of the Federal system, should pay, at oncé, the quota assigned to them. Each had to go through a process similar to that which the General Government had itself undergone; —to assemble their Legislatures; to ascertain the nature and amount of their revenues; to simplify, as much as possible, the old system of collecting them; to establish Mints and Tobacco manufactories, in order to obtain their share of the advantages in which the new order of things allowed them to participate; and so to regulate their expenditure, as to provide means for meeting their engagements with the Federation.

This could only be the work of time; and to those who are acquainted with the state of Mexico in 1823, it is a matter of surprise to see how much three years have enabled the country to effect. The whole arrears of Contingent, up to January 1827, did not exceed 538,143 dollars, and there was every prospect that, in the course of the present year, a part of this debt would be liquidated.

The States of Dŭrāngŏ, Chĭhŭāhŭa, Yŭcātān, ōājācā, Lă Pŭēblă, Săn Luis Pŏtŏsĭ, Vĕrăcrŭz, and Zăcătĕcăs, owed

nothing to the Federation. The debt of several other States, (as Guāñajūatō, New León, Cōhāhūilā, and Sōnōrā) was very inconsiderable; while those whose arrears were largest, (Jāliscō, Mexico, Quērētārō, and Vāllādōlīd,) are precisely the States which, from the amount of their population, and the superiority of their internal resources, are best able, ultimately, to meet their engagements.

The arrears due to the Federation for Tobacco are much more considerable than those due on the account of the Contingent. By the official returns it appears, that, up to June 1826, the States had received Tobacco, wrought and unwrought, to the amount of . . . 3,950,890 dollars.
and had paid . . . 1,343,539

Balance 2,607,351

The repayment of which will require time. The amount of the deficit, however, proves the importance which this branch of the Revenue has already acquired, and, as the establishments connected with it are now organized, its produce must henceforward increase both in regularity and amount. I do not, therefore, conceive that I estimate it too high, in giving two millions and a half as the probable gross receipt, in the year 1828.

I likewise think that the full *half* contingent, or 1,573,756 dollars, may be reckoned upon during the same period; and I am of opinion that, from the increasing home consumption of the country, the produce of the custom-houses will not fall short of the eight millions of dollars, at which Mr. Esteva estimates them, in his report for 1827.

Upon this supposition, I shall hazard a calculation of the probable revenue of Mexico in 1828; taking the gross receipts of the ten months ending the 1st of July, 1826, as the basis, with allowances for such moderate increase, as I conceive the general aspect of affairs to warrant; but omitting

all the items included in the official returns of receipts for 1826, which originate in eventual or accidental causes, and are not classed, by the law of the 4th of August, amongst the ordinary revenues of the Federation.

Estimate of Mexican Revenue in 1828.

	Gross Re- ceipts in 1826.	Net Pro- duce in 1826.	Probable Produce in 1828.
	<i>Dollars.</i>	<i>Dollars.</i>	<i>Dollars.</i>
Importation Duties . . .	7,043,237	6,854,633	8,000,000
Tobacco	1,582,616	1,361,626	2,500,000
Contingent	1,368,452	1,368,452	1,573,756
Gunpowder	159,840	132,522	250,000
Post-office	224,543	87,462	320,000
Lottery	106,887	49,153	120,000
Salinas	65,813	44,921	75,000
Mint	170,670	15,607	250,000
Inquisition (Property of) .	26,440	15,010	30,000
Temporalidades (Convent property, &c.)	34,456	21,475	40,000
Duty on Silver exported .	48,525	48,525	75,000
Stamps	14,840	434	20,000
Pulque	29,353	29,353	35,000
Assay and Apartado Duties	21,074	19,128	21,074
Fondo de Californias . .	11,247	11,197	12,000
Averia	539,886	529,850	540,000
Peages (Turnpikes) . . .	66,740	45,542	70,000
	11,514,619	10,634,890	13,931,830

Or, in round numbers, fourteen millions of dollars, (allowing 68,170 dollars for arrears due, and other contingent receipts), which sum, I am convinced, that the country can only be prevented, by very great mismanagement, from producing.

Indeed, if Mr. Esteva's calculations can be depended upon, the Revenue has *already* very nearly equalled my estimate for the year 1828.

The 11,514,619 dollars given in the preceding table, are the receipts, not of a year, but of a term of *ten* months.

Mr. Esteva, who includes in his general statement many eventual items, which I have omitted, (*Diezmos, Reintegros, Donativos, &c.*) makes the *net* produce amount to

Dollars.

11,389,698

To which he adds one *fifth*, for the two

remaining months 2,277,939

Thus making the sum total 13,667,637

But, in a country where the duties on foreign goods form so important a part of the revenue, it is a fallacy to take the receipts of all the months of the year as equal. Nearly the whole supply of European goods for the Mexican market, is imported during the winter months, on account of the sickness that prevails upon the coast from April to October. It is, therefore, a palpable error to suppose that the receipts of July and August, (the two months *not* included in the statement presented to Congress), must be equal to those of two of the winter months; and to add to the sum total of the produce of the custom-houses (7,043,237 dollars) one *fifth*, (or, 1,173,872 dollars), as a fair equivalent for the omission.

This observation does not apply equally to the other branches of the revenue; nor does it affect my estimate of the probable produce of the custom-houses in the year 1828; but it may serve to explain the apparent contradiction of a *surplus* revenue of 304,538 dollars, as given by Mr. Esteva, in his Report of January 1827, and the difficulty in covering the actual engagements of the country, which certainly has been experienced.

To take a fair view of this subject, it will be necessary to consider the expenditure of Mexico, as compared with its receipts, according to the estimates for the present year, to which it seems neither necessary, nor probable, that any great addition will be made.

	Dollars.
Ministry of <i>Relaciones</i> : (Home and Foreign Department)	264,082
Department of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, including Supreme Tribunal	226,098
The Army	9,073,932
The Navy	1,309,045
The Congress, (salaries of Deputies and Senators; clerks, office expenses, &c.)	402,064
Interest on Goldschmidt's loan at five per cent.	973,600
Interest on Barclay's loan at six per cent.	1,136,000
Finance Department, including salaries of President and Ministers, and all Federal officers, and charges of Tobacco, Gunpowder, &c.	2,574,021
Total	15,958,842

From this amount Mr. Esteva deducts, (with the alleged concurrence of the Minister of War) 2,595,744 dollars, for reductions to be made in the Army and Navy estimates; thus bringing the total expense of the year to 13,363,098 dollars: viz.—

	Dollars.
Total expenditure	15,958,842
Reduction in War department	2,595,744
Remain	13,363,098

	Dollars.
Receipts, according to estimate given in Mr. Esteva's Report	13,667,637
Expenditure as above	13,363,098
Balance, or Surplus Revenue	304,539

Such is the result given by Mr. Esteva's official Report, of January 1827, and repeated in the Manifesto published by him, at the President's desire, on quitting the Ministry shortly afterwards.

It is unfortunately but too evident that this result is incorrect ; for how, (it will be asked,) can Mexico, with a balance, however small, in her favour, have allowed her credit to be destroyed in Europe, as it has been during the present summer, by the non-remittance of the funds required for the payment of the dividends due upon her loans ?

It is by no means easy to answer this question, unless by supposing, (as I have done), that some miscalculation must have been made, both with regard to the actual receipts of the ten months, (although upon that subject there is less room for doubt), and in the estimate of the contemplated produce of the other two. It was generally stated in Mexico, in 1826, that great exertions had been made in every branch of the Revenue department, as the time for making up the accounts approached, in order to give the most favourable view possible of the Finances of the country, by including in the receipts every thing that could in any way be comprehended in the term, which was to be submitted to Congress, as the basis of the Minister's calculations.

It is by no means improbable, therefore, that some of the inferior officers may, (intentionally, or inadvertently,) have augmented the receipts of the first ten months, by adding to them a part of the sums known to be due in the two last ; in which case, the *fifth* added afterwards as the produce of these same months, would give a result doubly erroneous as the total produce of the year.

But even allowing 11,389,698 dollars, to have been the net *bonâ fide* receipts of *ten* months, still the *fifth*, which Mr. Esteva adds for the remaining two months, is, if not supposititious, at least not borne out by any positive data. Yet it

is upon this supposition, that the fact of Mexico having ever yet had a *surplus* revenue, of one single dollar depends.

Take for instance the actual expenditure, as given by the Finance Report	13,363,098 dollars
And the actual Net Receipts	11,389,698

There will be a deficit of	1,973,400
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Add to the receipts one *tenth*, in lieu of one fifth, (as assumed by Mr. Esteva,) and there will still be a deficit of nearly one million, viz. :

		Dollars.
	Expenditure	13,363,098
Receipts	11,389,698 }	
One tenth	1,138,969 }	12,528,675
	Deficit	834,423

Add a *seventh* even, and still there is a deficit of 346,296 dollars. It is, therefore, upon the fact of the produce of the last two months having been *equal*, or very nearly so, to the average of the other ten, that Mr. Esteva's whole calculation turns; and this, from what I have stated, must, I fear, appear very doubtful.

Besides, it must not be forgotten, that while the receipts (upon paper) have been carried as high as possible, in order to produce the favourable result given by Mr. Esteva's Report, the estimates of the War Department were reduced considerably below the lowest estimate given for the year by the Minister of War, in the Report of which the third Section of this Book contains an analysis.

The expenses of the Army and Navy, were there calculated at 10,378,678 dollars; while Mr. Esteva gives only 7,787,233 dollars; thus assuming as *effective* in 1827, the reductions which are pointed out as *probable* in 1828, and for which the expense of the squadron under Commodore

Porter, and the reinforcements sent to Texas, can have left but little room in the present year.

It is, therefore, strongly to be presumed, that if the Receipts have been *less*, the Expenses of the present twelve-month have been considerably *more*, than was foreseen at its commencement; and if to this circumstance we add the amount of bills drawn upon the loan account, and protested here, which it was necessary to provide for in Mexico, although they were not included in the Estimates of either 1826 or 1827, and the total loss of 1,458,496 dollars, which still remain of the second loan, but of which the late embarrassments of the house of Barclay, have deprived the Mexican Government,—it will become evident, that a temporary embarrassment may have occurred, without there being any reason to consider it as likely, seriously, to affect the credit, or resources of the country.

As the amount of the assistance which Mexico has received from foreign capitalists, is of some importance in considering the capability of the country to cover its own expenses, I shall conclude this Section with a short account of the Loans contracted in England, with the houses of Goldschmidt and Barclay, and a statement of their nominal value, and real produce.

The first Loan concluded with the house of Goldschmidt in 1823, for the sum of 3,200,000*l.* sterling, produced at 50, (at which price it was disposed of, though brought out at 58,) £1,600,000 or *Eight* millions of dollars, of which the Firm reserved for commission, payment of interest, &c. &c. 419,936*l.*, thus reducing the net produce of the loan to 1,180,064*l.* or 5,900,323 dollars; this being the whole amount received by Mexico, in return for having pledged her credit for *Sixteen millions* of dollars, bearing interest at five per cent.

The terms, it must be admitted, are usurious enough.

The second loan taken by the house of Barclay, Herring,

Richardson and Co., in 1824, was for the same amount as the first, viz. 3,200,000*l.* sterling, bearing interest at six per cent.

It was sold by commission, and produced at 86 $\frac{3}{4}$			<i>£.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Deduct					
Commission		<i>£.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	
Interest on first eighteen months retained	166,560	0	0		
Sinking Fund	288,000	0	0		
Ditto for first loan	48,000	0	0		
Contingent Expenses	694,000	0	0		
Money previously advanced with interest	8,942	9	3		
	200,000	0	0		
Net Produce			2,776,000	0	0
Or dollars			1,405,502	9	3

It appears farther, that from this net produce of	<i>£.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
We must deduct	1,370,497	10	9
	291,699	5	8

which the house of Barclay has not been able to make good, so that . . . 1,078,798 5 1 or 5,393,991 dollars, will be in reality, found to be the only portion of the second loan, that has been applied to the internal wants of Mexico, during the last three years.*

Of the mode in which this has been expended, nothing certain can be known, until the accounts of the last two years are laid in detail before the Congress: much has been said of injudicious expenditure; and it is by no means improbable, that in this respect, a sudden command of money may have produced its usual effects; but some good has at

* It has been remarked to me that the above is an *ex parte* statement, and that the house of Barclay may have claims upon Mexico sufficient in their amount to balance the deficiency in their remittances upon the Loan account. Of this I cannot judge. I merely lay before my readers a statement, officially promulgated by the Mexican Government, for the correctness of which it is responsible. If this statement be erroneous, it is open to contradiction, and ought to be publicly contradicted by the parties themselves.

all events been mingled with the evil. By the statement, which Mr. Esteva has already published, it appears that a considerable part of the proceeds of the loans has been employed in the following manner.

Purchase of Tobacco and paper for <i>Fabrica</i> , with		Dollars.
arrears due on preceding years	.	1,616,256
Old Credits paid	.	439,287
Arms, Shipping, Clothing for troops, &c.	.	917,549
Foreign Missions	.	108,995
Remittances to California, and for defence of frontiers	.	400,000

In all . 3,482,087

This, at least, is money usefully spent, and, however dearly the accommodation may have been purchased, it ought not to be regretted, since without it, Mexico could never have risen from the state of general depression, into which the country was thrown by the long continuance of the civil war.

It now only remains for me to recapitulate the leading facts contained in the preceding pages.

The Revenue, for twenty years before the Revolution, (from 1790 to 1810,) averaged, according to the most authentic returns, twenty millions of dollars annually.

<i>Two</i> of the principal sources of this revenue, the Duties on gold and silver, and the Indian Capitation tax, which produced, the first		.	.	.	5,500,000 dollars
and the second		.	.	.	1,300,000

In all . 6,800,000

have been abolished under the present System, (the one temporarily, the other for ever;) but their place is supplied by the Importation and Exportation duties, which, from the importance that the trade of the country has already acquired, have actually produced, as we have seen, 7,043,237 dollars

in one year, in lieu of the 500,000 dollars, at which they were estimated under the Viceregal Government.

The Monopolies of Tobacco and Gunpowder, the Post-office, the Lottery, and the duty upon Pulque, (in the Federal City,) remain unchanged: the monopoly of Salt has been added. The confiscated property of Convents, and the Inquisition, may be set against the *Media Anata* and *Mesada*; and although the *Alcavalas*, (which alone produced 3,000,000 dollars,) together with the minor branches of Cards, Stamps, Licenses for cockpits, and a portion of the Tithes, have been made over to the States, the Contingent to be paid by them in return, (3,136,875 dollars), will more than cover the deficiency.

There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that the revenue of the Federal Government will be less, ultimately, than that formerly derived from the country by Spain. But time and tranquillity are necessary in order to repair the devastation occasioned by the late struggle, and even if the mines prosper in no ordinary degree early in the ensuing year, I should think that 1835 would be the earliest period at which it may reasonably be expected that the receipts of the Mexican Treasury can again equal those of 1803.

In the mean time, however, some progress has been made.

Of the produce of the Revenue from 1810 to 1821, nothing certain is known; it is, however, generally supposed not to have exceeded fourteen millions of dollars.

After the overthrow of the Spanish Govern-	Dollars.
ment by Iturbide, the receipts fell, in 1823, to .	5,409,722
in 1824, they did not certainly exceed .	8,452,828
in 1825, they may be taken, as a <i>minimum</i> , at .	11,500,000
and in 1826, at .	13,000,000

adding something less than one *seventh* to the actual receipts of the ten months, included in Mr. Esteva's memoir of 1827, in lieu of the *fifth*, there given as the produce of the two months, the accounts for which had not been made up.

During the same period, the estimates of expenditure have been reduced, from . . . 17,986,674 dollars, or, with the interest on the foreign loans, not included above, . . . 2,109,600

20,096,274

to 13,363,098 dollars: so that even allowing one million of dollars over and above Mr. Esteva's estimate, for expenses in the War Department, still, a saving of nearly six millions of dollars will have been effected in the course of four years: viz.

Dollars.

Estimates for 1827, including interest on loans	. 13,363,098
Add one million for War Department	. 14,363,098
Estimates for 1825, with Dividends on loan	. 20,096,274

Saving in 1827, 5,733,176

This is a result, which ought to afford more satisfaction to those whose interests have been affected by the late want of remittances from Mexico, than the most specious attempt to demonstrate, upon paper, the existence of a Surplus Revenue, from which no practical benefit can be derived. It proves that the resources of the country are unimpaired; that, with very limited assistance from foreign capitalists, the Revenue department has been re-organized, the complicated machinery of former times simplified; and a system established, which has already produced, in *ten months, eleven millions and a half* of dollars; and that, although the Receipts do not yet *quite* cover the Expenditure, there is every prospect that they will do so in 1828, since that expenditure can hardly exceed the Estimates of the present year, while a lamentable change indeed must take place, in order to prevent the Revenue from producing *the fourteen millions* of dollars, at which, upon the most careful, and dispassionate computation, I have estimated it in the preceding pages.

For the information of those who may wish to see, more in detail, the various items of the Public Expenditure in the different Departments, I annex a Table of the Estimates of each, as given in the Finance Report of 1827.

Of the Revenues of the States, which consist, in general, of

1. Mint duties.
2. Alcavalas.
3. Three per cent. duty on foreign goods consumed in the territory of each State, (granted by General Congress.) Profits on sale of tobacco.
4. Three per cent. on silver exported.
5. Stamps.
6. Income tax, (where established by State Congress,) and such Municipal Duties,
7. On Pulque, Theatres, Bull-fights, Cock-pits, &c. as each State may think fit to enact,

I shall have occasion to speak more at large, in Books V. and VI. which contain an account of my journey into the Interior. Here, they are only of importance inasmuch as they do, or do not, enable the States to cover their engagements with the Federation, on which the Public Revenue, and, consequently, the Public Credit, in part, depends. This point has been already considered.

GENERAL TABLE OF EXPENDITURE IN 1827.

Department of Home and Foreign Affairs.

	Dollars.
Office Expenses, and Clerks	35,295
Mission to Pānāmā	31,987
Mission to the United States	17,200
Mission to Columbia	19,000
Mission to England	27,040
Special Mission of Mr. Camacho, in all,	28,000
Mission to Holland	17,640
General Archive Office	10,724
Commission of Boundaries to the North	15,000
Survey of the Guăzăcōalcō	4,500
Botanical Garden	2,849
Chōpūltēpēc	5,470
National School of Surgery	1,500
Mexican Antiquities (Museum)	4,282
Huěhuētōcā Commission	2,350
Governor of Federal District	4,000
Expenses of his Office	5,060
Nightly Watch in Mexico	53,512
Gefe Politico of Alta California	5,000
Gefe Politico of Baja California	5,000
Gefe Politico of Tlāscālā	2,220
Gefe Politico of New Mexico	850
Cesantes	4,520
Academy of San Carlos	10,992

	Dollars.
College of San Iuan de Lëträn . . .	1,378
Pension to Madame Iturbide . . .	8,000
Pension to Iturbide's Sister . . .	3,000
Repairs in Palace, &c.	6,348
Government Printing Establishment . . .	24,556

Total 317,273

Note. The amount assigned to the Home and Foreign Department considerably exceeds the amount authorized by Congress before 1827, but includes the additions proposed by Government for the present year. The authorized estimates are 264,082 dollars.

Department of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs.

	Dollars.
Office Expenses, Clerks, &c.	24,520
Supreme Tribunal of Justice	72,300
Tribunals of Districts	32,000
Inferior Courts	42,000
Courts of Federal District	17,168
Mission to Rome	15,520
Ecclesiastical Missions (amongst the Indians) . . .	7,590
Extraordinaries, in all	15,000

Total 226,098

War Department.

Office Expenses, Clerks, &c.	30,120
Estado Mayor	79,969
Inspector-General of Militia	300
Commissary-General's Office	8,242

	Dollars.
Two General Commandants of Eastern and Western Internal States	8,000
Five Sub-inspectors in <i>id.</i>	15,000
Office expenses of all the Military <i>Comandancias</i> , Postage, &c.	13,040
Eight Generals of Division, employed	48,000
Two ditto, on half pay	8,000
Fourteen Generals of Brigade, employed . . .	63,000
Two ditto, on half pay	6,000
Ten ditto, unattached	23,989
Medical Department	58,706
Engineers and College	24,877
Three Brigades of Artillery (line)	492,253
Twelve Battalions of Infantry (line)	1,760,541
Twelve Regiments of Cavalry (line)	1,830,060
Five Companies of Cavalry (line) in California .	114,767
Twenty-nine Companies of ditto in Eastern and Western Internal States	829,366
Eleven Companies of Infantry and Cavalry (Coasts)	200,442
Twelve Companies of Invalids	18,688
Four Battalions of Militia under arms, (Interior)	654,761
Ditto on the Coast	350,492
Three Squadrons and three Companies (Seltas) Coast	298,459
Fifteen Companies of Cavalry Militia) under arms in the North	420,360
Captains, Sergeants, &c. of the Twelve Companies of Artillery (Militia)	28,460
Captains, Sergeants, &c. (<i>Planas mayores</i>) of the Battalions of Militia (Sixteen) not under arms	130,340
Ordnance Department	31,594
Officers attached to different Corps	293,965

	Dollars.
Officers on half pay, pensions, &c.	1,005,795
Widow of General O'Donoju	12,000
Extraordinary Expenses	100,951
Repairs of Barracks, &c.	60,000
Expense of moving different Corps	52,993
Total	<u>9,073,531</u>

The Navy.

Offices in the Departments	23,593
Engineers and School	6,212
Offices of Accounts and Repairs	24,522
Chaplains	1,233
Surgeons and Hospital of San Blas	7,177
Officers on half pay	3,302
Widows' Pensions, &c.	1,564
Officers of Launches, &c. Port's	14,438
Rondines (Watchmen)	6,289
Criminals sentenced to labour	2,555
The Ship of the Line, Congress	272,771
Frigates, <i>Líbĕrtād</i> and <i>Tĕpĕyāc</i>	268,444
Corvette, Morelos	54,740
Brig, Guerrero	99,396
Brig, Victoria	52,836
Brig, Bravo	44,516
Brig, Constante	37,285
Goleta, Hermon	28,139
Four Gun-boats	87,765
Four Goletas	67,263
Two California Packets	11,782
Naval Artillery	30,196
Repairs of Storehouses, &c.	19,638
Repairs of Dockyard	143,442
Total	<u>1,309,045</u>

FINANCE DEPARTMENT.

General Congress.

	Dollars.
Salaries of Deputies	218,000
Salaries of Senators	109,000
Clerks in Secretaries' Office	12,900
Expenses	1,440
Office of Secretaries of Senate	7,900
Expenses	1,063
Office of Drawing-out Decrees (<i>de Redaccion</i>)	7,861
Clerks in the Audit Office, and in Department of Public Credit	43,400
Expenses	500
Total	402,064

Other Finance Departments.

Salaries of President and Vice-President	46,000
Clerks of Department	28,120
Receiver-General's Office (<i>Cuenta y Razon</i>)	38,200
Audit Office (<i>de Rezagos</i>)	12,074
Expenses of preceding Offices	3,000
The Treasury	44,623
Storekeepers, &c.	3,000
Offices of Commissaries-General	150,000
Farther Expenses required	20,000
General Finance Expenses	140,000
Clerks of other Offices	98,000
Cesantes (half pay)	145,000

	Dollars.
Pensions	18,415
Pensions (on Church)	9,436
Pensions (on Finance)	81,632
Pensions (on Revenue)	11,525
Twenty Thousand Tiercios of Tobacco	1,075,000
Tobacco Manufactory	355,546
Powder Mills	173,150
Pensions of Montepios	31,300
Extraordinary Expenses	100,000
Total	<u>2,574,021</u>

Interest on First Loan	973,600
Interest on Second Loan	1,136,000
General Congress (as stated)	<u>402,064</u>

Total Expenses of Department of Hacienda (Finance)	<u>5,085,685</u>
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General View.

Ministry of Relaciones	264,082
The Army and Navy, with reduction of one-fourth of Estimate	7,787,233
Ministry of Justice	226,098
Ministry of Finance	5,085,685
Total	<u>13,363,098</u>

Note. To this I should, for the reasons stated in the preceding Section, add, *at least*, one million of dollars, in order to cover the expenses in the Departments of War and Foreign

Affairs, not included in Mr. Esteva's estimate; so that Fourteen millions and a half of dollars may be taken as the lowest (*bonâ fide*) expenditure in the year. In 1829, when the War expenses are brought down to the *Minimum* of Seven millions, Thirteen millions and a half will cover the ordinary charges.

I have already expressed my opinion as to the probability of this sum being realized.

SECTION V.

REFLECTIONS ON THE TRADE OF MEXICO.—ITS FORMER,
AND PROBABLE FUTURE IMPORTANCE.—HOW AFFECTED
HITHERTO BY REVOLUTION.

AFTER passing in review the great public establishments by which the present Government is supported in Mexico, and examining the tenor of her new laws, and the state of the Army, the Church, and the Revenue, it only remains for me to inquire into the commercial wants of the community thus constituted, and to point out the influence which they are likely to exercise upon the manufacturing industry of the Old World.

It will not, I hope, be attributed to any affectation of modesty on my part, if I confess that I enter upon this task with great reluctance, and this, not merely because I feel myself incompetent to treat, properly, a subject, to which my earlier professional duties did not lead me to pay particular attention, but because it has been extremely difficult, during the last three years, to obtain data, in Mexico, sufficiently exact to warrant any definitive opinion.

It will, therefore, often be impossible for me to demonstrate satisfactorily the correctness of the conclusions which I may be inclined to form, even where general appearances are sufficiently strong to justify them to myself; and this must give an appearance of vagueness to the results of my enquiries,

which I have endeavoured, in the preceding Sections, most studiously to avoid.

Having pointed out the difficulties with which this part of my undertaking is attended, I shall enter upon it without farther preamble, commencing, as I have always done, my account of the present state of Mexican trade, with a retrospective view of what it was before 1810.

From the time of the Conquest until the commencement of the Revolution, the trade of Mexico was confined to the two Ports of Acăpūlcō and Věřăcrūz, through which a very limited supply of Chinese, and European manufactures was introduced for the consumption of the inhabitants. The Acapulco trade was conducted by one Royal galleon, of from twelve to fifteen hundred tons; and, until the year 1778, when a certain freedom of trade was conceded to the Colonies, the European imports were, in like manner, conveyed to the Eastern coast of New Spain in fleets of Register ships, chartered expressly by Government for the purpose, and placed under the orders of a Royal officer; which fleets only sailed from Seville or Cadiz once, in a term of four years.

The intercourse with Europe, which, as infinitely the most important, I shall make the first subject of my enquiries, was managed, during this period, almost entirely by a few great houses, established in the city of Mexico. These bought up the cargoes of the Register ships at the fair, which was then held at Jalapa, on the arrival of the fleet, and afterwards regulated, at their pleasure, the retail price of the different importations from Europe, which they disposed of to the merchants of the Interior.

In 1778, an important change occurred. The abolition of the Register ships, and the freedom of communication allowed with most of the principal ports of the Peninsula, put an end to the exclusive monopoly of Mexico, and induced a number of Spanish capitalists to establish themselves at Veracruz, which continued to be, under the new system, what it had

been under the old, viz : the only port of entry on the Atlantic side of the Mexican dominions.

These new houses were either branches of other houses in Spain, or agents, or importers at their own risk, and soon engrossed the whole trade.

The Capital, (with the exception of what was actually consumed there,) became a mere place of transit: the fair of Jālāpā was discontinued, and the wholesale dealers, (who multiplied rapidly in the Interior) came down to the coast, and purchased, at Veracruz, the supplies which the retailers, and inland consumers, in the different districts, were thought to require.

This state of things, though bad enough, from the manner in which the importations were confined to one spot, and consequently the value of every article enhanced by the expense of unnecessary land-carriage, was infinitely preferable to the system previously pursued, when, from the total want of competition, "the supplies of a great empire were (to use Humboldt's expression) introduced with as much caution as if it had been a blockaded town."

Monopoly, though not abolished, was, at least, compelled to extend its operations to a less circumscribed circle; and to the beneficial results of this change a gradual rise in the industry, the produce, and the revenue of Mexico, may be traced.

The effects, of the impulse thus given to the country, Humboldt has recorded in Book VI., chapter XII., of his *Essai Politique*, by which it appears:—First, that, upon a comparison of two distinct terms of four years, (from 1774 to 1778, and from 1787 to 1790,) there was a difference of 8,928,293 dollars on the amount of the exportations alone, in favour of the new system;* and Secondly, that, on a farther comparison of two terms of twelve years, before, and after the

* The first four years, (which were the last of the Fleets and Register ships,) gave an exportation of only 2,470,022 dollars; while the exportation of the Second term, (when the Decree of Free Trade began to

Decree of Free Trade, the revenue rose from 131,135,286 dollars, to 233,302,557 dollars; and the exportation of dollars alone, from 155,160,564 to 224,052,025.

But notwithstanding the advantages derived by the Government itself from the concessions made in 1778, and the consequent probability that, by a farther relaxation in the old Colonial Policy, still greater advantages might be obtained, the wealth, which speedily accumulated at Veracruz, combined with an intimate knowledge of the wants, and intrigues of the Court, enabled the merchants established there successfully to oppose every project, by which their own monopoly was likely to be affected, and to defeat the plans occasionally submitted to the Spanish Ministry, for opening a communication with the Interior through other ports, easier of access to the inhabitants of the Central and Northern Provinces than that of Veracruz.

The trade with Europe was concentrated on this one spot; and it is, consequently, in the returns of its Consulado, (or Corporation of resident merchants,) established by a Royal Cedula, in 1795, that we must seek the only authentic data that can now be obtained respecting the former commerce of New Spain.

The period comprehended in these returns, is a term of twenty-five years, (from 1796 to 1820;) and although it is to be regretted that the various items, of which the importations consisted, are not specified in the *Balanza General*, or General Balance of Trade, (the name given to the Consulado Report,) still, as these may be ascertained from other sources, and more particularly from Humboldt, the General Balance is important, in as much as it gives the total annual amount of the registered Exports and Imports on a long term of years.

take effect,) was 11,394,664 dollars; thus averaging 2,840,000 dollars on each year, in lieu of 617,000 dollars, which was the average from 1774 to 1778.

According to Humboldt's estimate, in 1803, the first of these (the Exports) consisted annually of

	Value.
Gold and Silver	17,000,000
Cochineal	2,400,000
Sugar	1,300,000
Flour	300,000
Indigo (native)	280,000
Salt Meat	100,000
Hides	80,000
Sarsaparilla	80,000
Vanilla	60,000
Jalap	60,000
Soap	50,000
Campeche Wood	40,000
Tabascan Pepper	30,000

or 21,780,000 dollars, which he fixes as the *Average* amount of the Exports, as given by the Custom-house Registers during several years of peace.

The Average Imports of each year, according to the same author, were—

	Value in Dollars.
<i>Ropas</i> , (linens, cottons, cloths, and silks) .	9,200,000
Paper, 300,000 reams	1,000,000
Brandy	1,000,000
Cacao	1,000,000
Quicksilver	650,000
Iron	600,000
Steel	200,000
Wine	700,000
Wax	300,000

Total	14,650,000
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Or, more generally, Average Exports	22,000,000
Imports	15,000,000

Amount of Trade . . . 37,000,000

(*Mouvement du Commerce.*)

This *includes* the silver exported on the account of the King, as well as the paper and quicksilver imported for the Royal Monopolies; which circumstance it is necessary to bear in mind, because the analysis of the Consulado Reports would, otherwise, give a result so different from that given by Humboldt, that the one would seem to contradict the other, and thus render any calculation founded upon the two illusory. But the Consulado never included in the Balanza General the Imports or Exports on the account of the Royal Treasury, which must, therefore, be added to each year, in order to give the total amount.

During the twenty-five years comprehended in the Veracruz annual report, the Trade of New Spain, exclusive of smuggling, was as follows:—

<i>Exports.</i>	Dollars.
Value in dollars to Spain,	197,853,520
Ditto to Cuba, and Spanish America,	49,388,246
Foreign Countries direct	32,292,457
<hr/>	
Total	279,534,223

<i>Imports.</i>	
From Spain	186,125,113
Cuba, &c.	51,008,190
Foreign Countries direct	21,972,637
<hr/>	
	259,105,940
<hr/>	

Total Exports and Imports of 25 years . . . 538,640,163

Dollars.

The Exports consisted of,	
The precious metals . . .	209,777,206
American Produce . . .	69,757,017
	<hr/>
Total	279,534,223

The Imports were—	
European productions	
from Spain and her	
Dependencies . . .	224,447,132
American Produce . . .	34,658,808
	<hr/>
Total	259,105,940

Exports and Imports . . .	538,640,163
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Above nine-tenths of this were monopolized by the Mother-country, as will appear by the following statement:—

Value in dollars of trade between Spain, and	
her Dependencies, with Mexico, from 1796 to	
1820	484,375,069
Value of trade, during the same period, with	
other countries direct	
	54,265,094
	<hr/>
Total	538,640,163

Even this small amount of direct trade was due to accidental circumstances, which compelled the Court of Spain to deviate, occasionally, from all ordinary rules; as was the case in 1807, 1808, and 1809, when foreign ships received licenses to trade with Veracruz, and exported, in the short space of three years,—

Dollars.

In Gold and Silver	27,825,504
In Cochineal	2,043,480
In Sugar	554,652

30,423,636

The direct Imports in the same time were .	19,202,912
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Exports and Imports	49,626,548
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The remainder of the direct trade was distributed amongst the years 1817, 1818, and 1820, when it amounted to 4,638,546

Total of direct trade	54,265,094
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The average annual value of the commerce of Veracruz, appears, by the foregoing statement, to have been :

Exports.

Precious Metals	8,391,088
Other Produce	2,790,280

11,181,368*Imports.*

European Manufactures and Produce	8,977,885
American Produce	1,386,352

10,364,237

Total Imports and Exports	21,545,606
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Of the Imports, four-tenths were the produce or manufactures of Old Spain and her Colonies, and the remaining six-tenths were the manufactures of other European countries,

imported indirectly through Spain, or Cuba, the returns for which were made through the same medium.*

To the annual average amount of Imports and Exports given above, must be added 9,840,667 dollars three reals; viz. 8,340,667 dollars, three reals, which I find to be the average value (on a term of thirteen years, from 1779 to 1791,) of the precious metals exported on the King's account; and 1,500,000 dollars, which on the lowest possible computation, must have been the value of the quicksilver, and paper, introduced for the mines, and the Royal Monopoly of Tobacco.

	Dollars.	Reals.
The two together, give, on the whole		
twenty-five years	226,016,684	3
which, added to the Imports and Exports		
of the Balanza General	538,640,163	0
give	764,656,847	3
as the Total, or 30,586,273 dollars seven reals, as the average annual amount of the whole Exports and Imports of Veracruz.		

This falls considerably short of Humboldt's estimate, (thirty-seven millions,) but is, I conceive, more correct, for in the twenty-two millions, at which he values the exports of Mexico, he includes Sugar, to the amount

of	1,300,000 dol.
Cochineal,	2,400,000
and Flour,	300,000
	<hr/>
	4,000,000

whereas Sugar only averaged, from 1804 to 1810 inclusive,

* I have borrowed the whole of this analysis of the Balanza de Comercio, (page 309 to 312,) from a very able report on the Veracruz trade, drawn up by Mr. Mackenzie, who was His Majesty's Consul there in 1823 and 1824, and whose investigations, with regard to that period, I have taken advantage of throughout this Section.

281,025 dollars per annum ; and Cochineal 1,100,327 dol-	
lars ; of Flour exported, I can find no traces ; so that, in	
these three articles alone, there was a diminution of 2,618,648	
dollars, the estimate being	4,000,000 dollars
the real exportation	1,381,352

Difference 2,618,648

calculated on a term of seven years.*

This reduces Humboldt's estimate from thirty-seven millions, to 34,381,352 dollars ; and, as I have perhaps underrated the value of the quicksilver and paper, which may have amounted to something more than one million and a half of dollars annually, the difference between the amount given by the Consulado Reports, and the calculations of the *Essai Politique*, although still considerable, is much reduced.

During this same period, the consumption of woollens, and cottons, of home manufacture, in Mexico, is supposed to have amounted, at least, to ten millions of dollars annually ; or to two hundred and fifty millions on the whole term of twenty-five years ; so that the home manufactures very nearly equalled in value the whole of the registered importations from Europe and America, (259,105,940 dollars,) notwithstanding the taste for the finer articles of European industry, (such as lace, rich silks, and fine cloths,) which Humboldt states to have become very prevalent about the beginning of this century.

It is true that the registered importation of European manufactures, does not give, by any means, the amount of the real consumption of the country ; for an average importation of 8,977,883 dollars, would only give, on a population of six

* I never venture to differ from Baron Humboldt without both diffidence and regret ; but in the present instance, I am merely stating in 1827, what has actually occurred, in lieu of forming an estimate beforehand ; which, however warranted by appearances at the time, might be, and has been, contradicted by the course of events.

millions, a consumption of twelve reals, (or one dollar and a half,) for each individual, in the year; while, according to the calculations of the Veracruz Consulado, the consumption of the produce and manufactures of the country, by each person, in the same time, averaged thirty-two dollars and three reals.

It is probable, therefore, that a contraband trade to a very great extent was carried on; and consequently, that the consumption of the home manufactures was never so nearly equal to that of the European manufactures, as would appear by the registered amount of both.

Still, it would be an extraordinary fact, that, in a country so thinly peopled as Mexico, any sort of competition between the rude industry of the natives, and the produce of European machinery should have existed, did not the monopoly of Veracruz sufficiently explain the circumstances, under which this competition took place.

This port was conveniently situated for the supply of the Capital, and the more central parts of the Table-land; but the distance rendered it nearly inaccessible to the Northern States, there being few residents in Dŭrāngŏ, Sŏnŏră, New Mexico, or the Eastern Internal Provinces, rich enough to afford a supply of articles, the value of which, in addition to the high duties, and the two hundred per cent. profits of the importer, was enhanced by a land carriage of from three, to five hundred leagues.

The great majority of the population was consequently compelled to seek, in its own industry, a substitute for those necessaries, which it was unable to procure from the manufacturing nations of the Old World; although there was not, I believe, an article of Mexican manufacture, that might not have been procured from Europe, of a superior quality, and at an infinitely lower price.*

* Imitations of some of the best of the Mexican manufactures have been tried at Glasgow, and it has been found that a Serape, or party-

Here, too, monopoly exercised its pernicious influence : as soon as the native manufactures became of importance, they fell into the hands of Spanish capitalists, who concentrated them, as much as possible, in the immediate vicinity of the Capital, (at La Puebla and Quērētārō,) from which places the inhabitants of the Interior, (where all rival establishments were discouraged,) were forced to draw their supplies of all the articles of ordinary consumption.

The effects of this system upon both the foreign and domestic trade of the country, were developed, in 1811, by Mr. Rāmōs Arīzpe, (then deputy to the Cortes for the State of Cōhāhūilā,) in a report upon the Eastern Internal Provinces, to which I have already had occasion to allude. (Book I., Section IV.)*

He there states, that the cotton and wool produced in these Provinces, were exported, and returned, at the end of the year, from Quērētārō and San Luis, rudely made up, indeed, but charged with all the additional costs of double carriage, and of three or four Ālcāvālās, in proportion to the number of hands, through which they had passed.

With regard to European goods, he demonstrates the disadvantage to be still greater. They were bought in Cadiz of the *second* hand, (there being but few articles imported into Mexico of *bonâ fide* Spanish produce;) in Veracruz, of the *third*; in Mexico, Quērētārō, or Zācātēcās, (the principal inland depôts) of the fourth; at the great fair of Saltillo, (where the retail dealers of the Eastern Provinces purchased their yearly provision,) of the fifth, and in each of these Provinces, of the sixth hand.

coloured woollen wrapper, which, at Sāltillō, or Quērētārō, sells for eighteen, twenty, and even twenty-four dollars, might be made here, sent across the Atlantic, and sold on the Table-land, with freight, carriage, and profit included, for eight, or, at most, ten dollars.

* The Eastern Internal Provinces, under the old territorial division of the country, comprehended Cōhāhūilā and Texas, New Lēōn, New Sāntāndēr, and Tāmāulipās.

Before they arrived there, they paid a duty on entering Cadiz, and another on leaving it made up for the American market; a duty on entering Veracruz; Ālcāvālā, on the sale there; Ālcāvālā, on the second transfer at Mexico, or Quērētārō, where the Saltillo trader made his purchases; Alcavala, at Saltillo, and Alcavala again in each of the Provincial towns, where the goods were ultimately retailed. The original manufacturer had his profit; the Cadiz merchant his; the merchants of Veracruz, and Mexico, or Queretaro, theirs; the Saltillo trader his; the retail dealers theirs again; while the whole of these accumulated duties, and profits, together with the charges of a land carriage from the coast, by the most circuitous route, fell upon the unfortunate inhabitants of a portion of the country, which, under a more judicious system, might have seen its wants supplied through the ports of San Bernardo, (in Texas;) Refugio, (at the mouth of the Rio Bravo;) and Altamira, (all of which are within sixty leagues of some of the principal towns,) at a moderate price, and without there being a single natural difficulty to be overcome.

But any change in this respect, required (as stated by the Regency, in 1810, on the repeal of the first concessions in favour of a free trade,) a previous revision of the code of prohibitive laws; and this was a subject of too much delicacy for the monopolists of Cadiz, and Veracruz, to allow of any interference with it, which their money or influence could avert.

As long as these lasted, the ports to the North of Veracruz remained closed, and the inhabitants of the Frontier provinces of Mexico were compelled to lay in their whole stock of necessaries for the year, at the great fair of Saltillo. Even there, they laboured under peculiar disadvantages. So little of the money coined in the Capital found its way back to the North, that the farmers were often obliged to make their payments in kind, and this was done at such a loss, that the pro-

duce of an estate was sometimes insufficient to enable the proprietor to furnish his family with the proper supplies. In this case, credit was given upon a mortgage of a part of the property; and the debt was allowed to increase, from year to year, until the estate itself was swallowed up.

It will hardly be believed that this iniquitous scheme formed not the least lucrative part of the speculations of the Mexican and Saltillo trader, and that no inconsiderable portion of the landed property in the North, was thrown by it, latterly, into their hands.

The Western Internal Provinces, which abounded more in the precious metals, were enabled, by this means, to obtain a more regular supply of European goods; and thousands of mules were employed, before the year 1810, in the trade between Dūrāngō and the Capital. They came, loaded with bars of silver, hides, tallow, corn, a little wine, chile, and sometimes, wheat; and returned with mining stores, (quick-silver, steel, and iron,) brandy, and manufactures, both foreign and domestic.

During this period, at Pūēblā alone, 20,000 Mantas, (pieces of cotton of thirty-two yards each,) were often made in the year; and, at Quērētārō, from sixty-three, to sixty-five thousand Arrobas of wool were worked up into Paños, Xergettillas, Bayetas, and Xergas, under which names the different woollen manufactures, in use amongst the common people, were designated; the annual average value of which was supposed to amount to 600,000 dollars.

Soap, leather, hats, and pottery, were likewise made in very large quantities: and, at one time, the earthenware of La Puebla and Guādālājārā, formed a considerable article of exportation on the Western coast, where it was shipped at Acāpūlcō, for Gūyaqūil and Perū.

But the trade on the Pacific side was never of any importance in comparison with that of Veracruz. It consisted, almost exclusively, in Chinese and Indian silks and muslins,

which formed the cargo of the Galleon, (or Nao de la China,) in return for which remittances in specie were made: the total amount of these varied from one and a half, to two millions of dollars; the whole of the imports and exports not having averaged more than three millions and a half of dollars, on a term of fifteen years, ending in 1810; at which time I conceive the trade of the galleons to have died a natural death.

By the preceding statement, it will appear, that the whole annual average value, in dollars, of the trade of Mexico with Europe, before the year 1821, was:—

	Dollars.
Including the imports and exports of the Royal treasury	30,586,273
Without them	21,545,606

That the average value of the trade, on the Western side, (up to 1810,) was three millions and a half of dollars, making, with the imports and exports of Veracruz, a total of 34,086,273 dollars.

That the whole of the Exports from Acapulco, and five-sixths of those from Veracruz, consisted of the precious metals.

That the Imports were partly Spanish produce, (as wines, brandies, oil, paper, and silks,) and partly European manufactures, imported through Spain, or the Havana; the direct importation being, in twenty-five years, less than one-tenth of the whole.

That the average exports of each year always exceeded the imports.* And

	Dollars.
* Commercial exports of specie (average)	8,391,088
Ditto of Royal Treasury	8,340,667 3
Total annual amount	16,731,755 3
American produce (average)	2,790,280
Total annual exports	19,522,035 3
Total imports, including those of Royal Treasury	11,864,237

That the value of the home manufactures of wool and cotton alone, (without including those of leather, hats, saddlery, earthenware, &c. &c., the consumption of which was very great,) nearly equalled the value of all the imports from any other part of the world.

The above is a rough sketch of the state of the trade of Mexico up to 1810. The first material change that occurred was occasioned by the civil war, which broke out in that year, and by which the Government was compelled, as early as 1812, to open the ports of Tămpicō and Tūspān to the East, and that of San Blas to the West, from the impossibility of introducing an adequate supply of European manufactures through Veracruz alone, the communication with that place being sometimes interrupted for months together by the Insurgents.

Foreign vessels, however, were still excluded from these ports, the total amount of the direct intercourse with Foreign countries, (as already stated,) not having exceeded four millions and a half of dollars, in the years 1817, 1818, and 1820, on the Eastern side.

With regard to the Western coast, nothing certain is known; but, as far as the imperfect returns, which I have been able to obtain, go, it appears that, although the trade of San Blas acquired, at a very early period, considerable importance, from the large remittances of European goods sent there, by Spanish merchants, from our West India Islands, across the Isthmus of Pănămă, and introduced through Guădălăjără, on to the Table-land, means were found to confine this trade, almost entirely, to *Spanish* vessels; nor was it until 1821 that a great and decisive change in this respect took place.

In the course of that year, the declaration of the Army in favour of Independence occurred, and one of the first effects of political emancipation was, to free the country from that

system of absolute prohibition, under which it had so long suffered. Foreign vessels were invited to visit the harbours of Mexico, on a footing of perfect equality with those of Spain ; and most of the Spanish capitalists, disgusted by the prospect of such an encroachment upon their former monopoly, and discouraged, too, by the aspect of affairs, withdrew, with their families, to the Peninsula, or the Island of Cuba.

They were replaced by Foreigners, principally British, or Americans, with some Germans and French, who, being all commission-merchants, found it more advantageous to supply the retailers of the Interior directly, without the intervention of any intermediate agent. They, consequently, established themselves in the city of Mexico, having merely correspondents at the ports, for the purpose of forwarding the goods consigned to them from Europe.

Thus, Veracruz and Alvarado, (which port was opened to Foreign trade in 1823,) became, in their turn, mere places of transit, with the exception of their own actual consumption, which, in the maritime provinces to the East, is by no means considerable, that of Jālāpā (the capital of the State of Veracruz,) not being supposed to exceed 600,000 dollars annually.

As the commercial interests of Great Britain in Mexico, are the principal object of this Section, I shall beg leave, before I proceed to trace the other effects produced by the Revolution, to express my opinion with regard to the line taken by the British merchants on their first arrival, in concentrating themselves, as they did, in the Capital.

I cannot but think, that, in attempting to supply, from any one point, (however central,) a country of such vast extent as Mexico, they have, in fact, repeated the error committed by the Spaniards, with merely a great reduction in the value of the goods brought into the market, in consequence of a great competition.

Thus, in the Capital, European manufactures have often been sold under prime cost, while the same articles, if landed upon other points of the coast, and properly spread through the country, without the addition of unnecessary land-carriage, (an expense always incurred when goods are transmitted through the Capital to the Interior,) might have been disposed of at a moderate rate of profit.

This was, perhaps, an unavoidable mistake at first, when the nature of the country was so little known ; but now that the effects of the system pursued have been felt, it has often been a matter of surprise to me, that, with some few exceptions,* there should not be an English house of respectability established any where but in the Capital, or, as agents, at the ports.

The consequence is, that a very large proportion of the British manufactures at present consumed in Mexico, pass entirely through the hands of North Americans ; and, after being landed by American ships at Tămpicō, Sõtō lă Mă-rîna, and Rĕfugiō, is disposed of, by American merchants, at San Luis Põtösĭ, and Săltillō, where they have formed establishments, and are in almost exclusive possession of the trade of the country.

The importance of this branch must not be estimated by its value in former times, for commerce, freed from artificial trammels, has, as usual, opened to itself a thousand new inlets ; and one of the first fruits of this salutary change has been to free the Northern Provinces from those evils, which Mr. Ramos Arizpe, so forcibly described in 1811.

They are now rising daily in prosperity, and have every prospect, from their vicinity to New Orleans, and from the

* The house of Ritchie and Co. at Guădălăjără, and that of Mr. Short, at Cŭliăcăn, have, I believe, had reason to be satisfied with the results of their departure from the general rule ; and I have little doubt that a similar experiment in each of the great towns of the Interior, would be eminently successful.

facility of their communication with the coast, of being as well provided with all necessary supplies as the Capital itself.

Similar advantages have been dealt out to the whole Mexican territory, by the Congress, with no sparing hand. The long line of coast, from the extremity of the Peninsula of Yucatān, to the boundary of the United States, is already frequented by foreign vessels; and, in due succession, from South to North, the ports of Sisāl, Cāmpēchē, Isla del Cārmen, Guāsacōalcō, Ālvārādō, Vērācrūz, Tūspān, Puēblō Viejō de Tāmpicō, Tāmpicō de las Tāmāulīpās, Sōtō lă Mărīnă (or Săntāndēr), Rēfūgiō, Săn Běrnārdō, and Galveston, have been thrown open to the trade with Europe, and serve as a medium of communication with the Table-land.

This, again, has led to the establishment of depôts, unconnected with the Capital, in the more Central and Northern Provinces, which receive their supplies direct from the nearest port.

Thus, San Luis Pōtōsī has become the depôt for Tāmpicō and Sōtō lă Mărīnă, from which it is about as far distant as Mexico is from Veracruz, (one hundred leagues,) whereas goods received *through* Veracruz and the Capital, would have to pay a land-carriage of two hundred and twenty leagues before reaching San Luis.

Cătōrcē is supplied in like manner, from Sōtō lă Mărīnă; Sătīllō, Mōntērēy, and Mōnclōvă, from Rēfūgiō; and Texas, from the Bay of Galveston, and the port of San Běrnārdō, between which places and New Orleans a communication by steam-boats is already organised.

On the Western coast, Gūadālājāră serves as a depôt to Săn Blăs; Cūliăcăn, Ālămōs, Cōsălă, and the other mining towns of Cīnălōă, with Dŭrăngō, (on the Table-land,) to Măzătlan; and the Villa del Fuertē, Arispe, (in Sonora,) Jēsūs Măriă, and Chīhŭāhuă, to Gūāymăs, a magnificent harbour in Lat. 28, about the centre of the Gulph of California.

Ācāpūlcō is likewise beginning to be again frequented, as the nearest harbour on the Western coast to the Capital, from which it is only distant ninety leagues.

This sudden extension of the channels of communication has, of course, increased the difficulty of giving any general view of the present amount of the trade of Mexico, or of analyzing the principal articles of which it consists.

It is, however, generally admitted, that the first effect of the Revolution of 1821, was to cause an immediate and extraordinary decrease in the Imports and Exports, the total amount of which, at Veracruz, fell, in 1821, to

1821, to	17,244,569
1822,	14,030,478
1823,	6,259,209

The change becomes still more sensible if applied to the Imports alone.

In 1821, they varied from their average value of 10,364,238 dollars, to 7,245,052 dollars, or about two-thirds.

In 1822, they declined to 3,723,019 dollars, or about one-third of their former amount.

In 1823, they rose slightly, being in all 3,913,019 dollars, that is, exceeding by 190,000 dollars the Imports of the preceding year, but still falling short of the former average by nearly two-thirds.

During the two first of the years mentioned above, the Imports and Exports of Veracruz may be taken as a fair estimate of those of the country in general, no other ports being, at that time, frequented: but in 1823, this was no longer the case. Twenty-three American vessels are known to have entered the port of Tāmpicō in that year; and at Veracruz, hostilities having commenced, in September, with the Castle of St. John, (then in the hands of the Spaniards,) the Custom-house was transferred to Alvarado, which became, for the time, the principal port of entry.

It would, therefore, be necessary to have an exact return of the trade both of Tampico, and of Alvarado, during the

four last months of 1823, in order to ascertain the real amount of the commerce of Mexico during that year; and this I have found it impossible to procure.

In 1826, an account was published of the trade of Alvarado in 1824, by which it appears that the total amount of the Imports and Exports was, dollars 15,158,941

The imports were	11,058,291
viz. :—	
Coasting Trade	284,087
American Produce	878,737
European Produce in American bottoms, principally through Cuba, and Yücātān,	3,481,831
European Imports direct	6,413,636
Total Imports	11,058,291
The Exports of 1824 were, in all,	4,098,650
dollars.	
The direct importation from Europe, at Veracruz, during the same period, was dollars	1,023,739
The Exports	593,907
Total Trade of Veracruz in 1824,	1,617,646

2,423,019 dollars of the 4,098,650 dollars to which the Exports from Alvarado amounted, were in silver, coined or wrought; as were 431,130 of the 593,907 dollars, exported through Veracruz.

The total amount of the Exports and Imports in the year, of the two ports, was 16,774,587 dollars.

viz. :—	
Total amount of Imports at Alvarado and Veracruz	12,082,030
Total Exports	4,692,557
	16,774,587

But, as I have already stated with regard to 1823, the trade of Alvarado and Veracruz in 1824, was not by any means the trade of Mexico ; for, although the British vessels chartered for the Gulph, still cleared exclusively at these two ports, no less than five thousand tons of American shipping are known to have been employed, in 1824, in the trade between Tampico and the United States.

It becomes, therefore, doubly necessary to ascertain the amount of this trade, (which consisted principally in the importation of European goods,) before any estimate can be formed of that of the country in general ; but this is unfortunately impossible ; no authentic information upon the subject, either public or private, having yet been obtained.

Allowing, however, four millions of dollars for the value of the Imports and Exports in the 5000 tons of shipping admitted to have been employed, and adding these four millions to the gross amount of the trade of Alvarado and Veracruz, (16,774,587 dollars,) there will be found to be but little difference between the trade of Mexico in 1824, and its annual average value before the declaration of Independence, viz.: 21,545,606 dollars, omitting, of course, the Imports and Exports on the account of the Royal Treasury, and taking only those comprehended in the Balanza General.

It was in the mode of introduction, and in the quality of the articles introduced, rather than in their aggregate amount, that the greatest change took place.

In 1821, the whole of the Imports, with the exception of 37,995 dollars, were introduced in Spanish bottoms, from Spain, or her immediate dependencies, without any intervention, or participation in the trade by any foreign power.

In 1822, the Imports from Spain and her dependencies amounted only to 2,553,255 dollars ; while the direct Imports from foreign countries rose to 1,169,764 dollars, or upwards of thirty times their amount in 1821.

In 1823, the Spanish Imports, at Alvarado and Veracruz,

fell to about one-fourth of their amount during the preceding year, being only 480,007 dollars; while the direct Imports from foreign ports rose to 2,090,732; without making any allowance for the twenty-three vessels from the United States which discharged at Tampico.

In 1824, the Imports from Europe direct at Alvarado and Veracruz, were 7,437,375 dollars, and those of European productions from Cuba, 3,481,831 dollars; (these last belonging strictly to the Imports from foreign ports, passing merely through the Havanna from its being a free port,) while no direct importation whatever from Spain took place. At Tampico, the trade was entirely in the hands of the United States; while at Alvarado, out of 18,730 tons of shipping registered in the year, 8,320 tons were from Europe direct.

These facts sufficiently show how entirely the channels of communication varied between 1821 and 1824. In the first of these years, not one foreign, in the last, not one Spanish vessel cleared at a Mexican port.

A change something similar occurred in the nature of the importations themselves.

Spanish silks, which, in 1821, were imported to the amount of 1,205,219 dollars, fell, in 1822, to 224,288 dollars. In 1823, they only reached 212,778 dollars, and in 1824, not a trace of them is to be found in the importation lists of Alvarado and Veracruz. Cottons rose in amount, as the silk importations decreased. In 1821, they only amounted to 888,726 dollars.

In 1823, they rose to 1,156,787 dollars, and, although the amount of the importations in 1824 has not been ascertained in any authentic shape, I should conceive, from the tonnage employed in the European trade, (of which cottons formed a most essential part,) that their value must have been, at least, two millions and a half of dollars.

Spanish wines and brandies, which, in 1821, were alone

known in Mexico, have been entirely supplanted by French, which, in 1824, appear to have been imported, through Alvarado and Veracruz alone, to the amount of 927,366 dollars, out of a total importation of 1,062,970 dollars.*

The native manufactures, of which I have spoken in the beginning of this Section, have shared the fate of those of Spain: they have fallen gradually into disuse, as the Mexicans have discovered that much better things may be obtained at a much lower price, and will soon disappear altogether. *Querétaro*, indeed, is still supported by a Government contract for clothing the army; but the cotton-spinners at *La Puebla*, and in other towns of the Interior, have been compelled to turn their industry into some other channel.

This, in a country where the population is so scanty, is not only not to be regretted, but may be regarded as advantageous: a few of the towns, indeed, may suffer by the change at first, but the general interests of the country will be promoted, as well as those of the foreign manufacturer, who may not only hope for a return in valuable raw produce for his manufactures, from the labour of these additional hands, but must see the demand for European productions increase, exactly in proportion to the decrease in the value of the home-made cotton and woollen manufactures, which averaged, before the Revolution, ten millions of dollars annually.

This sum is now added to the wants of the country, or, in other terms, to the amount of European manufactures annually consumed by New Spain.

Such are the principal changes produced by the Revolution in the intercourse between Mexico and Europe. It would be superfluous to trace them through all the minor branches of the actual trade of the country, nor have I the means of

* In making this calculation, I have taken as French, (or at least, not Spanish,) all the wine imported direct from Europe, with the brandy entered as *Aguardiente Frances*. The imports through Cuba I consider as Spanish produce.

doing so in an authentic shape, the returns from the different ports having been very irregular during the last three years, which have barely allowed time for the adoption of the measures necessary in order to afford some prospect of regularity in future.

To the West, the want of returns has been still greater, some of the ports now most frequented, (as Măzătlan and Gūāymās,) having had no Custom-house establishment at all before the end of 1825; while that of San Blas* was noted for the extreme laxity of its administration.

It will, therefore, be necessary to confine my investigations to the following points, upon which I shall hazard some general observations :

First, the amount of the trade of Mexico in 1827, estimated roughly by the produce of the Customs, and the number of ships employed.

Secondly. The probability of an increase, or decrease, in this amount, in the course of the next five years. And,

Thirdly. The system at present pursued with regard to Foreign trade, and the ameliorations of which it is susceptible.

The first of these points admits of something like evidence being adduced in support of any opinion that I may be inclined to form ; but the second leads, unavoidably, to much vague speculation, to which my readers will, of course, only attach importance in as far as they conceive the data, upon which it is founded, to be worthy of attention. The third, consists merely of a statement of facts, which it will not be necessary to enter into in great detail, as a new Tariff, which has long been in contemplation, will probably appear before my present work is concluded.

With regard to the first point under consideration, viz.

* The uninhabitable state of this port during five or six months of the year, (the rainy months,) may account in some measure for this laxity. At this season it is abandoned, the principal merchants betaking themselves to Tépíc.

“The amount of the trade of Mexico in 1827,” I have stated, that the first effect of the Revolution of 1821 was to occasion a sudden decrease in the commercial intercourse of Mexico with Europe; which was reduced, in three successive years, from Twenty-one millions and a half of dollars, (the annual average value up to 1821,) to Seventeen, Fourteen, and Six millions of dollars, to which it fell, at Veracruz, in 1823.

Allowing three millions more for the exports and imports of Alvarado and Tampico, we shall find the *bonâ fide* trade of Mexico, in 1823, not to have exceeded nine millions of dollars.

This sudden, and apparently unnatural diminution in the consumption of the country, at the very moment when it was first allowed to taste the advantages of a free trade with Europe, is explained, in part, by the simultaneous removal of those, by whom the commercial wants of Mexico had been previously supplied, and by the time required by foreign adventurers in order to make arrangements for entering upon a field, which was entirely new to them.

The whole of the year 1822, and a great part of 1823, were consumed in these arrangements, which were rendered very complicated by the necessity of opening some new line of communication with the Interior; Veracruz having become nearly useless as a port, in consequence of its vicinity to the Castle of Uloa.

The Old Spaniards too, who naturally relinquished with reluctance their hold upon the country, were still engaged in winding up their affairs; and, while this state of transition lasted, there was little to animate foreign speculators: nor was it until the commencement of 1824, that they acquired sufficient confidence in the stability of the new institutions of the country, and a sufficient knowledge of the most obvious channels of communication, to enter upon a commercial intercourse with Mexico, with any sort of activity.

The effects of it in that year, have been already shown. The trade of Alvarado and Veracruz, rose from Six to Sixteen millions and a half of dollars, (16,774,587,) while that with Tampico, which employed alone 5000 tons of American shipping, must have raised the total amount of the Imports and Exports of the year, to something very near the former average of 21,545,606 dollars.

The progress made since that time it is impossible exactly to define, for, although it would appear by the produce of the Custom-houses to be very considerable, (the receipts of the ten first months of the year 1826, having exceeded those of the *whole* of 1824, by three millions of dollars,) this may be said to demonstrate an improvement in the system of collecting the duties payable on foreign goods, rather than an increase in the amount of the goods themselves. When combined, however, with the number of vessels employed in the Mexican Trade, it affords a fair standard for regulating our opinions, and, as such, I shall state here the result of my enquiries.*

	Dollars.
In 1824, the Customs produced, during the whole year,	4,351,218
In eight months of 1825,	4,842,354
In ten months of 1826,	7,043,237

In 1823, the number of vessels which cleared, within the province of Veracruz, was, as follows :

* According to the official monthly statements, published by the Receiver-General of the Custom-house (Aduana) in the Veracruz paper, the Custom-house dues for June, July, and August, (three of the worst months of the year for trade, on account of the climate, rain, &c.) amounted to 1,200,000 dollars.

	Veracruz.	Alvarado.	Tampico.	Total.
British . . .	12	3	0	15
American . . .	34	15	23	72
Spanish . . .	30	0	9	39
Mexican . . .	18	0	0	18
French . . .	1	0	0	1
Danish . . .	1	1	0	2
Swedish . . .	1	0	0	1
	97	19	32	148

The tonnage at Veracruz, where alone it was registered, amounted to 8524 tons.

The returns in my possession for 1824, give no similar classification of vessels, and do not extend to Tampico. They merely state that one hundred and seventy-six vessels entered the ports of Alvarado and Veracruz, in the course of that year, the tonnage of which amounted to 18,730 tons. Thirty-nine of these vessels (tons 2836) were Mexican, (engaged in the coasting trade,) the remainder were all American or European; but the *Balanza* published by the Government, does not state whether the term *American* includes the island of Cuba, and whether there were any vessels from Spain amongst the sixty-one European vessels, which are stated to have entered the port.

It would, perhaps, be superfluous, to give an analysis of the year 1825, during which a slow, but steady progress was made. I shall, therefore, proceed at once to 1826, in the course of which the following vessels appear to have entered the Mexican ports.

From England . . .	55
The British West Indies . . .	25
Gibraltar . . .	15
	<hr/> 95

Carried forward . . 95

	Brought forward	95
France		49
Holland		15
Italy		6
Denmark		1
Hamburgh and Bremen		2
Sweden		1
Prussia		1
Spain		1
The United States		399
Lima, Guyaquil, and other ports in the Pacific		46
Columbia		6
China		5
Asia		2
Whalers on the Coast of California for refreshment		10
	Total	639
Prizes from Sea		8
Entries of National Vessels		626
	Total	1273

It must be admitted that this extraordinary increase of activity in the intercourse between the New and the Old World, taken in conjunction with the rise in the Customs from Four to Eight millions of dollars, (allowing something less than One million for the two months not included in the receipts of 1826,) augurs well in favour of the growing importance of Mexican Trade. It may not indeed, as yet, realize the golden visions of those, who, in 1825, regarded the New World as a source of instantaneous wealth; but it certainly holds out to a well-regulated spirit of commercial enterprise, a prospect of great ulterior advantages. I have not the means of determining exactly the present extent of those

advantages; for it is impossible, from the arbitrary nature of the valuations, upon which the Import duties are paid, to take the amount of these duties as any criterion of the value of the Imports themselves: I should conceive, however, that a trade in which six hundred and twenty-nine merchant vessels from Europe, the United States, Asia, and the Southern coasts of the Pacific, have found employment, must be more valuable, in the ratio of nearly three to one, than a trade in which two hundred and ten vessels only were engaged.

Yet such is the amount of the Shipping returns for 1824, if we add to the one hundred and seventy-six vessels registered at Alvarado and Veracruz, thirty-four more for the five thousand tons of American shipping registered at Tampico during the same year. If, therefore, the trade of 1824 nearly equalled the annual average amount before the Revolution, (Twenty-one millions and a half of dollars,) that of 1826 must have very considerably exceeded it.

It is in the Imports that the change principally consists; for the exportable Agricultural Produce of the country has varied but little since 1824. It is composed almost entirely of the Precious Metals, Cochineal, a little Indigo, Vanilla, Logwood, Jalap, and Zarzaparilla, Tabascan Cacao, and Pepper, with Cotton, Hides, and Flour, which are beginning to become of some importance in the North.

Sufficient time has not yet elapsed for the average value of these different articles to be ascertained. Indeed, it must, for many years, be subject to continual variations; as, while the impulse recently given to the country continues, the produce will increase with the facility of exchanging it for European productions, and, consequently, no calculation upon the subject can be hazarded.

At present, however, the whole of the Silver raised does not more than cover the difference between the value of the Imports and that of the exportable Agricultural Produce,

the Coinage of all the Mints in 1826 having only amounted to 8,451,000 dollars, while the registered exportation of Specie during the same period exceeded Seven millions and a half.

It may, perhaps, be interesting, in the absence of more authentic data, to trace the progress of some of the different Custom-houses established at the ports, which have been opened to Foreign Trade since 1824, as their receipts, under all the disadvantages of a system new in all its parts, and confided, in its first application, to agents unfitted, in many instances, by long habits of corruption, for any very strenuous exertions, afford, certainly, the very best evidence of increasing commercial activity. I shall, therefore, give a Comparative Table of their amount :—

		Produce in dollars.	
		1824.	1826, 10 months.
Campeche	.	115,033	157,464
Isla del Carmen	.	.	19,280
Tabasco	.	7,446	36,682
Tămpicō (Pueblo Viejo)	.	367,680	480,195
Tămpicō de Tămăulipās	.	.	326,640
Refugio and Soto la Marina, in	{	1823 . 14,538	378,734
	{	1824 . 113,119	
Acapulco	{	1821 . 20,362	422,343
	{	1824 . 100,308	
Măzătlan	.	30,392	125,298
Guāymās in 1821	.	26,736	44,676

I must again state that the sums given in the preceding Table are not meant to convey any idea of the *value* of the Imports introduced through the different ports, but merely to show what has been done towards the organization of a system, by which the amount of these Imports may, hereafter, be ascertained.

Smuggling prevails at present, to a most disgraceful extent,

both upon the Eastern,* and the Western coast. A very large proportion of the European manufactures transmitted through the United States, pays no duties; and there is little doubt that it is the hope of introducing their cargoes upon similar terms, (in conjunction with some local grievances, to which I shall have occasion to allude presently,) that has induced the masters of so many merchant ships, on the Pacific side, to desert the port of San Blas, and to clear at Măzătlan and Gūāymăs, where, until 1825, there was no Custom-house establishment at all.

All these circumstances render it impossible to hazard a calculation with regard to the actual consumption of Mexico; as neither the amount of the Imports, nor that of the Exports, nor any fair estimate of the illicit trade, can be obtained.

That it must exceed that of 1824 is evident; and it is equally clear that the quantity of European manufactures consumed must be infinitely greater (perhaps in the ratio of eight or ten to one,) than at any period before the Revolution, when a profit of a hundred and fifty per cent. was obtained upon every article; whereas, at present, the sale but too frequently does not cover the freight, duties, and prime cost. Beyond this point, however, I cannot go; nor do I believe that there is any one in Mexico sufficiently acquainted with all the ramifications of the trade to supply the information required.

I shall, therefore, proceed, at once, to the second point of enquiry; viz. "The probability of an increase or decrease in the amount of the Mexican trade, (whatever that may be) in the course of the next five years."

This question involves several important considerations;

* Principally by small American schooners with the northern ports of Tampico, Sotto de la Marina, &c. &c. Smuggling in Veracruz, in consequence of an improved system in their Custom-house, &c. is rendered very difficult; indeed, it is now confined almost entirely to the richer and less bulky sort of goods—silk, silk stockings, &c. &c.

for, in order to determine whether the demand for the products of European industry in Mexico, has already reached its full, or natural extent, it is necessary to ascertain what the state of the country was in 1824, and in how far its resources may be said to have developed themselves in the course of the last two years.

In 1824, Mexico may be said to have commenced its recovery from the effects of a Civil war of fourteen years' duration, in the course of which the country had been not only exhausted, but gradually drained of a very large proportion of its capital. The Old Spaniards, in whose hands this capital had accumulated, began, at a very early period of the struggle for Independence, to provide for a contingency, the probability of which they foresaw, by transferring the great bulk of their convertible property to Europe.

Some, indeed, remained, and retained a sufficient portion of their funds to give a certain activity to trade, and to promote particular branches of industry; but even the most hardy withdrew as soon as the separation from the Mother-country became inevitable, and, in the years 1821 and 1822, the whole remaining surplus capital of Mexico, was, if I may use the expression, abstracted from the circulation.

Of the amount of this capital no exact estimate can be obtained, a great part of it having been conveyed out of the country by secret channels.* The Mexicans affirm that it exceeded one hundred millions of dollars; (the calculations of the best informed of those whom I have consulted upon the subject, varying from eighty, to one hundred and forty millions,) a very large proportion of which was actually exported in gold or silver.

This sudden diminution of the circulating medium could only have occurred in a Colony, compelled, like Mexico, by peculiar circumstances, to depend, in a great measure, upon a

* I shall have occasion to investigate this subject more accurately in Book IV.

capital not strictly its own. In the best regulated community it must have occasioned great embarrassment and distress, but in a country of lavish expenditure and improvident habits, it almost destroyed, for the time, the possibility of improvement.

All the sources of National wealth were dried up; and, as the period of the greatest diminution of the circulating medium coincided with that of the greatest depression in the mines, it is probable that, without external assistance, the kingdom could not have recovered from the state of depression, to which it was reduced by such a concurrence of unfavourable circumstances.

This assistance was given by this country, partly in the shape of Loans, and partly in that of remittances made by the different Mining Companies for the prosecution of the works in which they are severally engaged.

The amount of both was trifling in comparison with the capital withdrawn; but it was sufficient to call into new life some of the natural resources of the country, and to give to the system that impulse, the effects of which I have traced in the preceding pages.

That these effects should, in the short space of three years, be so considerable, is no mean proof both of the capabilities of the country, and of the advantages which it derives from its freedom from former trammels; but they cannot be regarded as a fair criterion of what the commercial wants of Mexico will be, when improvement is no longer confined to the first, and most essential, elements of future prosperity, but extends, gradually, to the more important branches of its former agricultural industry.

The mines, as yet, have made no returns; and, although the capital employed in working them has produced the most beneficial effects upon those branches of Agriculture and Trade, with which they are more immediately connected, yet, it is to the *produce* of the mines, and not merely to the capital

by which that produce is sought, that we must look for permanent improvement.

The sums now expended may increase the supply of necessities in the Interior, and give to the landed proprietors, in the vicinity of the Mining Districts, the means of obtaining European manufactures, which they could not otherwise afford; but they have no tendency to produce a surplus of those articles in which the most valuable Exports of Mexico are likely hereafter to consist, most of which, (as Sugar, Indigo, and Coffee,) require the employment of a small capital in their cultivation, before they can rise into importance.

This capital the mines must supply; for they alone can remedy the deficiency in the circulating medium of Mexico, which has checked so many useful projects, and retarded, hitherto, the progress, that might otherwise have been made.

In a country where three per cent. per month has been obtained for money in the capital, (and that, too, on the most undeniable security,) there is but little inducement to capitalists to invest their funds in agricultural speculations. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the last three years, little should have been done towards turning to account those advantages, which might be derived from the diversity of the climate, and the variety of the productions, on the Eastern slope of the Cordillera.

Under any circumstances this must have been the work of time, for the maritime districts are not only thinly inhabited, but are remarkable for the listless and indolent character of the population, which seems to increase in proportion to the bounty of nature, and the consequent facility of obtaining a supply of the necessities of life.

Thus Veracruz, which, (after leaving the sea-coast,) in variety of productions, and fertility of soil, can be surpassed by no district of equal extent in the world, has a population not exceeding 250,000 individuals of every description, of whom it is supposed that not more than two-fifths are em-

ployed in the cultivation of a space of 4,141 square leagues: the remainder are inhabitants of the towns, either engaged in trade, or living in idleness. Nearly the same results would be given by an enquiry into the amount and distribution of the population upon the Western Coast; and the difficulty of rousing to exertion a society thus constituted, undoubtedly presents a very serious obstacle to any rapid improvement.

But still improvements have been found practicable wherever proper inducements have been held out for any length of time. The sugar, which formed so important an item in the Exports of Mexico before the Revolution, and amounted, in the years 1802 and 1803 to 1,500,000 dollars annually, was all raised in the Province of Veracruz, by free labour; the slaves imported during that period having borne no proportion to the increase in the produce.

The cultivation of Coffee and Tobacco about Cordova, at the present day, is conducted in a similar manner, nor has it been found difficult to procure a sufficient number of labourers to extend the quantity of land under cultivation, so as to keep pace with the increasing demand. Of the activity displayed throughout the valley of Cūāūtla, (which, though not a Maritime province, is Tierra Caliente, and consequently resembles the inland parts of Veracruz in climate,) I have spoken largely in Section III., Book I.; nor do I find any reason to vary the opinion there expressed, respecting the possibility, and even the probability, of great, though gradual improvements.

But these cannot be expected to be of spontaneous growth: they require time, they require exertion, they require capital; and the two last of these again depend, in a great measure, upon the mines, which, by increasing the circulating medium, must give the means, and with the means the inclination to promote those branches of agriculture best calculated to make a fair return for the time and capital employed upon them.

Should that increase in the produce of the mines, to which

I confidently look, take place as soon as I have been taught to expect, (*vide* Book IV.) the term, within which its effects will be felt, can hardly, I should think, exceed the five years, to which I have limited my present enquiry.

But, be it sooner, or be it later, the trade of Mexico, with reference to the amount of its present population, will not reach what I should term its *natural* limits, until the amount of Silver raised again equals the average annual amount of that raised before the Revolution, viz. : Twenty-four millions of dollars : nor do I conceive that any rapid increase in the present demand for European manufactures can be looked for, unless it be preceded by as rapid an improvement in the mines.*

It is probable, from the low prices of most European manufactures during the last year, and the difficulty of realising even the most moderate profit, that the imports of 1826 rather exceed the amount of what the country is able, under present circumstances, to consume ; in which case a decrease of activity in the intercourse with Europe, will appear upon the returns of 1827.

This circumstance is of little importance ; as, until things find their proper level, such fluctuations must frequently occur. But there is no prospect of seeing the demand fall far short of that which now exists, since, in local, as in mental improvement, each step in advance facilitates the next, and Mexico has already surmounted the greatest difficulty, the commencement of a new career.

Without pretending, therefore, to fix the ultimate value of her Commerce to Europe, or to Great Britain in particular, I

* The want of returns will necessarily limit the imports of manufactures from Europe ; for, as observed before, the loans, and the advances made by the Mining Companies, have hitherto, to a certain degree, encouraged the imports of English manufactures, by furnishing remittances, which would not otherwise have been found for the English exporter.

confess that I cannot but regard it as likely to acquire great and lasting importance.

It can be checked by nothing but the most injudicious legislative interference, on the part of the Mexican Government; and this I see no reason, at present, to apprehend; for, however ill-judged many parts of the present system may be, there has been a gradual tendency towards improvement, during the last three years, which augurs well for the future, and warrants the expectation of a better order of things.

This brings me to the third and last subject of enquiry, viz. :—"The present system with regard to Foreign Trade, and the ameliorations of which it is susceptible."

The duties on Exports and Imports, in all the ports of Mexico, are founded upon a Tariff, established by the Junta Suprema Gubernativa, (or First Independent Government,) in January 1822, but modified in some points, by subsequent acts of Congress.

According to this Tariff, a customs duty of twenty-five per cent. was made payable on all kinds of goods from all countries; which duty was to be paid upon a value assigned to each separate article by the Tariff, calculated upon the prices that had existed during the monopoly of the Mother-country.

Besides the Customs, there was a sort of Excise paid in the towns where the various articles were consumed, under the denomination of *Álcavāla*, the average amount of which was twelve per cent. although on wines and brandies it was thirty-five and forty per cent. There were, also, certain Municipal duties levied in the inland towns by the *Ayuntamientos*, or Corporations, which, however, seldom exceeded one and a half per cent.

Both the *Alcavalas*, (which belonged to the National Treasury,) and the Municipal duties, were abolished by the law of the 4th of August, 1824, by which the revenues of the Federation were classed; and, in lieu of them, a duty of Fifteen per cent. on all goods forwarded from the ports into the Interior, was established, (*Derecho de internacion*,) while

another duty of Three per cent. was granted to the States on the articles consumed in their respective territories.

This change, although it raised in fact the duties payable on Foreign Imports, from $38\frac{1}{2}$ to 43 per cent.,* was, nevertheless, an advantage to the merchant, as nothing could be so great an obstacle to the progress of Trade as the constant recurrence of the Alcavala, for which, though levied by certain fixed regulations, there was no established scale of value. This important point was left to the discretion of the Vista, (or inspector,) whose valuation, of course, varied in proportion to the price at which an understanding with him was purchased.

Under the present system, the Internation duty is paid upon the same valuation as the Customs, and to the same officers, by which the possibility of collusion, or of arbitrary valuations, is much diminished.

Goods when landed, are lodged in the Custom-house, where they remain until they are "dispatched," as it is termed. This consists in their being examined by the Vista, who determines the value according to the Tariff, which ought to be done within forty days after the goods have been landed. A term of three months is allowed for the payment of the duties.†

* Customs . . .	25	Customs . . .	25
Alcavalas . . .	12	Internation duty . .	15
Municipal dues . .	$1\frac{1}{2}$	Derecho de consumo . .	3
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	$38\frac{1}{2}$		43

† It will be seen by this statement, that for the duties on goods intended for the city of Mexico, it is necessary for the merchant resident in the city, to send dollars to Veracruz. To obviate the needless transmission of dollars, which will in part, if not wholly, have to be returned to the General Treasury in Mexico, the merchants in the city pay one half in specie and give security for the payment of the other half in the city of Mexico, they allowing the Government three or four per cent. on the amount, as an equivalent to the risk of sending the dollars to the coast, and the Government, on the other hand, giving a little extension to the time for paying the moiety of the duties into the General Treasury.

Established houses, or individuals giving adequate security, are permitted to forward their goods into the interior, without paying the duties until the expiration of the term fixed by law; but individuals without security, or establishments, must pay before removal.

Whatever is not prohibited by the Tariff, may be landed in any of the ports of the Republic, and warehoused, until a reference to Government can be made.

Articles not mentioned in the Tariff, are valued by a Vista, or Inspector, with the concurrence of the Administrator, or Collector, and the value is regulated by that of the articles most analogous.

Quicksilver, Mathematical and Surgical instruments, useful Machinery, Books, Drawings and Casts, Music, Seeds, and Plants, Flax, (hackled and unhackled,) and animals of all kinds, are exempted from the payment of any duty.

The exportation of unwrought Gold and Silver* is prohibited, but all other produce may be exported. The following articles only are subject to the payment of a duty on quitting the Mexican territory.

	Per Cent.
Gold (coined)	2
Gold wrought	1
Silver (coined)	3½
Silver wrought	3
Cochineal (fine) the value being fixed at sixty dollars, per Arroba of twenty-five pounds weight	6
Cochineal Dust (at ten drs. per Arroba)	6
Cochineal inferior ditto	6
Vanilla (value fixed at forty dollars a thousand)	10

Ships of all nations, with the exception of Spain, (whose flag is excluded on account of the war,) are admitted into the

* An application is now before Congress for allowing the exportation of Silver in bars, upon the payment of the Export duty according to the value of the bar, assayed and certified by the Mint.

ports of Mexico, on the payment of the established duties; which consist of a Tonnage duty of twenty reals (two and a half dollars) per ton, with the Anchorage and Harbour dues levied on Mexican vessels in the countries to which foreign vessels severally belong.

The Export duties are payable at once.

The *Derecho de Internacion* is not paid upon goods consumed upon the coast, but only upon taking out the *Guia*, or Pass, for their introduction into the Interior.

After goods have been "dispatched," the duties, to which they are declared liable, must be paid, without any abatement or reduction whatever, unless in cases where an error in the calculation, or in the payment can be proved.

Such is the Tariff which has subsisted during the last six years, more from the difficulty of agreeing upon a better, than from any peculiar excellence in the present system, the defects of which are but too apparent, and have led to a great deal of disagreeable discussion.

It is not of the amount of the duties that foreign merchants complain, so much as of the absurd scale of valuations, upon which these duties are paid.

The value of the Imports permitted by the Tariff was fixed, (as I have already stated,) in the first instance, not upon sworn *ad valorem* invoices, as is the case in most other countries, but upon an estimate of the current prices during the monopoly of the Mother-country; so that in lieu of forty-three and a-half per cent., one hundred, and one hundred and fifty per cent. is, in fact, paid, upon many articles, which are rated in the Tariff at five and six times their real value.

Where these excessive duties do not operate as an absolute prohibition, they hold out such a premium to the illicit trader, that a great part of the commerce of the country, is unavoidably thrown into his hands, to the detriment of the established merchant; and this system is already carried to such an extent in Mexico, that Cottons, which could not have

been retailed under five reals a yard, had the duty upon them been paid, were publicly sold in the Capital, (in 1825,) at *three* reals, and that in such quantities, that established houses were obliged to dispose of commission cargoes, at a loss of thirty and forty per cent., in order to realise something for their correspondents in England.

This evil was corrected a little by the gradual organization of the Custom-house establishments upon the coast: these diminished, in some places, the facility, with which the smuggling trade had previously been carried on; but there is reason to believe, that at the present moment, nearly one-third* of the whole of the European manufactures consumed in Mexico, is introduced without the payment of any duty.

In 1826, the Congress appeared to be sensible of the injury which the Revenue sustained from such a state of things, and seemed inclined to apply the only effectual remedy, by reducing the duties. A committee of the Chamber of Deputies, after a long investigation of invoice prices, compiled from them a scale of valuations, in which most of the errors of the old Tariff were corrected; and proposed, (besides) an additional reduction of Fourteen per cent. in the duties payable upon these valuations, so that the total reduction would have amounted to nearly fifty per cent.

This project was adopted by the Lower House, but rejected by the Senate, and the sessions of 1826 terminated without any understanding between the two Chambers having been effected.

In the present Congress, nothing has yet been done, but as the Tariff appears to be one of the principal objects of the extraordinary sessions, (November, 1827,) there is reason to suppose, that, early in the ensuing year, some new arrangement will take place.

In addition to the modification of the Duties, which, for

* It is difficult to fix the exact proportion. One-third part seems a great deal, and yet, in the Northern ports, it is thought to exceed this.

their own sakes, the Mexicans must, sooner or later, adopt, there are other essential points, in which a change is hardly less requisite.

Very great inconvenience has been occasioned by that part of the existing regulations, by which the Coasting trade is reserved to National vessels; for, by a strange misinterpretation of this article, Foreign merchant ships arriving on the coast of Mexico with a cargo of goods consigned to different ports, and different correspondents, are forced to discharge the whole, at the first port which they enter, and to procure, at an enormous expense, Mexican small craft to convey the goods intended for other ports, to the place of their destination, or to send them overland, which, in most cases, from the total want of roads, and the greatness of the distance, is impracticable.

The mischief done by such a regulation as this, in a country where, both to the East and West, the population is scanty, and the extent of the line of coast enormous, is incalculable: a cargo, for instance, part of which, if landed at Tampico, or Refugio, might be disposed of to advantage, becomes of no value if landed in toto, at Veracruz, and sent inland to the already glutted market of the Capital; and yet the same vessel may have other goods on board, totally unfit for the Northern market. But, after once breaking bulk, she is not allowed to re-embark any part of her original cargo, and is, therefore, compelled to re-ship one portion of it on board a Mexican coasting-vessel, which process is attended not only with great loss of time, but considerable additional risk.

On the Western coast, another regulation prevails, of a still more oppressive nature: merchant vessels proceeding from Europe round Cape Horn, generally carry out an assorted cargo, calculated to answer the demand of all the different ports at which they may touch. Many of the articles prohibited in Mexico are not contraband in Chile, Peru,

Colombia, and Guätēmālā, all of which have ports upon the Pacific.

A vessel may, therefore, naturally have on board goods for all these different markets; and if there be no attempt at concealment, these goods cannot fairly be assumed to be brought into a Mexican port with any fraudulent intention. But such is not the spirit of the present code of Mexico; for, should a vessel thus circumstanced, from a wish to dispose, first, of the Mexican part of her cargo, enter a Mexican harbour, the whole of the property on board, not included in the Tariff of the Republic, is confiscated, although the invoice may prove this property to be destined for another market.

The case actually occurred in 1826 with the Peruvian brig "Huasco," bound from Callao, to Gŷyăqŷil, and Rěălějő, (in Guatemala). After discharging the part of her cargo destined for Guyaquil, she proceeded to San Blas with a freight of Cacao for the Mexican market, intending to touch, on her return, at Rěălějő, with the rest of her cargo; which, on her arrival at San Blas, was duly manifested, and deposited in the National warehouses. The Cacao was disposed of; but, on making the usual application for leave to re-embark the goods destined for Guätēmālā, the Supercargo was informed that these goods were contraband, and confiscated to the State. An appeal was made to the tribunals in vain; and, after a law-suit of four months, during which time the vessel was incurring a very heavy expense, the rainy season having set in, the Supercargo was compelled to return to Peru with the total loss of a part of his cargo, and the abandonment of his intended voyage to Rěălějő.

Another very general cause of complaint is the Warehousing system, more particularly as practised upon the Western coast. At Veracruz, and Tampico, there are proper magazines for the reception of the goods when landed; but at San Blas, the only warehouse is situated in the town, at a considerable distance from the landing-place, and upon the top of

a very steep hill; whereby much delay, inconvenience, and loss, is unavoidably occasioned. The damage to fine goods; the breakage of glass and crockery; and the leakage in spirits and wine, in discharging, carrying inland, warehousing, unstowing, carrying back again to the beach, and re-shipping, in the event of re-exportation, independent of the expense incurred in mule hire and labour, amounts, upon each cargo, to a very large sum. Nor is this all: the magazines themselves are infested by a species of white ant, called *el comajen*, which attacks every thing, and destroys, in an incredibly short time, whatever it does attack. All these disadvantages, combined with a difference in the mode of levying the *Derecho de Internacion*, which is exacted upon all goods at San Blas, (whether sent into the Interior, or not,) at the expiration of a term of ninety days, and an additional duty of two and a half per cent. (under the name of *Ävēřĩă*) paid upon the exportation of Specie, have nearly destroyed the trade of San Blas, which, at one time, had acquired considerable importance. Merchant vessels, latterly, have proceeded, almost uniformly, to Măzătłān and Gūāymăs, where, from there being no Government establishments, the warehousing of goods, and even the payment of duties at all, have not been very strictly enforced. It is to be hoped that the Executive will take warning by the fate of San Blas; for, otherwise, the establishment of a Custom-house at the new ports will only serve as a signal to the importers of foreign goods to seek other channels of communication with the Interior; and the Revenue will be defrauded, at the same time that the security of fair commercial enterprise is destroyed. The evil can only be corrected by the reform of abuses, which compel even the most respectable houses to have recourse to smuggling, as the only means of saving their property from destruction.

One of the most serious defects of the present regulations still remains to be mentioned,—the power given to the Vista, or Inspector, of admitting articles not expressly included in

the Tariff, at a valuation, regulated by that of the article most analogous.

The extent to which this provision might operate, was not, at first, foreseen; but, in the course of the last three years, so many articles of European manufacture, formerly unknown in Mexico, have found their way to its shores, that very great room has been left for the exercise of the discretionary powers, with which the Vistas were intrusted.

Amongst the articles not included in the old Arancel, were British Plain Cotton* goods, for which no specific valuation was fixed, and which were, consequently, estimated by the valuation of India Cottons, (to which they were supposed most to approximate,) with a reduction in the valuations in proportion to the inferiority of the goods.

Thus, India Cottons were estimated at four and five reals per vara, and British, (of the same widths) at two and three reals; on which valuations the duties were calculated, and paid.

This arrangement remained in force for upwards of two years, with the implied (though not specific) approbation of the Government; and was regarded, by the merchants, as equally valid with the other articles of the Tariff, upon the faith of which the trade with Mexico was conducted: Cottons became one of the principal articles of importation, and the sale was so favourable in 1825, that very extensive orders were given for 1826, no less than five vessels with cargoes,

* The cotton goods here alluded to, are those known in Manchester by the name of "Long Cloths," being an imitation of those imported from India formerly, and indeed at present to a limited extent. But in this important article of commerce, England is likely to be outdone by the recent manufacturing establishments of the United States. Their coarse, grey, or unbleached long cloths already supersede the British in the markets of the Brazils and Mexico.

A considerable trade in this article is now carried on with the Indian Archipelago; such has been the extraordinary revolution of the cotton trade of the East Indies.

principally of Cotton goods, having entered the ports of Veracruz, and Tampico, in October and November of that year.

But, at the very moment when these vessels were about to clear, a question was raised in the Senate, respecting the legality of the reduced valuations adopted in 1824; and the Minister of Finance was desired to state, by what authority British Cottons had been allowed to be imported on terms more favourable than India cottons, for which alone a valuation was fixed by the Arancel?

The Minister, in lieu of explaining the circumstances of the case, and pointing out the impossibility of levying the same duties upon articles, the intrinsic value of which differed so materially, threw the whole responsibility of what had been done upon the Custom-house officers on the coast, who, in self-defence, were compelled to inform the merchants, that no Cottons would be thenceforward admitted, but upon the payment of the full duties, in lieu of those payable upon the reduced valuations.

The injustice of such an innovation, (amounting in fact to a prohibition) at the very moment when great importations were about to be made, in full confidence that no change could take place in the established Tariff, without due warning being given, was strongly represented to the Mexican Government; and the Executive was so far convinced of the impolicy of the measure, that an appeal to Congress was made against it, and the goods recently imported were allowed to remain in Deposit, until the point at issue should be decided.

The discussion was protracted, and the result long doubtful, for the question involved private, as well as public, interests. Nothing was determined by the Congress of 1826, nor was it until the end of February, 1827, that a return to the old duties of two and three reals per vara, was decreed by the Chamber of Deputies. The concurrence of the Senate

was subsequently obtained, (16th of March,) but, from the vague terms in which it was worded, another doubt arose as to whether the Import duties were to be paid on the goods being "dispatched," at the Custom-house on the coast, (most of them having been in Deposit three and four months,) or whether the ninety days, allowed by law for the payment of the duties, were to be reckoned from the date of the decision of the Congress respecting the valuations.

Upon this point, a verbal promise had been given by Mr. Esteva, who agreed, at a very early period of the discussion, that, from the moment that the appeal against the increased valuations was entered, and admitted by the Government, the time which might intervene between the date of this appeal, and the decision of the Chambers respecting it, should not be included in the legal term of Deposit.

But Mr. Esteva having quitted the ministry, his successor, (Mr. Salgado,) did not, at first, conceive himself to be bound by this promise, and refused to interpret the silence of the Senate with regard to a point, upon which, as far as British interests were concerned, the whole question turned; —as, to most of the houses concerned, the immediate payment of the duties, which amounted to no less a sum than Seven hundred thousand dollars, (£140,000,) would have been hardly less disadvantageous than the re-exportation of the goods.

The Collectors upon the coast, left again to act upon their own responsibility, insisted, of course, upon the payment of the duties as soon as the goods were withdrawn from the Government Magazines, and, in some instances, actually proceeded to enforce it. The consequence was, that new representations to the Government became necessary, and business was, once more, at a stand, until the point was referred by the Ministers to the President himself, who, immediately, decided it in favour of the merchants, and directed orders to be given to the Collectors upon the coast, so clear, and defini-

tive, that no doubt or difficulty afterwards occurred, and things resumed at once their usual course.

All this unpleasant, and tedious discussion, originated, (as has been shown) in the exercise of a discretionary power in a case where every article of the mutual compact ought to have been most explicitly defined. Fortunately, the disadvantages inseparable from such a state of things were corrected, in the instance under consideration, by a strong sense of justice in the Executive; and it must be admitted, that, however good the abstract right of the merchants might be, to claim the indulgence which they at last obtained, it does no little credit to the Mexican government that it should, at a moment of some pecuniary embarrassment,* have given up, for three months, so large a sum as seven hundred thousand dollars, which were almost within its grasp.

The fairness with which I have stated, in this Section, the disadvantages under which the commerce with Mexico is, at present, carried on, may be regarded as some proof that I have not, intentionally, overrated its importance. Many of the present abuses will, I trust, be gradually removed, for, in the reports of the Commissioners who have been employed by the Government to inspect the Custom-house establishments upon the coast, I observe that most of the grievances mentioned in this Section, are noted as requiring redress. This is more particularly the case in a printed report lately published by Mr. Valdez, who was sent, as a Special Inspector to San Blas, and whose opinion concurs entirely with that of His Majesty's Consul, Mr. Barron, with regard to the causes which have reduced the trade of that port, in two years, from 500,000 to 94,000 dollars. It is from such investigations as these, originating at home, and conducted by natives, that

* The dividends for the July quarter, remitted by the Primrose, were then making up, and the government was very anxious, on this account, to augment, as much as possible, the funds at its disposal upon the coast.

conviction and improvement may be expected; but time is necessary to bring them to maturity, and on this account I should regard it almost as a desirable event if the present Tariff were allowed to remain a little longer unchanged. The commercial interests of the country will be better understood in 1828 than they are in 1827; although, since 1821, great progress has, undoubtedly, been made: and as, when a reform is effected, it is to be wished that it should be permanent, the more time that is allowed for reflecting upon it the better.

The revenue of Mexico, however, (of which the Customs form so important a branch,) will never attain its full extent, until the system has received all the ameliorations of which it is susceptible.

If changes are judiciously made, and the duties so reduced as to bring the imports more within the reach of the great body of consumers, (who are now either excluded from the market, or forced to purchase their supplies from the illicit trader,) I am inclined to believe that the whole expenses of the Republic may be provided for by the produce of the Customs alone. Under all the disadvantages of the present system, they have yielded, in ten months, 7,043,238 dollars, and I have estimated their produce for the ensuing year at eight millions.

Without pretending to fix the ratio of increase afterwards, or to determine the period within which it may be expected to take place, (for both of these depend upon the proceedings of the legislature,) the facts contained in the preceding pages will, I think, demonstrate its possibility. The rest, time, and the gradual influence of experience upon the Mexicans themselves, must determine. I must repeat, however, that during the last three years the way has been prepared for the introduction of a better order of things. Communications have been opened between the most distant points; the post-office has been re-organized, (although much room

for improvement in that department still remains,) and a system of general passports established, by which foreigners are secured against the petty persecutions to which they were formerly exposed, on the part of the local authorities. The prejudices originally entertained against them are likewise subsiding, and it is my belief that, with these prejudices, no small portion of the jealousy felt with regard to their supposed fraudulent intentions in trade, will likewise disappear.

Happy indeed will Mexico be when the Congress discovers that the interests of the Government, if rightly understood, are not only not incompatible with those of the established merchant, but are so far identified with them, that commerce and the revenue must stand or fall together. Then, and then only, will Mexico attain that station which she seems destined to hold hereafter amongst the great communities of the world; for then, and then only, can the wonderful capabilities of her soil, and the not less wonderful abundance of her mineral treasures, be turned to full account.

BOOK IV.



B O O K IV.

THE MINES OF MEXICO. — GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. — SUBJECT, HOW DIVIDED.

THE large capitals invested by British subjects during the last four years, in the Mines of Mexico, and the differences of opinion that have prevailed, upon this side of the Atlantic, with regard to these speculations, induced me, at a very early period of my residence in New Spain, to devote a good deal of attention to this subject, and to endeavour to turn my stay in the country to account, by collecting all the information respecting it, that it was possible for me to obtain. I had not, however, prosecuted my enquiries long, when the investigation, which private curiosity had prompted me to undertake, became a public duty, circular orders having been transmitted to his Majesty's Agents in the New World to endeavour to ascertain the exact amount of Silver raised, and exported, in the countries in which they severally resided, during a term of thirty years; an account of which was to be forwarded to Government, together with an estimate of the probable future produce.

In the execution of these orders, I was obliged to embrace the question of Mining, (in as far as Mexico is concerned,) in

the greatest possible extent ; for it was necessary to procure, and embody, all the most authentic data now extant, with regard to the former produce of the Mines, and the proportion borne by that produce to the exports of precious metals from the different ports of New Spain, before I could feel myself warranted in hazarding an opinion, at all, upon a subject so vast and so important in its bearings.

The future produce of the country, again, depended, in a great measure, upon the issue of the present attempt to work the Mines by the aid of Foreign Capital ; while the probability of bringing each of the several undertakings, in which this capital is invested, to a more or less favourable conclusion, could only be ascertained by putting myself into communication with the Directors of the different Companies, and by visiting, in person, such of the principal Districts as were not so very far removed from the Capital, as to render it impossible to reach them, without a sacrifice of time, of which my other occupations would not admit.

In the course of these enquiries, I have collected a considerable mass of information ; and although, from my total ignorance of mineralogy, I have derived less benefit from my personal observations than I might have done, had I been better prepared for the task, yet, in one respect, this very deficiency may have proved an advantage, since it compelled me to confine my investigations to subjects, of which I was better able to judge than of the quality of the ores ; viz. the mode in which the general proceedings of the Companies have been conducted ; the feelings of the natives with regard to them ; the local advantages which they possess ; the difficulties which they have had to surmount ; the extent of the outlay of each ; the progress already made in their respective works ; and the expectations which that progress seems to warrant, with regard to the future.

Upon all these points, the opinion of an impartial observer will not (I hope) be unacceptable to those engaged in Trans-

atlantic Mining adventures ; while, to others, it may be interesting to learn in how far those denunciations of fraudulent schemes, and Stock Exchange speculations, with which the Press has abounded during the last two years, and to which property to such an extent has been sacrificed, are, or are not, founded, in as far as regards New Spain.

It will be necessary, in order at once to satisfy curiosity, and to remove all reasonable causes of doubt, to enter into this subject at considerable length. I shall therefore divide what I have to communicate, into four Sections, which will embrace the following points :—

First Section.

A Comparative Statement of the Produce of the Mines of Mexico during a double term of fifteen years, before, and since, the Revolution of 1810 ; with an account of the exportation of Specie, during the same Period.

Second Section.

The Mining System of Mexico before 1810 : the changes which occurred from that time till 1823, when the idea of Foreign Companies was first suggested : the number of these Companies now established in Mexico ; their outlay ; the extent of the undertakings in which they are engaged ; the difficulties with which they have had to contend ; their progress and state in 1827.

Third Section.

Whether the large Capitals which have been remitted to Mexico, and invested in the Mines, by British subjects, and on British account, are likely to be productive of adequate returns to the Adventurers ; and, within what period it may reasonably be expected, that those returns will become sufficiently considerable to make the general produce of the Country equal, or even exceed, the annual average amount derived from the Mines before the year 1810 ?

Fourth Section.

Some general Observations upon Mexico as a Mining Country, with an enquiry as to the probability of her being enabled, by her mineral treasures, to multiply her commercial relations with Great Britain, and to acquit the interest, of whatever loans she may have contracted there.

The answers to these Queries, in conjunction with the statistical details contained in the Vth and VIth Books of this work, which will consist, principally, of an account of my journey to the mining districts of the Interior, will convey nearly all that I have to communicate upon a subject, the importance of which, both to Mexico and to England, rose in my estimation with every step that I took in my investigations respecting it. Nor do I despair of conveying a similar impression to my readers, provided they will divest themselves of those hastily conceived opinions, by which judgment is so often warped, and under the influence of which it is as useless to affect to search for truth, as it is impossible to attain it.

SECTION I.

BEFORE I enter upon the enquiry which is to form the subject of this Section, viz. "A comparative statement of the produce of the Mines, during a double term of fifteen years, before and since the Revolution of 1810, with the proportion borne by the *Produce* to the *Exports* of the precious metals, during the same period;" it is necessary to premise, that it is almost impossible, from the want of authentic data, to institute any exact comparison between the quantity of Gold and Silver raised in any two years of these two periods, or to fix the proportion borne by it, in each year, to the Exports.

The utmost that can now be attempted, is, to form a reasonable estimate of the total Produce, and total Exports, of each fifteen years, without pretending to arrive at an exact analysis, the materials for which no longer exist. During the Civil War, the archives, not only of the College of Mines, (to which Humboldt had access, and by which the produce of each separate District might have been ascertained,) but of almost all the Mining Deputations,* were destroyed; and, after the most diligent enquiries, both in the Capital, and the Interior, I have been able to obtain but few and scattered remnants of those valuable documents, which had accumulated in the great mining provinces, during the three preceding centuries. Even the registers of the sums paid into the *Cajas Provinciales*, (Provincial Treasuries) as the King's

* *Vide* Section II. for an explanation of this term.

Fifth, have disappeared; and their loss is the more to be regretted, as they would have furnished data, upon which the total produce might have been easily, and correctly computed.

The Coinage, therefore, is the only standard that can now be adopted; and although this, from its nature, cannot comprehend the whole amount of the precious metals *raised*, (some portion of which, in each year, was not converted into dollars,) yet, if about *one* million of dollars be added to the average of the Mint returns, for Silver not registered at all, and registered Silver worked up into plate, (the abundance of which, in Mexico, was, at one time, proverbial,) there will not, I believe, be any reason to suppose that the actual produce of the country, during the fifteen years preceding the Revolution, much exceeded the estimate thus formed.

With regard to the Second Period, which commences with the Civil War, the difficulty of forming any correct calculation of the annual produce of the country, is much increased.

The returns of the Mint of Mexico are of no avail, as, during the years 1810, 1811, and 1812, Mints were established at Guānājuātō, Zācātēcās, Guādālājārā, and Dūrāngō, with which the Mint of the Capital had no connexion, and over which it exercised no control.

Nor do the returns of all these establishments combined, lead to a more satisfactory result; for there are many obvious reasons why they cannot be regarded as affording a correct estimate of the *produce*:

1st. Because a large proportion of the silver sent to the Mints was not silver *then* extracted from the mines, but plate belonging to Churches and private families, the whole of which was melted down during the Revolution, in order to supply the rapid decrease of the circulating medium.

2ndly. Because the Coinage in the Provincial Mints was so bad,* and the quantity of base metal used as alloy so

* The dollars which have survived this period of disorder, are now only taken at a discount of from fifteen to twenty per cent.

great, that even a correct account of the number of dollars struck off, would not be found to give a just idea of the quantity of silver, which they contained.

3rdly. Because of the large sums which passed through the hands of the Revolutionary Chiefs, (some of whom worked mines of considerable importance,) no account was ever given. And,

4thly. Because the gold contained in the silver, (a great abundance of which is found in the ores of some mines,) was never properly separated from it, after the communication between the Interior and the Capital was closed. None of the Departments possessed a Casa del Apartado, (in which the chemical process of separating the two metals, when combined, is performed; and, although some portion of the gold may have been obtained by the use of quicksilver in the *Ārāstrēs*, (crushing mills,) whatever remained incorporated with the silver was sacrificed; and, as the amount of gold, produced annually, before the Revolution, averaged 1,100,000 dollars, (a great part of which passed through the Casa del Apartado,) this loss, in fifteen years, must have amounted to a very considerable sum.*

These observations sufficiently prove the unavoidable inaccuracy of any estimate that can now be formed, respecting the amount of the precious metals raised from the mines of Mexico, during the fifteen years immediately subsequent to the Revolution: but having pointed out the difficulties that must be encountered, and the impossibility of so entirely surmounting them as to arrive at any very accurate conclusion, I shall proceed, without farther preamble, to state the results of my enquiries with regard to the Produce and Exports of each of the two periods under consideration.

* I have myself seen ores from *Guārisāmēy*, at the Mint of Durango, which contained 2100 grains of gold to the Marc. (There are 576 grains in the ounce.) The mine of Rayas has produced ores containing 2700 grains; and 550 grains per Marc is by no means an uncommon *ley de oro* (proportion of gold) in the mine of Villalpando, at Guanajuato.

By the annexed Table, (No. 1,) it appears that the registered Coinage of the Mint of Mexico, from the year 1796 to the year 1810, (inclusive,) amounted to 342,114,285 dollars; which gives an average of 22,807,619 dollars for each year.

To this I should add for Silver, (registered and unregistered,) *not* coined, 1,192,381 dollars; thus giving Twenty-four millions of dollars as the whole annual average Produce of the Mines of Mexico during the fifteen years immediately preceding the Revolution of 1810.

The registered exportation from Veracruz, during the same period, on the account of the merchants, was, according to the Balanza General, or Annual Report of the Consulado of Veracruz,

	Dollars.
To Spain (in fifteen years)	91,340,275
To Spanish America	22,251,822
To Foreign Countries direct, in 1806-7-8, and 9	27,892,903
Total	141,485,000

The average Commercial exportation, therefore, to the East, in the fifteen years, would be 9,432,333 dollars, 2 reals.*

The exports of the Royal Treasury (not included in the Balanza General) are not to be ascertained by any recent document; I have, therefore, been forced to take as the basis of my present calculation, Humboldt's Table of the exports

* The Average of Commercial Exports given here differs from that given in the analysis of the Balanza General, in the last Section of the preceding Book, in as much as the calculation there embraces a term of twenty-five years; while here it only comprehends fifteen years, and ends exactly at the time when the registered commercial exports began to decrease.

on the King's account, to Spain, and to the Spanish Colonies, during a term of thirteen years, (from 1779 to 1791,)* which gives 108,428,677 dollars as the total, or 8,340,667 dollars, 3 reals, as the annual average amount of each of the thirteen years.

To these, again, must be added 2,000,000, or 2,500,000 dollars, as the annual amount of illicit extraction by those engaged in the smuggling trade; most of the articles thus introduced being paid for in specie upon the spot.

The total annual Exports appear, therefore, to have been :

From Veracruz	Dollars.	Rs.
On Merchant's account	9,432,333	2
On King's account	8,340,667	3
From Acapulco (on both)	1,500,000	
Contraband Trade	2,500,000	

Total average value of Exports	21,773,000	5
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Allowing 227,000 dollars more, on each year, for the Contraband trade, which appears to have increased in value in each successive year, although its exact amount cannot be ascertained, we shall have a total exportation of Twenty-two millions of dollars, to set against a total produce of Twenty-four millions; so that, during the fifteen years that preceded the Revolution, the amount of the precious metals that accumulated in Mexico would appear to have been Thirty millions of dollars.

This estimate differs materially from that given by Baron Humboldt, who did not conceive, at the time of his visit, that the annual produce of the mines exceeded twenty-three millions of dollars.

This calculation was perfectly natural in 1803, the average of the Coinage, from 1796 to that year, having only been

* *Vide Essai Politique*, Book V. Chapter XII. page 444, 8vo. edition.

21,750,249 dollars;* to which Humboldt adds 1,249,751 dollars, for silver not included in the Mint returns.

But the Coinage from 1803 to 1810 inclusive, averaged 24,016,182 dollars, (the total amount of the dollars registered in the Mint of Mexico, in these seven years, having been 168,113,278:) and this circumstance sufficiently accounts for the difference in the average produce of the whole term, as given in the *Essai Politique*, and in the present calculation.

With regard to the benefit actually derived by the country from its mineral treasures, or, in other words, the annual addition to the circulating medium, (after paying the difference between the Imports and Exports, and the remittances on the account of the Royal Treasury,) which Humboldt estimates at *one* million of dollars in each year, the increased Produce likewise accounts for the increase in the annual accumulation, which I have estimated at *two* millions of dollars.

I have no data that will warrant me in rating the average annual Exports, during the fifteen years now under consideration, higher than I have done, viz.: twenty-two millions of dollars; although, if we divide that term into two periods, of eight and seven years, (from 1796 to 1803, and from 1804 to 1810 inclusive,†) we shall find the average of the commercial Exports to have varied from 8,561,753 dollars, to 12,105,047 dollars. In the exports of the Royal Treasury, I do not believe that there was any material change. There is, therefore, nothing in the fluctuations of the Commercial Exports to affect the calculation with regard to the average of the whole term; while the Produce, undoubtedly, rather exceeded, than fell short of, the twenty-four millions of dollars at which I have estimated it; 1,192,381 dollars being, in the

* The Mint returns from 1796 to 1803 (inclusive,) give 174,001,998 dollars as the total Coinage during the eight years.

† Total Exports from 1796 to 1803, (Veracruz,) 56,859,768 dollars. Total Exports from 1804 to 1810, 84,735,332 dollars.

opinion of those whom I have had occasion to consult upon the subject in Mexico, a very inadequate allowance for the silver not included in the Mint returns.

I cannot, therefore, estimate the annual addition to the circulating medium, before the Revolution, at a less sum than two millions of dollars; and I am the more inclined to conceive this calculation to be correct, because the exportation of specie during the last fifteen years, (from 1810 to 1825,) appears so much to have exceeded the whole produce of the Mines, that the country, had it not been for the surplus which accumulated during this season of prosperity, must have been left without a circulating medium at all.

This brings me to the second part of my enquiry, viz. the Average annual amount of the precious metals raised from 1810 to 1825, with the exports during the same period.

I have already stated the impossibility of forming any very accurate calculation upon the last of these points, with regard to which much conjectural evidence must be admitted. As to the first, (the Produce,) although, for the reasons mentioned in the beginning of this Section, the returns from the different Mints cannot be said to furnish a *correct* estimate of the Silver raised from the Mines, they, nevertheless, comprise the only authentic data that can now be obtained, and I shall, consequently, make them the basis of my calculations.

By the annexed Tables (Nos. II. to VI.) it will appear that the Coinage, from 1811 to 1825 inclusive, in the whole territory of Mexico, was as follows:—

	Dollars
In Mexico	111,551,082
In Guādālajāra	4,868,760
In Dūrāngō	6,917,652
In Zăcătēcă	30,659,518
In Chihūāhūa	1,216,000
Forming a sum total of	155,213,012

from which, however, must be deducted 1,636,040 dollars, being the value of 396 *Tejos de oro* (Ingots of gold), and 4263 Ounces, (Doubloons) remitted upon the account of the first Loan by the House of Goldschmidt, and included in the Coinage of the Capital for the year 1825; and 300,000 dollars likewise received in gold, about the same time, by the United Mexican Company.

The remainder (153,276,972 dollars,) will give 10,218,464 dollars 6 reals, as the annual average *produce* of the fifteen years.

Yet, small as this sum is, in comparison with the Average of the registered Coinage before the Revolution, (22,807,619 dollars) it is impossible now to ascertain the Mines, or Districts, from which it proceeded.

Without regular returns, it is difficult to show to what extent the effects of the Revolution were felt in each; but, in those Districts where records were kept, (extracts from most of which I have been enabled to obtain,) the difference between the Produce of the fifteen years, before, and after, the commencement of the Civil War, appears to have been enormous.

In Guăñăjūātō, the amount of the precious metals raised, diminished from 8,852,472 Marcs of Silver, and 27,810 Marcs of Gold,* (the produce of the fifteen years preceding the Revolution,)† to 2,877,213 Marcs of Silver, and 8,109 Marcs of Gold, (or something less than one-third of the original amount of both;) which appears, by the annexed Table (No. VIII.) to have been the produce of the whole District from 1811 to 1825.

From Zacatecas, I have been able to obtain but partial accounts: it does not appear, however, by these, that any

* The Marc of Silver may be taken at $8\frac{1}{2}$ dollars, and that of Gold, at 136 dollars; so that the produce of Guanajuato in dollars, from 1796 to 1810, was 79,028,017 dollars, and from 1811 to 1825, 25,559,009 dollars.

† *Vide* Table VII.

very great falling off took place in the early part of the Civil War, the Mines of Veta Grande, (now worked by the Bolaños Company,) having yielded, from 1796 to 1810, 1,171,328 marcs of Silver, and from 1811 to 1825, 917,097 marcs. (Table IX.) The difference, therefore, on the whole term, was only 254,231 marcs, or 2,160,963 dollars. But Zacatecas, even in the years of its greatest abundance, never produced more than two millions of dollars annually;* and, notwithstanding the little change which occurred at Veta Grande, from the number of other mines, (not comprehended in that Negotiation†,) which were unworked in 1823, it may fairly be assumed that these two millions were, latterly, reduced to one.

The Mint returns, indeed, appear to contradict the assumption, as they give something more than two millions of dollars, as the average Coinage of each year. But the Coinage of Zacatecas did not consist of the produce of Zacatecas alone: it comprehended a part of the produce of Sömbrërētē, and Cătörcē, with that of Pīnös, and Rāmös, and other small Districts of San Luis Pötösī, the whole of which was brought to the Mint of Zacatecas, in preference to that of the Capital, with the exception of that portion of the Silver raised, which was conveyed to the coast in bars, without being converted into dollars at all, the general amount of which I shall have occasion, subsequently, to examine.

The average annual produce of Sombrerete, during this period, is stated, (though not upon the authority of registered returns,) to have been 300,000 dollars, or about 200,000 dollars less than the ordinary produce, from the time of the

* Humboldt gives the total produce in five years (from 1785 to 1789,) at 1,264,991 marcs, which give an average of 2,048,484 dollars on each year.

† *Negotiation* is a Mexican Mining term, and signifies a number of Mines, worked as one undertaking, by an individual, or association of individuals, whose quota of expenses and profits is divided into twenty-four *Barrs*, as they would be in working a single Mine.

great Bonanza of the Fagoaga family, (when eleven millions of dollars were raised in eight months, from the Mine of El Pävëllōn alone,) up to 1810.

The registered produce of the Mining Districts of San Luis Pötösī, (the most important of which was Cătōrcě) during a term of five years, before and after the Revolution, (for which alone I have been able to procure Returns,) is stated in the annexed Table, (No. X.) by which it appears that there was a decrease in the latter period of 8261 Bars of Silver, (each of 134 marcs, or 1139 dollars,) which gives a total difference of 9,409,279 dollars on the five years after 1810.

The produce of the Mines of Catorce in ten years, (from 1816 to 1825 inclusive,) according to an extract from the Registers, which has been recently transmitted to me, was 5,994,006 dollars; which, if one half of this sum, (or 2,997,003 dollars) be added for the five years not included in the returns in my possession, will give 8,991,009 dollars, as the total, or 599,400 dollars as the average annual produce of that District, on the whole fifteen years. Before the Revolution, Catorce was second only to Guănăjūātō in the amount of the silver raised, the value of which was estimated by Humboldt, (in 1803) at three millions and a half of dollars annually.

The produce of the Biscaina Vein, at Real del Monte, in seven good years before the Revolution, (from 1794 to 1801,) was six millions of dollars, or 857,042 dollars per annum. From 1809 to 1823, it only yielded 200,000 dollars in all, or 14,285 dollars per annum.

If it were possible to obtain returns from the other Mining Districts, the disproportion between the produce before, and after, the year 1810, would be found to be equally striking.

In all, the principal Mines were abandoned, the machinery was allowed to go to ruins, and the silver raised was merely the gleanings of more prosperous times; the workings,

(where any were attempted) being confined, almost entirely, to the upper levels.

Tasco, (an important military station to the South of the Capital,) forms a solitary exception to this rule; for the town being constantly garrisoned by Royalist troops, and only once taken by the Insurgents, the Tribunal de Minería undertook to work the Mines there, which formerly belonged to the famous Laborde; and did so with such success, that the produce is supposed to have averaged 400,000 dollars annually.

The other Mining Districts in the vicinity of the Capital, (Păchucă, Chicō, Zimăpān, Tēmăscăltēpēc, Tlālpūjāhua, el ōrō, Zăcūālpān, Āngăngēō, Sūltēpēc, and el Dōctōr,) were all nearly abandoned, or their produce so much reduced, that no returns of it were kept.

The amount of the silver known to have been raised since 1810, is, therefore, as follows:—

	Dollars.
Zăcătēcās, (average)	1,000,000
Guănjūātō, Gold and Silver, (average)	1,608,034
Cătōrcē, ditto	599,400
Sōmbrērētē, ditto	300,000
Tăscō, ditto	400,000
Real del Monte, ditto	14,285
Gūārīsāmēy, Săn Dīmăs, (included in Durango Coinage)	461,176
Northern Districts, included in Chihuahua Coinage	316,767
Total given by Registers in my possession	4,699,662

The above Table is only meant to show the impossibility of attempting, in the present state of Mexico, to ascertain the actual *produce* of the country by any other standard than that of the Coinage. It was in the different Mints that the silver raised was ultimately concentrated, as they alone afforded the

means of converting it into the ordinary circulating medium of the country ; and, with the exception of the Bars exported, direct, from the Eastern and Western Coasts, their Registers undoubtedly afford the fairest estimate of the real produce.

The average amount of these, on the whole fifteen years, being, as we have seen, 10,270,731 dollars, it becomes necessary to add no less a sum than 5,571,069 dollars to the returns of produce from the principal Districts, as given above, in order to make them equal in amount to the annual coinage.

In any country but Mexico it would be absurd to suppose that so large a mass of silver could be raised, annually, from sources comparatively unknown ; but, in New Spain, there is nothing either impossible, or improbable, in the supposition.

It is a fact universally admitted, that, in almost all the Mining Districts, although the towns have been ruined by the emigration of the wealthy inhabitants, whose capitals were formerly invested in Mining operations, the lower classes have, throughout the Revolution, found means to draw their subsistence from the Mines.

Under the denomination of *Būscōnēs*, (Searchers) they have never ceased to work ; and although, from the want of method in their operations, they have done the most serious injury to the Mines themselves, they have, in general, contrived to extract from the upper levels, or from the old workings, neglected in better times for others of greater promise, a very considerable quantity of silver.

This desultory system is still pursued in many parts of the country ; and, at *Zimāpān*, *Zācuālpān*, *el Dōctōr*, and many of the Northern Districts, a large population is even now maintained by it.

The silver thus obtained was sold in each Real de minas, at from four to six, eight, and twelve reals per marc below the Mint price, to those of the inhabitants who could afford, on such terms, to wait for an opportunity of forwarding it, under convoy, to the nearest Mint, where it was exchanged for dōl-

lars. It was called, in its rough state, Plata Piña, or Plata Pasta; and, incredible as it may appear that the value of the precious metals thus brought annually into circulation should have amounted to five millions and a half of dollars, there is no other mode, at present, of accounting for by far the largest proportion of the ten millions of dollars, which, unquestionably, were coined annually, in the different Mints of Mexico, during the Civil War.

One million, indeed, may be deducted from the Coinage of each of the four or five first years of the Revolution, for the *plate*, which was brought into circulation during that period.

But then, at least, as much must be added, upon the whole fifteen, for unregistered silver sent out of the country in bars.

A very large proportion of the great Bönānză* of the Marquis of Bústāmāntē at Bătōpīlās, comes under this description, nearly the whole of his enormous wealth having been sent direct to Gűāymās, and from thence to Gűyăqūil and Pănāmā, where it was shipped for Spain by the Pacific, or sent across the Isthmus to Portobello.

A similar exportation took place from all the Districts to the North of San Luis Pătōsī, and particularly from Catorce, where, from the facility of the communication with the coast, the Old Spaniards, by whom most of the mines were worked in 1810, were in the habit of shipping off all the bars that contained a ley de oro, and no inconsiderable proportion of the pure silver, to the Peninsula, without converting them into dollars.

I should, therefore, be inclined to estimate the total pro-

* *Bonanza* is a sea term, used by the Mexican Miners to designate a Mine in such a state as to cover all the expenses of working it, and to leave a considerable annual profit to the proprietor. It implies no particular sum, for you may have *bonanza* of a million, or a *bonanza* of 20,000 dollars; but it always signifies that things are going on satisfactorily;—in short, that you are in the Trades, with studding sails set below and aloft, and every prospect of a prosperous voyage.

duce of the country, during the fifteen years ending in 1825, higher, by nearly one million of dollars, than the Mint returns; and to suppose that, even during the worst of times, the value of the precious metals raised, annually, from the Mines of Mexico, cannot have averaged less than *eleven* millions of dollars.

The immense amount of the exports on private account; and the necessity of balancing, with the produce of the Mines, nearly the whole of the imports of Foreign manufactures, (a part of which was covered before the Revolution, by the Agricultural produce,) will explain the fact of the country having been reduced to a state of extreme penury, in the midst of this apparent wealth; the Minimum of the produce of Mexico being nearly double the Maximum of the average produce of any of the other Colonies of Spain, before the Revolution.*

It now remains for me to trace the effects of the Civil War upon the circulating medium of the country, by comparing, in as far as such a comparison is possible, the amount of the exports of specie, during the last fifteen years, with that of the produce, in conjunction with the specie, which may be supposed to have accumulated, during the fifteen years of prosperity, by which the Revolution was preceded.

The whole circulating medium of Mexico was estimated by Humboldt, in 1803, at fifty-five, or sixty millions of dollars.†

* The average produce of Peru, as given by Humboldt,	Dollars.
in 1803, was,	5,317,988
Buenos Ayres	4,212,404
New Grenada	2,624,760

Essai Politique, Livre IV. Chap. XI.

† I am induced to adopt Humboldt's estimate of the amount of the circulating medium of Mexico in 1803, not because I conceive it to have been correct, but because, in a calculation, where so much must necessarily be left to conjectural evidence, I wish to have something more than a mere supposition of my own to serve as a basis. Sixty millions are thought by most people to be very much under the real amount.

To this I should add fourteen millions, as the increase during the seven following years, when the average *exports* were, according to my calculation, twenty-two millions of dollars, and the average *produce* twenty-four millions; thus making the whole circulating medium, in 1810, amount to about Seventy-two millions of dollars.

The Mines, in fifteen years, appear to have produced 153,276,972, (according to the Mint returns,) or 165,000,000, if the average, which I have taken, of eleven millions annually, be correct; and these, with the seventy-two millions already in existence, give a total of two hundred and thirty-seven millions of dollars.

The exact amount of the exports in specie, it is impossible to ascertain; but, during a period of disorder, which, at one time, amounted to almost total disorganization, the allowance made for unregistered exports must be very large.

Respecting those of which an account was kept, I have obtained the only accurate information now to be procured, viz. extracts from the Registers of the Custom Houses of Vēră-crūz, Ācăpŭlcō, Săn Blās, and Măzătłān, for which I am indebted to His Majesty's Consular Agents at those Ports.

By these it appears, that the Commercial exports of Veracruz, from 1811 to 1820, were,

	Dollars.
To other Spanish Colonies	14,302,701
To Foreign Countries direct	434,608
To Spain	53,553,897
	<hr/>
Total	68,291,206

The Exports of

1821 were	{ Dollars	8,353,178
	{ Wrought Silver	67,488
		<hr/>
Carried forward		76,711,872

The Exports of

		Dollars.
	Brought forward	76,711,872
1822 were	{ Dollars .	7,489,780
	{ Wrought Silver .	81,237
1823 —	{ Dollars .	1,293,823
	{ Wrought Silver .	30,779
1824 —	.	2,854,936
1825 —	(about)	6,000,000

Total from 1811 to 1825, 94,462,427

The Imports from 1811 to 1820 were,

From Spain	66,815,639
From Foreign Countries direct	2,769,725
From other Spanish Colonies	24,698,656
Total	94,284,020

The Imports from 1821 to 1825 inclusive, were :—

	Dollars.
1821	7,245,052
1822	3,723,019
1823	3,913,092
1824	12,082,030
1825	
(No returns, therefore taken at the same amount as 1824)*	12,082,030
Total	39,045,223

Or, with the Imports of the ten preceding years, } 133,328,243

* The Imports for these years, include those of Alvarado ; Veracruz having been nearly abandoned as a port in 1823, as stated in the preceding Section.

From this amount must be deducted 27,770,774 dollars for the registered exports of Agricultural produce during the fifteen years under consideration; but this still leaves a balance against Mexico; the registered Imports being (with all deductions made) 105,557,469 dollars, and the registered Exports 94,462,427 dollars. The difference (11,095,042 dollars) must have been covered by the illicit extraction of gold and silver to that amount; there being no article of Agricultural produce, with the exception of Cochineal, sufficiently valuable to hold out a similar inducement for contraband trade. The registered shipments of Cochineal by Old Spaniards, who took this mode of making remittances to Europe, amounted in five years, (from 1821 to 1825,) to 7,451,992 dollars; and as this bears a fair proportion to the produce, (*Vide* Book I. Sect. III.) it is not to be presumed that the illicit extraction can have been very great.

My object in thus comparing the Exports of specie with the Imports of European manufactures, (which may appear, at first, to have no immediate connexion with the question now under consideration,) is, to show that no part of the Spanish property withdrawn from the country since the commencement of the Revolution, *can* be comprehended in the registered exportation from Veracruz, since the total amount of the Exports does not cover the total amount of the registered Imports, but leaves a balance of 11,095,042 dollars, to be paid by some other channel.

In the other ports it will be impossible for me to attempt a similar comparison, as I have not been able to obtain returns of Imports of any kind. I must, therefore, confine myself to a statement of the amount of the entries of the precious metals shipped in each port; and even these are but little to be depended upon, as the gentleman, to whom I am indebted for the extracts from the Registers of San Blás and Măzatlán, informed me that, in the opinion of the oldest merchants upon the Western coast, the *registered* exports did

not amount to above one-half of the *real* amount of the Silver exported; in which opinion Mr. Barcaiztegui, from whom I received similar returns of the exports from Acapulco, fully coincided.

Having premised this, I shall annex the results of the enquiries of these gentlemen, in one Table, without adding, as *pièces justificatives*, the original returns, which are in my possession, but are too voluminous for insertion.

Years.	<i>Amount of Specie exported.</i>		
	San Blas.	Mazatlan.	Acapulco.
1810			13,000
1811			25,883
1812			24,461
1813	346,884		108,331
1814	records missing	746,000	
1815	1,276,629	608,106	
1816	672,222	511,655	1,288,578
1817	757,086	343,719	154,000
1818	records lost	ditto	391,217
1819	ditto	ditto	218,689
1820	652,400	33,510	692,477
1821	1,570,542		23,191
1822	1,527,530	10,309	37,250
1823	1,054,708	84,420	223,000
1824	787,055	118,560	35,600
1825	182,243	165,797	57,075
<hr/>			
Total	8,827,299	2,622,076	3,292,752
<hr/>			

From Gūāymās, there are no returns; nor is any account whatever of Imports to be obtained from San Blas, on the West, or from Tampico, or any other port to the North of Veracruz, on the Eastern coast, during the period to which my enquiries are limited.

It is probable, however, that the registered exports from

San Blas and Mazatlan, do not more than cover the amount of the imports: as, from the moment that the port of San Blas was opened to Foreign trade by General Cruz, in 1812, the value of the European manufactures with which the Table-land was supplied through this channel, can hardly have been less than the average amount of the exports of the twelve years, viz.: 735,608 dollars.

At San Blas, therefore, as at Veracruz, no allowance can be made upon the registered exports of specie for the property of Old Spaniards transferred to Europe; the exports being hardly equivalent in value to the European Imports. The same may be said of Ācāpūlcō and Māzātlan: yet, the Spanish property actually realized, and abstracted from the capital of the country as it existed in 1810, is calculated by the best informed Mexicans, (as I have stated in Section V. of the last Book,) at from eighty, to one hundred and forty millions of dollars.

Let us first, therefore, see the amount of the whole registered exports, and then consider the additions which must be made to it.

The value in dollars of the exports from Veracruz, was:—

	Dollars.
From 1811 to 1820	68,291,206
From 1821 to 1825	26,171,221
San Blas (in the fifteen years)	8,827,299
Māzātlan (ditto)	2,622,076
Acapulco (ditto)	3,292,752
Total, in fifteen years	<hr/> 109,204,554 <hr/>

Of the Exports on the King's account, which are not included in this estimate, nothing certain is known; but, from the difficulty which the Viceregal Government experienced from 1811 to 1817, in raising funds to meet the exigencies of the moment in Mexico, I am induced to believe that, during

the whole of that time, no remittances to Madrid can have been made. The Tobacco monopoly, and the duties upon Gold and Silver, of which the "*sobrante liquido, remisible*," was composed before the Revolution, failed entirely; and, although new taxes were substituted for them, these were barely sufficient to defray the expenses of the war. After 1816, things became more settled, and some trifling remittances were made, which ceased again entirely upon the declaration of Independence in 1821, so that I should not calculate them in all, during the whole fifteen years, at more than ten millions of dollars.*

With regard to the Smuggling trade, this was by no means the case, for, if the demand for European manufactures became less amidst the general distress, the profits of the illicit trader increased; the facility with which goods were introduced being proportionably greater, and the reduction in the price, consequently, such as to enable him to defy competition. I do not, therefore, conceive the amount of the Contraband trade ever to have fallen below the average before the Revolution, viz. two, or two and a half, millions of dollars.

We must, therefore, make the following additions to the registered Exports as given above, viz. :—

	Dollars.
	109,191,454
Remittances to Royal Treasury	10,000,000
Smuggling trade, in fifteen years, taken at something below the average amount before 1810	34,910,953
Carried forward	154,102,407

* This is merely a supposition, open both to inquiry and correction; for, with regard to the Royal exports, I have no data to guide me. They probably exceeded my estimate considerably, in which case, the value of the Spanish property remitted to Europe might be still farther diminished.

Dollars.

Brought forward	154,102,407
Allowance for the exports of three years, the returns for which have been lost at San Blas, taken at the average of the other twelve, viz. 735,608 dollars	2,206,824
Balance of the excess of registered <i>Imports</i> in fifteen years at Veracruz	11,095,042
Total	167,404,273

This I regard as the amount of the Exports, in gold and silver, that must, *necessarily*, have taken place, in order to cover that portion of the Imports from Europe, that remained unpaid, after deducting the whole of the exportable national produce; with the addition of ten millions only as remittances to Madrid.

The Spanish property remitted to Europe constitutes, therefore, nearly the whole of the unregistered Exports, the amount of which must be entirely a question of conjectural evidence; there being no data whatever upon which a calculation could be formed. We must, therefore, be guided by a few leading points, which seem to require more particular attention.

The First of these, is the well-known fact that, before the Revolution, two-thirds of the capital of the country were in the hands of Spaniards, who engrossed the whole commerce of Mexico, and were, likewise, most extensively engaged in agriculture and mines.

The Second, is the equally well-ascertained fact, that almost all these Spaniards have quitted the country, and that the depressed state of the Mines, of Agriculture, and of Trade, is due, in a great measure, to the withdrawing of those capitals, by which they were formerly supported.

The Third, is the curious circumstance which I have en-

deavoured to develope in the preceding pages, namely, that no portion of this capital can be included in the registered Exports, to the amount of which it must consequently be added.

Having arrived at this conclusion, it remains to fix the sum, at which the capital actually withdrawn in specie must be estimated.

The lowest calculation of the Mexicans upon this subject is eighty millions of dollars, while many go as high as one hundred and forty millions.

The last is utterly impossible, for the Minimum of eighty millions would leave the country without any circulating medium at all.

I have supposed seventy-two millions to have been the accumulation of the precious metals in Mexico in 1810; which, with the whole produce of the mines up to 1825, gives a total capital of two hundred and thirty-seven millions of dollars.

If we add to the exports, as given in the preceding pages, (167,404,273 dollars,) eighty millions of dollars more, we should reduce the currency of New Spain in 1827 to ten millions of dollars *less* than nothing. I should be inclined, therefore, to take one third of the registered exports, (109,204,554 dollars,) as a reasonable estimate of those of which no entry was made.

	Dollars.
This would give	36,401,518
which, added to the total exports, (according	
to my estimate of their amount,)	167,404,273
	<hr/>
gives a total of	203,805,791
	<hr/>

and this, again, leaves about thirty-three millions of dollars as the circulating medium of Mexico at the present day, after

allowing nearly thirty-six millions and a half for the Spanish capital withdrawn since the commencement of the Civil War.

The extreme scarcity of money experienced in Mexico during the last two years, renders the result given by this calculation by no means improbable. In 1810, with a currency of seventy-two millions, and a clear surplus produce of two millions more, which appears to have been the case during the seven last years before the Revolution, nothing could equal the facility with which advances were obtained for every useful, or even useless, project. In 1826, with a currency reduced to thirty-three millions, and a produce of eight, (the whole of which is required to cover the imports alone,) three per cent. per month, has been paid in the capital for specie, and that, too, where security was given for the full amount of the advances, by deposits of goods.

As it is to the Mines that we must look for the source of every future improvement in Mexico, I shall endeavour, in the subsequent parts of this book, to point out the manner in which their progress is likely to be affected by the present scarcity, which, operating, as it were, in a vicious circle, checks the produce of that, by which alone it can be itself relieved. Here it will be sufficient to state the conclusions which may be drawn from the facts detailed in the preceding pages, with regard to the point more immediately under consideration, viz.: the comparative produce and exports of the precious metals in Mexico:—they appear to be,

1st. That the annual average produce of the Mines of Mexico, before the Revolution, amounted to twenty-four millions of dollars, and the average exports to twenty-two millions; and,

2ndly. That, since the Revolution, the produce has been reduced to eleven millions of dollars, while the exports in specie have averaged 13,587,052 dollars in each year.

To this I may add that the produce has decreased latterly, in consequence of the sudden abstraction of that portion of the

Spanish capital, which still remained in the country, after the declaration of Independence in 1821.

The Old Spaniards, who had survived the first years of the Revolutionary war, (in the course of which many transferred the bulk of their convertible property to Europe,) retained a sufficient portion of their funds in circulation to give a certain activity to trade, and to the mines, in which most of them were, directly, or indirectly, engaged.

The produce rose in consequence, (as tranquillity and confidence were restored,) from four millions and a half of dollars, (to which it had fallen in 1812) to six, nine, eleven, and twelve millions, which was the amount of the coinage, in 1819, in the capital alone.

In 1820, the Revolution in Spain, and the apprehension of the effects which it might produce in Mexico, caused a considerable fluctuation, and the coinage of the year in the capital fell to 10,406,154 dollars. In 1821, when these apprehensions were realized, and the separation from the Mother-country became inevitable, the whole disposable capital, that had remained till then invested, was withdrawn at once, and the coinage in Mexico sunk to five millions; from which it fell to three and a half, at which it continued during the years 1823 and 1824.

In 1825, the foreign capitals recently invested began to produce some effect; but, in 1826, the total amount of the coinage in the five mints of the Mexican Republic did not exceed 7,463,300 dollars, as will appear by the Table, marked No. 12.

This is not to be regarded as indicating a failure on the part of the Companies, but merely as proving that the capital introduced by them had not then proved an equivalent for the capital previously withdrawn; or, at all events, that time had not been allowed to repair the ruinous consequences of the sudden abstraction of that capital, and the suspension of all Mining works that ensued.

But this inquiry belongs more properly to the Second Section, to which I shall accordingly proceed, begging leave to refer my readers to the twelve Tables annexed to this Section, (none of which are, I believe, as yet known to the Public,) for a more detailed examination of the data upon which my calculations are founded. They consist mostly of extracts from Official Records, the originals of which are in my possession. Some of them I procured myself, during my visit to the Interior. For others I am indebted to the kind intervention of friends; but I can warrant the authenticity of all: and, whether the conclusions which I have drawn from them be thought correct, or not, the materials themselves will, I believe, be found to comprise nearly all the information, that is now to be obtained, respecting the points which it was the object of this Section more particularly to examine.

TABLE No. I. FIRST PERIOD.

Account of the Coinage of the Mint of Mexico for 30 years, from the year 1796 to the year 1825, both inclusive.									
Years.	Gold.			Silver.			Total.		
	Dollars.	Reals.		Dollars.	Rls.	Grs.	Dollars.	Rls.	Grs.
1796	1,297,794	0	0	24,346,833	0	6	25,644,627	0	6
1797	10,38,856	0	0	24,041,182	7	0	25,080,038	7	0
1798	999,608	0	0	23,004,981	2	3	24,004,589	2	3
1799	957,094	0	0	21,096,031	3	3	22,053,125	3	3
1800	787,164	0	0	17,898,510	7	0	18,685,674	7	0
1801	610,398	0	0	15,958,044	1	0	16,568,442	1	0
1802	839,122	0	0	17,959,477	3	3	18,798,599	3	3
1803	646,050	0	0	22,520,856	1	9	23,166,906	1	9
1804	959,030	0	0	26,130,971	0	3	27,090,001	0	3
1805	1,359,814	0	0	25,806,074	3	3	27,165,888	3	3
1806	1,352,348	0	0	23,383,672	6	0	24,736,020	6	0
1807	1,512,266	0	0	20,703,984	7	3	22,216,250	7	3
1808	1,182,516	0	0	20,502,433	7	3	21,684,949	7	3
1809	1,464,818	0	0	24,708,164	2	6	26,172,982	2	6
1810	1,095,504	0	0	17,950,684	3	6	19,046,188	3	6
Total	16,102,382	0	0	326,011,903	0	0	342,114,285	0	0

TABLE No. II. SECOND PERIOD.

Years.	Gold.			Silver.			Total.		
	Dollars.	Reals.		Dollars.	Rls.	Grs.	Dollars.	Rls.	Grs.
1811	1,085,364	0	0	8,956,432	2	9	10,041,796	2	9
1812	381,646	0	0	4,027,620	0	9	4,409,266	0	9
1813				6,133,983	6	0	6,133,983	6	0
1814	618,069	0	0	6,902,481	4	6	7,520,550	4	6
1815	486,464	0	0	6,454,799	5	0	6,941,263	5	0
1816	960,393	0	0	8,315,616	0	3	9,276,009	0	3
1817	854,942	0	0	7,994,951	0	0	8,849,893	0	0
1818	533,921	0	0	10,852,367	7	6	11,386,288	7	6
1819	539,377	0	0	11,491,138	5	0	12,030,515	5	0
1820	509,076	0	0	9,897,078	1	0	10,406,154	1	0
1821	303,504	0	0	5,600,022	3	6	5,903,526	3	6
1822	214,128	0	0	5,329,126	4	6	5,543,254	4	6
1823	291,408	0	0	3,276,413	3	0	3,567,821	3	0
1824	236,944	0	0	3,266,936	2	0 $\frac{1}{2}$	3,503,880	2	0 $\frac{1}{2}$
1825	2,385,455	0	0	3,651,423	3	0	6,036,878	3	0
Total	9,400,691	0	0	102,150,391	0	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	111,551,082	0	9 $\frac{1}{2}$

No. III.

Coinage of Guadalajara from 1814 (when a Mint was first established there) to 1825.		
	Dollars.	Reals.
From Jan. 26, to Dec. 31, 1814 .	901,949	
From Jan. 1 to April 30, 1815 . .	192,749	2
From Feb. 9 to the end of June, 1818	219,449	
From June 13 to the end of Dec. 1821	255,174	
In 1822	931,645	
In 1823	734,355	2
In 1824	957,365	
In 1825	676,073	4
Total .	4,868,760	0

No. IV.

Coinage of the Mint of Durango from 1811 to 1825.		
Years.	Dollars.	Reals.
1811	247,439	
1812	808,792	
1813	784,240	
1814	438,050	2
1815	336,987	
1816	314,193	
1817	139,800	6
1818	260,830	4
1819	244,298	
1820	136,793	
1821	209,229	2
1822	608,666	
1823	818,430	
1824	753,345	2
1825	816,558	2
Total	6,917,652	2
<i>Durango, July 15, 1826.</i>		

No. V.

Coinage of the Mint of Zacatecas from Nov. 1810 to Dec. 1825.		
Years.	Dollars.	Reals.
From Nov. 14, 1810, to Aug. 31, 1811	1,154,902	6
From Sep. 5, 1811, to March 26, 1813	4,776,971	4
From April 3, 1813, to July 29, 1814	2,455,000	0
From July 30, 1814, to May 16, 1818	3,635,107	6
From June 16, 1818, to Dec. 30, 1818	638,174	3
From Dec. 31, 1818, to Dec. 30, 1819	1,026,775	4
In 1820	764,011	6
In 1821	1,326,700	7
In 1822	3,610,455	0
In 1823	3,965,000	0
In 1824	4,093,062	5
In 1825	3,213,356	0
Total	30,659,518	1

No. VI.

Account of the Number of Bars of Pure Silver, and Bars with a Ley de Oro, entered in this Treasury from 1791 to August 1825, with their Value in Marcs.			
	Bars.	Marcs.	Ounces.
Silver amalgamated	3,687	477,778	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Silver smelted	6,514	823,743	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
Bars with a Ley de Oro . . .	246	30,223	2
Gold, pure and mixed with silver	10,447	1,331,745	3
	672	14,392	2
Total	11,119	1,346,137	5
<i>Chihuahua, Aug. 27, 1825.</i>			
(Signed)		RAMON MASCARENA.	

No. VII.

Account of the Produce of Guanajuato from 1796 to 1810.

Years.	Bars.	Marcos of Silver.	Marcos of Gold.
1796	3,734	491,126	1,081
1797	5,265	707,042	968
1798	4,784	625,937	2,529
1799	3,825	499,966	1,972
1800	3,874	506,676	1,932
1801	2,638	342,608	1,457
1802	3,867	502,497	1,676
1803	5,706	750,887	1,538
1804	5,734	755,861	2,128
1805	5,510	723,789	2,495
1806	4,716	618,417	2,188
1807	4,417	578,735	2,396
1808	4,685	617,474	1,842
1809	4,737	620,012	2,189
1810	3,896	511,445	1,419
Total	67,388	8,852,272	27,810

Guanajuato, July 26, 1826.

(Signed)

JOSE DE LA LUZ SANCHEZ.

No. VIII.

Produce of Guanajuato from 1811 to 1825.

Years.	Bars.	Marcos of Silver.	Marcos of Gold.
1811	2,067	270,206	550 0 0
1812	2,702	357,930	907 0 0
1813	2,204	292,211	462 0 0
1814	2,568	337,795	708 0 0
1815	2,088	275,905	841 0 0
1816	2,041	269,711	694 0 0
1817	1,580	199,706	523 0 0
1818	1,215	155,112	401 0 0
1819	1,149	145,362	450 2 2
1820	814	100,465	326 2 7
1821	600	73,983	298 3 6
1822	795	95,057	597 2 2
1823	804	96,802	413 5 5
1824	931	106,775	517 3 6
1825	830	100,193	419 4 0
Total	22,388	2,877,213	8,109 0 4

Guanajuato, July 26, 1826.

(Signed)

JOSE DE LA LUZ SANCHEZ.

No. IX.

Produce of the Mines of Veta Grande from 1795 to 1825.					
Years.	Marcas.	Ounces.	Years.	Marcas.	Ounces.
1795	41,900	3	1811	42,776	3
1796	35,570	4	1812	32,970	1
1797	10,533	3	1813	83,166	6
1798	15,702	6	1814	98,378	3
1799	8,178	5	1815	29,034	2
1800	17,848	3½	1816	45,197	6
1801	14,326	7	1817	39,243	6
1802	20,996	1	1818	50,770	2
1803	64,291	3	1819	59,954	7
1804	136,836	3½	1820	67,886	3½
1805	299,944	7½	1821	52,186	5½
1806	193,533	2	1822	86,293	3
1807	102,999	6	1823	94,452	3½
1808	184,230	2	1824	67,093	6½
1809	65,293	6	1825	67,699	6½
1810	101,550	4			
Total	1,313,237	2½	Total	917,105	0½

No. X.

Account of the number of Bars of Pure Silver, and Bars with a Ley de Oro, entered in this Treasury from 1800 to 1804, and from 1815 to 1819.

Years.	Bars of Pure Silver.	Bars with a Ley de Oro.
1800	2,388	59
1801	2,410	37
1802	2,426	63
1803	3,898	49
1804	2,784	60
Total	13,906	268
1815	1,724	12
1816	863	12
1817	1,026	10
1818	1,111	14
1819	1,135	7
Total	5,859	55

Treasury of the State—San Luis Potosi.

January 16, 1827.

(Signed) JUAN GUAJARDO.

No. XI.

Account of the Produce of Catorce from 1816 to 1825.		
Years.	Mars.	Dollars.
1816	39,236 2	313,890
1817	89,888 4	719,108
1818	89,095 2	712,762
1819	87,549 7	700,339
1820	88,136 3	705,091
1821	77,862 4	622,900
1822	112,519 5	900,157
1823	86,634 5	693,077
1824	78,327 6	626,622
1825	79,186 4	633,492
Total	828,432 42	6,627,438

No. XII.

Mints.	Silver.	Gold.	Total Dollars.
Mexico	2,733,221	573,024	3,306,245
Zacatecas	2,427,844		2,427,844
Guadalajara	369,079	30,947	400,026
Durango	789,207		789,207
Guanajuato	539,978		539,978
Total	6,859,329	603,971	7,463,300

SECTION II.

THE MINING SYSTEM OF MEXICO BEFORE 1810; CHANGES WHICH OCCURRED FROM THAT TIME TILL 1823, WHEN THE IDEA OF FOREIGN COMPANIES WAS FIRST SUGGESTED. THE NUMBER OF THESE COMPANIES NOW ESTABLISHED IN MEXICO, WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THEIR OUTLAY;—THE EXTENT OF THE UNDERTAKINGS IN WHICH THEY ARE ENGAGED;—THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THEY HAVE HAD TO ENCOUNTER;—THEIR PROGRESS;—MORE PARTICULARLY DURING MY RESIDENCE IN MEXICO;—AND STATE IN 1827.

It is unnecessary for me to commence an inquiry respecting the present state of the Mining establishments of Mexico, by reverting to an epoch too distant to throw any light upon the character of the Mining laws now in force. I shall therefore merely observe that, after a period of considerable confusion and obscurity, during which all mining questions were decided by an appeal to a heterogeneous code introduced by Charles V., and composed of old Flemish and German laws, of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, an entirely new form was given to the Mining institutions of New Spain, in the year 1777, by the establishment of a Supreme Council of Mines, (denominated the Real Tribunal General del importante cuerpo de Minería de Nueva España,) which was followed by the publication of a new Code of laws, (called Las Ordenanzas de Minería,) and by the creation of Thirty-seven

Provincial Councils, or Mining Deputations, (*Diputaciones de Minería*,) each exercising a jurisdiction independent of the civil authority, in all mining cases, in the District assigned to it, with an appeal to the Supreme Tribunal, which resided in the Capital.

The Provincial Deputations were composed of deputies, chosen annually, by the Mining proprietors of each District; and these again deputed two members of their own body to reside in the Capital, who, with a Director, appointed by the Government, an Assessor, two Fiscals, and a Civil Judge, constituted the Supreme Tribunal. A College was added to this extensive establishment; and the King assigned, for the support of the whole, one Real de plata upon each Marc of Silver coined, to be deducted from the duty of *Seigneurage*, which had before been paid to the Crown.

A part of this revenue was destined to cover the salaries of the Supreme Tribunal, (which did not, however, exceed 25,000 dollars in all,) while the remainder defrayed the expenses of the College, and furnished a Capital, out of which advances, (*Avios*) were made, at the discretion of the Tribunal, to Mining Proprietors, who required funds in order to complete their works. These advances were distributed, (according to Humboldt) with more liberality than judgment; there being instances on record of individuals having obtained "*Avios*" of from two to three hundred thousand dollars, for single Mines. But although, in more than one case, the whole of the money thus improvidently invested was lost, great enterprises were encouraged by the certainty, which every respectable Miner felt, that, in an emergency, it would always be in his power to obtain assistance: and this, in conjunction with the removal of the commercial restrictions, by which the progress of the Country had before been cramped, but which were much diminished in 1778 by the Decree of Free Trade, exercised so beneficial an influence throughout New Spain,

that the produce of the Mines increased, (in a term of ten years,) from 112,828,860 dollars, (the amount of silver raised from 1760 to 1769,) to 193,504,554 dollars, which were yielded by the mines from 1780 to 1789, when the ameliorations introduced began to produce their full effect. From 1790 to 1799, still farther progress was made, the produce having amounted to 231,080,214 dollars, or more than double what it had been in 1769; and there is little doubt that the increase would have continued in a similar ratio, during the next ten years, (from 1779 to 1809,) when the produce only amounted to 226,265,711 dollars, had not the munificent donations of Charles III. been swallowed up by the distresses of his Successors. During the wars which followed the French Revolution, the Tribunal of Mines, in addition to a voluntary gift of half a million of dollars, was forced to assist the Royal Treasury with a loan of three millions more. The whole of its disposable funds were swept away by these advances, and more than half its revenue has been absorbed since, by the interest of the money raised in order to meet such unexpected demands. The Miners, forced again to depend upon the speculations of individuals for "Avios," confined their operations within narrower limits; and although in two years of the term under consideration the Coinage attained the Maximum of Twenty-seven millions of dollars, (in 1804 and 1805,) still, there was a decrease upon the whole term, as compared with that ending in 1799, of nearly five millions.

The Mining Code of Mexico, (*Las Ordonanzas de Minería*) having been published in English, with notes, it will be sufficient for me to observe, that the object of its provisions was rather to determine disputes between individuals, than to settle any differences between the Mining proprietors and the Sovereign. The whole Mining property of the Country was, indeed, supposed to be invested in the Crown, but the only use which the King made of his rights, was to concede to any

individual, who "denounced"* the existence of a metalliferous vein upon any particular spot, exclusive possession of a certain number of varas, (yards,) measured from that spot upon the course of the vein, which were called a *Pertinencia*, and became the real, *bonâ fide* property of the Denouncer, upon condition that he should undertake certain works for the extraction of ores, within a given time. If this condition were not complied with, the spot selected reverted to its original state of unappropriated Royal property, and might be again denounced, by any other individual, before the Mining Deputation of the District, which could not refuse a title to the new applicant, on his proving that, during the time specified by the Ordonanzas, no attempt had been made by the first denouncer to work the vein. No other intervention, direct or indirect, took place on the part of the Crown. The King (individually) was not proprietor of a single mine, nor is there one instance, since the Conquest, of an attempt having been made by the Government to interfere with the mode of working adopted by individuals, or to diminish the profits of the successful adventurer, by exacting, under any plea, or pretence, from the more fortunate, a higher rate of duties than that which was payable by the poorest miner to the Royal Treasury.

By this judicious liberality and good faith, the fullest scope was given for private exertion; and this, in a country where mineral treasures are so abundant, was soon found to be all that was requisite in order to ensure their production to a great extent.

The duties, however, which were payable upon the whole

* To "denounce," in the Mining Code of Mexico, implies that process, by which a legal right of possession is obtained to a particular portion of any vein, worked or unworked, known or unknown, which a Miner chooses to select for his operations. I have adopted the word because we have no equivalent for it in English. It probably originated with the first discoveries, when a person might be fairly said to announce, or denounce a vein, the existence of which was not previously known.

of the Silver raised, were very considerable. They consisted of the King's Fifth, (reduced, subsequently, to the Demiquint, or tenth,) the duty of One per cent. (*derecho del uno por ciento*), and the Mint dues (*derechos de Monedage, y Señoreage*), amounting in all, to $3\frac{1}{2}$ reals (of eight to the dollar) upon each marc of silver, which contained 68 reals, but for which the proprietor received only 64. Where gold was combined with the silver, the duties of the Casa del Apartado were added, which made a total of $19\frac{1}{8}$ per cent. Those paid on pure silver were $16\frac{2}{3}$.

The amount of these duties was not nearly so detrimental to the interests of the Miner, as the necessity of transmitting the whole produce of his mine in Bars to the Mint of the Capital, where alone it could be converted into dollars. This, in the more distant Provinces, (from the enormous expense of land-carriage,) was equivalent to a very heavy additional duty, from which neither the Revenue, nor the Country derived any material benefit; but which tended, unavoidably, to confine Mining operations to a smaller circle, and caused the rich Districts of the North to be neglected, while the Mining Capitals were employed, almost exclusively, upon the poorer ores of the South. A similar effect was produced by the restrictions upon the sale of Quicksilver, the monopoly of which belonged to the Crown: for although, by a series of judicious reductions, the price of this essential article was so much lowered, as to place it within the reach of every class of Miners, still, the distribution of it, (which depended upon the Viceroy,) was by no means impartially regulated, the poorer Miners being generally sacrificed to the influence of the richer; while the necessity of concentrating the supply in one great dépôt, (the Capital) and of effecting the importation through one solitary port, (Veracruz,) rendered the possibility of obtaining a sufficiency for the regular reduction of ores, in the North, extremely uncertain, although the want of it entailed upon the Mining proprietor inevitable ruin.

Such were the principal characteristics of the Mining system of New Spain before 1810, at which time the country was supposed to contain 500 Reales, or Realitos, (spots in which mines were worked,) with from three to five thousand mines, (large and small,) included in the thirty-seven Mining Districts, or Deputations, into which the Viceroyalty was divided.

The names of these Districts, with those of the principal mines in each, may be found in Humboldt, (Book IV. Chapter II.) as given by a manuscript, drawn up by Don Fausto Ellhuyar, (first Director of the Supreme Tribunal,) for the Viceroy, Count Revillagigedo. I do not insert them here, both because I am unwilling to trespass unnecessarily upon the time of my readers, and because it will be more suitable to the purposes of my present inquiry to give, subsequently, a table of those Mines, for which contracts have been entered into by British Companies, and to specify the *States* in which they are situated; that being now the only territorial division recognized in Mexico. It is, therefore, only necessary to repeat, what I have attempted to demonstrate in the first Section, namely, that the average annual produce of these thirty-seven Districts, during the fifteen years which preceded the Civil War, was twenty-four millions of dollars, or six millions of pounds sterling.

The extraction of this enormous mass of Silver, was not, (as has been supposed in Europe,) the result of a simple process, in which the Mine owners and the Government were the only parties concerned, but rather the effect of a most complicated system, by which the Silver raised was made to pass through the hands of four or five immediate agents, before it was brought into circulation, or even paid the Duties to the Crown. Few of the old Miners were originally capitalists. Many were unable, at first, to obtain advances from those who were so, except to a very limited amount; and were thus compelled to carry on the works of their mines,

by converting the first fruits into ready money, without waiting to ascertain the quantity of silver which the ores might contain. This led to the establishment of a class of middle-men, called *Rescatadores*, who bought up the ores at the mouth of the mine, and reduced them in Haciendas (Amalgamation works) of their own. The *Rescatadores* again, being mostly small capitalists themselves, had recourse, in their more extensive operations, to the opulent merchants established in the towns, who furnished them with funds, when required, on condition of receiving the silver produced at a rate considerably below the Mint, or market price, (for instance, at six and seven dollars per marc, when the Mint price was eight;) and by this process, (which was called "*Avio à premio de platas*,") both the risk and the profits were so subdivided, as to give the poor Miner great facilities at first, while the capitalist was enabled to invest his money almost without fear of loss.

This system was carried to an enormous extent before the Revolution, and by it, almost all classes of the community were interested in the success of the mines, while a vast floating capital was employed in them, besides that which was, in some measure, withdrawn from circulation, and sunk in dead works. It gave an impulse to Mining operations altogether unprecedented in the history of the world; and as discoveries were pushed on all sides by the poorer adventurers, who required but very trifling advances to search for mineral treasures, it is more than probable that, if public tranquillity had continued undisturbed, the Mining produce of Mexico, at the present day, would have exceeded, by at least one-third, the utmost produce of the richest years before the Revolution.

The Civil War entirely destroyed the chain of communication between the highest and lowest classes of Mining speculators. In many Districts the Haciendas of the *Rescatadores* were ruined, as were the machinery and works of the mines

themselves. In others, water was allowed to accumulate, in consequence of the suspension of the usual labours; while in all, the merchants, who had before supplied funds for carrying on the different operations, withdrew their capitals, as soon as the intercourse between the seat of Government and the Provinces was interrupted. In the years 1811 and 1812, the Agricultural produce of the country likewise decreased so rapidly, that it became difficult to procure the means of subsistence. The Mining towns were surrounded by Insurgent parties, which occupied the whole of the open country, and rendered it impossible either to receive supplies, or to make remittances, without the protection of a large escort; while the exactions of the officers, by whom these escorts were commanded, (exactions, which were reduced to a system, and in which the Viceroy himself largely participated,) doubled the price of quicksilver, and every other article consumed in the mines; and thus reduced the value of silver to the miner so much, that the marc did not repay the cost of extraction, even with the richest ores. The poor ores were allowed to accumulate untouched.

This was the real evil of the Revolution. It was not the destruction of the *matériel* of the mines, however severe the loss, that could have prevented them from recovering the shock, as soon as the first fury of the Civil War had subsided; but the want of confidence, and the constant risk incurred by the possession of a capital, which, from its being in so very tangible a shape, was peculiarly an object of attraction to all parties,—led to the gradual dissolution of a system, which it had required three centuries to bring to the state of perfection in which it existed at the commencement of the war of Independence. I do not believe that I am guilty of any exaggeration in stating, that there never was a greater spirit of enterprise, more liberality, or, in general, better faith, displayed in any part of the world, than amongst the Miners of Mexico before the year 1810. Unexampled prosperity was

their reward; and had freedom of commerce then existed, there is no doubt that the country would have derived the greatest permanent benefit from their exertions. As it was, riches easily acquired, were as lightly dissipated; but little was done towards national improvement;—no fund was provided for future emergencies;—and, after the great convulsions of 1810, 1811, and 1812, nothing remained to denote, amidst the general wreck, the epoch of splendour which had so immediately preceded it.

The efforts of the Spanish Government to alleviate this distress were unavailing; although, in justice to Spain, it must be said, that whatever may have been the faults of her Colonial System in general, with regard to the Mines she has always adopted a more liberal policy. This liberality commenced soon after the War of Succession, when, in order to conciliate the Mexicans, the King's Fifth was reduced to a Tenth, by a Decree dated the 30th of December, 1716. In 1769, the price of the Quintal of Quicksilver, (a Royal monopoly,) was reduced from eighty to sixty dollars, and in 1777, to forty-one dollars including the freight to Mexico. In 1780, gunpowder, (another monopoly,) was ordered to be sold at $4\frac{1}{2}$ reals per pound, instead of six reals; and an exemption from Alcavalas was granted in favour of all articles consumed in the Mines; which exemption was so rigorously observed, that Don José Galvez, when establishing a small tax upon maize, at Gūanājūatō, in order to improve the present entrance into the town, allowed the maize for the consumption of the Mines to pass duty free.

By order of the same Count Galvez, in 1785, during a year of scarcity, the Miners were supplied with maize from the Royal stores, at the usual price. In 1793, the Government declared its intention not to raise the price of Quicksilver, even in time of war; and as recently as 1814, (8th August,) an order was issued, again exempting from the tax of Alca-

valas, every article of ordinary consumption in the Mines, and extending this privilege to all the Mining Districts.

But no encouragement, on the part of the Royal Government, could supply the want of capital, and of confidence; and, with the exception of some works at Catorce,* Zacatecas, and Sombrerete, which were prosecuted successfully, after the reverses of the Insurgents in 1814, and 1815, by small Spanish capitalists, who resided upon the spot, Mining, throughout the Kingdom, was reduced to a mere shadow of what it had been. In 1821, even these partial works were given up, (on the declaration of the Independence,) and most of the Spaniards who had invested money in them withdrew their capitals, and returned to Europe.

Such was the state of the Mining interests of Mexico, when the first Independent Government was established. Its attention was early, and unavoidably, drawn to the subject, because the Mines had involved in their fall both agriculture and trade, to which their restoration could alone give a new impulse.

This part of the subject, however, belongs more properly to the observations with which it is my intention to close this Book. Here it will be sufficient for me to state the means adopted to afford immediate relief.

By a Decree of the Regency, (dated 20th February, 1822,) the duties formerly paid under the denominations of One per cent. Royal Tenth, Seigneurage, and Bocado, were abolished, as were those exacted during the Revolution, on Plata Pasta, or silver in a crude state; in lieu of which, a duty of three per

* The emigrants from Catorce were very numerous; I mean those who returned to Spain, or France, with 60, or 70,000 dollars. The United Company has now almost all the Mines at Zacatecas, which were abandoned at this time, and also those belonging to Don Narciso Anitua, at Sombrerete, which he was compelled to give up just as he had completed the drainage.

cent. upon the real value of the gold and silver raised, was substituted. The expense of Coinage was also reduced to two reals per marc, and the charge at the Apartado, for the separation of the silver from the gold in ores containing both, to two reals, in lieu of five and a half. In addition to this, the monopoly formerly enjoyed by the Casa del Apartado was done away with, and liberty granted to the Miners to perform the process of separating the gold from the silver, where, and as, they pleased.* They were likewise allowed to dispose of their silver, (after presenting it at any of the Provincial Mints to be assayed, and paying the duty of three per cent.) as a marketable commodity, for which each was to obtain the best possible price.

The importation of Quicksilver was declared to be duty free, and Powder, (although it continued a Government monopoly,) was ordered to be delivered to the Miners at prime cost.

In making these concessions, the Government of Mexico only followed the example of the Peninsula; most of the reductions indicated above having been sanctioned by the Cortes of Madrid, at the suggestion of the Mexican Deputies, in June and July 1821: but the establishment of Mints in the different States, (their legal establishment, I mean,) is due to the Revolution, as is the free introduction of Quicksilver, on so many different points of the coasts of the Republic. Both these are most important advantages; for the last opens an easy access to many rich Districts, to which Quicksilver could only be conveyed at an enormous expense before; while the newly erected Mints, when provided, as they will be in the course of time, with funds for the purchase of the Plata Pasta, as brought in by the poorer Miners, must pro-

* The United Mexican Company has taken advantage of this concession, on the part of the Government, to form an establishment in the Capital, in which, by a change in the process, they undertake to separate the two metals at a less expense than the Casa del Apartado.

mote the progress of Mining enterprises throughout the Federation, since, by destroying the monopoly of the Capital, they diminish, most materially, both the time and the expense necessary in order to convert Bars into dollars, at a distance (sometimes) of three and four hundred leagues from the place where the silver is raised; and thus add, specifically, to the value of every marc that the Mines produce.

But, notwithstanding these advantages, capital was wanting in order to turn them to account. The emigration of the Old Spaniards, who were, with few exceptions, the *Aviadores*, or *Habilitators*,* and the vast sums withdrawn by them from the country, during the years 1821 and 1822, rendered an accession of fresh Capitalists necessary, in order to restore the Mines to any thing like their former importance; and with this view, by an act of the Congress, the door was thrown open to Foreigners, who were allowed to become joint proprietors with Natives, on terms highly favourable to the adventurers, had they entered upon the field presented to them with a proper knowledge of the country, and of the nature of the enterprises which they were about to undertake.

Of the eagerness with which the clauses in this Act favourable to foreign speculation were taken advantage of by His Majesty's subjects, it would be unnecessary for me here to speak, were it not for the very prejudicial influence which this eagerness has exercised upon the interests of the adventurers, by creating a ruinous competition at the very outset, and thus compelling many Companies, in lieu of proposing their own terms, to submit to those dictated by the Mexican Proprietors; and consequently, in some instances, to commence their operations upon conditions so onerous, as much to diminish their prospects of success.

Before I attempt, however, to point out the errors that

* To *habilitate*, signifies to furnish funds for working a Mine, with or without a share in the management of the works. *Habilitar*, and *Habilitador*, can only be rendered into English by adoption.

have been committed in this respect, and the consequences to which they have led, it will be necessary to state the number of the Companies actually in existence, the amount of the capital invested in them, and the States and Districts in which it is embarked.

Without reckoning any of those Associations which started up, during the general mania for Mining, in England, and threw up their engagements in Mexico as soon as the feeling in favour of such undertakings subsided, there are, at the present moment, Seven great English Companies, besides One German, and Two American Companies, employed in working Mines in different parts of the Federation.

Of the names of these Companies, the nominal capital of each,* the capital actually invested, and the *States*, in which their labours are carrying on, a succinct account will be found in the following sketch.

* I use the epithet *nominal*, because great reluctance seems to have been shown latterly, on the part of the Shareholders of some Companies, to complete the advances for which they have rendered themselves liable; as if, had it been possible to restore the Mines to activity without a real, and *bonâ fide* investment to a much larger amount than they could themselves supply, the Mexicans would ever have consented to allow Foreigners to participate in those advantages, of which, during three centuries, their mines have been the source.

REAL DEL MONTE COMPANY.

Director in Mexico, CAPTAIN VETCH.

Capital.	Invested.	States.	Mines.
£400,000	About £400,000.	<div> <div>Mexico.</div> <div>Real del Monte.</div> <div>Zimapan.</div> <div>Valladolid.</div> </div>	<p>All the Mines on the two great Veins of Biscaina, and Santa Brigida, formerly belonging to the Regla family.</p> <p>The Mine of Moran.</p> <p>Mines on the Veins of Acosta and S^o. Esteban.</p> <p>Lead Mine of Lomo del Toro, at Zimāpān.</p> <p>Eight Iron Mines at the Encarnacion, near Zimāpān.</p> <p>Mines of San Francisco, Guadalupe, and Don Martin, at Pechuga.</p> <p>Mines of los Apostoles, La Machorra, and San Pedro Barreno, at Ozūmātlān.</p>

BOLAÑOS COMPANY.

Directors, CAPTAINS VETCH and LYON, R. N.

Capital.	Invested.	States.	Mines.
£200,000.	About £150,000.	<div>Guadalajara</div> <div>or</div> <div>Jalisco.</div> <div>Zacatecas.</div>	<p>Tepec, Intermedio, Concepcion, el Camichin, Laureles, and Barranco, on the Veta Madre of Bolanos.</p> <p>Mines belonging to the Fagoaga family, at Veta Grande.</p>

TLALPUJAHUA COMPANY.

Director, Mr. DE RIVAFINOLI.

Capital.	Invested.	States.	Mines.
£400,000.	About £180,000.	Mexico. Valladolid.	Seven Mines at <i>El Oro</i> ; and Eighty-six Mines on all the principal Veins of the District of <i>Tlalpujahu</i> , including those of Coronas, Laborda, and Las Virgenes.

ANGLO-MEXICAN COMPANY.

Director, Mr. WILLIAMSON.

Capital.	Invested.	States.	Mines.
£1,000,000.	About £800,000.	Guānājuātō.	Vālenciānā, Mēlladō, Tēpēyāc, Sīrēnā, Villālpāndō, and several small mines on the Veta Madre, and other Veins, at Guānājuātō.
		Mexico.	La Cruz, San Fērnāndō, Guādālūpē, and three other small mines at Zīmāpān.
		Quērētārō.	Four small Mines at San Crīstōbāl and Mācōnī.
		San Luis Pōtōsī.	Mines of Cōncēpciōn, (a share,) Guādālūpē de Veta Grande, and Milāgrōs, at Cātōrcē.
		Mexico.	Mines of La Reunion, Soledad, Guadalupe, Santa Brigida, and El Rosario, at Real del Monte.

UNITED MEXICAN COMPANY.

Directors { DON LUCAS ALAMAN.
Mr. GLENNIE.
Mr. AGASSIS.

Capital.	Invested.	States.	Mines.
£1,200,000.	About £800,000.	Guanajuato.	{ Rayas, Sechó, Cata, La Calera, San Roquito, San Rafael, La America, Guadalupe, at Guanajuato.
		Guadalajara.	{ Diamantillo and Guardaraya, at Co-manja.
		Zacatecas.	{ Quebradilla, Malanoche, San Bernabé, San Acasio, El Desierto, Loreto, at Veta Grande.
		Chihuahua.	{ Mines on the Veins of El Pavellon, and La Vetanegra, at Sombrerete.
		Oaxaca.	{ La Divina Providencia, Animas, and Belen, at Jesus Maria.
			{ La Natividad, Dolores, and a mine of Magistral, at Capulalpan.
			{ Mines on the Vein of San Pablo, at Teojomulco.
			{ Mines of La Bomba, Santa Ana, Las Papas, San Miguel, San Antonio, and Santa Rita, at <i>El Chico</i> .
		State of Mexico.	{ All the Mines on La Veta Descubridora of <i>El Oro</i> , with those of San Acasio, and San Rafael.
			{ La Magdalena, Los Reyes, and La Guitarra, at <i>Temascaltepec</i> .
			{ San Antonio, and San Diego, at <i>El Christo</i> .
			{ San Mateo, at <i>Zacualpan</i> .
			{ Coronilla, at <i>Tetela del Rio</i> .

THE MEXICAN COMPANY.

Capital.	Invested.	States.	Mines.
		Veracruz	{ Copper Mines of Sumoloacan, between Las Vigas and Perote.
		Zacatecas.	
		Oaxaca	{ Some Mines at Fresnillo (not worked.) Mines of Dolores, Santa Ana, San Felipe Neri, Jesus, San José, La Soledad, &c.
		(near the Capital of the State.)	

CATORCE COMPANY.

Present Director, Mr. STOKES.

Capital.	States.	Mines.
Capital and Investments not exactly known; but the last not supposed to exceed £60,000.	San Luis Potosi.	{ Dólórēs Mēdēllin, Guădălŭpītō, Dōlōrēs Trōmpētă, Sērēnō, and Great Adit of La Purisima, at <i>Catorce</i> .
	Queretaro.	
	Mexico.	{ Mine of El Doctor, in the district of that name. Mines of Santa Ana, Guădălŭpě, Todos Santos, Santa Clara, and Cinco Senores, at Tēpāntītlān.

AMERICAN COMPANIES.

COMPANY OF BALTIMORE.

Director, Mr. KEATING.

Capital Invested.	State.	Mines and Districts.
Unknown; but very small.	Mexico.	{ Mines of San Jōsē, San Luis, and Santa Brigida, at Temascaltepec.

COMPANY OF NEW YORK.

Capital.	State.	Mines.
Unknown ; and In- vestments, if any, very trifling.	Mexico.	<div> <div>La Carniceria.</div> <div>Las Animas.</div> <div>La Mina de Aguas.</div> <div>San Juan de las Quebradillas, at Tē- māscāltēpec.</div> </div>

GERMAN COMPANY OF ELBERFELD.

Directors, {
 Mr. STEIN.
 Mr. SCHLEIDEN.
 Mr. VON GEROLDT.

Capital Invested.	State.	Mines and Districts.
Total In- vestment about 637,760 dollars, or L127,552.	Mexico.	<div> <div>Mines of Arēvālō and Santa Rosa, at <i>El Chico</i>.</div> <div>Mine of Santa Rita, at <i>Zimapan</i>.</div> <div>Chalma and La Santisima, at San <i>José del Oro</i>.</div> <div>Saltillo and San Joaquin, at <i>El Car- donal</i>.</div> <div>Nineteen small Mines at <i>La Pechuga</i>.</div> <div>Nine Mines, called De Arriva, at <i>Te- mascaltepec</i>.</div> <div>The Mina Grande, and two others, at <i>Saltepec</i>.</div> <div>Durazno, Christo, Dolores, and Tri- nidad, at <i>El Christo</i>.</div> <div>El Carmen, La Purisima, and San Atenogenes, at <i>Angango</i>.</div> </div>

My readers will perceive by this statement, that British Capital, to the amount of nearly three millions sterling, is actually invested in the Mexican Mines; or has, at least, been expended in enterprises immediately connected with them, as machinery, mining implements and stores, quick-silver, and the salaries of officers employed in the different Companies.

The exact sum disbursed in Mexico, it is impossible for me to state; I should conceive, however, that at least twelve millions of dollars must have been laid out, at the commencement of 1827, the vivifying influence of which has extended to almost every part of the Federation.*

I come now to "the character and extent of the undertakings in which the Companies are engaged,—the difficulties which they have had to encounter;—their progress,—state,—and prospects,—in 1827."

All these points are, in fact, so intimately connected, that they can hardly be considered apart; nor will it, I fear, be possible for me to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion with regard to them, without entering into considerable details; but this I shall do with the less scruple, because it is to the supposed failure of those golden dreams, by which the imagination of the public was captivated in 1824, (and to which no small portion of the enthusiasm then displayed in favour of American Independence may, perhaps, be traced,) that that revulsion of feeling, which has since taken place, must be ascribed, as well as the despondency, with which those most interested in American Affairs, now look forward to the issue of their several undertakings. For these gloomy forebodings

* I do not mean that bullion to this amount has been imported into Mexico; but that a capital of twelve millions, which would, otherwise, have found its way to Europe, has been retained, and brought into circulation in New Spain, in exchange for the Bills of the different Companies. The imports in Specie on Mining account, have not, I believe, exceeded 300,000 dollars.

I see, at present, no ground; but if persevered in, they may be attended with circumstances still more injurious to British interests in the New World, than even the errors committed during the period of wild and unbridled speculation, by which they were preceded. I shall endeavour, therefore, by a plain statement of the advantages and disadvantages of the line that has been pursued, to show the nature of the expectations that may still be reasonably entertained with regard to the result.

If I were to take into account nothing but the amount of capital now invested in the mines of Mexico, the average annual produce of these same mines before the Revolution, and the fact, that those from which by far the largest proportion of this annual produce proceeded, are now worked upon British account,—I should hazard but little in pronouncing the success of all the Companies to be unquestionable. But experience has shown how ill calculations formed on such a basis can stand the test of those practical difficulties, with which Companies have to contend in the New World; and many a scheme, the issue of which, upon paper, seemed infallible, has proved utterly inapplicable to the American Continent, as soon as the attempt to reduce theory to practice was made upon the opposite side of the Atlantic. It is true that there is nowhere in Mexico that physical impossibility of success, which, at Upsallata, (in Chile,) appears to have put an end to the hopes of the adventurers at once;* but still, the want of a previous knowledge of the country has been severely felt in all the operations of the Companies; and, in more than one instance, has, at least, delayed a result, of which the character of the Mines themselves seems to afford the fairest promise. Upon this point, (the excellence of the Mines,) no doubt can be entertained; for if ever Mining was reduced to a certainty, it was so in Mexico, before the Revolution. There might be fluctuations, indeed, in

* *Vide* Captain Head's Statement.

particular Districts; and capital, if invested without judgment, might then, as now, be lost. But the general produce of the country was the same, during a long series of years; or, if it varied, the variation originated not in the Mines, but in causes totally unconnected with them, which rendered the supply of quicksilver, and other indispensable articles, more or less precarious.

England, even while unconnected with Mexico, always exercised a direct influence upon the produce of her Mines. A war with Great Britain generally caused a reduction of nearly one-third in the Mint returns; but then the first years of peace brought with them a corresponding increase, so that the *average* was never materially affected. A similar connexion may be traced between the Mining and Agricultural interests. From the enormous quantity of mules, and horses, employed in Mining operations, (14,000 were in daily use in Guāñajūatō alone,) a rise in the price of maize occasioned an immediate reduction in all the Mining establishments. The poorer ores were suffered to accumulate in years of scarcity, nor did they become objects of attention, until a succession of plentiful crops again afforded the Mining proprietors the means of keeping up a sufficiency of live-stock to reduce them with profit. But, notwithstanding these unavoidable drawbacks, a surprising uniformity will be found in the general produce of the country. The failure of one Mine was compensated by the success of others; and thus, a sort of standard was established for the year, which rendered Mining in Mexico almost as sure a mode of investing capital as any other. The average Produce, (as we have seen,) on a term of Fifteen years, was Twenty-four millions of dollars. What the exact amount of the capital was, by the investment of which, in Mining operations, this vast sum was produced, it is impossible now to ascertain. I should be inclined, however, to estimate it, at least, at Thirty-six millions of dollars, or nearly three times the amount of the capital

now employed in the same way by the British Companies. I am bound to state, that for this estimate I can give no authority. It is a mere matter of conjecture; but since I have seen the number of Amalgamation works, and other extensive and costly establishments, now in ruins in every part of Mexico, and compared them with those which have been rebuilt by the Companies, all that they have done seems to be as nothing in comparison with what must formerly have existed. I was particularly struck with this on entering Guanajuato, where more money has been expended by the two Companies established there, (the Anglo-Mexican, and the United Mexican,) than upon any other single spot in the Federation, yet the suburb of Marfil, which was formerly, according to Humboldt, "an imposing sight," from the activity that prevailed in every part of it, is still a scene of desolation; and when, after passing a long succession of ruined Haciendas, one at last enters the town, the population is found to be reduced to a little more than one-half of what it was in the year 1809, when it exceeded 90,000 souls. Without dwelling unnecessarily upon this idea, I will only add that, in as far as my own means of observation have extended, the remark holds good with regard to every Mining District in the Federation. In Zacātēcās, Cātōrcē, Sōmbrērētē, and Real del Monte, the works of the Companies are lost amongst the remains of former times; and by what they have expended, some estimate may be formed of what must have been expended before them.

This fact, (the difference between the capital now invested, and that which it was intended to replace,) is one cause of the disappointment of those, who imagine that, because a very large sum has been laid out upon the Mines of Mexico by British capitalists, the produce of those Mines ought, at once, to equal that of the best years before the Revolution.

But a still simpler solution of this disappointment may be found in the total ignorance of every thing connected with

the New World, under the influence of which most of the capital, now employed in Mining speculations there, was invested.

In every other commercial enterprise, some previous acquaintance with the subject might have been thought necessary; but the Mines were to be an exception to all ordinary rules; and, on the principle, I suppose, of taking *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, vast sums were embarked in schemes, of which the very persons, who staked their all upon the result, knew literally nothing, except the name.

I am far from wishing to lay unnecessary stress upon this circumstance, but it is essential to a right understanding of the delays that have occurred in the realization of the hopes of those, who sought a profitable investment in the Mines, to state, that the only knowledge which the British Public possessed, three years ago, of Mexico, was derived from a superficial acquaintance with the *Essai Politique* of Baron Humboldt; which, although it contains more valuable information than any other similar work, that has ever been given to the world, was, nevertheless, calculated to create an erroneous impression with regard to the actual state of New Spain, by descriptions of a splendour, which had long ceased to exist. No allowances were made for the moral, as well as physical, effects of fourteen years of civil war;—the dispersion of the most valuable portion of the Mining labourers;—the deterioration of landed property;—the destruction of stock;—and the difficulty of reorganizing a branch of industry so extensive in its ramifications as Mining, and so dependent upon other branches, not immediately connected with the Mines themselves, and consequently, not under the control of their Directors! This was to be effected, too, in a country, in many parts of which it was necessary to create a population, before a single step could be taken towards repairing the ruin, which the Revolution had occasioned. And yet, nine-tenths of those who engaged in the arduous task, did so

under the conviction that *water* was the only obstacle to be overcome, and that the possibility of surmounting this, by the aid of English machinery, was unquestionable! Nor was this all. The errors which Baron Humboldt's scientific eye had detected in parts of the Mining system of Mexico, were supposed to extend to the whole. The practical experience of the native Miners was underrated;—their machinery condemned, without any previous inquiry as to its powers, or the different degrees of perfection which it had attained in the different Districts:—*gradual* improvement was pronounced too sluggish a process; and Cornwall was drained of half its population, in order to substitute an entirely new method, for that which had been endeared to the Mexicans by the experience of three centuries.

The total failure of this attempt was the natural consequence of the want of consideration with which it was made.

That it *has* failed, (although the fact seems still to be disputed in England,) it is impossible to deny; nor do I believe that, under any circumstances, it could have proved permanently successful.

Englishmen of the lower orders appear to undergo a change, on leaving their own country, (particularly if exposed to the contagion of a large town,) which renders them the most inefficient of human beings: nor is it by an excess of liberality, which only raises them above the sphere in which they were fitted to act, that this evil can be remedied. Indolence, obstinacy, and insolence, take, but too soon, the place of those qualities, by which our working classes are distinguished at home; and, as their prejudices are not less strong than those which they have to encounter on the part of the Natives, the result, in all cases where mutual assistance is required, cannot be favourable.

It is but fair to add, that the disinclination of the Mexicans to co-operate in many of the plans suggested, has been not a little increased by the discovery that some of our

boasted improvements* have not been productive of any solid advantage, while others have proved complete failures; and where this is the case, it is next to impossible, in any country, to substitute new methods, merely because they are new, for a practice, which time has already rendered familiar.

Experience has now induced most of the Companies to retrace their steps, and to reduce their establishments in such a manner as to make the *management* strictly European, while the operative part is confided to Natives; but this experience has been dearly bought. The Anglo-Mexican Company alone had expended, in September 1826, nearly 30,000*l.* in salaries to men, most of whom have now been dismissed; and full 100,000*l.* in machinery (including duties and carriage from the Coast,) not one twentieth part of which either has been, or ever can be, made use of, the machinery of the country having been found fully adequate for the drainage of their Mines.†

The expenses of the Real del Monte Company, in the same way, have been still greater; but there, the issue of the whole undertaking depends upon the application of the power of Steam, and the engines render European workmen of all kinds indispensable. Even there, however, a great reduction is taking place.

The United Mexican Company has likewise dismissed almost all its European workmen. Indeed, in many instances,

* I allude not to the use of machinery where that of the country has proved insufficient, as at Real del Monte, but to the attempt to substitute the Cornish system of washing and dressing Ores, for that of New Spain. In this, as in many supposed improvements in the process of Amalgamation and Smelting, innovation has, hitherto, only led to loss; and I believe that, in every instance, the works for reducing Ores are now confided to Natives.

† The Mines of Villalpando and Sirena, which are likely to prove the most productive, were drained by Mr. Williamson, in six months, by the application of Malacates, (Horse Whims;) and of the ultimate drainage of Valenciana, by the same process, I entertain little doubt.

the whole management is confided to Natives; and although this system has not, I think, been generally successful, (from the listlessness, and want of activity, of many of the agents,) in some places it has been productive of the very best effects, as at Sombrerete, where nothing could exceed the beautiful order in which I found the works, under the management of Don Nărcișo Ȃnîțuă, who acts, at the same time, as Proprietor, and as Mining Director for the Company.

At Tlalpujahua, the attempt to introduce a strictly European system was never made; and that Company has, consequently, experienced fewer changes, and incurred less expense since its establishment, than any other. Its whole outlay does not exceed 180,000*l.* while, by engrafting upon the old Mexican machinery a number of modern European improvements, a steady progress has been made in the works, which now present every prospect of a favourable result.

I have been unavoidably drawn into these details, in order to place in a proper light, strictures, which, although they apply, in some measure, to all the Companies, are not applicable, in the same degree, to each: nor can I terminate this unpleasant portion of my task, without pointing out a few additional circumstances, by which the prospects of the Adventurers in the Mexican Mines have been more or less influenced.

There is hardly a single Company, amongst those now formed, that has not expended considerable sums upon Mines, which, had they been better acquainted with the country, they would never have attempted to work. This is not to be attributed entirely to the Directors in Mexico. In 1825, the rage for taking up Mining contracts was such, that many adventurers, who presented themselves in London for that purpose, disposed of Mines, (the value of which was, to say the least, very questionable,) to the Boards of Management in England, without the Agents of the Company upon the spot having been either consulted, or even apprized of the

purchase, until it was concluded. Others were contracted for in Mexico, without proper inquiry or precaution; and large sums were often paid down for mere pits, which, upon investigation, it was found impossible to work. In some cases, operations were actually commenced, and all the preliminary parts of a Mining establishment formed, without sufficient data to afford a probability of repayment. In many of the Districts immediately about the Capital, (as Zimapan, El Doctor, Capula, Chico, Temascaltepec, &c.) this has been the case; and although these desultory experiments have been subsequently abandoned, still, they have been a drain upon the Companies, which is the more to be regretted, because it never could have been productive of any great result.*

In general, the selection of Mines, amongst the first Adventurers, was determined by a reference to Humboldt. Any Mine not mentioned in his *Essai Politique*, was rejected as unworthy of attention; while those which were favourably spoken of, were eagerly sought for.

In this respect, the work in question has exercised an influence highly prejudicial to British interests, not from any fault of the author's, but from the conclusions imprudently drawn from the facts which he has recorded.

Humboldt never asserted, or meant to assert, that a Mine, because it was highly productive in 1802, must be equally so in 1824. A general impression of the Mining capabilities

* I do not wish to enumerate the individual instances of these failures that have come to my knowledge, but there is one very generally known, that of Mr. Bullock's Mine at Temascaltepec, which was purchased of him by the Houses of Baring and Lubbock, and upon which I should think that 20,000*l.* must have been expended before their Agent, (Mr. Bullock,) could convince himself of the injudiciousness of his choice. What induced him, in the first instance, to fix upon this particular spot, I am unable to state, for I have never discovered any record, or even tradition, respecting the former produce of the Mine. Certain it is, however, that it does not now contain the slightest vestige of a vein, nor has one ounce of ore, (rich or poor,) been raised from it.

of Mexico was all that he wished to convey ; and how could he illustrate their importance better, than by presenting statements of what had been done, as the best criterion of what might still be effected in a country, the mineral treasures of which he regarded as almost unexplored ?

Unfortunately, the consequence of these statements was, to direct the attention of the world *exclusively* to spots, which, from the enormous quantity of mineral wealth that they have already yielded, may fairly be supposed to have seen their best days.

I do not mean to say that the great Mines, taken up by our Companies, are exhausted ; on the contrary, I believe that they will still amply repay the Adventurers for the stake invested in them ; but I have, certainly, little doubt that, in many instances, the same capital might have been laid out, elsewhere, with a much more immediate prospect of advantage.

Besides, however good the Mines, the price paid for their former celebrity in the shape of "Alimentos," (a yearly allowance to their owners,) has proved a very serious addition to the first outlay of the Adventurers.

Those paid by the Real del Monte Company to Count Regla, amount to 20,000 Dollars. The Anglo-Mexican Company, for the Mine of Valenciana alone, pays yearly 24,000 Dollars. On the preparations for draining the first, (the great Biscaina Vein,) nearly two millions of Dollars had been expended when I left Mexico, and at Guanajuato, the Valenciana Mine had cost, on the 1st of September, 1826,—672,264 Dollars. Farther advances will be required in both cases, before the drainage can be completed ; and certainly, there ought not, in reason, or justice, to have been any surcharge, in the shape of Alimentos, where so large an investment of capital was necessary for the preliminary works.

But this was one of the effects of that competition between the different Companies, which made each fear to find a rival

in the rest : another, was the little attention paid to the terms of the Contracts, which are not always as favourable as they might have been made. Some of the most expensive Mines, (as Valenciana, and Rayas,) are held for a shorter term of years than would have been desirable ; and in others, many onerous conditions have been introduced, which nothing but the extreme eagerness of the first Adventurers to take up the greatest possible number of Mines, could have given rise to. Fortunately, these disadvantages are pretty equally distributed ; so that, in most Companies, the good and the bad Contracts serve to counterbalance each other : I do not, however, know any one, whose engagements are unexceptionable, or by any means as good as they might now be made.

Such are the disadvantages under which the British Companies, now established in Mexico, labour, and such the causes that have, hitherto, impeded their progress. Both have proceeded, in a great measure, from the want of a proper knowledge of the country, in the first instance, which has, undoubtedly, entailed upon them an expenditure, which, by a more judicious system on commencing their operations, might have been much diminished.

Against these drawbacks we must set, First, The known goodness of a great proportion of the Mines now in the possession of the Companies ; and the equally well known fact, that, when these Mines stopped working, there was no falling off or diminution in their produce ; so that as soon as the present Adventurers reach the lower levels, they have almost a certainty of being repaid for a part, at least, of their advances.*

* I cannot urge this point too strongly, for although the mass of silver already raised from some mines, undoubtedly diminishes the probability of their continuing equally productive for a long term of years, yet, where the richness of the vein continued unimpaired in 1810, it affords almost a certainty of the repayment of the capital invested, in the first instance, leaving the profits only to be affected by the ulterior returns.

Secondly, The great progress that has been already made by all the Companies: the forward state of their preparatory works; and the rapidity with which, after making roads, rebuilding Haciendas, and laying in stores of all kinds, they are now approaching the lower workings of their different Mines, where the demand for farther advances, on the part of the Shareholders, will cease.

Thirdly, The certainty, that errors once committed, will not be repeated; that every precaution is now taken in order to confine the operations of the Companies to those Mines from which speedy returns may be expected; that the greatest activity is displayed in every one of the negotiations; and that this activity is rendered doubly efficient by the lessons of the last three years.

My own experience enables me to add that, in Mexico, there has been no instance of any of those disgraceful speculations which have contributed so much to discredit, in England, Mining Adventures in general. The engagements of the different Companies are all *bonâ fide* engagements, and no exertions have been spared in carrying them into effect. The efforts which have been made in the service of some of the Associations, and the obstacles that have been surmounted, are quite incredible, and do the highest honour to the gentlemen charged with the direction of their affairs: and, though some of the minor undertakings, in which capital was, (perhaps injudiciously,) invested, at a time when a desire to employ capital in this way was universal, have since been given up, still, the great enterprises which were pointed out, in the first instance, as the object of the formation of the different Companies, have been steadily pursued, and are now in a very advanced state.

Those who are unacquainted with the scale upon which Mining enterprises in Mexico are conducted, and who judge of the outlay required there, by a comparison with that which attends the working of one of the smaller mineral de-

posits of Europe, are at a loss to comprehend the necessity of an expenditure so large as that of some of the Companies has already been: I shall, therefore, take the liberty of submitting to my readers the following observations, which will be found, more or less, applicable to all the Mining Associations of New Spain, and may tend to throw some light upon this part of the subject.

The Outlay of the Companies has not, in any instance, been confined to a single Mine, but has embraced a series, or suite of Mines, sometimes in the same, sometimes in different districts, each requiring a multiplicity of extensive works, not only in the interior, for the drainage and extraction of ores, but on the surface, in order to turn to account these ores, when raised.

It is in the immense mass of ores which they are capable of producing, and not by any means in the abundance of Silver contained in them, that the riches of the Southern, or Central mining districts of Mexico, consist. Before the Revolution, it was calculated that the three millions of marcs of silver, to which the average annual produce of the country amounted, were extracted from ten millions of quintals (hundred weights) of Ore; so that the proportion of Silver did not exceed two and a half ounces to the hundred weight.*

The quantity of machinery requisite, in order to reduce this mass into a fit state to be submitted to the action of the quicksilver, by which the silver is ultimately separated from it, was immense; and as the whole of it was destroyed during the civil war, it became necessary to erect anew, horse-whims, (Malacates,) magazines, stamps, crushing-mills, (Arastres,) and washing-vats; to purchase hundreds of horses for the drainage, and mules for the conveyance of the ore from the mine to the Haciendas, (where the process of reduction is carried on;) to make roads, in order to facilitate the commu-

* *Vide* Report of Tribunal de Minería, and Humboldt, *passim*.

nication between them; to wall in the Patios, or courts, in which amalgamation is at last effected; and to construct water-wheels wherever water power could be applied; nor is there one of these expenses, that is not in so far indispensable, that, without them, the drainage of the mines themselves could lead to no sort of advantage.

It is, therefore, by works of this nature that the Companies have commenced their operations, and in them the largest portion of their outlay has consisted. Authorised by their contracts to look forward to a long term of possession, (generally from twenty to thirty years,) and entitled, by the former goodness of the mines, to expect an abundant produce, their preparatory works have been constructed in such a manner as to combine durability with convenience, and, in most instances, will require but few additions. Of the scale upon which things have necessarily been done, I shall beg leave to adduce a few examples.

The possessions of the Real del Monte Company, on the two great Veins of Santa Brigida, and La Biscaina, (which are usually regarded in England as one *mine*,) cover a space of 11,800 yards, and are intersected, at intervals, by thirty-three shafts, varying in depth from 200 to 270 yards, but all sunk with a magnificence unparalleled in Europe. The whole of these shafts, together with the great adit, which follows the direction of the two veins, branching off from the Santa Brigida Vein at the point where it intersects that of the Biscaina, and from which the wealth of the Regla family was principally derived, were delivered over to the Company, in July 1824, in a state of absolute ruin. Many of the shafts had fallen in, (though cut, at intervals, in the solid porphyritic rock;) in others, the timbers had given way, and in all, as the adit was completely choked up, the water had risen to an enormous height. In July 1826, when I visited Real del Monte, the adit was cleared, and retimbered, from the mouth,

(near the mine of Mörān,) to the shaft of Dolores, (a distance of 2,807 yards;) seven of the great shafts on the Biscaina Vein, and two on that of Santa Brigida, were repaired down to the adit level, (213 varas,) forming in all a space of 12,439 feet, that had been retimbered, and 5,921 feet that had been actually dug out anew, in order to free it from rubbish, in the course of two years. 45,400 yards of road were likewise made during the same time, by which a communication for waggons was opened from the different shafts to the farms in the mountains, as well as to the great Hacienda of Regla, between which and the mines, six hundred mules were formerly employed daily in the conveyance of Ores. At all the principal shafts buildings were erected, with magazines, and workshops for carpenters and smiths, inclosed by lofty stone walls. At Regla, a thirty-six feet water-wheel had been made, and a wheel-pit built for its reception. Eight of the old arastres, (worked by water,) had been repaired; dwelling-houses for miners built; smelting furnaces erected; stabling completed for 500 mules and horses; and every preparation made for putting the whole establishment into activity, the instant that the drainage of the mines could be effected.

To accomplish this, five large steam-engines, (three of Woolf's, and two of Taylor's,) together with one steam stamping-engine, and two small saw mill-engines, amounting in all to 1500 tons of machinery, were sent out from England; all of which, at the period of my visit, had been safely transported from the coast to Real del Monte, by the party under the orders of Captain Colquhoun, whose exertions in this most arduous enterprise, had they been made in the field, instead of having occurred in the service of a private Association, would have excited both the surprise and the gratitude of his country. Seven hundred mules were employed, during five months, upon this great work, with from seventy to one hundred men; without including those who had been pre-

viously occupied in repairing such parts of the road between Veracruz and Perote, as must have proved impassable for loaded waggons.

Nothing could be more honourable to the director, Captain Vetch, than the flourishing state of the establishment at the period of my visit ; nor do I think that the most timorous of the shareholders, would have murmured at the expense, had they seen the ability with which the whole plan had been traced, and witnessed all that two years had enabled their agents to effect.

At Bolaños, (which, though a distinct company, was likewise under the direction of Captain Vetch,) the expenses have been confined, almost entirely, to the preparations for the drainage, which consist of one great work, designed by Captain Vetch, and executed hitherto under his superintendence. The Company possesses there fourteen shafts, communicating with each other below ground, and occupying a space of 4,100 yards upon the vein.

The mines, though peculiarly rich, were abandoned in 1798, from the enormous expense of keeping down the water, in which, at that time, 5,000 mules were employed. As a substitute for these, a single water-wheel is now to be erected ; it having been ascertained, by repeated measurements, that a sufficient fall may be obtained to work this wheel, by bringing a canal, or leat, from the river, which runs through the barranca, (ravine,) in which the mines are situated, at a considerable distance up its course.

The length of this canal is 6,176 yards, or three miles and a half, of which 3,034 yards, (or nearly one mile and three-quarters,) must necessarily be carried under ground, by excavating a tunnel.

In 1826, 1,943 yards of the open cutting, and 1,629 yards of the tunnel, were completed, (four feet deep and six wide ;) in addition to which, ten lumbreras, (or air shafts,) had been sunk, the aggregate depth of which was 180 yards. One

thousand three hundred and nine yards more were driven before the 1st of February, 1827, which left only 450 yards to be completed.

The whole is regarded by the natives as a most judicious, and scientific work, which well deserves to be repaid by the success, which those acquainted with the district confidently predict.

The works of the Anglo-Mexican Company, comprise twenty mines in the district of Guānājūatō alone; three in that of San Cristōbāl; two at Măcōnī; five at Zīmăpān; three at Cătōrcē, and six at Real del Monte. Of the Guana juato mines, some are upon an enormous scale, as Vălěnciănă, Mělladō, Těpēc̃yac, Sīrēnă, and Vīllălpăndō, all of which were delivered to the Company, in February 1825, in a state of complete ruin.

When I saw them, in November 1826, the machinery, and works connected with them, had been entirely rebuilt; the drainage in Sīrēnă, and Vīllălpăndō, was nearly concluded, and in the Valenciana it was proceeding at the rate of 10,000 tons per week. Nine Haciendas de beneficio, (amalgamation works,) had been erected, and completely fitted up, with crushing-mills, and every other necessary. In most of these, the process of reducing ores was carrying on to a considerable extent: some were still idle, but the progress of the drainage in the Valenciana, and Villalpando, was expected very shortly to furnish a sufficiency of ores to bring them all into activity. The number of mules and horses employed in the drainage was 3,100; in addition to which there were about 400 more used merely in the conveyance of ores from the mines. The weekly expenses of the Valenciana mine alone, which is regarded as the principal undertaking of the Company, were about 1,200*l.*: the whole outlay upon it, in September 1826, was, 134,452*l.*: but then the produce of the Valenciana, from 1788 to 1810, when the works were^s stopped by the Revolution, averaged 1,446,067 dollars (or 289,213*l.*) per an-

num; so that the investment is by no means disproportioned to the extent and importance of the object in view.

What I have stated, with regard to the three Companies already mentioned, is applicable to all the rest.

The outlay of the United Mexican Company is distributed amongst the principal mines of most of the principal districts, in all of which the preliminary works have been brought nearly to a conclusion, Haciendas built, and the necessary preparations made at a very great expense, for carrying on operations upon a large scale. On the great mine of Rayas alone nearly 100,000*l.* have been expended. On the Veins of El Pāvēllōn, and La Veta Negra, at Sōmbrērētē, at least an equal sum has been employed; as much more has been sunk in the mines of San Ācāsīō and San Bērnābē, at Zācātēcās; but all these are undertakings of great promise, and upon so large a scale, that success, in any one, would repay the outlay upon the whole in the course of a few years.

At Tlālpūjāhuā, the Company which bears that name is in possession of eighty-six mines, the very position of many of which, in 1825, it was difficult to ascertain, from the length of time which had elapsed since they had been abandoned; none of these mines is upon a very large scale, but, from their being so numerous, a multiplicity of works have been required, all of which have been executed with the greatest activity and talent. These works extend over a surface of 21,260 yards, comprised in the $106\frac{3}{10}$ Pertinencias, which belong to the Company. Thirty-nine mines were in work early in 1826; in addition to which three Haciendas had been built; a large stock of mules and horses purchased for drainage, (about 2000,) and such encouragement given to workmen, that, in lieu of 150 men, (no more could be obtained at first,) 2,300 labourers were in daily employment at the time of my last visit, (in January 1827,) by whose united efforts the appearance of the place had been entirely changed, and a

flourishing town created, where, two years before, nothing but ruined houses were to be seen.

It is to be regretted that the sudden change of feeling, which took place in England, with regard to Mining adventurers in general, should have compelled the directors of the Tlālpujāhuā Company to suspend the execution of one of the most magnificent mining works that has yet been planned in Mexico; the execution of which, although attended with considerable expense at the outset, would have proved highly advantageous to the interests of the shareholders, had proper provision been made for its completion. The mines of Tlalpujahua, having been worked at a time when the science of mining was in its infancy in Mexico, cannot be drained by machinery without a very considerable expense; it having been found necessary, in many instances, to begin, by enlarging the shafts, in order to allow of the application of the larger horse-whims, (Malacates,) used in other districts. To remedy this inconvenience, as well as to obviate the disadvantages with which drainage, by a multiplicity of small adits unconnected with each other, could not fail to be attended, it was in contemplation to drain all the principal mines at once, by the construction of one immense adit, (*Galerie d'écoulement*,) for which the local peculiarities of the district seemed to offer extraordinary facilities. The ground was surveyed by the principal Engineer of the Company, Mr. Moro; and the opinion of the Director, (Mr. Rivafinoli,) with regard to the utility of the projected work, coinciding entirely with that of the Head Miner, (Mr. Burkart,) of whose indefatigable exertions it is impossible to speak too highly,—the line for this stupendous gallery was traced, and the work itself commenced early in 1826.

The whole length of this ádit, from its mouth, which is situated in the valley of Tepetongo, about a league from Tlalpujahua, to the point at which it intersects the great Coronas Vein, will be 5,176 yards. At 4,976 yards it cuts the Vein

of La Borda, upon which some of the most promising mines of the Company are situated; and, in both instances, a depth of 132 yards below the deepest of the old workings will be obtained. The Gallery is two yards wide, and three and a half high, being constructed in such a manner as to allow of the use of small carts. In order to facilitate its construction, twelve lumbreras, (air-shafts, (*puits d'airage*,) have been opened, at intervals of from 350 to 450 yards from each other; and from each of these, again, two galleries extend to the right and left upon the line of the adit, so as to admit of the greatest possible number of workmen being employed at the same time. The depth of the twelfth of these air-shafts, which is the deepest, is 300 yards: the first is only sixty-three yards deep; but the aggregate depth of all amounts to 2,332 yards. It is in this that the great expense of the undertaking consists, as well as its difficulty. The aggregate depth of the air-shafts constructed for the Tunnel at Bolaños, is only 180 yards; and the tunnel itself, being merely a water course, is upon a much smaller scale than the Tlalpujahua adit, (four feet deep, by six wide.)

There can be no doubt, however, that both Mr. Burkart, and Mr. Moro, are perfectly competent to carry through the undertaking in which they have engaged, provided they are supported by the Shareholders at home; and every one at all acquainted with mining must perceive the advantages which would result from it to the Adventurers, as, in all their principal mines, it would ensure both the drainage, and the extraction of Ores, for the space of 132 yards of virgin ground, without the expense of machinery above; which requires not only a permanent investment of capital, but frequent additions, for repairs, as well as for keeping up the supply of animals, by which it must be worked.

In the Autumn of 1826, fifty yards of the great Gallery had been driven, (from the mouth,) and the air-shafts, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, and 12, commenced. Some of these had

already attained a considerable depth, but the panic of the Shareholders in England has, I believe, rendered the farther progress of the work extremely slow.

The time consumed in the undertakings, which I have described in the preceding pages, is not more than might have been foreseen, had the nature of the enterprise been inquired into beforehand. The capital required might, undoubtedly, have been less, under better management; but still, it has effected what it was intended to effect, and it has purchased, besides, a stock of experience, which the Companies may turn to great account in their future operations.

Under these circumstances, to allow discouragement to rob them of the fruits of their labours, at the very moment when they are almost within their reach, would be both melancholy, and absurd.

It was, however, a *dénouement*, to which the sudden revulsion of feeling, that took place in England in 1826, was very near leading. Had the despondency occasioned by that period of distress continued, the whole advantage of what has been done would have reverted to the Mexicans alone; for such is the present state of the mines, that the proprietors would easily have found funds to carry on the works, if abandoned by the Companies, and *intended*, in almost every instance, to do so.

Fortunately, confidence has been, in some measure, restored; and, notwithstanding the serious consequences with which the errors of the first six months must be attended, (consequences, which I have not attempted either to palliate, or to disguise,) it is in my firm conviction that, with a little perseverance, the result of the different enterprises now carrying on with British Capital, will be productive both of adequate returns to the Adventurers, and of permanent advantage to their Country.

To what extent these returns may be expected to go, and what the advantages are, which both England and Mexico will derive from them, it will be the object of the next Sections to enquire.

SECTION III.

WHETHER THE LARGE CAPITALS WHICH HAVE BEEN REMITTED TO MEXICO, AND INVESTED IN THE MINES BY BRITISH SUBJECTS, AND ON BRITISH ACCOUNT, ARE LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE OF ADEQUATE RETURNS TO THE ADVENTURERS; AND WITHIN WHAT PERIOD IT MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED THAT THESE RETURNS WILL BECOME SUFFICIENTLY CONSIDERABLE, TO MAKE THE GENERAL PRODUCE OF THE COUNTRY AGAIN EQUAL, OR ULTIMATELY EXCEED, THE ANNUAL AVERAGE AMOUNT DERIVED FROM THE MINES BEFORE 1810.

IT will be seen that this Section embraces two distinct subjects of inquiry:—

1st. The returns likely to be made by the different Companies to the Adventurers engaged in them; and,

2ndly. The probability of the general produce of the country being so increased by these returns, (or by any other causes,) as to equal, or ultimately to exceed, the average annual produce before the year 1810.

With regard to the first of these points, I shall submit to my readers the opinions of such of the Directors of the different Companies as have ventured to enter upon this part of the subject in their communications with me, (which some, from a very natural disinclination to commit themselves, did not,) and state, succinctly, in how far these opinions coincide with my own:—Upon the second point, I shall hazard a calculation myself, founded upon the general tenour of the information, which I have been labouring, during the last two years, to collect. I must, however, premise, that the data upon which any such calculation must be founded, in the

present state of Mexico, are too scanty to admit of the possibility of arriving at any exact result; while success, even where facts are not wanting to guide us in our investigations, and where every thing seems to indicate its probability, is always liable to be retarded by those causes, which I have pointed out in the preceding Section, as exercising a general influence upon the Mining interests of New Spain, and consequently, as more or less closely identified with the prospects of the present Adventurers.

No powers of machinery, for instance,—no exertions, or combinations of private ingenuity, could counterbalance the effects of several successive years of scarcity, or afford security amidst the desolation of a second civil war.

The mines, at the same time that they are the great source of the prosperity of Mexico, are the first to feel any event by which that prosperity is menaced. Like the funds in Europe, they always indicate the approach of a storm; and require security, as well as a concurrence of other favourable circumstances, in order to reach their natural level. Every calculation respecting them must, therefore, take as its basis the supposition, that public tranquillity will not be disturbed, nor the ordinary course of nature interrupted by any unusual visitation, (such as pestilence or famine,) with which the New World is occasionally afflicted. It is upon this supposition, that the gentlemen, of whose authority I shall presently avail myself, have proceeded in their communications with me; and it is upon a similar understanding alone, that I can venture, in justice to them, or to myself, to lay before my readers the result of our joint inquiries. I trust, however, that due weight will be given to this observation, and I shall consequently proceed, at once, with my task; not with a wish to encourage delusive hopes, but merely in order to show the nature of the expectations that may reasonably be entertained by those who have embarked so large a stake in the mines of New Spain.

Captain Vetch, the Director of the Real del Monte Mining Association, in a Report dated the 26th September, 1826, after stating the produce of the mines of Count Regla, during the fifty years in which they were in full activity, to have been twenty-six millions and a half of dollars,* calculates that, by working the two great veins, (La Biscaina and Santa Brigida,) at once, (which was never the case before,) the Company may expect to derive from them a yearly return of one million and a half of dollars:—He adds another million for the other mines belonging to the Company on the Veins of Mōrān, Ācōstă, Săn Estěvăn, &c., in the same district; and at Pěchūgă, Zīmăpān, and Ōzūmătlān; and declares his expectation, “that the mines, in the course of the year 1827, will cover their own expenses, and that, in 1828, the produce will be two millions of dollars; fully equalling, if not surpassing, the annual average amount derived from them before the year 1810.”

In a second Report, dated 16th March, 1827, Captain Vetch confesses that delays have occurred in the completion of the preparatory works, which will, in all probability, render some farther advances on the part of the Company necessary during the year 1827; but he does not modify his opinion with regard to the prospects of the Adventurers in any other respect, and appears to consider success in the years 1828, and 1829, as certain.

The same gentleman, in his capacity of Director of the Bolaños Company, estimates the probable annual produce of the mines of Bolaños, after the year 1828, (the whole of which will be occupied with the drainage,) at two millions of dollars, (Report of 1st October, 1826;) and he adds in a subsequent Report, (of 16th March, 1827,) that he sees no reason to change his opinion either with regard to the mines, or the time at which they may be expected to become productive, as he is borne out in all that he had stated in his former report, by the

* Average 530,000 dollars per annum.

rapidity with which the works required for the drainage, were advancing towards their conclusion.

Without adopting implicitly these calculations, I am bound to state that they are made by a gentleman of undoubted ability, and that the works, by which they are to be realized, have been carried on by him with the greatest science and activity.

I confess, however, that Captain Vetch's expectations, with regard to Real del Monte, are more sanguine than my own, because his estimate of the probable produce considerably exceeds the average registered amount of former times.

He, however, justifies his calculation, with regard to the Biscaina vein, (the most important of all,) by stating that it is founded upon the produce of its best years, (from 1794 to 1801,) when it yielded six millions of dollars; and that it is not assuming too much to say that, with improved machinery, and an improved system of working, it may again be brought to the same standard, as soon as the deeper levels are reached; in which it is universally admitted that the richest ores were found, although, from the difficulty of keeping them free from water without steam-engines, they were ultimately abandoned.

Should these expectations be realized, and the produce of the year 1829 amount to two millions of dollars, deducting one million for the expense of keeping up the establishment, the whole outlay of the Company, (400,000*l.*.) would be repaid in 1830; after which period, they would, as long as the mines continued to yield ores in the same ratio, after dividing the profits with the proprietor, receive an interest of 750,000 dollars, (or about thirty-four per cent.) upon a nominal capital, of the use of which they would have been deprived for only five years.

Reduce these profits to twenty-five, or twenty per cent., during the time for which the mines are contracted, and they will still be enormous; although not at all equal to those which Captain Vetch expects to derive from Bolaños, where, by the

investment of 150,000*l.*, (or 750,000 dollars,) commencing in the year 1826, he looks for a produce of two millions of dollars in the year 1829.

This estimate is a fair one, as it does not exceed one *half* of the produce of some former years, before the expense of the drainage compelled the proprietors to abandon the deepest levels.*

Half the sum, (supposing the other half to be absorbed by the expenses,) would repay the whole capital invested, in the year 1829; and leave one million of dollars annually, to be divided by the proprietors in every subsequent year; so that the profits of the Company, as long as the mines continued to be productive, would be equivalent to two-thirds of their whole original expenditure, or something more than sixty-six per cent.

Under such circumstances, loss, at all events, either of capital, or of a return upon it, much exceeding any ordinary interest, can hardly be apprehended; for, although mining cannot be subjected to fixed calculations, it is a fact universally admitted in Mexico, that the chances of loss diminish, in proportion to the extent of the operations carried on; and that, although many a poor miner has lost his little all upon one ill-chosen spot, few instances have occurred, in which a district of known richness has disappointed the hopes of those who have possessed the means of exploring it in every part.

The Report of Mr. Williamson, Director of the Anglo-Mexican Association, (dated June 1826,) after stating the progress made, and the probability of concluding the drainage of the Valenciana mine in eighteen months, proceeds to give the average annual produce of Guanajuato before 1810,† which appears to have been, on a term of fifteen years, 5,572,206 dollars; two-thirds of which, or 3,714,804 dollars, actually proceeded from the mines now working by the Company.

* *Vide* Table of Produce, No. 1, at the end of this Section.

† *Vide* Table, No. 7, annexed to preceding Section.

Mr. Williamson expects, that in two years, (*i. e.* in 1829,) he shall be enabled to bring the produce of the mines again to this standard; nor do I see any reason to question the possibility of his doing so, now that the reductions mentioned in the preceding Section have placed the establishment on a footing, at once economical and effective. He deducts one-half of the produce for expenses, which leaves 1,857,402 dollars, to repay the Adventurers for their advances, which is to be done before any division of profits with the Mexican proprietors takes place, and might, consequently, be effected in four years from the present time; (the outlay being three and a half millions, and the mines covering now their own expenses :) and he then takes half that sum again, (or 928,701 dollars,) as the interest to be paid, or rather the profits to be derived from the speculation during the duration of the contracts, if the mines do not prove totally unworthy of their former reputation.

This calculation, like all others upon the same subject, is open to objections. Delays may occur, and the most reasonable hopes may be disappointed; but it has for its basis the records of what has been, and it assumes nothing but the possibility of restoring things to what they were, before a great political convulsion compelled the owners of the most flourishing mines to abandon their works.

To the activity and judgment displayed, at the time of my visit to Guanajuato, in the operations by which the result, to which Mr. Williamson looks, was to be produced, I can myself bear witness; and, in the opinion of the natives, such was the progress already made, that a Barr, or share, in the Valenciana, which, in 1825, was not valued at more than 30,000 dollars, was, in 1826, reckoned worth 100,000.

I may add, that from August 1826, up to the time of my departure from Mexico, (May 1827,) the mines covered their own expenses; and that, during the month of March alone,

(1827,) the silver reduced in the Haciendas of the Company amounted to 54,964 dollars.*

The want of records of former produce has prevented Mr. de Rivafinoli, the Director of the Tlalpujahua Company, from hazarding any calculation, as to the probable amount of the produce of the mines belonging to that Association.

He stated, however, in a Report, dated September 1826, that, from the 1st of January 1827, he expected to be enabled to cover his expenses, and to pay an interest of ten per cent. upon the capital invested, then amounting to 160,000*l*.

These hopes have not been realized up to the present moment, accidental delays having occurred, as in every other Association; but, from the forward state of the preparatory works, the admirable system introduced at Tlalpujahua, and the great promise of some of the ores that have been raised, I am inclined to think that the year 1828 will not elapse without Mr. Rivafinoli's expectations being fulfilled; while I see great reason to hope that, during the two subsequent years of 1829 and 1830, a large portion of the capital invested will be repaid.

The Directors of the "Mexican Mining Company," having neither given to the world a statement of the amount of the capital laid out by them, nor published any documents with regard to the former produce of their mines, I can make no calculation whatever as to the amount which may be expected to be derived from them. The Directors, however, stated, in their communications with me, that, both at Sumoloacan, (near Perote,) and in Oaxaca, the mines actually working by the Company were in full produce: that, at the first place, they considered the quantity of ore on hand as fully equal to the expenditure; and that, although this was not yet the

* I have no returns of the former produce of any of the mines worked by the Anglo-Mexican Association, with the exception of the Valenciana, which will be found in Tables Nos. 2 and 3.

case in Oaxaca, the mines there had yielded, up to the end of December 1826, twenty-six bars of silver, worth (including a small ley de oro) about 30,000 dollars.*

The disorganization of the Catorce Company, occasioned by the failure of the House of Goldschmidt, prevented their Directors from favouring me with any report. I was, however, enabled to ascertain, during my journey North, that their outlay at Catorce did not exceed from thirty to forty thousand pounds. Fifty thousand pounds more are required, and two years' time, to complete the principal work which they have undertaken there; but, if they can raise funds to carry it on, there is no mining enterprise in the country of which the Mexicans have so high an opinion; and I should myself be inclined to estimate their probable profits, for some years, at from sixty to seventy per cent. upon their advances.

The former produce of Catorce, during its best years, was 2,854,000 dollars, (the average on five years, from 1800 to 1804.) The mines from which by far the largest proportion of this sum proceeded, are now unworked, and must remain so, until the great Adit, the contract for which the Catorce Company has taken up, be concluded.

There is, however, every probability that, if carried on, the annual produce would equal that of the most flourishing periods before the Revolution; the riches of the vein having continued undiminished, at the time when the increase of the water obliged the proprietors to abandon the works.

Mr. Alaman, the principal director of the United Mexican Company, in a Report full of curious information, which he had the goodness to draw up for me, declined hazarding any positive calculation as to the probable amount of the produce

* The reserve displayed by the Agents of the Mexican Company in their communications with me, and the scantiness of the data with which they supplied me, must account for the manner in which I have here spoken of their undertakings. A more detailed account of their operations will be found in the new matter annexed to the present edition.

of the mines worked by that Association, "because, (to use his own words,) "the produce of a mine could never be said to bear any exact proportion to the capital invested in it; sometimes exceeding all reasonable expectations, and at others, falling short of the most moderate estimate, particularly when confined to any given time."

Mr. Alaman stated, however, that "as the large capital of the Company enabled it to work a number of districts at one and the same time, the probability of great profits increased in proportion to the number of mines capable of producing them:" and he adds, "that, if the past can be taken as a criterion for the future, *many* of the mines worked by the United Mexican Association, (as El Pavellon, at Sombrerete, San Bernabé, or San Acasio, at Zacatecas, and Rayas, at Guanajuato,) were capable of covering, in a very few years, the whole outlay of the Adventurers;" (although that outlay amounted, at the close of 1827, to 800,000*l.*;) "without reckoning many other mines, in the possession of the Company, celebrated for their former riches, or the new mines of Sēchō and Lōrētō, which had already repaid the advances made upon them, and were producing profits."

In another part of his report, Mr. Alaman stated, that in most of the districts the preparatory works were nearly concluded; and that, with the exception of the two great mines of Rayas and San Acasio, in the course of the present year, (1828,) all the mines of the Company would be in full produce. For the two exceptions, he fixed, as the maximum of time required, the autumn of 1828, so that in 1829 the Adventurers may hope to reap the full fruits of their present advances.

If any faith can be placed in Mining calculations, these fruits must be very considerable; for the United Mexican Company possesses, perhaps, a larger portion than any other, of the mines most celebrated for their former riches, and that on terms sufficiently equitable. I, therefore, rate their pros-

pects high. But, at the same time, it must be confessed, that the vast extent of their undertakings is a disadvantage, from the impossibility of enforcing uniformity of system in operations, which are spread over 800 leagues of country, (from Jesus Maria, North-west of Chihuahua, to Teojomulco, in Oaxaca,) and that, consequently, there is reason to fear that the difficulties of management will tend, whatever be the exertions of the Directors, considerably to diminish the profits.

It would be folly in me to attempt to fix what Mr. Alaman has declared his inability to do,—the period at which the Company may look for the repayment of its advances; but should any one of their great undertakings succeed, (and it is difficult for the most desponding to suppose them all failures,) that period cannot be more distant than that fixed by the Directors of other Companies—viz. the year 1831 or 1832.

The Report with which the Directors of the German Company were so obliging as to furnish me, contains many interesting facts, some of which tend not a little to confirm the opinion expressed in the preceding Section, that, had the attention of the British public not been exclusively directed to the mines which came recommended by Baron Humboldt's authority, capital might have been, in many instances, invested more profitably, in mines of less celebrity, but easier of access, than some of those selected by the English Companies.

Not one of the German mines is known in England; for *Arēvālō*, the most important one amongst them, (at Chico,) was discovered after Humboldt's visit to Mexico; yet the Germans, by a judicious selection, made upon the spot, by miners of great experience, and activity, have done more, (in proportion,) in less time, and with a smaller capital, than any of the Foreign Companies established in New Spain.

By the statement of the Directors, it appears that they commenced their operations in the Autumn of 1825; and

that, at the end of December 1826, they had drawn from the very small proportion of mines at that time brought into work, a sum nearly equal to one-fourth of the capital employed.

The outlay of the Company, including the transport of the directors and officers from Germany, amounted to 637,760 dollars; while the produce was 147,153 dollars: a result sufficiently favourable to render any farther calculations as to the ultimate success of the Company unnecessary. That success, however, will not be so rapid as might be expected, unless the capital of the Association (originally 500,000 dollars) be increased, so as to enable its agents to bring the mines taken up by them at once into activity, instead of adopting the slow process of applying the profits of the one to the wants of the rest.

With regard to former produce, the mine of Arevalo, at Chico, is stated to have paid the King's tenth upon five millions of dollars, from 1804 to 1824; or to have averaged 250,000 dollars per annum.

The mines at Real de Arriba, in the district of Temascaltepec, produced, weekly, twelve bars, or 13,000 dollars, (yearly, about 600,000 dollars). Sta Rita, (at Zimapan,) upon the years 1791, 1792, and 1793, left a profit of 100,000 dollars: and the richness of the gold mines at San José del Oro, led, in former times, to the appointment of a Receiver-general for the King's fifth in that district alone. The present state of the mines there, however, does not appear to warrant any immediate expectations of success.

On the whole, should the undertakings of the Company be prosecuted with vigour, the annual produce, at the lowest possible estimate, may be taken at 600,000 dollars in the year 1830; with a probability of its considerably exceeding that sum; as Arêvălă alone, in the opinion of all the miners whom I have consulted, (both natives and foreigners,) is capable,

at the present moment, of producing seven bars weekly, or 365,000 dollars per annum, could a sufficient number of workmen be procured for the extraction of the ore.

Of the two American Companies mentioned in the sketch, (those of Baltimore and New York,) I can say little, except that the first only has effected an establishment in Mexico. The mines to be worked by both are situated at Temascaltepec, (about thirty leagues from the Capital,) and the works are conducted with great economy and activity by Mr. Keating, a distinguished mineralogist of the United States.

With regard to the result, I have been informed that, from the tables of former produce, during a long series of years, there is reason to hope that the mines may pay an interest of from nine to fifteen per cent. upon the capital invested, which does not exceed 100,000 dollars. The completion of the works will, probably, be effected in the course of the year 1828.

The preceding pages contain the only data, upon which a calculation "of the returns likely to be made to the Adventurers by the Companies now established in Mexico," can, at present, be attempted. The result is by no means such as I could have wished, as it is founded upon conjectural evidence, and amounts, at best, to nothing more than probability; but I have no hesitation in adding that I regard this probability as strong, and that, after a very careful investigation, I see little reason to consider the expectations of the Directors as exaggerated, or to suppose that, before three years have elapsed, these expectations may not be realised.

If this be the case, the addition to the amount of Silver now raised, in the year 1830, might be roughly estimated in the following manner:—

	Dollars.
Real del Monte Company	2,500,000
Bolaños	2,000,000

Dollars.

Anglo Mexican	3,700,000
Tlalpujahua	850,000
Mexican Company	200,000
Catorce Company	250,000
United Mexican	3,000,000
German Company	440,000
American Companies	60,000
Total	13,000,000

In this calculation I have taken the produce of the three first Companies at the estimate of their own Directors.

I have allowed for Tlalpujahua what I conceive to be a very moderate sum, considering the exclusive possession by that Company of all the mines of the District, and the great riches that were, undoubtedly, drawn from them in former times, although the records of those times have been lost.

For the Mexican Company I have allowed more than their present produce would seem to warrant, in consideration of their having only just received the means of carrying on their works with vigour, by the arrival of several German miners, whose assistance, in Oaxaca, was the more necessary from the inexperience of the native miners of that state.

The expectations of the Catorce Company cannot be realised so early as 1830, as their works are now suspended: I therefore take the probable produce, in that year, much under the estimate formed in the preceding part of this Section.

For the United Mexican Company I have assigned a sum, which is small, if a calculation of the probabilities in favour of the Association be formed upon the same basis as that which has been adopted for the rest. But Mr. Alaman's refusal to give an opinion, renders caution in a mere observer doubly necessary.

I have supposed the progress of the German Company to be slow, from the uncertainty of any addition being made to its present capital.

In all, I have given *produce*, not *profits*; for these, of course, depend upon the manner in which the operations of the Companies are conducted, every shilling injudiciously expended, being, in fact, so much deducted from them.*

The sum total gives an addition of thirteen millions of dollars to the present produce of the country in, or before, the year 1830.

It remains, therefore, to inquire into the Second part of the question now under review, viz.:—

“The probability of the general produce of the country being so increased by these returns, (or by any other causes,) as to equal, or ultimately to exceed, the annual average produce before the year 1810.”

The Coinage of Mexico, although its average amount, from 1811 to 1825, was something more than ten millions of dollars per annum, as stated in the first Section of this Book, rather decreased, than increased, towards the latter part of this period, and did not amount in the year 1826, to more than seven millions and a half of dollars: (Vide Table of Coinage marked No. 12, Section I.) The causes of this diminution I have endeavoured to develop in the preceding Section.

It does not arise from any deterioration of the mines themselves: they are what they were in 1810, and, consequently, are equally capable of producing what they then produced: but the capital which gave, at that time, so great an impulse

* It often happens that mines, though producing silver to a very considerable amount, yield no profit at all to the proprietors, the whole produce being absorbed by the expenses. This was the case at Bolaños in 1795, when five thousand mules were employed in the drainage; and more recently, in the mines of Veta Grande at Zacatecas, which, when taken by the Bolaños Company, though producing ten thousand dollars weekly, barely covered the expenses of working.

to the Mining interests, has been withdrawn from the country, or diverted into other channels. The outlay of the Companies is not, by any means, an equivalent for that capital; and many years must elapse before that equivalent be found: I mean, before a system can be re-organised, that will give to every class of Mining adventurers the facilities, and advantages, which they enjoyed before 1810. A great proportion of the expenditure of the Companies consists, at present, in dead works,—Amalgamation works,—roads, and stock,—all indispensable as preparations, and highly beneficial to the country in general, but not to the interest of the miners, (I mean, those not employed in the Companies,) to whom *Avios*, or advances in money, are essential, which they can no longer obtain. Besides, the mining population itself has decreased, and there are many districts in which a want of hands is severely felt. I do not, therefore, think it probable that, even under the most favourable circumstances, the produce of the country can, for some time, exceed the amount of the present coinage, added to that given by my calculation of the probable produce of the Companies, which would make a total of about twenty millions of dollars.

To this I think it may rise in the year 1830; and should it do so, the increase afterwards will be gradual, but progressive; new mines will be brought into activity as the present scarcity of capital diminishes; and, provided public tranquillity be not disturbed, there is reason to believe that the produce of the mines of Mexico, in five years after that time (1835) will be nearly equal to the annual average amount derived from them before the Revolution.

In taking this view of the subject, I feel myself bound to state that I have been thought too sanguine by many persons to whom I have communicated it, and, amongst others, by some, for whose general knowledge of Mexico I have the highest respect; but at the same time I must add, that the apprehensions, which I have heard expressed, originate

either in causes entirely unconnected with the mines, (principally of a political nature,) or in a supposition that the errors committed by the Companies on their first establishment are still persevered in, and, consequently, still occasion the lavish expenditure, with which they were necessarily attended at the outset.

Upon the last of these points my visit to the Mining Districts has relieved me from all doubts. The Companies have served their apprenticeship: they have paid dearly for their experience, it is true; but they have learned that nature is not to be forced, and that, without the strictest attention to economy, and to the details of management, no command of capital can ensure success. Their establishments have been reduced in consequence; and it only remains, therefore, to inquire, whether the mines are sufficiently good to cover the expense already incurred, and still to hold out a reasonable prospect of advantage? This I have endeavoured to ascertain by a reference to the only data, upon which an estimate can possibly be formed; and by instituting a comparison between the expenditure of the Companies and the former produce of the mines worked by them, as given by official Records: the result is comprised in one table, and it certainly does appear to be that the mines are able to pay off the whole outlay, in three or four years, provided the produce in 1829 be not very much below the standard of the average annual produce before 1810. This I see no reason to apprehend; for the mines have remained unchanged, and untouched, during the Revolution. In lieu of being exhausted by progressive workings, their riches were locked up, if I may use the expression, by the accumulation of water; and it is only now that the lower levels, from which nine-tenths of the silver raised in 1810 were extracted, are beginning to become accessible. What, then, is to prevent the produce from reaching its former standard, calculated as that standard has been, in this Book, not upon traditionary sayings, or vulgar report,

(which is but too often synonymous with vulgar error,) but upon the evidence of those Records, that have survived the Revolution? More than this I do not wish at present to assume; for I think so highly of the ability and practical experience of the Mexicans in mining matters, that I am very much inclined to believe that we have, at least, as much to learn from them, as they from us. I therefore reject, at once, those ideas of European mining on the other side of the Atlantic, which have been attended, hitherto, with such ruinous effects: but having admitted this, it would be hard to deny that the accession of science, and skill in machinery, brought by us into the present coalition, when combined with the knowledge of their own country, which the Mexican miners possess in the very highest degree, and applied, gradually, in the mode best adapted to the local peculiarities of each District, must, in the end, have a beneficial influence, and must tend to increase, ultimately, the annual produce of the mines.

This has been already exemplified in more than one instance, as at Real del Monte, and Bolaños, neither of which Districts could have been worked without the aid of European science, to direct the efforts of the natives. In other districts, where capital alone was wanting, the introduction of our machinery was superfluous; in all, however, it will be hereafter of use, for there is a point, at which the machinery of the country, (however improved) ceases to be of any avail. I do not, therefore, regard the expense incurred at Guanaxuato by the Anglo-Mexican Company, for machinery, (but a small portion of which is now in use,) as money lost to the Adventurers. The expense might have been avoided, and was therefore injudicious, as it increased the outlay, in the first instance, so enormously, as almost to occasion the dissolution of the Company; but a time will come, (before the contracts can expire,) when a part, at least, of this machinery may be turned to account upon the spot; while, if the im-

pulse given to the mines continue, opportunities will be found for disposing of the remainder to Adventurers in other Districts, where the use of it would not be restricted by that scarcity of fuel, which, in Guanajuato, would render the general application of the larger engines sent out in 1825 utterly impossible.

With regard to the political apprehensions to which I have alluded, I do not feel myself at liberty to speak. The seeds of disorder certainly still exist in Mexico; and it is, unfortunately, not less certain that, were they to lead to civil dissensions of a serious nature, the mines must suffer from the effects of the struggle. But although I will not predict those halcyon days of peace and concord, which some of the admirers of Republican principles seem to regard as the necessary consequence of the system that has been adopted, I have no hesitation in repeating here, what I have stated in the preceding parts of my work, namely, that great progress has been made towards a better order of things, and that the more I saw of the country, the more I became convinced that the people were wearied out with Civil war, and desired nothing but independence and tranquillity. The race of the old Insurgents has died off; the population of the Provinces has reverted to its original pursuits; and although a struggle for place and power may be carried on with great personal animosity in the Capital, the States are indifferent as to the result, and are occupied only with their own affairs.

I am not aware of the existence of any cause, (with the exception always of a hostile movement on the part of Spain,) that could again disorganise the great mass of the population; and it is this alone that the Companies in general have to apprehend. Partial disturbances indeed may, and probably will occur; but these are of little moment, and could hardly exercise any very prejudicial effect upon the Mining interests of the country, from which so large a portion of the Mexican community derives its subsistence at present, and to

which, consequently, they are not less interested than the foreign Adventurers themselves, in affording protection.

The same observation holds good with regard to an increase of duties on the part of the Government, (of which I have heard great fears expressed here,) as soon as the mines begin to become productive anew. Upon this subject it is impossible to give the Adventurers any other security than that which they may derive from the reflection, that this increase of duties must weigh as heavily upon the Mexican proprietors, as upon themselves. The mines are private, not public, property; and the produce, (according to the terms of the contracts,) after the repayment of the capital invested by the Companies in the first instance, is to be divided equally between the Adventurers and the Mexican proprietors.

In order to favour the attempt to work the mines anew by the assistance of foreign capitals, the duties formerly paid on the silver raised, (seventeen per cent.) were reduced to about five and a half. There was no pledge that, when the capitals were repaid, some increase would not be made in the duties: but there is also no reason to suppose that they will ever again be raised to their former standard, because the interests, not of the *foreign capitalists*, but of the very influential class of *Mexican proprietors*, require that they should not be so. The amount of duties was formerly fixed by the Mother-country. It now depends, not even upon the Executive of Mexico, but upon an assembly of native Mexicans, amongst whom the great Mining Districts are sure to be adequately represented. It is, therefore, hardly natural to suppose that they will give their sanction to a measure by which they themselves will be the first to suffer; nor can they, in any way, in a country which pays for all its imports in bullion, impose a duty upon the silver raised in such a manner as to bear upon Foreigners, without affecting themselves. I leave good faith entirely out of the question in this view of the case, because, though always appealed to, it is, I fear, of but

little weight with any Government in discussions of this nature. But I cannot refrain from adding that, in the whole course of my residence in Mexico, I have seen nothing on the part of the Government to warrant the supposition, (which those who wish to regard American affairs in the most unfavourable light, so gratuitously make,) that it would violate all its engagements with Foreigners, merely on the score of their not being natives, or seek to deprive them of the fair fruits of their labours. I believe, on the contrary, that a conviction of the advantages which Mexico derives from her intercourse with Europe, has been gradually taking root during the last four years; that many of the exaggerated ideas entertained in 1824 of the importance of the New World to us, have given way to a belief that this importance is (to say the least) reciprocal; and that a disposition to cultivate a good understanding with the commercial nations of Europe has increased in proportion to the increased wants which Europe is called upon to supply. I have given in the Third Book some instances of the existence of this feeling, as well as of the ameliorations to which it has already led with regard to Trade: why then should its existence be assumed as impossible, and its operation supposed not to extend to the mines, in which the interests of the Mexican and British Adventurers are much more closely interwoven with each other, than they can be in any other species of international intercourse?

The above observations are merely matters of private opinion, but as such I leave them to the consideration of my readers, who will give them as much, or as little importance, as they may seem to deserve.

I come now to the probability "of the annual average produce ultimately *exceeding* the twenty-four millions of dollars, raised from the mines before 1810."

This probability depends, in my opinion, in a great mea-

sure, upon the time at which the attention of the Adventurers in the Mines of Mexico is directed towards the North.

It seems, at first sight, a singular fact, in the history of a country so celebrated for a spirit of mining enterprise as Mexico, that, during three centuries, this spirit should have been confined to a comparatively small circle; and that, with some few exceptions, the richer ores of the Internal Provinces, should have been neglected for the poorer districts in the vicinity of the Capital.

But this fact admits of one simple explanation.

As long as the monopoly of the Mint of Mexico continued, it was absolutely impossible, in the Interior of the country, to obtain a sufficiency of the circulating medium to carry on any great mining enterprise; and, even to commence one, a triple capital was required, as six months elapsed before silver, sent in bars from the North, could be brought back converted into specie.

Dollars were often at a premium in Guanajuato itself; but in the North, they became an article of trade, the price of which, like that of all other articles, increased in proportion to the scarcity of the supply; so that both the Mine-owner, and the Rescatador, (amalgamator on his own account,) were obliged to convert their silver into specie at a loss of one-third of its legal value; while, for every article consumed in the mines, for which they exchanged Plata Pasta, or silver in a raw state, they paid at least double the market price.

It will hardly be believed that silver of the finest quality has been sold, (and currently sold) in the Northern provinces, at four dollars two reals, and four dollars four reals per marc, the Mint price being eight dollars.*

Few mines, however rich, could be worked under these disadvantages, and they sufficiently account for the preference given by the old miners to ores, that yielded seven and eight

* *Vide* Reports of Tribunal de Minería.

marcs of silver on the Monton of thirty-six quintals, if within seventy or one hundred leagues of the Capital, in lieu of exploring the tantalizing wealth of the North, where, although fifteen and twenty marcs were yielded by the same quantity of ore, the profit was absorbed by usurious charges on every thing else.

These reasons became only more cogent after 1810; for, although Mints were established at Durango, and Chihuāhuā, quicksilver rose in price, during the Revolution, from forty-one dollars to one hundred and forty, and one hundred and fifty dollars the quintal; while the general want of capital, rendered it impossible for the miners to obtain advances, (*Avios*,) even by the greatest sacrifices.

The whole country, therefore, North of Durango, remains almost unexplored. That it will long continue so, I do not believe, for public attention has already been turned in this direction, and should the first adventurers succeed, an extraordinary change may be expected to take place in the Mining interests of New Spain in the course of the next twenty years.

That the great mineral treasures of Mexico commence exactly at the point where Humboldt rightly states the labours of the Spaniards to have terminated, (about Latitude 24°,) is a fact now universally admitted by the native miners, although, hitherto, but little known in Europe.

In order the better to illustrate it, I shall beg to subjoin some details, which I was enabled to collect during my journey into the Interior, premising, that I have the evidence of Registers of produce, and official documents, for every fact submitted to my readers, (some of the least voluminous of which I subjoin,) and that I have adopted nothing upon mere verbal report.

The States of Durango, Sonora, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa, contain an infinity of mines hitherto but little known, but holding out, wherever they have been tried, a promise of riches superior to any thing that Mexico has yet produced.

The Districts, a list, or sketch of the principal of which will be found in Table IV., are distinguished, not less by the superior quality of their ores, than by the circumstance of their beginning to be productive within a very little distance from the surface, (usually from ten to fifteen yards); whereas the Veta Madre of Guănjūātō yields little or nothing until the depth of eighty yards is attained. The metals seem to increase in richness as you approach the North; insomuch that in the Real, or District, of Jesus Maria, in that great branch of the Sierra Madre, which separates the States of Durango and Chihuahua, from those of Sonora and Sinaloa, to the North and West,—the ores of the mine of Santa Juliana, (which does not exceed seventy yards in depth) appear, by a certified Report from the Diputacion de Minería, now before me, to average seven and eight marcs of silver per carga, of (300 lbs.,) which is the average produce of ten cargas of good ore in Guănjūātō; while ores of the best quality yield as much as from four to ten marcs per Arroba, (of 25 lbs.) or forty marcs per carga.

At Bătōpīlās, (in the State of Chihūāhuā,) where the matrix is, in general, quartz, the pure malleable silver intermixed with it often exceeds in proportion one half; and masses of this description, of the weight of eleven Arrobas, (270 lbs.,) have been raised. One of five Arrobas in weight, (125 lbs.,) was in existence at Chihūāhuā during my visit to the North, and I was even solicited to purchase it for the British Museum.

Only three Districts in the North have been, hitherto, worked with any sort of regularity, Santa Eulāliā, Bătōpīlās, and Guărisāmēy.

The first, (Santa Eulalia,) from its vicinity to the town of Chihuahua, was worked as early as 1705.

Its registered produce, from that time to 1737, was 55,959,750 dollars, or an average of 1,748,742 dollars per annum. From 1737 to 1791, it yielded something more

than forty-four millions, making a total of one hundred millions of dollars during a period of eighty-six years.

The district was gradually abandoned during the last years of the last century, on account of the incursions of the savage Indian tribes; but in 1791, it possessed a population of 6,000 inhabitants, with seventy-three Haciendas for reducing metals, and one hundred and eighty smelting furnaces. All these are now in ruins, and the produce, during the last thirty years, has been little or nothing; the whole receipts of the Provincial Treasury of Chihuahua having only amounted to 10,769,096 dollars from 1791 to 1825; but the possibility of restoring the mines to what they were, is, in the opinion of the natives, undoubted.*

From Bătöpīlās, and Guăřisămēy, I have been unable to obtain returns as exact as those from Santa Eulalia; a great part of the wealth derived from the first, by the Marquis of Bustamante, having been sent out of the country unregistered, during the Revolution, by the ports of Măzătīlān and Guăymăs. But it is upon record, at Durango, that Zămbărănő, the proprietor of all the principal mines of Guăřisămēy and Săn Dīmăs, paid, as the King's fifth, upon the silver raised from the mines, between the period of their discovery, (in 1783,) and 1807, when he died, eleven millions of dollars. These immense riches were derived principally from five great mines, La Candelaria, (at San Dimas,) San Juan Nepomuceno, Cinco Seňores, La Abra, and Tapia; from the first of which, (La Candelaria,) I possess regular returns for five years, which prove the annual profits never to have been less than 124,000 dollars, while in some years they amounted to

* In this they are probably misled by their attachment to a place, which, during so long a period, was the source of the prosperity of the State; for with so many virgin districts in every direction around them, it can never be advisable for Foreign Capitalists to attempt the regeneration of Santa Eulalia.

223,082.* The ores of the mine, during the whole of this period, appear to have produced from five to six marcs per carga, (of 300lbs.) and often to have yielded twenty, and even thirty marcs. Indeed, nothing of a quality inferior to the first could have covered the expense of extraction; as, when the Candelaria had attained its greatest depth, (300 Varas,) the water was still brought up from the bottom of the mine in leathern buckets upon men's shoulders. The Ley de Oro (or proportion of gold) in the ores of Guăřisămēy, is very great, amounting sometimes to 2,100 grains to the marc. But, notwithstanding these advantages, the mines are now going fast to ruin, the works having been suspended during the Revolution, and the possibility of re-opening them, at present, to any extent, being impeded by a lawsuit between the heirs and executors of the former proprietor.

Without entering into similar details, respecting each of the other districts mentioned in the Table of the Northern Mines, (No. IV.) it will be sufficient to state that, with some few exceptions,† they all possess, in a greater or less degree, the same advantages; (richness of ores, and veins productive almost at the surface;) that few have been worked to any extent; and, consequently, that the risk of making the necessary experiments there is trifling, in comparison with the immense outlay required by the old mines of the Southern districts, which have, in general, attained an enormous depth. The money invested in the Valenciana, or in Rayas, or in the Biscaina vein, would be sufficient to make a trial of half the Mining districts of the North at once; for no expensive

* *Vide* Table, No. V.

† The ores of El Parral, Măpimi, and Cuēncămē, are amongst these exceptions, being poor and abundant. But it is worthy of remark, that none of these districts are included within the range of the Sierra Madre. They all lie in the flat country to the East of it, and partake more of the character of the Central and Southern districts.

works need be commenced there, until the character of the veins, which it might be in contemplation to work, was sufficiently ascertained. The undertaking would, indeed, require an adventurous spirit, and a determination to submit to every privation, at first, in order to ensure success: but if these qualities were combined with a sufficient knowledge of the country, and some personal influence, I am inclined to think that, with a very small capital, success would be undoubted.

In the present state of discouragement with regard to all Transatlantic speculations, it is not probable that any experiment of this kind will be attempted upon a large scale, for some time; but I am convinced that, when once it is fairly made, an enormous addition to the mineral wealth of Mexico will be the result. To what an extent this may ultimately be carried, it would be useless now to inquire; for, without the assistance of Foreign capitalists, years will probably elapse before the gradual spread of population facilitates discoveries in those rich districts, where the want of inhabitants now presents a serious obstacle to commercial enterprise.

Population, however, in Mexico, has always followed the course and progress of the mines; and that too with astonishing rapidity. The Mexican miners are proverbially inconstant in their tastes, and roam from one district to another, whenever there is a new discovery, or Bonanza, to attract them.

Of this, Catorce furnished a memorable instance, in the year 1773. It is impossible to conceive a more bleak and desolate spot than that upon which these famous mines are situated,—the very summit of a mountain ridge, inaccessible, even at the present day, to any thing but mules,—without provisions, or water, or resources of any kind; yet, in three years after the discovery, it had a population of five thousand souls, and the town now contains sixteen thousand inhabitants. The fame of its riches brought crowds of settlers from Guă-năjūātō, Zăcătēcās, and Sōmbrērētē; and, notwithstanding

the local disadvantages which I have enumerated, these settlers have remained. But the mines of Catorce possessed most of the properties which characterise those of the North: they all began to be productive almost at the surface, and all yielded ores of a quality unknown in the neighbouring districts of Zacatecas and Guanajuato.

The metalliferous dust of the famous mine of "Zāvālā," which produced four millions of dollars in two years, was eagerly brought up, at the mouth of the mine, by Rescatadores, (proprietors of Amalgamation works,) who came from Pinos, and even from Guanajuato, (distances of fifty and eighty leagues,) for the purpose, at the price of one dollar for the pound of ore, (three hundred dollars per carga.)

The owner of the mines of Santa Ana and San Geronimo, (Captain Zūñigă,) after living upon their produce during his whole life, bequeathed, by his will, (of which I have an authentic copy,) four millions of dollars, the greatest proportion of which was left to pious institutions. The mine of La Luz, denounced in 1804, and still in full work, has given to its present proprietor, the Licenciado Gordoa, the estate of Mal Passo, near Zacatecas, (for which he paid 700,000 dollars,) and a million of dollars capital: the best ores, during this time, have sold, according to the registers of the mine, at 340 and 380 dollars per carga, (of 300 lbs.)

The ores of a particular level of the mine of La Purisima, which belongs to the family of the Obregons, (*el ojo del cielo*,) sold for 600, 400, and 380 dollars per carga; at which price they were bought as late as 1817.*

* The necessity of a class of middlemen, or Rescatadores, so often mentioned in this Book, was nowhere more strongly exemplified than at Catorce; where almost all the first discoverers were mere adventurers, and consequently unable to establish the necessary works for reducing the ores of their mines. This was done by small capitalists, most of whose establishments are still kept up by the descendants of the families, although the speculation is not now by any means what it was.

With such attractions as these, natural difficulties are easily overcome; and I have little doubt that, as soon as their existence in a particular part of this country is generally known, the tide of population will set in that direction; and that establishments will be formed there, which, in the course of a few years, will become of immense importance. Every day is adding to our knowledge of regions formerly considered as inaccessible. The Sierra Madre has been traversed seven times, between Ōāxācā and Chihūahūa, by one very spirited and intelligent English traveller, Mr. Glennie, whose opinion of its riches confirms all that had been surmised in earlier days; and his conviction of the advantages to be derived from mining speculations in that direction, has induced the directors of the United Mexican Company to entrust him with the formation of an establishment at Jesus Maria, (one hundred leagues West of Chihuahua, upon the slope of the Sierra Madre,) which I consider as a first step towards that revolution in the Mining affairs of Mexico, the probability of which, in the course of twenty or thirty years, I cannot but look forward to.

Some Americans have endeavoured to establish a Company for Bātōpīlās, but have not, I believe, as yet, succeeded in raising a sufficient capital.

A Mexican Company for working some of the mines of Sōnōrā was likewise proposed in the capital very lately, but failed; I believe, in consequence of a want of confidence in the persons who wished to promote its formation.

Hence, the only standard of the value of the ores at Catorce, is the price which they fetch at the weekly sales, which take place at the mouth of the mine. A similar system is pursued occasionally at Guanajuato, where, from the immense mass of ores raised, it was difficult for any individual to establish works sufficiently extensive to reduce them all. The Foreign Companies wish to adopt a different system, and to unite the profits of the Amalgamator with those of the Miner; but in some mines and districts, sales are still resorted to, from the difficulty of abolishing so old a custom.

A similar enterprise will shortly be attempted in England, by an English gentleman, (Colonel Bourne,) who has been long a resident in Mexico, in conjunction with Mr. Escalante, the representative of the state of Sönōrā in the Senate.

They have taken up contracts for the mines of Arīzpē, (about 36° north latitude,) in a situation possessing great local advantages, a fertile country, the vicinity of two large rivers, and a communication by water with the Pacific. The mines themselves were formerly celebrated for their riches, and the capital required to bring them again into activity is very small.

The specimens which I have seen of the ores extracted from them, almost induce one to adopt the theory, that the proportion of silver contained in the ores increases as you advance towards the North; a theory very generally believed, at present, in Mexico, and certainly confirmed by the superiority of the Northern ores to those of the richest districts in the South.

The idea probably originated in the discovery of the famous Bolas de Plata, (Balls of Silver,) of Ārīzōnā, in the beginning of the last century, which was, and probably still is, believed in Europe to be one of those fables, with which mining countries always abound.

But the attention of the present Government of Mexico having been drawn to the subject, a search was made in the Vice-regal Archives, by order of the President, for the correspondence, which was known to have taken place respecting it in the year 1736.

This correspondence I have seen, and I have in my possession a certified copy of a Decree of Philip the Fifth, dated Aranjuez, 28th May, 1741, the object of which was to terminate a prosecution, instituted by the Royal Fiscal against the discoverers of Ārīzōnā, for having defrauded the Treasury of the duties payable upon the masses of pure silver found there.

The Decree states the weight of the Balls, Sheets, and other pieces of silver discovered, (*bolas, planchas, y otras piezas de plata,*) to have amounted to 165 arrobas, 8lbs., in all, (4033lbs.): and mentions particularly one mass of pure silver weighing 108 arrobas, (2700lbs.); and another of eleven arrobas, upon which duties had been actually paid by a Don Domingo Asmendi, and which, as a great natural curiosity, (*como cosa especial,*) the King states ought to have been sent to Madrid.

The Decree ends by declaring the district of Arizona to be Royal property, as a “*Criadero de Plata* ;” (a place where, by some natural process, silver was created;) .an idea, to which the flexibility of the metal, when first extracted, seemed, in those times, to give some colour of probability ; and by directing it to be worked upon the Royal account. This put a stop to the enterprises of individuals;—the district was deserted; an attempt to send a colony there failed; and, in a few years, the very name of Arizona was forgotten.

I am far from supposing that the whole of the facts recorded in this Decree can be taken as correct, although the authenticity of the Decree itself is unquestionable. But what one cannot adopt without confirmation, ought not to be rejected without inquiry; and I see enough, at least, in these records of Arizona, to warrant the supposition, (confirmed as it is by the facts and appearances mentioned in the preceding pages,) that the hitherto unexplored regions in the North of Mexico, contain mineral treasures which, as discoveries proceed, are likely to make the future produce of the country infinitely exceed the amount that has been, hitherto, drawn from the (comparatively) poorer districts of the South.

In how far these discoveries must be influenced by the progress of population, and in what degree the discoveries them-

selves may be expected to influence that progress, remains as a subject of inquiry for the fourth and last Section of this Book; in which I shall endeavour to point out the connexion between the Mines, and the Agriculture, and Commerce of Mexico, as the best mode of illustrating the effect likely to be produced by their prosperity upon a country, the general interests of which they so effectually promote.

TABLE No. I.

Produce of Bolaños from 1752 to 1780.				
Years.	Marcs.		Dollars.	Reals.
1752	261,681	2	2,158,870	$\frac{1}{4}$
1753	211,808	5	1,747,421	
1754	210,039	6	1,732,827	$\frac{3}{4}$
1755	238,927	2	1,971,149	$\frac{3}{4}$
1756	284,158		2,344,303	$\frac{1}{2}$
1757	251,633	2	2,075,974	$\frac{1}{4}$
1758	223,678	7	1,845,350	$\frac{1}{2}$
1759	166,106	7	1,370,581	$\frac{1}{2}$
1760	165,787	7	1,367,749	$\frac{3}{4}$
1761	127,199	2	1,049,393	$\frac{3}{4}$
1762	73,998	2	603,060	$\frac{1}{2}$
1763	68,337	6	563,786	$\frac{1}{4}$
1764	79,336	3	654,525	
1765	69,825	7	576,063	$\frac{1}{4}$
1766	79,977	2	659,812	$\frac{1}{4}$
1767	55,150	4	454,991	$\frac{1}{2}$
1768	55,152	2	455,006	
1769	64,374	5	531,090	$\frac{1}{2}$
1770	59,197	4	488,379	$\frac{1}{4}$
1771	49,753		410,462	$\frac{1}{4}$
1772	49,302	6	406,747	$\frac{1}{2}$
1773	53,852	4	444,283	
1774	69,075	1	569,869	$\frac{3}{4}$
1775	69,390	7	572,474	$\frac{1}{2}$
1776	110,688	7	913,183	
1777	128,540	6	1,060,461	
1778	133,244	6	1,099,269	
1779	145,894		1,203,625	$\frac{1}{2}$
1780	147,055	5	1,213,208	$\frac{3}{4}$
Total	3,702,269	5	30,543,720	$\frac{3}{4}$
<p>From 1646 to 1752, Gamboa states the average annual produce to have varied from three and a half, to four millions of dollars.</p>				

TABLE No. II.

Produce and Expenditure in the Mine of Valenciana
from 1788 to 1810, and from 1811 to 1825.

FIRST PERIOD.

Years.	Total Produce.		Expenses.		Profit.	
	Dollars.	Reals.	Dollars.	Reals.	Dollars.	Reals.
1788	1,571,216	2½	429,159	2½	1,142,057	0
1789	1,633,459	0½	448,133	1	1,185,325	7½
1790	1,499,939	1½	454,523	5	1,045,415	4½
1791	1,639,085	4	733,321	0	905,764	4
1792	1,049,753	0	757,173	4	292,579	4
1793	1,042,876	0½	738,354	2	304,521	6½
1794	1,282,042	0½	799,328	2	482,713	6½
1795	1,696,640	3½	815,817	6½	880,822	5
1796	1,315,424	1½	832,347	0	483,077	1½
1797	2,128,439	2½	878,789	2	1,249,650	0½
1798	1,724,437	4	890,735	5	833,701	7
1799	1,584,393	1½	915,438	5½	668,954	4
1800	1,480,933	7	977,314	5	503,619	2
1801	1,393,438	0	991,981	7	401,456	5½
1802	1,229,631	1	944,309	1½	285,321	7½
1803	1,232,045	0	937,931	6½	294,113	1½
1804	1,185,265	5	941,121	1	244,144	4
1805	1,113,756	4	946,346	6	167,409	6
1806	1,040,632	7	914,662	7	125,970	0
1807	1,191,582	2	1,019,781	3½	171,800	6½
1808	1,523,815	6	1,205,924	1	317,891	5
1809	1,385,611	1½	1,204,333	1	181,278	0½
1810	869,068	3	899,521	1½		
	31,813,486	3½	19,676,349	4½	12,167,589	5½
	Deduct loss in year 1810				30,452	6½
	Clear Profit				12,137,136	7

TABLE No. III.

Produce and Expenditure in the Mine of Valenciana from 1788 to 1810, and from 1811 to 1825.						
SECOND PERIOD.						
Years.	Total Produce.		Expenses.		Profit.	
	Dollars.	Reals.	Dollars.	Reals.	Dollars.	Reals.
1811	323,762	2½	122,687	6½	201,074	4
1812	279,599	7	144,002	7½	135,596	7½
1813	258,920	3½	238,443	1½	20,477	2
1814	305,638	6½	215,257	3	90,381	3½
1815	279,346	0	235,519	6½	73,826	1½
1816	178,512	7	149,030	5½	29,482	1½
1817	165,986	5½	136,429	1	29,557	4½
1818	174,971	1½	142,317	2½	32,653	7
1819	202,414	5½	180,743	1	21,671	4½
1820	80,183	6	63,351	3	16,832	3
1821	101,138	6½	72,809	5½	28,329	1
1822	70,450	4½	60,575	2	9,875	2½
1823	36,199	1	32,045	3½	4,153	5½
1824	117,143	5½	87,341	3	29,802	2½
1825	31,413	4	11,588	7	19,824	5
	2,605,682	2½	1,862,143	3	743,538	7½

TABLE No. IV.

MINING DISTRICTS OF THE NORTH.

STATE OF DURANGO.

In the Sierra Madre—Guārisāmēy, San Dimās, Gāvīlānēs, Tāyōltitā, Cānēlās, Siānōrī, Bacis, Tāmāsulā, Ventanas, San Andres.

East of the Sierra Madre—Cuēncāmē, (near the River Nazas,) Yērvā Būēnā, Māpīmī, Indēe, El Orō, Guānāsēvī.

STATE OF CHIHUAHUA.

El Parrāl, Santa Eulalia, Batopilas, Jesus Maria, Los Pilares, Capirichic, Santa Rosa de Cosiquiriachic, El Pilar, Batopilillas, Rosario, El Potrero, Milpillas.

STATE OF SONORA AND SINALOA.

Mūlātōs, Cōsalā, Alamōs, Arispe, El Rosario.

TABLE No. V.

LA CANDELARIA.					
			Dollars.	Reals.	
1795.	Produce	. . .	258,936		
	Expenses	. . .	128,384		
	Profits	.	130,552		
1796.	Produce	. . .	359,361		
	Expenses	. . .	136,279		
	Profits	.	223,082		
1803.	Produce	. . .	225,778	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	
	Expenses	. . .	101,416	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	Profits	.	124,362	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	
1804.	Produce	. . .	260,555	2 $\frac{5}{8}$	
	Expenses	. . .	117,240	0 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	Profits	.	143,315	1 $\frac{7}{8}$	

SECTION IV.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS UPON MEXICO AS A MINING COUNTRY;
WITH AN INQUIRY AS TO THE PROBABILITY OF HER BEING ENABLED
BY HER MINERAL TREASURES TO MULTIPLY HER COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
WITH EUROPE, AND TO ACQUIT THE INTEREST OF WHATEVER
LOANS SHE MAY HAVE CONTRACTED THERE.

IT is to Baron Humboldt's *Essai Politique* that Europe is indebted for whatever knowledge it now possesses of the peculiarities by which Mexico is distinguished as a Mining country. How little was known before his time may be inferred from the fact, that Robertson, celebrated, as he so justly is, for the diligence and accuracy of his researches, in his view of the Colonial Policy of Spain, confounds, every where, the climate of Mexico with that of Peru and Chil  , and deplores the mortality occasioned amongst the natives, (whom he supposes to have been compelled to work in the mines,) "by the sudden transition from the sultry climate of the valleys, to the chill, penetrating air, peculiar to high lands in the torrid zone." I need hardly state that, the idea is a mistaken one; and that however miserable the lot of those poor wretches may be, whose sufferings, amidst the eternal snows of the Andes, (at Upsallata, and San Pedro Nostoli,) Captain Head so forcibly describes, there is no sort of analogy between their situation, and that of the mining population of New Spain. Compulsory labour has never been known there; and the temperature of Z  c  t  c  s and Gu  n  j   t  ,

where the first mines were worked, differs but little from that of Tlāscālā, Chōlulā, and Tēnōchtītlan, where the population was found to be most concentrated at the time of the Conquest.

So little, indeed, are the metalliferous ridges, which have been, hitherto, the seat of the great mining operations of the Spaniards, elevated above the level of the Table-land, that, with the exception of Jesus Maria, (North-west of Chihuahua,) I hardly know one mining district, in the vicinity of which the snow remains long on the ground. Real del Monte, and Talpujahuā, are certainly not warm; and the first is liable to be occasionally enveloped in clouds, as is the district of El Oro, near Zimāpān, and many others on the Eastern branch of the Cordillera. But the difference between their level, and that of the Capital, does not exceed 1,500, or 2,000 feet, (as will be seen by a reference to the map of Routes and elevations annexed to this work,) and the cold felt there by visitors from the warmer districts, is merely relative; the thermometer seldom falling below 40° of Fahrenheit, except in the nights, which are sometimes severe. This temperature seems well adapted to the constitution of the Indians, who flock to these mountain districts with their families, on the report of any new discovery, and appear to thrive there as well as upon the Table-land. There are particular tribes of Natives, who have been miners from generation to generation, and who lead a roving life, migrating, with their wives and children, from one district to another, as they are attracted by the fame of superior riches. A mine in Bonanza, in whatever part of the country it may be situated, is sure of a sufficient supply of workmen, because the system of payment by Partido, (a share in the ore raised,) which is usually resorted to upon such occasions, is always preferred to regular wages, however high, for dead works. It was by employing liberally this powerful incitement to exertion, that the Old Spaniards found means to create a population in the most

distant and desolate districts, without having recourse to the Mita or Tanda, which, in Peru and Chile, was in such general use; while it is not improbable, that the absence of that system of forced labour, adopted South of the Equator, has contributed not a little to encourage the love of mining, which prevails at the present day, amongst the natives of New Spain. Far from looking upon it with dread or repugnance, they regard it as their natural occupation, and appear to feel, in many parts of the country, a sovereign contempt for the agricultural population, which is reduced to vegetate upon a scanty daily pittance, without a chance of acquiring that sudden wealth, which sometimes falls to a Barretero's lot. In addition to these accidental advantages, the ordinary wages of a miner are high; and although the money which passes through his hands is usually as ill spent, as it is rapidly acquired, still, to ensure the means of indulging in a weekly excess, (the necessity of which seems to be an article of the mining creed in every country,) there are few Indians who will not enter gladly upon a week of labour.

It is not, therefore, to be apprehended, that the late change of institutions in Mexico will occasion any difficulty in finding hands to carry on mining operations there, to whatever extent they may be pushed by the Companies, although there have been great complaints upon the subject, hitherto, in many districts, from the total dispersion of the population during the Civil War. Things revert, however, gradually, to their former state, and that without the necessity of any extraordinary exertion. At Tlālpūjāhūa, for instance, upon the first arrival of the Company, (in 1825,) one hundred and fifty labourers were collected with difficulty. In 1827, from twelve to sixteen hundred persons were in daily employment in the mines, besides from six to seven hundred more, who were occupied in cutting wood, and making charcoal in the neighbouring mountains. At Guanajuato, within one year after the establishment of the Anglo-Mexican and United

Mexican Companies, the population increased from thirty to nearly forty-five thousand. A similar change took place at Zăcătēcās, Sōmbrērētē, and Real del Monte. Hundreds of Indians emerged from the fastnesses, in which they had been dragging on a precarious, and almost savage existence, in the midst of every kind of privation, to seek a livelihood by active labour; and this disposition must necessarily increase, as the advantages derived from it become more apparent.

It will not, however, produce its full effect, until the mines begin to yield ores anew, for it is only the really industrious part of the population that has sought employment, hitherto, in the preparatory works; but, from the moment that these are concluded, it is very generally thought that there will be no deficiency of labourers.

I have already pointed out the fact, that the importance of the mines of Mexico consists not merely in the amount of the Mineral treasures which they produce, but in the impulse communicated by them to all the other great interests of the State.

In a country, the largest and most fertile portion of which, (the Table-land,) is precluded, by the peculiarity of its position, and by the want of a water-communication with the Coast, from exchanging its produce for that of European industry, the great mass of the population would be reduced to the lowest state of indigence, were it not for the home-market created by the mines. In this respect, the very poverty of the ores of Mexico was an advantage, by increasing enormously the scale upon which Mining establishments were necessarily formed. We have seen that the Three millions of marcs of silver, to which the average annual produce of the country amounted, were extracted from Ten millions of Quintals of ore; and I have endeavoured to give, in the second Section, some idea of the process, by which the separation of the silver from this mass of extraneous substances was effected. The number of men and animals employed in

it was immense, and in every place where they were thus congregated, a demand was created for Agricultural produce, which rose, as the importance of the mines increased, and called gradually into existence a cultivation, of which no trace was to be found before. Such has been the progress of civilization, and of Agricultural industry, throughout New Spain. With the exception of the Capital, which, as the seat of Government, derived its importance from other sources, and the towns of La Pūcblā, Guādālājārā, Vāllādōlīd, and Ōāxācā, which were selected as the seats of the great Episcopal establishments of the country, there is hardly a single town in Mexico, that does not derive its origin, directly or indirectly, from the Mines; while, in like manner, cultivation will be found to extend in a long line from South to North, with occasional inclinations to the East and West, (following always, in its direction, that of Mining discoveries,) the course of which may be easily traced upon the map.

The most fertile portions of the Table-land are, the Bāxīō, which is immediately contiguous to Guānājūatō, and comprises a portion of the States of Vāllādōlīd, Guādālājārā, Quērētārō, and Guanajuato: the valley of Tōlūcā, and the Southern parts of the State of Valladolid, which supply both the Capital and the Mining districts of Tlālpujāhūa, Ēl Ōrō, Tēmāscāltēcēc, and Āngāngēō: the plains of Pāchūcā and Āpām, extending on either side, to the foot of the mountains, upon which the mines of Real del Monte and Chico are situated: Itzmīquīlpān, which owes its existence to Zimāpān: Āguāscālīentēs, by which the great Mining town of Zācātēcās is supplied: a considerable circle in the vicinity of Sōmbrērētē and Frēsñīllō: the valley of the Jaral, and the plains about San Luis Pōtōsī, which town, again, derives its name from the mines of the Cerro de San Pedro, (about four leagues from the gates,) the supposed superiority of which to the famous mines of Pōtōsī, in Peru, gave rise to the appellation of Pōtōsī. A little farther North we find the dis-

trict of Mătĕhŭālă, which is now a thriving town, with seven thousand inhabitants, created by the discovery of Catorce ; while about the same time, (the latter part of the last century,) Durango rose into importance from the impulse given to the surrounding country by the labours of Zămbrăno, at San Dîmăs and Guărisămĕy. Its population increased in twelve years, from eight to twenty thousand ; while whole streets and squares were added to its extent by the munificence of that fortunate miner. To the extreme North, Santa Eŭlălă gave rise to the town of Chĭhŭāhŭa ; Bătō-pĭlăs, and El Părrăl, became each the centre of a little circle of cultivation ; Jesus Maria, is, at the present day, producing a similar effect ; Măpĭmĭ, Cuĕncămĕ, and ĭndĕĕ, (a little more to the Southward,) served to develop the natural fertility of the banks of the river Năzăs ; while in the low hot regions of Sônōră and Cĭnălōă, on the Western Coast, almost every place designated in the map as a town, was originally, (and generally is still,) a Real, or district of mines.

Such was the case with Ālămös and Cŭlĭăcăn, and Cösălă and Ėl Rösăriő ; and such will be found to be the case with an infinity of other towns and villages scattered over the territory of the Mexican Republic, which, but for the mines, never would have existed at all. When once formed, these establishments, as Humboldt very justly observes, often survived the mines which gave them birth ; and turned to agricultural labours, for the supply of other districts, that industry which was at first devoted solely to their own. Some, however, are so unfavourably situated as necessarily to follow the fate of the mines ; in which case their population goes to swell that of the nearest district where there is a demand for labour, but might easily be diverted into more distant channels, were the advantages held out sufficiently great to compensate the difficulties of the removal.

An examination into the sources of the wealth of the principal families of the Mexican nobility will confirm what I

have stated with regard to the towns, by leading us nearly to the same result. The family of Rēglă, which now possesses landed property to an immense extent in various parts of the country, purchased the whole of it with the proceeds of the mines of Real del Monte. The Făgöögäs owe their present importance to the great Bönānză of the Păvellōn at Sömbrrētē. The estates of the family of Vībāncō proceeded from the mines of Bōlāñōs. The houses of Vălenciānă, Rühl, Pērez Gālvēz, and ōtērō, are all indebted for their possessions to the mines of Valenciana and Villālpāndō, at Guāñjūātō. The family of Sărdānētă (Los Marqueses de Rayas,) takes its rise from the mine of that name. Cătă and Mēllādō gave to their first proprietor (Don Francisco Matias de Busto) the Marquisate of San Clemente, with immense wealth, a part of which has been transmitted to his descendants. The Cañada of Laborde, at Tlalpujahua, with the mines of Quēbrădillă and San Ācăsĭō, at Zăcătēcăs, all contributed towards the three fortunes of Laborde. The family of the Ōbrēgōnēs owes its beautiful estates, (near Leon,) to the mines of La Purisima, and Concepcion, at Catorce; as does the family of Gordoă, the estate of Malpasso to the mine of La Luz. The son of Zămbrănō, (the discoverer of Guărisămēy,) wasted as his rightful property has been, is still in possession of four of the largest estates in Dŭrāngō; and Bătōpĭlăs gave to the Marquis of Bŭstămānte, both the means of purchasing his title, for which he paid by a loan of 300,000 dollars, (60,000*l*.) to the Royal Treasury, during the Revolution, and the affluence which he is now enjoying in the Peninsula.

The above is a most imperfect sketch of the origin of the fortunes of the leading families in Mexico. With some few exceptions, such as the Conde de Āgrędă, whose fortune was made by trade, the descendants of Cortes, who received a Royal grant of the Valley of ōăxăcă, (the value of which is now much reduced by the abolition of the Indian Capitation

tax,) and the families of some of the Spanish merchants established at Jālāpā and Věřacrūz, it will be found that almost the whole landed property of the country is in the hands of Mining families, and has, in a great measure, been brought into cultivation by the mines. They furnished the means of building the vast Presas de Agua, or reservoirs, without which agriculture can so seldom be carried on successfully upon the Table-land; and thus rendered productive districts, the fertility of which, had nature not been assisted by art, would never have been developed; while the constant demand, in the Mining towns, for every article of agricultural produce, rendered this mode of investing capital preferable to any other then open to a Native. The Civil War has, indeed, reduced almost to nothing the value of these possessions, and there is little, at present, to demonstrate the wealth, to which, under more favourable circumstances, the principal families of the Republic will find themselves restored: but time alone is wanting in order to bring things round their natural level; the seeds of opulence are there, and, in proportion as the country advances towards a more settled order of things, the period approaches, at which they may be again expected to produce their former fruits.

Melancholy, indeed, would be the fate of Mexico, if the source from which all her riches have hitherto been derived, were, as some suppose, exhausted and dried up! She could not only find no substitute for her mines in her foreign trade, of which they furnish the great staple, Silver, but her resources at home would decrease, in exactly the same proportion as her means of supplying her wants from abroad. Her Agriculture would be confined to such a supply of the necessaries of life, as each individual would have it in his power to raise;—districts, formerly amongst the richest in the known world, would be thrown for ever out of cultivation;—the great Mining towns would become, what they were during the worst years of the Revolution, the picture

of desolation; and the country would be so far thrown back in the career of civilization, that the majority of its inhabitants would be compelled to revert to a Nomade life, and to seek a precarious subsistence amidst their flocks and herds, like the Gaucho of the Pampas, of whose Indian habits Captain Head has given us so spirited, and so faithful a picture. I desire no better proof of this than the contrast, existing at the present day in every part of New Spain, between the degraded situation of the husbandman, or small landed proprietor, in any district without an outlet, and that of a proprietor, (however small,) in the vicinity of the mines. The one is without wants, and almost without an idea of civilized life; clothed in a leather dress, or in the coarsest kind of home-made woollen manufactures;—living in primitive simplicity perhaps, but in primitive ignorance, and brutality too;—sunk in sloth, and incapable of exertion, unless stimulated by some momentary excitement: while the other, acquires wants daily, with the means of gratifying them; and grows industrious, in proportion as the advantages which he derives from the fruits of his labour increase; his mind opens to the advantages of European arts; he seeks for his offspring, at least, that education which had been denied to himself;* and becomes, gradually, with a taste for the delights of civilization, a more important member, himself, of the civilized world! Who can see this, as I have seen it, without feeling, as I have felt, the importance, not only to Mexico, but to Europe, of a branch of industry capable of producing such beneficial effects? And *alone* capable of producing them: for Mexico, without her mines, (I cannot too often repeat it,) notwithstanding the fertility of her soil, and the vast amount of her former Agricultural produce, can

* Amongst the young Mexicans who have been sent to England, or the United States, for their education, I could mention several from the Mining districts, as the sons of Don Narciso Anitua, at Sombrerete, and those of the principal Agent of Count Regla, at Real del Monte.

never rise to any importance in the scale of nations. The markets of the Table-land must be *home-markets*, and these the mines alone can supply. On the Coasts, indeed, the productions of the Tropics, which we term Colonial Produce, might serve as an object of barter; but these, supposing their cultivation to be carried to the greatest possible extent, could never cover the demand upon European industry, which the wants of a population of eight millions will, under more favourable circumstances, occasion, as their value must decrease in proportion to the superabundance of the supply, until they reach the point, at which their price, when raised, would cease to repay the cost of raising them. Thus the trade of Mexico would be confined to her Vanilla, and Cochineal, (of which she has a natural monopoly;) while the number of those who consume European manufactures in the Interior, (which does not yet include one-half of the population,) would be reduced, probably, to one-tenth. Fortunately, there is no reason whatever to apprehend the approach of that scarcity of mineral productions, with which many seem to think that New Spain is menaced. Hitherto, at least, every step that has been taken in exploring the country, has led to fresh indications of wealth, which, in the North, appears to be really inexhaustible. To the European manufacturer, it is a matter of indifference whether the silver, transmitted to him in return for the produce of his labour, proceeds from Guāñajūātō, or Dūrāngō, from the centre of the Table-land, or the fastnesses of the Sierra Madre. The capability of the country to produce it in sufficient quantities to ensure a constant market, and an equally constant return, is the only point which it can be of importance for him to ascertain; and of this, from the moment that a sufficient capital is invested in mining operations, I have no scruple in stating that there can be no doubt.

Mining in Mexico has, hitherto, been confined to a comparatively narrow circle: the immense mass of silver which

the country has yielded since the Conquest, (Humboldt calculates it at 1,767,952,000 dollars, in 1803,) has proceeded from a few Central spots, in which the capital and activity of the first speculators found ample employment: yet, if we examine those spots, we shall find that three centuries of constant productiveness, have not been sufficient to exhaust the principal mines originally worked in each, while by far the largest proportion of the great Veins remains unexplored. This is the case at Guănjūātō, with the mines of Cătă and Răyă, and at Zăcătēcă, with those of San Ācăsîō and San Běrnăbē,—all of which now belong to the United Mexican Association. Valenciana is a more recent discovery, but Měllādō, (likewise at Guănjūātō,) which belongs to the Anglo-Mexican Company, is supposed to have been the first mine denounced in that district. At Sōmbrēretē, the Vein of the Păvēllōn has been worked from the time of the Conquest, though it was only in the year 1792 that it produced the famous Bonanza of the Făgōăgăs. The mines of Santa Eulalia, in Chîhūāhūa, continued to be equally productive during a period of eighty years, and were only abandoned at last in consequence of the incursions of the Indian Tribes.*

The riches of Real del Monte can hardly be said to have diminished in a term of sixty years, although the difficulty of the drainage caused the works there to be suspended.† The same may be said of Bolaños, which is likewise in the hands of one of the English Companies; (*Vide* Section II.)—and although, in some of the inferior districts, many smaller veins have been worked out, we have to set against this the immense regions hitherto unexplored, or if examined, only sufficiently

* *Vide* preceding Section.

† Count Regla possesses an account, given upon oath by the miners employed in 1801, of the state of the lower levels, at the time when the mines on the Biscaina vein were given up, by which it appears that the richness of the vein continued unimpaired.

so to afford some faint indications of the riches which they are now known to contain.

There is, therefore, so little reason to question the producing powers of the country, that, were it necessary to adopt one of two extreme suppositions, there would rather be cause to fear a depreciation in the value of our present circulating medium, from the probability of too great an increase in the average annual produce, than to apprehend any great falling off in its amount. But the progress of discoveries, as we have seen, is liable to be influenced by a thousand circumstances, unconnected with the mines themselves: any great change, in either sense, must be the work of time; and occupied as the Companies now are by extensive undertakings in the more Central districts, it seems probable, not only that the former standard of twenty-four millions per annum will not be reached before the year 1835, but that, while the mines of the South continue to be sufficiently productive to repay the Adventurers, capital will not be employed to any great extent in the less accessible districts of the North, to which, as I have already stated, I am induced to attach the greatest importance.

On the other hand, it may be urged that the trade now opened with Asia, through the ports of Māzatlān and Gūāymās, will hold out great encouragement to speculations in that quarter, by the facilities which it affords for turning to immediate account riches, which were formerly of (comparatively) but little advantage. The luxuries of life may now be obtained with as much ease by the inhabitants of the Provinces on the Pacific, as by those of the Capital itself; and there can be little doubt that, in proportion as wealth becomes more desirable, it will be more eagerly sought. It is, therefore, difficult, after allowing a reasonable time for these causes to operate, to suppose that they will not produce their natural effects; in which case I am certainly inclined to think

that a very considerable increase in the amount of silver raised in Mexico, may be expected to take place; although it is impossible now to fix the period at which this change will occur, and still more so, to ascertain the extent to which it may ultimately be carried. It is enough for the commercial nations of Europe to know that, from the moment that the internal affairs of New Spain assume a more settled character, and that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the new institutions to take root, there is every prospect of an increase in the demand for every article of European manufacture, while that very increase in a country, the revenue of which depends so much upon the customs,* will augment the power of the Government to meet its engagements abroad.

It may, and I fear it will, be said, that the chain of evidence is here incomplete, and that I am assuming a fact favourable to Mexico in the first instance, in order to draw from it my own conclusions afterwards. This is by no means my wish; but at the same time, I confess that, (in common, I believe, with all those who have had an opportunity of inquiring into the resources of New Spain,) I do regard it as so well ascertained a fact that her mineral riches are almost unexplored, that I am willing to rest upon it my whole calculation with regard to her future importance as a country. I have not formed this opinion hastily, or without endeavouring to collect all the data respecting it, that it is possible to obtain in the present unsettled state of the country; but having formed it, (whether correctly or erroneously, time alone can determine,) I cannot lay it aside at pleasure, in an investigation, the result of which it must materially influence. I need not, however, remind my readers, that I am here only canvassing probabilities, nor again urge upon their attention the fact, that, whatever be the capabilities of the country, their development depends upon the general course of events, which may

* *Vide* Section V. of Book III.

advance or retard the moment, at which the extent of the resources of Mexico can alone be fully known.

I shall now quit a part of my subject, upon which so much uncertainty necessarily prevails, and revert to one that admits of a more accurate investigation, viz. the immediate influence of the mines upon the commercial demand, with a few observations upon which I shall beg leave to close this Book.

In an extensive Mining negotiation, one-half of the annual produce may be fairly taken as the amount brought into circulation in the country by the expenses of working. This half is distributed, partly amongst the superintendents, and labourers in the mines, and partly amongst the landed proprietors of the surrounding districts, each, and all of whom, it enables to become consumers of something more than maize-cakes, and home-spun cottons, by bringing within their reach a portion of those Imports, with which the American market is supplied by European ingenuity. Of the facility with which a taste for European productions is acquired, the total downfall of the native manufactures of wool and cotton, in the short space of four years, is a sufficient proof. I have not the means of tracing the exact amount of the consumption of British manufactures in each of the Mining districts, but it is certain that, wherever a company has been established, shops have been opened, and regular supplies of goods drawn from the Capital, or the nearest port, not one-fiftieth part of which could have been disposed of, had the mines continued unworked. The streets of Guăăjūāto, Sōmbrērētē, and Zăcătēcă, are full of large magazines; there is a constant communication between Cătōrcē and Rēfūgiō; as there is between the mining towns of Sōnōră and Cīnălōă, and the ports of Măzătlan and Gūăymă.

At Real del Monte, I was assured that the change which had taken place, in fourteen months, in the appearance of the population, was really wonderful; and at Tlălpjăhuă, which,

in 1825, was a ruined mountain village, Mr. de Rivafinoli, (the Director of the Company established there,) informed me that the Alcavala, (or Excise,) which, on his first arrival, amounted only to 250 or 300 dollars per month, had risen to 1,500 and 2,000 dollars; and that a shop for the sale of European manufactures had been opened there, by the house of Green and Hartley, the monthly receipts of which amounted to six thousand dollars. If we reflect that the money thus brought into circulation is not confined to the Districts, in which I have described its more immediate effects, but extends, more or less, over the whole country, by giving a value to wheat, maize, and barley, hides, tallow, Pita-ropes, coarse sacking, with cattle, sheep, mules and horses, from the great breeding estates in the North, and that all those who are thus enabled to dispose of their own stocks, become instantaneously consumers of ours, it will be seen that the investment of capital, by which this change has been promoted, has not only not been injurious to England, but that, in point of fact, a large proportion of the fifteen millions of dollars, at which I have estimated the investments of our Companies, has already returned to us, in the shape of remittances to our manufacturers at home.

As the Mines improve, these remittances will increase: we have, at present, but little more than the proceeds of that capital, by which the regeneration of the mines is to be effected, in conjunction with a produce, not exceeding one-third of the average standard before the Revolution. When the mines begin to pay, the case will be very different; for, in addition to the *half*, which I suppose to be absorbed by the expenses, one moiety of the remaining half will go to the Mexican proprietor, and consequently remain in the country, until it is exchanged there for the produce of European industry.

Upon the amount of that produce consumed, the most important branch of the Revenue depends; and it is to the

increase or diminution of the Revenue again, that the creditors of Mexico must look for regularity in the payment of the interest due upon the loans contracted in this country.

Of the ability of Mexico to meet her engagements, under moderately good management, I entertain no doubt; nor would any temporary fluctuations in her receipts or commerce, affect my opinion of her resources. It would be melancholy, certainly, were the bountiful intentions of Nature to be frustrated, by civil dissensions, or by injudicious legislative interference; a little tendency to which will, probably, long remain in all the countries formerly subject to Spain; but my visit to the Interior of Mexico taught me to believe, that the party spirit, which rages occasionally in the capital, ought not to be taken as a criterion of the general feelings of the inhabitants; and to hope, that few causes in fact exist, by which the general tranquillity of the country is likely to be disturbed. Of those causes, in a work of this nature, I am not at liberty to speak; I shall, therefore, proceed at once to what I must term, in the usual phrase of the day, my Personal Narrative, which will contain some account of my first and second visits to Mexico, (in the autumn of 1823, and January 1825,) together with my subsequent journeys to the Mining Districts, (in 1826 and 1827,) in which I shall endeavour to include all the statistical details, of any interest, respecting the different parts of the country through which I passed, not comprehended in the preceding parts of this work.

One million, five hundred and sixty-one thousand, two hundred and forty-nine dollars must likewise be added for the Coinage of Sōmbrērētē, where it appears that there was a Mint in full activity from the 16th of October, 1810, to the 16th of July, 1811.

The effect of this would be to render the Total Coinage of the fifteen years 159,255,840 dollars, viz. :—

	Dollars.
Amount given by General Table	155,213,012
Coinage of Guanajuato, from December	
1812 to May 1813	311,125
Ditto from 1821 to 1825	2,170,454
Coinage of Sombrerete	1,561,249
<hr/>	
Total	159,255,840

and this again, (with the deductions specified in the first Section,) would give 10,487,986 dollars, 5 reals, as the annual average of registered produce, since the Revolution, in lieu of 10,218,464 dollars, 6 reals, at which I have estimated it.

I merely state this for the sake of correctness, as it does not affect my subsequent calculations, in which I have taken as the basis a produce of Eleven millions.

Besides, the produce both of Guanajuato and Sombrerete, is given separately in the Table of Produce, as taken from official records.

I annex a General Table of the total Coinage of all the Mints of Mexico, including that of the Capital, from the year 1733, when it was first placed under the direction of the Government, and returns of the annual coinage regularly kept.

By this it will appear, that the sum of 1,435,658,611 dollars has been *registered* as the produce of the mines of Mexico in ninety-three years, (from 1733 to June 1826.)

The work of Baron Humboldt enables me to add from Registers, which, but for his researches, would now have ceased to exist, (since not even the Mexican Government has been enabled to annex them to its official statements of the Mint Returns,) 272,514,825 dollars more, as the registered coinage of the Mint of Mexico from 1690 to 1733, with which year the present table commences.

This gives a produce of 1,708,173,436 dollars in a hundred and thirty-six years, and proves both the constancy of the producing powers of the country, and the moderation of Baron Humboldt's calculations with regard to them, since he estimated the amount of silver raised from the Mines of Mexico in 1803, (from the Conquest in 1521,) at 1,767,952,000 dollars, or, 2,027,952,000 dollars, if one seventh were added to the Official Returns for unregistered silver.

GENERAL TABLE OF COINAGE IN MEXICO.

The Mint of the Capital was established in 1535. Until the year 1733, when it was placed under the direction of the Government, there are no Returns.

From 1733 to June 1826, the registered

Coinage is :—

Dollars.

In Gold	63,365,406	}	1,382,218,536	3	0
In Silver	1,318,853,130				

GUANAJUATO.

From Dec. 1812, to May 15,

1813 311,125

From April 1821, to June

1826 2,713,069

3,024,194 0 0

ZACATECAS.

From Nov. 24, 1810, to June 1826 .

32,108,185 1 6

GUADALAJARA.

From 1812, to June 1826,

In Gold 225,632 0 0

In Silver 5,433,527 7 9

5,659,159 7 9

DURANGO.

From 1811, to June 1826

7,483,626 4 0

CHIHUAHUA.

From 1811 to 1814, when the Mint was

suppressed

3,603,660 0 0

SOMBRERETE.

From Oct. 16, 1810, to July 16, 1811,

when the Mint was suppressed .

1,561,249 2 0

Total . . . 1,435,658,611 2 3

APPENDIX.



APPENDIX.

A.

EXTRACTS FROM A REPRESENTATION, ADDRESSED TO THE VICEROY OF BUENOS AYRES, BY THE APODERADO (AGENT) OF THE LANDHOLDERS OF THE PROVINCE.

THE resources of the Royal Treasury being exhausted by the enormous expenditure which has lately been required, your Excellency, on assuming the reins of Government, was deprived of the means of providing for the safety of the provinces committed to your charge. The only mode of relieving the necessities of the country, appears to be to grant permission to the English merchants to introduce their manufactures into the town, and to re-export the produce of the Interior, by which the revenue will be at once increased, and an impulse given to industry and trade.

Your Excellency possesses powers sufficient for the adoption of any measures that the safety of the country may require, but a natural desire to ensure the result of these measures, by adapting them to the peculiar situation of the Vice-royalty, induced your Excellency to consult the Cabildo of this city, and the Tribunal of the Real Consulado, before any definitive resolution was taken.

The intentions of your Excellency had barely transpired, when several of the merchants manifested their discontent and dissatisfaction. Groups of European shopkeepers were formed in all the public places, who, disguising their jealousy and personal apprehensions under the most specious pretences, affected to deplore, as a public calamity, the diminution of the profits, which they have hitherto derived from the contraband trade. At one time, with hypocritical warmth, they lamented the fatal blow which the interests of the Mother-country were about to receive, and at another, they predicted the ruin of the colony, and the total destruction of its commerce: others again announced the universal distress that the free exportation of the precious metals would bring upon us, and pretended to feel a lively interest in the fate of our native artisans (whom they have always hitherto despised), endeavouring to enlist in their cause the sacred name of religion, and the interests of morality.

Never, certainly, has America known a more critical state of affairs, and never was any European governor so well entitled as your Excellency to dispense at once with the maxims of past ages; for if, in less dangerous times, the laws have often been allowed to sleep, when their observance might have checked the free action of the Government, surely your Excellency cannot now be condemned for the adoption of a measure, by which alone the preservation of this part of the monarchy can be effected.

Those should be doomed to eternal infamy, who maintain that, under present circumstances, it would be injurious either to Spain, or to this country, to open a free intercourse with Great Britain. But even supposing the measure to be injurious, still it is a necessary evil, and one which, since it cannot be avoided, ought at least to be made use of for the general good, by endeavouring to derive every possible advantage from it, and thus to convert it into a means of ensuring the safety of the state.

Since the English first appeared on our coasts, in 1806, the merchants of that nation have not lost sight of the Rio de la Plata in their speculations. A series of commercial adventures has followed, which has provided almost entirely for the consumption of the country; and this great importation, carried on in defiance of laws and reiterated prohibitions, has met with no other obstacles than those necessary to deprive the Custom-house of its dues, and the country of the advantages which it might have derived from a free exportation of its own produce in return.

The result of this system has been to put the English in the exclusive possession of the right of providing the country with all the foreign merchandize that it requires; while the Government has lost the immense revenues which the introduction of so large a proportion of foreign manufactures ought to have produced, from too scrupulous an observance of laws, which have never been more scandalously violated than at the moment when their observance was insisted upon by the merchants of the capital. For what, Sir, can be more glaringly absurd than to hear a merchant clamouring for the enforcement of the prohibitive laws, and the exclusion of foreign trade, at the very door of a shop filled with English goods, clandestinely imported?

To the advantages which the Government will derive from the open introduction of foreign goods, may be added those which must accrue to the country from the free exportation of its own produce.

Our vast plains produce annually a million of hides, without reckoning other skins, corn, or tallow, all of which are valuable, as articles of foreign trade. But the magazines of our resident merchants are full; there is no exportation; the capital usually invested in these speculations is already employed, and the immense residue of the produce, thrown back upon the hands of the landed-proprietors, or purchased at a price infinitely below its real value, has reduced them to the most deplorable

state of wretchedness, and compelled them to abandon a labour which no longer repays them for the toil and expense with which it is attended.

The freedom of trade in America was not proscribed as a real evil, but because it was a sacrifice required of the colonies by the Mother-country. The events which led to the gradual increase of this exclusive commerce, till it became a monopoly of the Cadiz merchants, are well known.

Well informed men exclaimed in vain against a system so weak, so ruinous, and so ill judged; but inveterate evils are not to be cured at once. Minor reforms had paved the way for a system founded upon sounder principles, when the late extraordinary events, changing entirely the political state of Spain, destroyed by one unforeseen blow all the pretexts by which the prohibitory laws had been previously supported.—The new order of things which the Mother-country has proclaimed as the happy commencement of national prosperity, has completely changed the motives for the prohibitory system, and demonstrated, in their fullest extent, the advantages that must result to the country from a free trade. Good policy, therefore, and the natural wish to apply a remedy to pressing evils, are converted into a positive duty, which the first magistrate of the state cannot, in reason, or justice, neglect.

Is it just that the fruits of our agricultural labours should be lost, because the unfortunate provinces of Spain can no longer consume them? Is it just that the abundant productions of the country should rot in our magazines, because the navy of Spain is too weak to export them? Is it just that we should increase the distress of the Mother-country, by the tidings of our own critical and vacillating state, when the means are offered to us of consolidating our safety upon the firmest basis? Is it just, that, when the subjects of a friendly and generous nation present themselves in our ports, and offer us, at a cheap rate, the merchandize of which we are in want, and with which Spain cannot supply us, we should reject the proposal, and convert, by so doing, their good intentions to the exclusive advantage of a few European merchants, who, by means of a contraband trade, render themselves masters of the whole imports of the country? Is it just, that when we are entreated to sell our accumulated agricultural produce, we should, by refusing to do so, decree at the same time the ruin of our landed-proprietors, of the country, and of society together?

If your Excellency wishes to diminish the extraction of specie, which has taken place latterly to so great an extent, there is no other mode of effecting it than to open the ports to the English, and thus to enable them to extend their speculations to other objects. It is one of the fatal consequences of the contraband trade, that the importer is absolutely compelled to receive the value of his imports in the precious metals alone. His true interest, indeed, consists in exchanging them at once for articles that may become the objects of a new speculation; but the

risks with which the extraction of bulky commodities must be attended, under a system of strict prohibition, induce him to sacrifice this advantage to the greater security which exports in specie afford, and to deprive himself of the hope of new profits, and the country of the sale of its most valuable produce.

Yet the Apoderado of the Cadiz monopolists maintains, "that a free trade will be the ruin of our agriculture." This luminous discovery is worthy of his penetration. The free exportation of the produce, is declared to be detrimental to the interests of the producer! What, then, is to be the mode of encouraging him in his labours? According to the principles laid down by our merchants, the agricultural produce should be allowed to accumulate,—purchasers are to be deterred from entering the market, by the difficulties of exporting the articles bought up, to countries where they might be consumed; and this system is to be persevered in until, after ruining the landholders by preventing them from disposing of the fruits of their labours, the superfluous produce itself is to be employed to fill up the ditches and marshes in the vicinity of the town.

Yes, Sir, this is the deplorable state to which our agriculture has been reduced during the last few years. The marshes around the town have been actually filled up with wheat; and this miserable condition, which forms a subject of lamentation with all true friends to their country, and scandalizes the inhabitants of the whole district, is the natural fate of a province, in which, as soon as an inclination is shown to apply a remedy to these evils, men are found daring enough to assert, "that by giving value, or, in other words, a ready market, to the agricultural produce, agriculture will be ruined."

Buenos Ayres, 30th September, 1809.

B.

REPRESENTATION OF THE AMERICAN DEPUTIES TO THE CORTES OF SPAIN,
1ST AUGUST, 1811.

SIR,

THE Cortes being about to discuss the question of the pacification of the Americas, We, the undersigned Deputies, believe it to be our duty to lay before your Majesty whatever information we possess with regard to the best mode of effecting this most important point:—information which may tend, at the same time, to convey an exact idea of events, which are much misrepresented before they reach the Peninsula. The knowledge of the evil ought to precede the inquiry as to the remedy. In order to extinguish the fire that is consuming the Americas, it is necessary to examine its origin. It appears, that all agree that the desire of Independence first excited amongst the Americans the flame of discord, when

they saw that it was impossible that the Peninsula should employ force against them. The loss of power, on the part of the Mother-country, is, therefore, the first circumstance to be noted ; but something more than this was required to occasion the explosion, since otherwise it would have taken place as soon as the obstacle was removed, and this has not been the case ; the revolt of the colonies being effected in some places before others, and in none immediately on the arrival from Spain of the first fatal news of the occupation of Madrid.

In Caracas, the intelligence of the invasion of Andalusia by the French, and the dissolution of the Central Junta, caused the revolution, by which, on the 19th of April, 1810, the Authorities were deposed without bloodshed, and a Junta created, with the title of Supreme, for the government of the Province, " to preserve its existence, and provide for its safety," as it is expressed in the proclamation which was published upon the occasion.

The same news was communicated to Buenos Ayres by the Viceroy, Don Baltasar Cisneros, who permitted the people to assemble a Congress, in order to take the necessary precautions, and not to be involved in similar calamities. This produced, in May, 1810, a Provisional Junta, which took the command, until a Congress could be formed of Deputies from all the Provinces.

The imprudent conduct of the Corregidor of El Socorro, in the new kingdom of Granada, in attacking with troops the unarmed people, who, by means of official representations, endeavoured to calm him, and to avoid a rupture, irritated the natives, and caused a revolution, on the 3d of July, 1810, the first effect of which was the imprisonment of the Corregidor himself, and his satellites.

In Santa Fè de Bogota, a still slighter cause led to the explosion. An individual was passing a small shop, when the European proprietor offended him by some words reflecting on the Americans in general. The Creoles, piqued with this, assembled in a body and attacked him, and those who hastened to his assistance. This trifle lighted the torch of dissension, and the irritation increased to such a degree, that a Junta was installed, July 20, 1810, which took the management of affairs in the Viceroyalty, excluding many of those who governed before.

In Carthagena another Junta was formed, the 18th of August of the same year, in consequence of the proceedings of the Governor, and the odious differences which he excited between the European Spaniards and the Americans.

In Chile, the violent attempts of the Captain-General, Don Francisco Carrasco, who was brought to trial by the Council for his conduct, caused such a sensation, and irritated the people so much, that he was obliged to resign. The Conde de la Conquista succeeded him. After this, a Provisional Junta was created, the 18th of September, 1810, following the example of the Junta of Cadiz, which approved the measure,

in a proclamation addressed to the Americans. This Junta was recognized by, and received laws from, the Cortes.

In Mexico, the imprisonment of the Viceroy, Don José Yturriagaray, by a faction of Europeans, on the night of the 15th of September, 1808, created disputes between them and the Americans. This feeling, spreading gradually through the kingdom, and increasing from day to day, by the death of some and the imprisonment of others, (particularly of the Corregidor of Queretaro,) and the distinctions conferred by the new Viceroy, Don Francisco Venegas, upon the author and accomplices of the faction, caused an insurrection in the Interior, which began in the village of Dolores, the 16th of September, and extended itself in a most alarming manner.

Such are the circumstances which have occasioned the breaking out of the Revolution in the different parts of America; the pretext unanimously alleged, is the necessity of providing for their own safety, and their wish not to be given up to the French, or any other power, but preserved to Ferdinand VII., whom all have acknowledged, and proclaimed as their king. This being the case, to what, but to bad government, can the present differences be attributed? The daily increasing system of oppression banished from the hearts of the natives the hope of reform, and begot the desire of Independence, which was looked upon as the only remedy. An inflammable material has gone on accumulating, till at last it has ignited, with a very small spark, and the mine has burst. Oppression, is, without doubt, the first link in the chain of causes which have produced this effect. Throughout the Colonies, the fear of being betrayed to the French was very great, and not entirely without foundation. To this circumstance, which was common to all the Provinces, and occasioned the Revolution in Caracas, may be added the conduct of the Viceroy in Buenos Ayres, who communicated the intelligence of the invasion of Andalusia as a decisive blow, allowed the people to form a Congress, and to choose a Junta which should govern them.

The bad conduct of the chiefs in Quito, Socorro, and Chile,—of individuals in Santa Fè,—of both, as well as of the Government, in Mexico, may be subjoined to the fatal news from Spain.

It is worthy of remark that the differences have everywhere commenced with an attack upon the Creoles, on the part of the Europeans. Nowhere has any American been known to insult a European, but the reverse. In every province, Americans were tried and thrown into prison, on pretence of being disaffected to Spain, and yet not one of the many Europeans who insulted the Americans, even in public places, was chastised. In them it was a crime only to show themselves well disposed towards the Creoles, or to commiserate their oppression. For this the most respectable men amongst them were arrested, and even a Viceroy himself deposed. Americans were continually sent to the Peninsula, where they were absolved, which proves the injustice with which they had been treated. In a word, the blood of the Creoles was profusely

spilt, without one drop of the Europeans being shed, except in their defence, or by way of reprisals for the rivers which they caused to flow.

The streets of Callao, in the kingdom of New Granada, the fields of Cordova, in that of Buenos Ayres, the mountain of Las Cruces, the plains of Aculco, the bridge of Calderon, the city of Guanajuato, with a thousand other places in Mexico, were the scenes of these horrors; without relating what took place in Quito, over which, for the sake of humanity, we must draw a veil.

We shall therefore only add, that in Mexico the Government rewarded the authors of the faction who insulted the natives of the kingdom, and were the origin of the insurrections.

As to the pretexts assigned, in order to know whether they are really such, or whether there is some foundation for them, it is necessary to consider—1st, That they were the same in every place: 2dly, That they were original, i. e. that one province has not been the echo of another, but that each has assigned its own causes, without having any communication, or previous consultation, with the rest: 3dly, That these pretexts, if not true, are at least so plausible that it would be difficult to demonstrate their fallacy: And, 4thly, That they are conformable to the principles by which their conduct ought to be regulated, and for the neglect of which they might justly be condemned.

The supposition of French influence is unfounded, not because they have not endeavoured to obtain it, but because they have not been successful. Buonaparte has made use of several Spaniards as agents to conciliate the Americas, but these were unanimously deaf to his voice, and notwithstanding the flattering promises contained in his proclamations, they have burnt them by the hands of the common hangman, put to death the bearers, and uniformly expressed their detestation of the Government by which they were sent.

With regard to the English, it is evident that in the parts of America with which they hold no communication, as Mexico and Santa Fè, they cannot have exercised an influence prejudicial to Spain; and we believe that they have not done so even in the countries which they are in the habit of frequenting; for there have been no disturbances in the Havana; unless indeed, it be assumed that no predisposition in favour of Independence existed there as in other places, in which case they may have encouraged, without absolutely exciting, the inhabitants to revolt. The English ambassador, in his note to our Government, in which he offers the mediation of Great Britain to effect a reconciliation with the Insurgents of America, endeavours to clear his Government from the imputation, and states that the only object of the communications into which England has entered with Caracas and Buenos Ayres, is the wish to be able to mediate between the two parties more effectually.

All may be resolved into the desire of Independence, which is the *primum mobile*. This, again, may be divided into two classes; Independence of the European Spaniards, and Independence of the Government

of the Peninsula. We will suppose that the Creoles desire the last, as is affirmed in many of the papers of the day, and, I believe, by most people. Still the great and principal cause of their criminal intentions will be found in the state of oppression in which they have lived for so many years. This impelled them to take advantage of the first opportunity to shake off the yoke. Without it, they would have acknowledged the Government, although regarding it as illegitimate, in order to conform with the rest of the nation. Bad Government alone has been the cause of the dissatisfaction of the Americans.

In order to form a just idea of the effects produced, and the system pursued, let us consider the Creoles as men, as individuals, and as members of a political community. As men, they believed themselves degraded by the Government, which regards them with contempt as colonists; i. e. as an inferior class, or species of men, who have never enjoyed the rights due to all. The consequence of this is, that the Creoles have been loaded with abusive terms, sarcasms, and opprobrious epithets, by those who fancy themselves superior, only because they are natives of a different soil. As individuals who, for food and raiment, are in want of the fruits of the earth, they complain of restrictions which prevent them from turning the advantages of their soil to account, and manufacturing what they require. As members of society, they lament to see themselves bowed beneath the cruel yoke of despotic governors, who are often sent out to oppress them.

The disturbances and commotions which have now commenced will not cease until the motives for discontent are removed. It would be acting contrary to nature to endeavour to put a stop to effects, while the causes which necessarily produce them are still in existence.

The flame might be extinguished in one of the Provinces, but it would appear in another; and while the remedy is applied to one, it would return to the other. It would not be sufficient even to destroy all the inhabitants of America, and convey a new population there, because the sons of those who must necessarily be born there, (it being impossible to send all the women to be confined in Europe,) would love their native soil, and be equally indignant at the oppression to which they would find themselves subjected.

Why is not this to be remedied, when your Majesty can do it with such trifling sacrifices, as we have shown? Is it possible that the wish to continue to regard the Americas as colonies, although the name has been abolished, should prevail against the philanthropy, the liberality, and knowledge of the National Congress?

This would be to act in such a way that the blame must fall upon the nation, which, till now, has been imputed only to the Government.

Cadiz, 1st August, 1811.

(Signed)

VICENTE MERALEO,
&c. &c. &c.

C.

REPRESENTATION ADDRESSED TO THE CORTES BY THE AUDIENCIA OF MEXICO.—DATED 18TH NOVEMBER, 1813.

THIS *exposé*, which consists of 270 paragraphs, is one of the most valuable of the state papers which the assiduity of Don Carlos Bustamante has rescued from oblivion. It is too long, and contains too many details of merely local interest, to be read with pleasure, in toto, by persons unacquainted with Mexico.

I have, therefore, preferred making a selection of the passages which throw most light upon the feelings of the country, and the effect produced by the introduction of the Constitution, to attempting a translation, which would have been too long to be inserted in the body of my work, and would hardly have been thought worthy of attention in the Appendix.

The Audiencia assigns as a reason for its interference :

Paragraph 3.—That the laws which recommended to the especial care of the Courts of Audience the preservation of their respective districts, have not been abolished by the Constitution ; and that it is consequently the duty of the Tribunal to point out the effects with which the late change of institutions has been attended.—It then proceeds:—

8.—In these moments of calamity, the great Charter of the Spanish people, dear and respectable as it is to all its individuals, is not, and cannot be, carried into effect in New Spain.

9.—The article which concedes the liberty of the press, was only acted upon during two months, nor can it be so at present, without endangering the safety of the state.

2.—The laws respecting elections of Ayuntamientos,—deputies, and members of Provincial Deputations, have likewise not been observed.

3.—The regulations by which the security of the persons and goods of the citizens of towns is confided to the Alcaldes, and Municipal bodies, are also necessarily suspended.

10.—Such, Sire, have been in this country the consequences of the wisest Constitution of the world, and such it was to be foreseen that they would be.

11.—Your Majesty, in giving to Spain a Constitution, freed her from despotism and anarchy. Such was the object of the liberty of the press, —the elections, and other popular forms adopted in that Constitution ; and this object was attained in the Peninsula, because the general desires of the people were in unison with those principles of justice which the Constitution sanctioned. Here, the result was exactly the reverse, because patriotism and public virtues were wanting ; and because, if the will of the people, corrupted as it now is, prevails, the Independence of

the country will be established also, in favour of which the great majority of the natives is undoubtedly decided.

12.—This last assertion may, perhaps, require some proofs, but, unfortunately, it is but too easy to adduce them.

No rebellion can prosper without it be countenanced by public opinion;—on this account, the French made no progress in Spain; but here, without any other protection or assistance, the rebels have sustained themselves for three years against the heroic valour and fidelity of the troops of the country, against the forces which have been sent from Spain, and against the efforts of many loyal Americans, and of all the European residents.

13.—This fact alone proves that the general wish here is the same as that which has been manifested in various other parts of America. It is confirmed by the spontaneous breaking out of the Revolution in the different Provinces, without any sort of compulsion being necessary in order to induce them to declare against the government; (although force has been hitherto applied in vain, in order to oblige them to return to their obedience,) by the conspiracies and disturbances in the Capital; and by the result of the elections, in particular, which were celebrated by the rebels, (as well they might be,) since they themselves could not have selected persons more after their own hearts.

14.—The Audiencia does not deny that many Americans of all classes, besides the troops, have given proofs of exalted loyalty; and it admits that, in many instances, it was impossible for defenceless towns and villages to attempt any resistance against an armed banditti; but it is not the less true that the majority of the people, and almost all the towns, are in favour of the rebellion; and that whereas, in Spain, although some few traitors have sided with the French, not a single village has declared in their favour; here, on the contrary, although many individuals have embraced the just cause, Provinces, towns, and villages, have all shown a disinclination to support it.

18.—Your Majesty has heard that the rebellion by which this, and other countries of America, are devastated, “was caused by Napoleon,—by the Council of Castile,—by the Junta of Seville, which, by means of its commissioners, threw all Mexico into confusion,—by the arrest of the Viceroy Iturrigaray,—by the fear of falling under the dominion of the French, or by the desire to continue subject to Spain.” At other times, it has been said that the number of strangers admitted by Spain into her colonies has occasioned the loss of her sovereignty there; and that the improvement of the natives, has both taught them their rights, and made them impatient to recover them,—Others again have urged,—“the natural propensity of the Creoles to idle change;—their desire to obtain their share of honours, public employments, and full liberty,—their wish, in every thing, to vie with the Europeans,—the terrible inequality of their present lot,—the small proportion of American representatives,—the in-

justice with which the inhabitants have been treated, and their determination to put an end to a system of oppression, which began with the Conquest."

19.—The result will have convinced your Majesty of the fallacy of these assertions, each of which was usually accompanied by the recommendation of some particular measure, which was to serve as a remedy for the evil. The remedy has been tried,—one concession after another has been made; but the evil remains, and will remain, exactly *in statu quo*.

20.—Some other cause must, therefore, be assigned for the calamities which afflict New Spain, and it is as easy to point it out, as it is to affirm that it is the only one:—a King who, although himself a sage, thought that he might disregard the practice of every other nation, abandoned this province to its fate, by withdrawing the Colonial (Presidial) garrison. From that moment it might have been foreseen that it would aspire to Independence as soon as it felt its own strength.—Such has been always the desire of colonies situated at a distance from the centre of government:—they have invariably preferred their own advantage, to the laws of justice.

(It is unnecessary to follow the *exposé* through the following paragraphs, in which the Audiencia attempts to prove that a colony can never cancel its debt of gratitude to the Mother-country, and that in Mexico those with whom the first idea of Independence originated, were mere adventurers, who embarked in the cause as the only mode of retrieving their ruined fortunes.)

24.—The invasion of the Peninsula, the abdication of the Sovereign, and the occupation of Madrid by foreign troops, offered some prospect of an approaching Independence, which could not but be flattering to a Viceroy, who had but little else to hope.

25.—It is impossible not to shed tears on reflecting that the exalted patriotism displayed throughout New Spain upon that occasion, should have been so soon diverted into a different channel. The Spanish monarchy will never possess more loyal citizens than all its inhabitants then were;—they loved, they adored their King,—and the vehement effusion of their sentiments was the best proof of their sincerity.

26.—But fate decreed that, at that moment, a few restless spirits; ("hombres discolos, o' preocupados,") should dream of Independence, (the very name and idea of which had been, till then, happily unknown to their countrymen,) and that their projects should be countenanced by a body, respectable in itself, amongst whose members many connived at proposals which could have no other object. The worst, too, was, that these schemes were, to a certain point, favoured by measures on the part of the Government, which, if they had not been cut short, would have been of themselves sufficient to revolutionise the country.

27.—Thus, the extraordinary pretensions of the Ayuntamiento of

Mexico, with regard to the new appointment of Government officers, and the oaths to be taken by them, as well as the creation of Provisional Juntas in the capital, and in other parts of the kingdom,—pretensions favoured by the tortuous and inconsistent policy of the Viceroy,—had a direct tendency towards the establishment of the Independence.

28.—If your Majesty calls to mind the events which took place in this city between the 29th of July and the 15th of September of 1808, it will be evident how much was done, in so short a time, in order to separate it from the Mother-country. This tribunal had the honour of informing the Regency, at the time, of the reasons which induced it to oppose, at all hazards, the dangerous Juntas which were celebrated here on the 9th and 31st of August,—1st and 9th of September.

31.—It was in these days that a pamphlet was published by Fray Melchor de Talamantes (of Lima)—entitled “The National Congress of the Kingdom of New Spain,”—dedicated to the Ayuntamiento of Mexico, in which the Viceroy was solicited to assemble the Mexican Cortes, in spite of the opposition of the Audiencia, which might be neutralized by the opinion of the Ayuntamiento, and of twelve respectable lawyers.

33.—The project is avowed in the Insurgent paper, entitled, *El Ilustrador Nacional*, published in Sultepec, the 18th of April, 1812, in which, referring to the origin of the Civil War, it is said, “What could America do in order to check the progress of these evils, including the chance of seeing, by some intrigue or caprice of the Spanish Mandarins, this beautiful portion of the monarchy, subjected to the dominion of France?”—“To declare its Independence was its only resource, and to create a National Congress, wise, just, disinterested, and calculated to inspire the people with confidence in its measures:—this project was submitted to the Viceroy, Don José Iturrigaray, on conditions as reasonable, as they were advantageous to the Peninsula; but it was discovered by some evil-intentioned Gachupines,* who, in violation of all laws and justice, forestalled the measure, by seizing the person of the Viceroy, and imprisoning all those who had been privy to his plans.”

34.—It was on this account that Don Carlos Bustamante, editor of the *Juguettillo*, who, after publishing this seditious paper in the capital, while the liberty of the press was established, has now joined the Insurgents,—calls the night of the 15th of September,—“*Noche infausta*,” “an unpropitious night!” and such it was to men like him, whose schemes of Independence it deranged.

35.—But these projects were soon revived under the government of a Viceroy, whose authority, although afterwards confirmed, was, at first

* *Malos, necios, y atolondrados, Gachupines.* Evil-intentioned, ignorant, and perverse Gachupines.

thought dubious:* advantage was taken of the inexperience of the Archbishop to induce him to prepare a vast force to resist Napoleon, as if it were possible for the armies of the tyrant to reach our coast, while Spain was in alliance with England. He was taught, too, to dread a design, on the part of the Europeans, to remove him, as they had done his predecessor; and to carry his suspicions so far that he planted canons before the palace to defend himself against those who never dreamt of attacking him. Nor was this all: under the plea of taking precautions against the emissaries of France, the Viceroy's confidential advisers designated, under this odious name, all their own rivals, or opponents, marking out in particular a number of European Spaniards; and this conduct prepared the Indians, and mixed Castes, who had hitherto remained indifferent, to take an interest in the controversy, and to believe, one day, that the Gachupines were resolved to betray the kingdom to Napoleon. Thus was destroyed that moral force, which, since the discovery of these countries, had maintained their tranquillity; and with it was lost that, which it was most our interest to preserve. Information was received, both of the conspiracy of Valladolid, and of the machinations of Hidalgo himself, but no attention was paid to it; and people were thus taught, that, in Mexico, they might attempt every thing with impunity, since, whether they failed, or were successful, they were sure of pardon.

36.—The Audiencia succeeded to the Viceroyalty *ad interim*, and did, what in it lay, to remedy the evil; but its roots had already struck too deep: it was too late.

37.—Under these circumstances, the Viceroy appointed in 1810, arrived, and so opportunely that, but for him, all must have been lost. Hidalgo had already raised the standard of rebellion. This man, without honour or religious principle, had nevertheless sufficient knowledge of mankind to calculate not only upon the assistance of the troops whom he had seduced, but (as he himself said a little before,) upon the powerful aid of the ambition, the vices, and the ignorance of his countrymen. His war-cry was the proscription of the Europeans, who had been lulled into security by habitual confidence, and still more by the testimony of their own consciences: he was joined instantly by a host of curates, friars, and lawyers, all men of desperate fortunes, and all determined to seek in the public ruin the impunity of their own crimes. The great mass, too, of Indians, and mixed castes, which had taken no part till then in the affairs of the state, was roused at once into open rebellion against the Government; stimulated by the desire of indulging their vicious passions, concealed by the plea that the Europeans, against

* The Archbishop to whom the reins of Government were confided after the arrest of Iturrigaray.

whom their enmity was directed, were agents of Napoleon, as stated in Paragraph thirty-five. In consequence of this, Hidalgo had in a few days whole towns and provinces at his devotion, and advanced upon the Capital with an army infinitely more numerous than that by which it was defended.

38.—The prudence and firmness of the Viceroy saved the state. The rebels were repulsed at Las Cruces, and defeated at Aculco, by a General, whose consummate skill converted into invincible soldiers men, who, under any other direction but his, would have turned against their General and their country. The same General drove them from Guanaxuato, and destroyed at last Hidalgo's whole force at the Puente de Calderon, while their chief expiated his crimes by the death which he had so well deserved in the Northern Provinces.

39.—But still the rebellion continues, has continued, and will continue, with no other change than the mere chances of war; and even should the force of the Cura Morelos, which is now the only formidable one, be destroyed, yet the day is far distant when we can hope to see security and order restored.

40.—Many wonder at the ferocious spirit that characterized Hidalgo's rebellion, exemplified in the Alhondiga of Guanaxuato, and in the ravines of Valladolid, Guadalajara, Tehuacán, and Sultepec.

41.—But Hidalgo knew perfectly all the peculiarities of his situation, and turned them to account. Without the riches of the Europeans, he could not pay his own debts, much less undertake an expensive war: without these same riches as a bait, he could not gratify that thirst for plunder which possessed the immense legions by which he was followed. Besides, it was as difficult to establish independence while the Europeans remained in power, as it was to prevent these vile and cruel traitors from giving loose to their rage against those who had from the first opposed its establishment.

42.—The flame which Hidalgo lighted in the little town of Dolores spread through the country with the rapidity of atmospheric pestilence. The clergy were the first to declare in favour of a liberty, unjust, premature, and the forerunner of a thousand calamities: they profaned the pulpit and the confessional by making them vehicles for disseminating doctrines subversive of all true religion and all submission to the constituted authorities. They even put themselves at the head of the rebellion, fancying that their sacred character would shield them from punishment, as, from the mistaken piety of our monarchs, has been but too often the case.

44.—Such were the circumstances under which our new political institutions were announced here, towards the establishment of which this tribunal has contributed by every means in its power. The result has proved how vain were the hopes that this change of system would produce any beneficial effect. Morelos, at the very moment of the publica-

tion of the Constitution, in return for this benefit, sacked the town of Orizava: every European who has since fallen into the hands of the rebels has been put to death, even at the very gates of the capital; nor has there been one example of a single individual belonging to the rebel armies having recognized your Majesty's authority, or laid down his arms out of respect for the Constitution. Yet they affirm in the twentieth Number of the *Correo Americano del sur*, of the 8th of July, 1813, that the Constitution has been violated; that it is for this that they are in arms; and that upon its strict observance depends the peace of America.

45.—But the effrontery with which they change their ground, in order to excuse their conduct, is scandalous.

46.—Your Majesty may judge of what they think of the Constitution by what they say of its authors.

47.—In the *Correo*, Number twenty-one, they affirm, "that the Cortes of Cadiz are composed of men so impious and immoral, that the very natives of Geneva (*aun los Ginebrinos*) would be ashamed of owning them as associates. They have abolished a tribunal which will one day judge them, and they are preparing to give a death-blow to Religious Orders, and to the treasures of the Church, at the same time."

49.—In the *Correo*, Number twenty-four, of the 5th of August, they return to the charge, and say, that "the Government of Cadiz, is a barbarous, factious, and impious Government, more the enemy of Ferdinand than the French themselves."

51.—Your Majesty must not think that these Proteuses think more highly of the Constitution than those by whom it was framed; they wish, indeed, as well they may, that it should be established in those towns which they do not occupy, because of the assistance which it affords them in their projects; but far from adopting or desiring it for themselves, one of their principal chiefs, José Osorno, stated in a proclamation of the 26th of last December, "that he and all his followers would perish, or succeed in giving to Mexico a constitution which should ensure the happiness of her sons."

55.—The rebels have never desired a constitution from Spain, although it came down from heaven: as to Independence, they repeat the term because it was used by Hidalgo, whose disciples they are; but this only proves that some men, better informed than the rest, invoke it because it suits their views. They know the difficulty of establishing it, in despite of the most constant nation in the world: they know, too, that the heterogeneous classes of which the population of New Spain consists, could never form a regular government. Their own interest is their only motive, as was proved by Hidalgo, when he fled to the United States with six millions of dollars.

57.—Nor has the Constitution been productive of better effects in those provinces, which, being occupied by our troops, are unable to fol-

low their own vehement desires in favour of Independence. To them it is an *Ægis*, beneath which they not only conceal the perversity of their own wishes, but turn against their country the remedies that were intended to heal its wounds

72.—Thus, when notwithstanding the opinion expressed against the measure by the Bishops of Puebla, Valladolid, Guadalajara, Monterey, Merida, and Mexico, together with the Intendants of Mexico, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas, the liberty of the press was established; it left traces which more than justify the necessity of suspending it, in order to deprive the rebels of its support. In two months it completely perverted the public opinion, as it was foreseen that it must and would do.

74.—The military character of our chiefs was decried, and the Revolution indirectly defended by the use made of the name of Ferdinand, until the rebels threw off the mask, and declared in the letter addressed by the Revolutionary Junta to the *Cura Morelos*, "that Ferdinand was for them a suppositious being, whose name appeared to advantage in their projects, without any fear that he would ever claim the crown."

84.—The *Pensador*, equally bold and ignorant, ventured to assert "that the Viceroy had been here absolute sovereigns; that no civilized nation had ever been so ill governed as this; that despots and bad government were the real cause of the insurrection, and not the *Cura Hidalgo*; that the Spanish system had been a most pernicious one; that the door to preferment had been shut upon every native; and that an armistice ought to be concluded until the justice of their complaints could be inquired into."—Vide Nos. 5, 6.

(The Audiencia attempts to disprove the reality of these complaints by quoting the *Reales Cédulas* of the 12th March, 1697, the 21st February, 1725, and the 11th September, 1766; by which equality was conceded to the Creoles in all employments. It quotes likewise the order of the 23d August, 1796, respecting free trade; the encouragement given to silk manufactures, &c. and attributes to the natural indolence and imbecility of the natives the fact of their not having turned any of these beneficent provisions to account.)—Vide Paragraphs 84—122.

122.—Nor was the abuse of the liberty of the press confined to this. On the 25th of June, a decree had been published, directing military commandants to treat all ecclesiastics taken in arms, as they would the other Insurgents, without any regard to their sacred character.

123.—This decree was attacked by the clergy of Mexico, and by the author of the *Juguettillo* (No. 3.); and

129.—Public opinion was so completely corrupted by their artifices, that, in the mobs of the 29th and 30th of November, assembled under the plea of celebrating the election of the electors for the Constitutional *Ayuntamiento* of Mexico, there were *Vivas* in honour of the Creoles, of

the Insurgents, and of Morelos; intermingled with cries of "Death to the Government,—to the King,—to Ferdinand VII." There were Vivas, too, for the authors of the *Pensador* and *Juguettillo*, and for the "Defender of the Mexican clergy." (Dr. Don Julio Garcia de Torres.)

136.—It thus became evident that no laws, however excellent in themselves, are applicable under all circumstances: and that the liberty of the press, which was intended to disseminate that general information which might have remedied the calamities of the country, only increased them by increasing the general corruption. The political writings of the day produced upon the natives the same effect that spirituous liquors cause amongst savages; nor could any restrictions or modifications prevent a law, most beneficent in itself, from being converted into an engine of destruction, by the protection which it afforded to those, whose only aim it was to prepare for a general explosion by inflaming the blackest passions of the multitude.

137.—Such was the unanimous opinion of the sixteen members of this court.

142.—In conformity to it, the Viceroy suspended the liberty of the press:—a measure too unfavourable to the interests of the rebels, not to be received by them with loud disapprobation.

146.—The *Indulto*, granted almost by anticipation to traitors, has produced effects similar to the consequences of the liberty of the press.

147.—Even were the general opinion not what it is, men would find it their interest to write seditious papers,—knowing that they will be well received, and better paid,—and to join the Insurgents afterwards, knowing that the *Indulto* will secure to them the enjoyment of whatever they may plunder while amongst them.

152.—The *Consulado*, which comprehends the majority of European residents, demanded passports for all its members in the event of the liberty of the press being re-established.

154.—But if it be impossible to execute, at present, the article of the Constitution which relates to this point; it is still more so to carry into effect those respecting popular elections.—The experiment, nevertheless, was made. In a country where a hundred persons cannot meet without some disturbance, seven millions of men were called together, with all the air and outward pomp of absolute sovereignty, in virtue of a law which could never have been intended to apply to such extraordinary circumstances.

157-8.—In the elections for Mexico a thousand intrigues and informalities occurred, which ought to have invalidated the whole proceeding.

159.—The result, however, was, that not a single European, or an American distinguished by his patriotism,* was returned as elector.

* Patriotism is, of course, used by the Audiencia to express devotion to the cause of *Spain*; as *Patriotas* were Royalist volunteers.

On the contrary, men were chosen who were well known for their attachment to the Independent cause:—men who had opposed all loan or donative to the Mother-country; men who had voted for the Independent Juntas in 1808, or signed the representation of the clergy alluded to in Paragraph 41.

160.—The rebels had good reason to celebrate these elections, as they did, with salvos of artillery, and Te Deums, for they proved, (as they themselves said,) “That Mexico, and the whole kingdom, were in their favour, and that resistance would be no longer possible, since the power was in the hands of Creoles, who would force the Audiencia to be silent, or hang the Oidores and all the Gachupines together.”

171.—The Viceroy’s attempt to calm the agitation of the public by conciliatory measures proved utterly fruitless.

172.—The elections were just what was to be expected from the character of the electors. The two Alcaldes, the two Syndics, and sixteen Regidores, of whom the Ayuntamiento of Mexico was composed, were all men either justly suspected, or notoriously addicted to the Independent cause, and even in actual correspondence with Insurgent chiefs.

174.—The result of the Parochial elections for the ultimate election of Deputies to the Cortes, was equally unfortunate. Out of 591 electors, every one was taken from the class of the disaffected.

176.—The Junta, which was composed, at last, of twenty-eight electors, (nineteen of the forty-one Partidos having sent no representatives,) contained only five Europeans, who came here to be the laughing-stock of the people: and of fourteen Deputies, and four Suplentes,—the Europeans and American patriots only obtained the sterile honour of a seat as Suplente.

181.—Such is the example held out to the other cities of this country, by the most excellent, noble, loyal and imperial city of Mexico!

182.—Between it and the plan proposed in the name of the Insurgent Junta by one of its leaders, Dr. Cos, suggesting that the Europeans should resign the supreme authority, there is no other difference than that, what the rebels have merely established in theory, Mexico has put into practice. Nor can your Majesty entertain a doubt as to the persons to whom all Civil, Military, and Ecclesiastical employments would be confided, did it depend upon those, by whom the late elections have been made, to confer them.

183.—Not having been able as yet to attain that Independence for which they have so long sighed, (la suspirada Independencia,) they have shown the spirit by which they are animated, in excluding, by a species of Ostracism, from all elective charges, those patriotic citizens, who, if attention had been paid to the spirit of the Constitution, would have been more peculiarly called upon to fill them.

188.—The Constitution intended that the choice of the people in

the elections should be determined by the love of their country.* In lieu of this, a love of Independence and anarchy has prevailed ; and on this account the Ayuntamiento is composed of vile creatures, either positively committed in the rebellion, or at least, undistinguished by any pretensions to patriotism.

193.—It is with deep concern that the undersigned American members of the tribunal observe, that out of 652 appointments made by the people in Mexico in different elections, not one has fallen upon an European !

194.—In like manner the European Oidores declare, that not one of the many Americans of known virtues and patriotism, who are the honour of this capital, was thought worthy of one of these appointments.

198.—The establishment of the Provincial Juntas only serves to impede the measures, which, in the present state of things, Government must often take ; and, in common with all others, the election of the individuals who are to compose them, must be attended with the four following serious inconveniences :—First, the extreme difficulty of legally qualifying a real citizen.—Second, the more than probability that all Americans of real merit, and all Europeans, will be excluded.—Third, the well-founded fear that the choice of the people will fall upon men of suspicious character, or decided enemies to their country ; and Fourth, the extreme and unavoidable danger of general meetings of the inhabitants.

214.—The change in the administration of justice has not been less disadvantageous. Since the establishment of the Jueces de Letras, in lieu of the old Alcaldes de Corte, y de Barrio,—all the impeachments on suspicion of treason, or disaffection, which the committee of public security so often brought before the Viceroy, or the criminal court, have ceased.

215.—This would be a happy event, if there were no delinquents ; but, unfortunately, the activity of our magistrates has been paralyzed at the very moment when there are more traitors than ever. The sentinels in Mexico are fired at in the very centre of the town, nor can a soldier leave the gates without being lassoed.

232.—The sum of all that has been stated here is, that an error in policy, and the misfortunes of the Mother-country, first caused the idea of Independence to be conceived here : That this idea began to develop itself in 1808, in the claim preferred by the Ayuntamiento of Mexico, and countenanced by certain individuals,—to exercise sovereign authority ; That this claim was preferred, and could be preferred, with no other object as is confessed by the rebels in their official papers :—That the Europeans checked the progress of these machinations, by deposing

* I must again observe, that it is a body composed entirely of old Spaniards that writes, and consequently that the words "patriotism, and love of their country," mean love of the Peninsula, and not of Mexico.

the Viceroy, who protected them, from whence proceeded the infernal hatred conceived by the rebels against them,—a hatred, of which they have given evidence, by the murders, and other atrocities, committed in the very outset of the rebellion, and which admit of no other explanation. That the second great error, was the not sending out instantly a Viceroy of energy, activity, and experience; in lieu of which, a weak and unjust Government was allowed to exhaust the remains of that moral force, which had, till then, maintained the tranquillity of the country; and thus to afford room for the revival of the former projects:—That if the wisdom of the first Regency gave to Mexico a Viceroy of a very different character, it was no longer time to prevent an explosion, although it rendered its consequences less fatal:—That, as a necessary consequence, the rebels were forced to seek impunity for their crimes in a Revolution, the cause of which has constantly been the ambition of the few, and the immorality of the many:—That the Clergy have turned against the State that propensity to disorder, which has always characterised these natives, and have done so with impunity:—That a rebellion, founded upon such principles, and favoured by such powerful assistance, could not fail to make great progress, and must continue to do so, until recourse is had to the only measures capable of correcting it:—That generosity and mildness will rather increase than diminish the evil; because they will be attributed to fear, or to weakness, on which account permanent Indultos, and forgetfulness of offences, have rather fed than quenched the flame:—That the most liberal institutions are thrown away upon such men as these; and that, as a necessary consequence of the above, the sacred Constitution itself is so likewise, it not being possible to execute some of its articles, while others have been necessarily infringed.

234.—In the capital itself, the Viceroy has been forced to take precautions against revolt, and to fortify himself against the public spirit of the day, which has not only caused insurrections, but may repeat them, and consequently renders the presence of a considerable number of troops indispensable.

237-8.—By leaving crime unpunished, all moral force is lost, and society thrown into a state of disorganization: The general wish of the country forms, or openly protects the projects of the Independent party: The august assembly of the Cortes is not only not recognized by the rebels, but its most beneficent acts are turned into ridicule by the malevolent colouring which is given to them; while its views are defeated by others, who assist the schemes of the Insurgents, by an apparent submission to the decrees of the Congress, in as far as this can be reconciled with their common object. The old system is abolished; the new one not yet established; (en el aire): the Constitution sometimes an object of ridicule, sometimes used as an instrument,—all elective employments, the prey of factious, ambitious, and faithless men:—the government without consideration,

or even the necessary authority. Such is the state to which three years have reduced this lovely country, once the envy of the world.

239.—But what shall be the remedy for such transcendent evils? The rebels propose, as the only means of saving the country, those which will serve best to secure their triumph.

242.—The contempt with which all conciliatory measures have been received is the best proof of their inefficiency.

244.—The Audiencia will not omit to point out the only plan which it regards as likely to produce a radical cure.

245.—No doubt can be entertained as to the origin of the evil, which is, unquestionably, a spirit of Independence now generalized throughout New Spain: This is the real cause of the discord and jealousy which prevail, fomented by the constant opposition of the loyal and patriotic Spanish residents to these ideas of Independence: The struggle would be at an end if they were capable of compromising with their loyalty and devotion to the cause of the Mother-country.

246.—They must, therefore, be supported by powers, of which, however extraordinary, the history of ancient and modern nations, under critical circumstances, affords many examples.

249.—The wisdom of the august Congress must prepare the way for the happiness which it is desirous to bestow upon this people, by removing, with a strong arm, the obstacles which their perversity has, hitherto, opposed to its introduction.

251.—Besides supplying a physical force sufficient to replace the moral force which has been lost, under circumstances of such extreme difficulty and distress, it is indispensably necessary to suspend all measures likely to diminish the new impulse that must be given to the Government, and, amongst others, the principal, and most beneficent of all,—the Constitution itself.

253.—The disaffected here have converted this Constitution into a mere tool for their perfidious designs: We repeat, once more, that sentiments of public good have no sort of influence over these men;—that gratitude is unknown to them, and that the majority, without a single political idea, have lent themselves with pleasure, and even with fury, to any and every change that afforded them the prospect of indulging their natural propensity to plunder and vice. The direction of a machine, moved by such springs as these, can neither be doubted nor resisted:—Every thing must be sacrificed, therefore, or the application of the machine, for a time, given up.

254.—Yes, Sire;—Let those men, who, without faith or country, maintain in secret the same treasonable principles as the rebels themselves, declaim against the proposal; let them continue, under the mask of patriotism, to combat with arms only the more dangerous because they are more polished, that authority which the rebels openly defy; let them protest an attachment which they do not feel to the new institutions,

and invoke the Constitution in order the better to destroy it, and their country together; let them endeavour, in fine, to ruin this tribunal, by undermining the credit of its members; still the Audiencia, firm alike in its loyalty and its principles, must state, with all respect to your Majesty, that, it being impossible to carry the Constitution into effect, in the midst of a permanent conspiracy, which is sapping the very foundations of the State, it appears to them absolutely necessary to suspend it as long as such a state of revolution and disorder continues.

255.—The sacrifice will be momentary: the return, the salvation of the present, and the felicity of future generations.

262.—The contest which the Viceroy is forced to sustain, compels him to exercise absolute authority in many parts of the kingdom. To invest him with powers to do so legally *in all*, would at once enable him to act with proper decision, as circumstances might require, and put an end to all uncertainty and murmurs. This, and a recommendation to carry into execution, as soon as possible, the Constitution,—but simultaneously, and in all its parts,—would put an end to a political chaos, the confusion of which is infinitely worse than the want of any rule at all.

263.—In this case the just and prudent observance of the law; which authorizes the Viceroy “to banish from the dominions of Ultramar those whose residence there might be injurious either to the service of God, or to the public peace and tranquillity,”—would save those rivers of Spanish blood, which are now flowing throughout New Spain.

269.—There is certainly no other mode of preserving the State from its approaching ruin. Unfortunate indeed will be the country, and this tribunal, should it have failed, in the opinion of the Cortes, in establishing the necessity of the measures proposed upon solid grounds. The unavoidable abuse of a Constitution, perfect in itself, will hasten the progress of this country towards Independence, which is not only the object, but the decided will of the majority of the inhabitants; and it will be in vain to oppose to this furious torrent the wishes of the real patriots, since we have to deal with men who will only submit to positive physical superiority: in the mean time, one excess leads, by a necessary consequence, to others, and confusion is now nearly at its height.

270.—Such, Sire, is a true picture of the state of affairs in New Spain: the decision of your Majesty will determine whether it is, or is not, any longer to exist as a country.

(Signed)

Mexico, 18th Nov. 1813.

Thomas Gonzalez Calderon, José Mexia, Miguel Bataller, Manuel del Campo y Rivas, Juan Antonio de la Riva, Miguel Modet, Pedro de

la Puente, Miguel Bachiller, Felipe Martinez, Manuel Martinez Mansilla, Ambrosio Lagarzurrieta.

NOTE OF EDITOR.—(DON CARLOS BUSTAMANTE.)

The Audiencia lost by the establishment of the Spanish Constitution, which was sworn in Mexico, the 30th October, 1812, the most lucrative part of its former privileges: The Commissions, Conservadurias de Mayorazgos, the Judgment of Natives, the Assessorships of the Mines and Post-office, the Management of the Marquisate of the Valle de Oaxaca, the Auditorships of War, &c. its direct influence over the Viceroy by means of the Acuerdo, and its right of deciding in cases of appeal upon government measures. Hence its detestation of a system which it attacked under the pretence of zeal for the public welfare.

Hence, too, its hostility to Iturrigaray, whom it deposed, ignominiously, and whose condemnation to a fine of 284,241 dollars, under a sentence of Residencia, it ultimately effected.

NOTE OF ENGLISH EDITOR.

Bustamante is undoubtedly right in his opinion of the motives by which the Audiencia was actuated; but, at the same time, it must be confessed that this Tribunal appears to have had a very clear perception of the real state of Mexico. Its arguments with regard to the inapplicability of the Constitution to a country in a state of revolution, are unanswerable: it conceded too much, or too little: Spain had no choice but to retain her power, if she could, by the means which had enabled her, during three centuries, to support it, and to modify abuses, the existence of which she could not deny, when submission was restored; or to resign her authority at once into the hands of those, who would no longer acknowledge it, and to endeavour to make the best bargain she could for the cession of rights, which she could hardly hope to retain. The error lies in having thought that the first of these alternatives could be adopted with any prospect of success; and this error is the more inexcusable on the part of the Audiencia, from the conviction which it expresses, and appears to feel throughout the present Representation, that the sense of the majority of the nation was decidedly in favour of Independence. To conceive that, when once this idea had taken root, it could ever be eradicated,—to hope that in a country where it had spread in an instant from the highest to the lowest classes, “like atmospheric plague,” and where its growth was fostered not only by every principle of reason and justice, but by feelings of personal interest and private animosity, the spirit could be stifled or crushed, was the height of folly; and dearly has Spain expiated it by the loss of those advantages, which, until within the last year, it was still in her power to secure.

D.

CONFIDENTIAL LETTER OF THE VICEROY CALLEJA, ADDRESSED TO THE MINISTER OF WAR, BUT CONTAINING A PRIVATE REPORT UPON THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, FOR THE INFORMATION OF HIS MAJESTY FERDINAND VII.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

By a private letter from Jalapa, I have received a manuscript copy of the Decree of our most beloved and desired Sovereign, dated Valencia, May 4th, 1814, by which his Majesty declares to be null the Constitution promulgated by the General and Extraordinary Cortes, and reassumes the exercise of that Sovereign power, of which the Congress had de spoiled him.

My loyalty as a vassal,—my attachment to the King as a grateful subject,—and my conviction as a good Spaniard,—filled my heart, upon this occasion, with the purest satisfaction; and I instantly ordered the inclosed proclamation to be published, by which I announced to the kingdom at large the happy tidings, and swore, as first Chief of these dominions, in the name of the Sovereign of Spain, Don Ferdinand VII. my ready and sincere obedience to his Royal will.

(Precautions taken against the introduction of any Agents, or Decrees of the Cortes, &c.)

I regard it as a duty to lay before his Majesty a rapid sketch of the state of these countries, and of my own conduct since I assumed the reins of Government on the 4th March, 1813; and I entreat your Excellency to allow me to do this through your Excellency, in order that his Majesty may be enabled to take at once those measures which are necessary for the salvation of his Majesty's dominions here, in which rebellion has increased fearfully, in consequence of the road opened by the Constitution for the execution of its criminal projects.

This Constitution was sworn, and in part established, when I took the command of the country:—nothing could be more discouraging than the aspect of affairs; for the rebels, flushed with the advantages which they had already obtained, threatened the Capital, and were actually in possession of Oaxaca,—Acapulco,—a great part of the Western coast,—the capital of Texas, through which they drew supplies from the North Americans,—in short, of the largest portion of New Spain, as well as of innumerable towns, Haciendas, Mines, and roads.

Under such circumstances my situation was most critical. Compelled to make head against the attacks of an enemy disseminated over eight hundred leagues of country, and protected by the great majority of its inhabitants, with a very small military force at my disposal, and without hopes of succour from the Peninsula; surrounded by concealed enemies,

who, under the shelter of the new Institutions, aided, directed, and encouraged the rebels, from this, and all the other principal towns in the kingdom, without my being able to counteract them, on account of the Constitution, and the decrees of the Cortes, by which my hands were tied;—deprived, too, of the support and assistance, which I might have derived from the principal Corporations, all of which had been filled by the popular elections with men interested in the ruin of the Spanish Government in this Hemisphere,—I suffered the most cruel mental anguish, and despaired, at times, of being able to preserve for our beloved Sovereign this precious part of the possessions of the crown.

In vain I represented to the Regency, by every possible opportunity, that Mexico would be irrecoverably lost, unless a different system were adopted, and the Constitution suspended; my complaints were neither attended to, nor answered, and I was only charged publicly to adhere strictly to the new principles, which every day deprived me of the few means that I had left for curbing the Insurrection.

Happily, my military operations were so fortunate, that I succeeded in destroying the rebel Cúrate Morelos, whose success at one time seemed to menace the ruin of Spanish dominion here. I recovered Oaxaca, with the port and fortress of Acapulco, and succeeded in driving out of Texas the rebels, with their Anglo-American Allies; a number of the Insurgent chiefs were taken; some of their principal bands dispersed, whose vicinity to the Capital threatened us with a scarcity, by impeding the introduction of supplies; and the roads so far cleared, that but small escorts were required in order to keep up the communications with the Interior. If that with Vera Cruz be not yet established, it is principally the fault of the Governor of that district, who, notwithstanding my being responsible for the measures of the Government, has more than once alleged direct orders from the Regency as an excuse for disregarding mine, and thus deprived our operations of all unity of plan. This want of subordination in the local authorities has tended greatly to increase the general disorder, and to render fruitless, for want of co-operation, the prodigious efforts of the troops.

This, and other causes which I shall have the honour of pointing out to your Excellency as I proceed, have counterbalanced the decisive advantages which we have obtained in the field; and I am compelled to confess that, notwithstanding our victories, but little has been done against the spirit of the rebellion, the focus of which is in the great towns, and more particularly in this capital. On one side, the elections,—the fanatical elections,—destroyed, in a moment, the fruits of the labour, the efforts, the combinations of months;—and, on the other, the want of power to chastise those, who constantly corresponded with the rebels, and informed them of all the military preparations of the Government, prevented the execution of our plans. For your Excellency must take as the corner-stone of my whole argument the fact, that the great

majority of the natives of this country is most decidedly in favour of the Insurrection, and of Independence; without their frequent invocation of the respectable name of our Sovereign, being any thing more than a veil, with which they endeavour to conceal their criminal projects, as your Excellency may perceive by thousands of papers which have been taken from the Insurgents, some of the most essential of which I will forward by the first opportunity.

This fact being once admitted, nothing could be more favourable to the ideas of the disaffected than the Constitution, since, besides securing the impunity of the traitors, either by paralyzing the Viceroy, and preventing him from acting with energy and decision, or by taking advantage of the new judicial system, which affords but too many openings for criminals to elude the arm of the law, the elections have afforded them the means of throwing the whole power into the hands of the factious, and of reducing the Executive to the circle of its immediate dependents, by depriving it of the confidence which it might have reposed in certain corporations, and compelling it rather to defend itself against their attacks, than to look to them for support. Such is the reason of the attachment which the Americans have displayed towards the new institutions: they have discovered that, under their safeguard, they advanced rapidly, and without any sort of risk, towards the great object of their wishes, the Independence of the country, and the proscription of the Europeans, whom they detest.

Experience has convinced me of this truth. The Municipalities, the Provincial Deputations, and the Cortes themselves, in as far as the Provinces of Ultramar are concerned, are composed of nothing but Insurgents; and some of so decided and criminal a character, that, notwithstanding the restrictions imposed upon me by the decrees of the Cortes, I have been compelled to arrest them, even at the risk of exciting a popular disturbance, fomented by those in whose hands the power is now deposited. At this very moment, two of the most noted Insurgents are on their way to the Peninsula as Deputies to the Cortes, now happily abolished,—Don José Maria Alcalá, and the Licenciado Don Manuel Cortasar. I cannot describe the bitterness of spirit with which I have seen two such pernicious individuals set out to prescribe laws to our noble Spaniards, and to exercise in the capital their share of an authority, which they will only use in order to prepare, and accelerate the ruin of America. At any other time, the data now in my possession would have authorized me to secure the persons of these men, and to proceed afterwards to adduce the proofs of their guilt: but as this was a necessary preliminary under the new system, I have been compelled to allow of the departure of criminals, who, under our old, and more judicious, order of things, would, certainly, not have thus triumphed over justice and the law.

Every measure which the Cortes have taken with regard to these

countries, seems to have had no other object than to precipitate their ruin ; and as the Insurgents here are in continual and close communication with their Deputies in the Peninsula, they receive information of every decree relative to America, and claim its immediate observance, in terms which have not even left me the option of suspending the execution of those which I regarded as most prejudicial.

In this singular, and most embarrassing situation, I had no means of saving my honour but by giving in my resignation, which I have frequently tendered : nor can I account for its not having been accepted, since I was not only known to be disaffected to the principles of the Constitution, but, in spite of express and repeated orders actually suspended, and refused to execute some of its provisions, which I saw must produce a positive dissolution of all government in this country.

Such was my conduct with regard to the liberty of the press, the appointment of the *Jueces de Letras*, the maintenance of a body destined to watch over the public security in the interior of the capital ; and the declaration, that the authority of the Viceroy was superior to that of the Political Chiefs, and the Deputations of the several Provinces.

In the course of the two months, during which the liberty of the press was established under my immediate predecessor, it caused so general an irritation in the public mind, and produced such an extraordinary number of seditious, incendiary, and insulting papers, that an insurrection was on the point of breaking out in this Capital ; the violence of the mob being first displayed on the celebration of the election of the new Municipality, which was, in fact, the first triumph of the rebels. On this occasion, the populace was infuriated by treasonable addresses, and led on by the example of a number of disaffected, who mingled with the crowd. The streets were filled with bands of men, who, at nightfall, carried lighted torches. There were Vivas in favour of Morelos, Independence, and the new Electors, all Americans, all men whose fidelity was suspected, and many of them positive rebels ! Death was denounced against the Europeans, and their Government. The doors of the cathedral were forced, and the mob had even the insolence to present itself before the palace, and to demand the artillery. The liberty of the press was suppressed in consequence of this event ; and I refused to re-establish it, notwithstanding a second order from the Regency, directing me to carry the Constitutional law into effect, in spite of what had taken place.

The appointment of *Jueces de Letras* was likewise carried into effect against the express stipulations of a law, which reserved this faculty to the Regency. Had I not done this, the administration of justice, in a town of 150,000 inhabitants, would have been entrusted to two Constitutional Alcaldes, Civilians, and notoriously addicted to the Independent party.—By a necessary consequence, crimes would have remained unpunished, and the good exposed to the risk of falling victims to a conspiracy ; and although the measure was disapproved of by the *Ayunta-*

miento, which made representations against it both here and at the Court, I have supported it with firmness, and explained to the Regency the absolute necessity of its adoption.

In order to maintain tranquillity in this populous capital, and to prevent, more particularly, the secret communications which were kept up with the Insurgents, by watching over the conventicles and private meetings of concealed traitors, a tribunal of police was established, which, under the superintendence of one of the members of the Audiencia, took cognizance of all cases of this description. On the receipt of the new law for the regulation of tribunals, this establishment was done away with, and the disaffected were on the point of seeing themselves at liberty to pursue their schemes without let or hindrance, the whole police of the town being confided to the two Constitutional Alcaldes. In this dilemma, the impossibility of leaving such a field open to the machinations of the disaffected, induced me to conciliate obedience to the law, with a proper regard for the public security, by allowing the old *employés* in the police to retain their situations, under the orders of a person of distinction and confidence, who performed some of the duties of the situation as a commissioner, without any judicial authority. His duties were to give passports to those who wished to leave the Capital,—to examine those who entered it,—to watch over clandestine Juntas, or meetings, and to arrest all suspicious persons, delivering them over to the competent judge within forty-eight hours after their detention, as provided by the law.—The Ayuntamiento could not brook a measure that threatened to derange those agreeable prospects, which the exclusive direction of the police opened to its bad faith;—and it took advantage of the letter of the Constitutional law, to protest, in a very high tone, against the new regulation,—not from any real zeal in support of the law, but because, by retaining in its own hands the police, and the investigation of crimes, in which not a few of its own members were implicated, it would have been easy for them to continue, without fear of interruption, their perfidious intrigues, and to prevent their friends and colleagues from being detected in similar crimes.—This measure I likewise sustained with equal firmness, and I represented to the Regency the impossibility of providing for the security and preservation of the country, while every day some new legal disqualification was added to those, which had already compelled me to abandon so many of those interesting and delicate points, for which I was nevertheless held responsible.

But the most serious and important point of all, was the establishment of the political superiority of the Viceroy throughout the kingdom, and the immediate dependence of the Provincial Deputations upon him. The most complete division and anarchy menaced these dominions, had I not fixed a central point in their common Chief; for without regarding the decrees of the Cortes respecting the powers of the Viceroy, every Political Chief believed himself endowed with independent powers in his

province, and every Provincial Deputation, absolute in its own district, and without any obligation to contribute, by order of the Viceroy, towards the common support of the army. It was impossible in this way to attempt any farther resistance, or to prevent the provinces from falling into the hands of the Insurgents in detail.

The discussion began to grow warm, and it was insinuated that the Viceroy was nothing more than a mere Captain-General of a province, not entitled, as such, to dispose, in any way, of the revenues of the State, which belonged exclusively to the Real Hacienda (Royal Treasury); and this error, originating in our new laws, and fomented by the factious, to whom nothing could have been more advantageous than such a division of power, was about to precipitate us into an abyss of misfortunes. I had foreseen these evils, and the point to which the Provincial Juntas would carry their pretensions; but the scandalous occurrences which took place in Yucatan, where the Provincial Deputation, after disembarassing itself of the authority of the Captain-General, decreed, and actually carried into effect, a project of free trade, by throwing open the ports to Foreigners, without taking into account its dependence, in financial matters, upon this Viceroyalty,—confirmed my suspicions, and made me accelerate the declaration of the paramount authority of the Viceroy throughout the kingdom, and of the submission due to him by all the Deputations, supported by the opinion of a number of ministers, and lawyers, as will appear by the inclosed copy of the decree.

(Refusal of the Junta of Monterey, capital of New Leon, to acknowledge Don Joaquin Arredondo, as Military Commandant, and Gefé Politico, of the Internal Provinces, or to furnish him with necessary supplies.)

Such is the vacillating and depressed state to which I have seen myself reduced here:—without power, without authority, without representation, or dignity,—deprived of that assistance which the Audiencia has always afforded by its *Dictámenes*, and *Acuerdos*, to my predecessors;—subjected, in some measure, to the legal opinions of a Fiscal, and Auditor, and consequently unable to consult any one but them on the most critical occasions;—without a sufficient number of troops to extinguish the rebellion at once;—without money, or reliance upon the public corporations;—struggling, at the same time, with the armed bands of rebels, and the machinations of secret traitors; trying to restrain the insolent disobedience of the one, and the hardened fanaticism of the others; in the midst of a confusion of ideas with regard to the government, with which the good and the bad were equally infected;—resisting the fury of that political mania, the contagion of which seemed to have spread to all classes, drawing alike the merchant, the artisan, the clergyman, and the husbandman, out of their proper spheres, and making them politicians, or rather political dreamers, (*febricitantes*;)—trying, in every way, to conciliate the reciprocal hatred of the Europeans and

the Americans; and witnessing, every hour, the danger with which the country was threatened by the effects of an ill-timed liberty, and a monstrous rebellion;—I leave it to your Excellency to imagine what must have been the anguish which I have often endured.

Happily I now see some end to the evils which have afflicted us: all will cease as soon as His Majesty deigns to turn his eyes to this much wounded portion of his kingdom. My unshaken loyalty has long sighed for the day, which has at length arrived, and henceforward no one shall venture with impunity to refuse obedience, while I am at the head of this Government, to the orders of the Sovereign of Spain, Ferdinand the desired!

But the disaffected are all in favour of the Constitution; not that they ever really and sincerely intend to adopt it, or to submit to the Mother-country on any terms, but because it affords them the means of attaining what they desire without risk, and with more facility than they could expect.

On this account they will doubtless be active on the present occasion, in fomenting discord, and encouraging rebellion, under the mask of liberty and patriotism, or of hatred to despotism and tyranny; words, of which a use has been made, of late, too dangerous to be tolerated any longer.

Some even of the Europeans have wrong views upon this subject, and will not see the danger to which they expose themselves by lending their countenance to ideas which can only lead from disaffection to rebellion; and it is the more necessary on this account to ascertain the depth to which the roots of the new system have struck, and to take advantage of this critical moment, in order to fix for ever the authority of His Majesty in this country, by changing the alimentary system altogether, and employing tonics, and actual cautery, to exterminate the cancer, by which the patient is consumed.

The insurrection is so deeply impressed and rooted in the heart of every American, that nothing but the most energetic measures, supported by an imposing force, can ever eradicate it; for it is to be observed, that even if the arms of the rebels prove unsuccessful, and their plots fruitless, still misery, and a growing consumption, will do that, which neither force nor intrigue may be able to effect.

It is to be hoped that with the troops which I command, the Insurgents will be beaten, as they have been till now, in whatever number they may present themselves; but it is no less certain, that this is not sufficient to put an end to the rebellion, but rather tends to prolong its fatal effects.—It acts against us in two ways, by open force, and by increasing distress: the first will be always repelled, the second will reduce us gradually to death's door.

The military force now at my disposal is but just sufficient to garrison the capitals of the Provinces, and to cover the large towns: but, in the

mean time, an infinity of smaller towns are left, unavoidably, at the mercy of the banditti: the roads are ours only as long as a division is passing over them; and the Insurgents, who are infinitely superior to us in number, are masters of the largest proportion of the cultivated lands: the consequence is that trade is at an end; agriculture languishes; the mines are abandoned; all our resources exhausted; the troops wearied out; the loyal discouraged; the rich in dismay; in short, misery increases daily, and the State is in danger.

As the armed bands of the rebels are constantly in motion, without any fixed place of residence, and are principally composed of men belonging to the Haciendas, the trapiches, and the mines, used to live in the open air, and on horseback, and accustomed to the transition from vicious indulgence to frugality and want, they require no regular administration. Without plan or calculation they wander over the country, eating and drinking where they can, and robbing, plundering, and devastating all that falls in their way: now uniting in large masses, now dividing into insignificant parties, but always doing us incalculable mischief. It is the facility which this mode of life affords them for satisfying the wants of the moment, and consulting either the caprice of the hour, or the desire of vengeance, that endears to them this predatory existence: blood flows unceasingly: the war is perpetuated, and the fruit is never to be attained.

The continuation of such a contest is the worst evil that we can experience, and the effects of the ruin which it entails upon us will hardly be less felt in the Peninsula than here. The war, besides the fatal consequences with which it must always be attended, detains in this country the few Europeans who have any thing still to lose, and prevents them either from assisting the Government, or even subsisting, with comfort, themselves: the war dries up the very sources of our prosperity: it renders contributions a mere name, by destroying those branches of industry upon which they ought to be levied: it diminishes our population, and converts what still remains of it into robbers and assassins: the war teaches the Insurgents, to our cost, the art of making it with success, and gives them but too good a knowledge of their advantages in point of number and resources.

The war strengthens and propagates the desire of Independence, holding out a constant hope of our destruction, a longing desire for which (I must again assure your Excellency) is general amongst all classes, and has penetrated into every corner of the kingdom.

The war affords the Insurgents an opportunity of knowing Foreign Powers, with whom they form connexions, and from whom they receive aid: the war, in fine, destroys, in detail, our little army, either by the fruitless fatigues of a campaign under the present system, or by exposing it to the influence of seduction, to which the apparent remoteness of our success gives but too much room, and the effects of which are felt even

amongst the European soldiers, without its being possible for the Government either to replace them, or the arms which they generally carry off.

The usual means of recruiting are useless amongst a people who detest the armies of the King; conscription is of no avail, on account of the want of order in the villages, and the opposition of the Ayuntamientos. Forced levies, which are sometimes attempted, only serve to swell the number of our regiments for the moment, and afterwards to strengthen the ranks of the enemy, while our small stock of military stores is exhausted by the arms and uniforms, which our deserters are enabled, by the general assistance that they meet with, to carry over to the rebels:—For, as six millions of inhabitants, decided in the cause of Independence, have no need of previous consultation or agreement, each one acts, according to his means and opportunities, in favour of the project common to all:—The Judge, and his dependents, by concealing or conniving at crimes:—the Clergy, by advocating the justice of the cause in the confessional, and even in the pulpit itself:—the writers, by corrupting public opinion:—the women, by employing their attractions to seduce the royal troops, and even prostituting themselves to them in order to induce them to go over to the insurgents:—the Government officer, by revealing, and thus paralyzing the plans of his superiors:—the youth, by taking arms:—the old man, by giving intelligence, and forwarding correspondence:—the public Corporations, by giving an example of eternal differences with the Europeans, not one of whom they will admit as a colleague,—by refusing any sort of assistance to the Government,—and by representing its conduct, and that of its faithful agents, in the most odious light, in protests, for which malice always finds a specious pretext; while the edifice of the State is thus sapped by all, under the shelter of the liberal institutions of the day!

An association has subsisted in this Capital for more than three years, under the name of “the Guadalupe,” which corresponds with every part of the kingdom, and is composed of a number of men whose situation necessarily gives them a participation in the affairs of the Government. And yet it is by these men that the operations of the rebels have been directed, and that they have been encouraged and supported in their reverses.

From this club they received every species of information that could conduce either to their security, or to the success of their plans,—a diary of all that passed in the Capital,—statements of forces,—of money and stores, issued by the Government,—accounts of its resources, wants, and necessities, and intelligence of every measure taken by the Viceroy, in order to meet the exigencies of the moment. Proofs of this treasonable correspondence have been acquired during the late severe checks which the Insurgents have received, and many of the principal criminals of this faction have been discovered: I should have already purged the

country of the most dangerous of these traitors,—and, by so doing, deranged the schemes of the disaffected,—intimidated secret enemies, and strengthened the hands of the Government, if I had been able to act with freedom or energy. But the necessity of conforming to the laws which the Constitution had established, in order not too openly to set at defiance the will of the Mother-country, communicated always in the august name of the King our Master, compelled me to trust to the slow, and, under present circumstances, insidious course of a judicial inquiry, confided often to judges but little less criminal than the accused themselves, without deriving from the measure any other fruit than a confirmation of my suspicions, that the Government was undermined, without any possibility of avoiding the explosion.

In such a situation as this, no resource remains but to re-animate the authority of the Government, and to make a last effort to conclude the war, by crushing the rebellion at once. The re-establishment of the old laws will no longer suffice: There was a time when they were sufficient to keep up the ancient illusions of these people with regard to their chiefs and magistrates, and to inspire them with a proper respect for their measures and decrees: But now,—decided, discredited, and even turned into ridicule, by the new system,—stigmatized as arbitrary and unjust,—attributed to an illegal origin, and held up to the scorn of the crowd,—they have lost their *prestige*, and even their respectability, and are no longer capable of reducing a people which has thrown off the yoke, or of communicating to them an impulse sufficiently powerful to compel them to return within the bounds of duty. When once this is effected, they may be governed again by the old Code, or by any other that his Majesty may think fit to adopt for his dominions of Ultramar.

But, at present, I see no other remedy for countries actually a prey to rebellion, than the establishment of martial law, until such time as the extermination of the disaffected, and the reduction of the rest of the inhabitants to order and obedience, entitle them again to enjoy the general laws of the monarchy, and the protecting goodness of the most worthy of Monarchs.

But as the efficiency of this heroic remedy depends principally upon its being supported by a sufficient force, it is absolutely indispensable that from six to eight thousand soldiers should be immediately sent over, as they must be, at all events, in order to avoid the loss of these dominions.

It is true, that this number of troops is not sufficient to complete the work; but if, in addition to them, arms and clothing were transmitted for twelve or fifteen thousand infantry, and six or eight thousand cavalry, I would fill the ranks with men of the country, which would not be a difficult task, as soon as a few examples of severity have struck terror into the minds of the disaffected, and counteracted, or entirely destroyed the pernicious influence of the Corporations.

For this first step the force already indicated will be sufficient, particularly if it be placed under the orders of officers of merit and discernment, who know something more than merely how to manœuvre their troops, and who, by a seasonable combination of justice with severity, energy with prudence, will inspire at once respect, love, and confidence.

It will then be easy to establish respectable detachments at the principal points, and to employ flying divisions, in order to clear the roads, and to watch over the interests of the farmer, the miner, and the merchant. The villages will then be reduced to obedience; the thousands, who now live by plunder, will be forced again to seek, by their own labour, their daily bread. The muleteer would resume his former employment, which he has exchanged for that of Insurgent, perhaps from necessity, or despair:—the same will occur with the miners, whose case is similar: capitals will be again invested: the receipts of the Treasury will increase: want will disappear, blood will cease to flow: many of our present opponents will come over to our side: The well-disposed will be encouraged, and the hopes of those fanatics stifled and destroyed, who profess loyalty only to undermine the monarchy with greater security.

When I stated to your Excellency that no other mode than that which I have suggested, remained for putting an end to the rebellion, I did so because I have already tried every other method without effect. A constant Indulto has opened the way for a reconciliation with the Government ever since the first rising of Hidalgo. I have refused to act upon denunciations with a certain knowledge that my having done so was known to the persons implicated, in order to see whether generosity would move them. I have inclined the balance of justice to the side of mercy, in notorious cases of disaffection: I have endeavoured to convert the deluded by representing the evils which they would draw upon themselves by exhausting the patience of the Government: I have used menaces of positive rigour towards the most obstinate, which I have not always carried into effect, because I did not conceive that I had a force sufficient to bear me out in it; and I have employed reason and argument in order to destroy their errors. Nay, more: reflecting that since the Constitution was sworn, it was necessary to observe it, particularly since the natives had shown themselves so much attached to the cause, I made use of this Code in order to gain their good-will, and accommodated myself to the principles proclaimed by the Government which then ruled, and which, whether good or bad, it was necessary to support, in order to avoid positive anarchy.

But all my hopes were vain, since they only liked the Constitution because it was a useful tool. A proclamation which I published on assuming the reins of government, expressing the political principles which I had resolved to pursue, produced no sort of effect; nor was a second manifesto, circulated in June last, more fortunate. It is impossible.

therefore, to doubt the nature of the measures by which the rebellious spirit of the country must be quelled.

Notwithstanding the apprehensions which I have thought it my duty to express in the most unreserved manner, with regard to the state of this country, in order the better to enable his Majesty to take the requisite measures for its preservation, I have no hesitation in assuring your Excellency that, whatever changes may occur, Mexico shall not succeed in throwing off the yoke, and withdrawing her obedience to her lawful sovereign, while I am charged with her preservation, although it should be necessary for me, as a last resource, (which, however, I do not think probable,) to put myself at the head of the whole army, and to lay waste the country with fire and sword, until I had destroyed our infamous opponents, and planted in every corner the standard of the Monarch of Spain.

I have extended this letter much beyond what I intended, but my profound loyalty, and my wish to preserve to my August Sovereign this precious part of his dominions, have compelled me to present to his Majesty, through the medium of your Excellency, a detailed account of the state of New Spain. I have done no more than furnish, at present, a mere sketch of the dangers of its position; but considering that this will be sufficient to enable his Majesty to take the most necessary steps at once, I shall reserve for the next opportunity a detailed history of the rebellion, which shall be accompanied by all the documents necessary to confirm what I have stated here, and shall be compelled to state hereafter, respecting the fatal disposition of the natives. In the mean time, I entreat your Excellency to examine my correspondence with the ministers of War, and of Grace and Justice, in which you will find the same ideas and principles which I have expressed in this letter respecting the new system, and my sad forebodings as to the effects which must be produced by its observance in this country.

It now only remains for me to solicit your Excellency to lay at His Majesty's feet the expression of my unspeakable joy at the happy succession of His Majesty to the Throne, and Sovereign rights of his August Predecessors; my eternal adherence to His Majesty's Royal person and rights, and my determination to sacrifice my life, as a soldier and a subject, in their defence, following as Viceroy the conduct which I observed, in the face of the world, at the beginning of the civil disturbances in the year 1810, when I quitted the command of San Luis Potosi, in order to take the field, and snatching from the bosom of the Insurrection those very men who would have been its most formidable support, but have, in fact, done most towards extinguishing it, I immortalized the brave and loyal warriors of the North by dissipating on the fields of Aculco, Guajuato, and Calderon, the tempest, which the apostate Curate, Miguel Hidalgo, had raised against the throne of Spain, and proved that the first wish of my heart was the defence of our adored Ferdinand, and the

noble ambition of preserving for so worthy a monarch the rich possessions of which he is Lord in this vast continent. God preserve your Excellency, &c.

FELIX MARIA CALLEJA.

Mexico, 18th August, 1814.

PLAN OF IGUALA.

E.

ART. 1. The Mexican nation is independent of the Spanish nation, and of every other, even on its own Continent.

ART. 2. Its religion shall be the Catholic, which all its inhabitants profess.

ART. 3. They shall be all united, without any distinction between Americans and Europeans.

ART. 4. The government shall be a Constitutional Monarchy.

ART. 5. A junta shall be named, consisting of individuals who enjoy the highest reputation in the different parties which have shown themselves.

ART. 6. The junta shall be under the presidency of his Excellency the Conde del Venadito, the present Viceroy of Mexico.

ART. 7. It shall govern in the name of the Nation, according to the laws now in force, and its principal business will be to convoke, according to such rules as it shall deem expedient, a congress for the formation of a constitution more suitable to the country.

ART. 8. His Majesty Ferdinand VII. shall be invited to the throne of the empire, and in case of his refusal, the Infantes Don Carlos and Don Francisco de Paula.

ART. 9. Should his Majesty Ferdinand VII. and his august brothers decline the invitation, the nation is at liberty to invite to the imperial throne any member of reigning families whom it may select.

ART. 10. The formation of the constitution by the congress, and the oath of the Emperor to observe it, must precede his entry into the country.

ART. 11. The distinction of castes is abolished, which was made by the Spanish law, excluding them from the rights of citizenship. All the inhabitants of the country are citizens, and equal, and the door of advancement is open to virtue and merit.

ART. 12. An army shall be formed for the support of Religion, Independence, and Union, guaranteeing these three principles, and therefore it shall be called the army of the three Guarantees.

ART. 13. It shall solemnly swear to defend the fundamental bases of this plan.

ART. 14. It shall strictly observe the military ordinances now in force.

ART. 15. There shall be no other promotions than those which are due to seniority, or which shall be necessary for the good of the service.

ART. 16. This army shall be considered as of the line.

ART. 17. The old partisans of Independence who shall immediately adhere to this plan, shall be considered as individuals of this army.

ART. 18. The patriots and peasants who shall adhere to it hereafter, shall be considered as Provincial Militia-men.

ART. 19. The Secular and Regular priests shall be continued in the state in which they now are.

ART. 20. All the public functionaries, civil, ecclesiastical, political, and military, who adhere to the cause of Independence, shall be continued in their offices, without any distinction between Americans and Europeans.

ART. 21. Those functionaries, of whatever degree and condition, who dissent from the cause of Independence, shall be divested of their offices, and shall quit the territory of the empire, taking with them their families and their effects.

ART. 22. The military commandants shall regulate themselves according to the general instructions in conformity with this plan, which shall be transmitted to them.

ART. 23. No accused person shall be condemned capitally by the military commandants. Those accused of treason against the nation, which is the next greatest crime after that of treason to the Divine Ruler, shall be conveyed to the fortress of Barrabas, where they shall remain until the Congress shall resolve on the punishment which ought to be inflicted on them.

ART. 24. It being indispensable to the country that this plan should be carried into effect, in as much as the welfare of that country is its object, every individual of the army shall maintain it, to the shedding (if it be necessary) of the last drop of his blood.

*Town of Iguala,
24th February, 1821.*

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